From: KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: Remove unnecessary CAP_MAC_ADMIN check
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2020 21:49:55 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200305204955.31123-1-kpsingh@chromium.org> (raw)
From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
While well intentioned, checking CAP_MAC_ADMIN for attaching
BPF_MODIFY_RETURN tracing programs to "security_" functions is not
necessary as tracing BPF programs already require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Fixes: 6ba43b761c41 ("bpf: Attachment verification for BPF_MODIFY_RETURN")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 13 +++----------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index ae32517d4ccd..55d376c53f7d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -9808,20 +9808,13 @@ static int check_attach_modify_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long) prog->aux->trampoline->func.addr;
- if (within_error_injection_list(addr))
- return 0;
-
/* This is expected to be cleaned up in the future with the KRSI effort
* introducing the LSM_HOOK macro for cleaning up lsm_hooks.h.
*/
- if (!strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name,
- sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1)) {
-
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
-
+ if (within_error_injection_list(addr) ||
+ !strncmp(SECURITY_PREFIX, prog->aux->attach_func_name,
+ sizeof(SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1))
return 0;
- }
verbose(env, "fmod_ret attach_btf_id %u (%s) is not modifiable\n",
prog->aux->attach_btf_id, prog->aux->attach_func_name);
--
2.20.1
next reply other threads:[~2020-03-05 20:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-05 20:49 KP Singh [this message]
2020-03-05 22:38 ` [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: Remove unnecessary CAP_MAC_ADMIN check Alexei Starovoitov
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