From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3DEA4C3F2D2 for ; Thu, 5 Mar 2020 19:04:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2214420801 for ; Thu, 5 Mar 2020 19:04:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726368AbgCETEc (ORCPT ); Thu, 5 Mar 2020 14:04:32 -0500 Received: from mga14.intel.com ([192.55.52.115]:31615 "EHLO mga14.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725977AbgCETEb (ORCPT ); Thu, 5 Mar 2020 14:04:31 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga003.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.29]) by fmsmga103.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 05 Mar 2020 11:04:31 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,519,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="287749694" Received: from sjchrist-coffee.jf.intel.com (HELO linux.intel.com) ([10.54.74.202]) by FMSMGA003.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 05 Mar 2020 11:04:30 -0800 Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2020 11:04:30 -0800 From: Sean Christopherson To: Jethro Beekman Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, dave.hansen@intel.com, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, kai.svahn@intel.com, bp@alien8.de, josh@joshtriplett.org, luto@kernel.org, kai.huang@intel.com, rientjes@google.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Suresh Siddha , Haitao Huang , Chunyang Hui Subject: Re: [PATCH v28 11/22] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver Message-ID: <20200305190430.GL11500@linux.intel.com> References: <20200303233609.713348-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20200303233609.713348-12-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20200305174015.GJ11500@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 07:24:11PM +0100, Jethro Beekman wrote: > On 2020-03-05 18:40, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 04, 2020 at 01:35:58AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > >> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h > >> new file mode 100644 > >> index 000000000000..5edb08ab8fd0 > >> --- /dev/null > >> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h > >> @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ > >> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) WITH Linux-syscall-note */ > >> +/* > >> + * Copyright(c) 2016-19 Intel Corporation. > >> + */ > >> +#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H > >> +#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H > >> + > >> +#include > >> +#include > >> + > >> +/** > >> + * enum sgx_epage_flags - page control flags > >> + * %SGX_PAGE_MEASURE: Measure the page contents with a sequence of > >> + * ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations. > >> + */ > >> +enum sgx_page_flags { > >> + SGX_PAGE_MEASURE = 0x01, > >> +}; > >> + > >> +#define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4 > >> + > >> +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \ > >> + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create) > >> +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \ > >> + _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages) > >> +#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT \ > >> + _IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x02, struct sgx_enclave_init) > >> + > >> +/** > >> + * struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the > >> + * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl > >> + * @src: address for the SECS page data > >> + */ > >> +struct sgx_enclave_create { > >> + __u64 src; > > > > Would it make sense to add reserved fields to the structs so that new > > features can be added in a backwards compatible way? E.g. if we want to > > allow userspace to control the backing store by passing in a file > > descriptor ENCLAVE_CREATE. > > Reserving space for future fields is not necessary because the size of the > struct is encoded in the ioctl number. The kernel can use this to > differentiate between different call versions from userspace. Ah, perfect! Thanks!