linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <arnaldo.melo@gmail.com>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <arnaldo.melo@gmail.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2020 10:48:22 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200320134822.GA29833@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d521a22d-9fa7-1bca-fa60-f23b55953c91@linux.intel.com>

Em Fri, Mar 20, 2020 at 03:24:47PM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu:
> 
> On 19.03.2020 22:05, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:
> > Em Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 04:01:26PM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo escreveu:
> <SNIP>
> > 
> > So I'll try the steps below with/without your patch, and then... what
> > are the steps that a tester needs to go thru to have that refpolicy in?
> > Install some new SELinux package or library, spelling out in detail the
> > steps one needs to go thru helps reviewing/testing,
> 
> Yes, sure. Steps to extend FC31 Targeted policy for testing perf_events access control:

Thanks a lot! This is the level of detail I was talking about, good job!

- Arnaldo
 
> * download selinux-policy srpm [1]: selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm on my FC31
> 
> * install srpm - it creates rpmbuild dir: 
>   [root@host ~]# rpm -Uhv selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.src.rpm
> 
> * get into rpmbuild/SPECS dir and unpack sources:
>   [root@host ~]# rpmbuild -bp selinux-policy.spec
> 
> * Place patch below at rpmbuild/BUILD/selinux-policy-b86eaaf4dbcf2d51dd4432df7185c0eaf3cbcc02
>   dir and apply it:
>   [root@host ~]# patch -p1 < selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch
>   patching file policy/flask/access_vectors
>   patching file policy/flask/security_classes
>   [root@host ~]# cat selinux-policy-perf-events-perfmon.patch
> diff -Nura a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors
> --- a/policy/flask/access_vectors	2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300
> +++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors	2020-02-28 23:37:25.000000000 +0300
> @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@
>  	wake_alarm
>  	block_suspend
>  	audit_read
> +	perfmon
>  }
>  
>  #
> @@ -1099,3 +1100,15 @@
>  
>  class xdp_socket
>  inherits socket
> +
> +class perf_event
> +{
> +	open
> +	cpu
> +	kernel
> +	tracepoint
> +	read
> +	write
> +}
> +
> +
> diff -Nura a/policy/flask/security_classes b/policy/flask/security_classes
> --- a/policy/flask/security_classes	2020-02-04 18:19:53.000000000 +0300
> +++ b/policy/flask/security_classes	2020-02-28 21:35:17.000000000 +0300
> @@ -200,4 +200,6 @@
>  
>  class xdp_socket
>  
> +class perf_event
> +
>  # FLASK
> 
>   [root@host ~]#
> 
>  * get into rpmbuild/SPECS dir and build policy packages from patched sources: 
>    [root@host ~]# rpmbuild --noclean --noprep -ba selinux-policy.spec
>    so you have this:
>    [root@host ~]# ls -alh rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/
>    total 33M
>    drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 .
>    drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4.0K Mar 20 12:16 ..
>    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 112K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
>    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 1.2M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-devel-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
>    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 2.3M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-doc-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
>    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root  12M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-minimum-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
>    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 4.5M Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-mls-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
>    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root 111K Mar 20 12:16 selinux-policy-sandbox-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
>    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root  14M Mar 20 12:17 selinux-policy-targeted-3.14.4-48.fc31.noarch.rpm
> 
>  * install SELinux packages from FC repo [2], if not already done so, and 
>    update with the patched rpms above:
>    [root@host ~]# rpm -Uhv rpmbuild/RPMS/noarch/selinux-policy-*
> 
>  * there are also packages providing GUI interface and visualizing SELinux management
>    [root@host ~]# dnf install policycoreutils-gui
> 
>  * enable SELinux Permissive mode for Targeted policy, if not already done so:
>    [root@host ~]# cat /etc/selinux/config
>    # This file controls the state of SELinux on the system.
>    # SELINUX= can take one of these three values:
>    #     enforcing - SELinux security policy is enforced.
>    #     permissive - SELinux prints warnings instead of enforcing.
>    #     disabled - No SELinux policy is loaded.
>    SELINUX=permissive
>    # SELINUXTYPE= can take one of these three values:
>    #     targeted - Targeted processes are protected,
>    #     minimum - Modification of targeted policy. Only selected processes are protected. 
>    #     mls - Multi Level Security protection.
>    SELINUXTYPE=targeted
> 
>  * enable filesystem SELinux labeling at the next reboot
>    [root@host ~]# touch /.autorelabel
> 
>  * reboot machine and it will label filesystems and load Targeted policy into the kernel
> 
>  * login and check that dmesg output doesn't mention that perf_event class is unknown to SELinux subsystem
> 
>  * check that SELinux is enabled and in Permissive mode
>    [root@host ~]# getenforce
>    Permissive
> 
>  * turn SELinux into Enforcing mode:
>    [root@host ~]# setenforce 1
>    [root@host ~]# getenforce
>    Enforcing
> 
>  * Now the machine is enabled to test the patch
> 
> --- If something went wrong ---
> 
> * To turn SELinux into Permissive mode: setenforce 0
> * To fully disable SELinux during kernel boot [3] set kernel command line parameter: selinux=0
> * To remove SELinux labeling from local filesystems: find / -mount -print0 | xargs -0 setfattr -h -x security.selinux
> * To fully turn SELinux off a machine set SELINUX=disabled at /etc/selinux/config file and reboot
> 
> ~Alexey
> 
> [1] https://download-ib01.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/updates/31/Everything/SRPMS/Packages/s/selinux-policy-3.14.4-49.fc31.src.rpm
> [2] https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/Fedora/11/html/Security-Enhanced_Linux/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Working_with_SELinux-Enabling_and_Disabling_SELinux.html
> [3] https://danwalsh.livejournal.com/10972.html
> 

-- 

- Arnaldo

      reply	other threads:[~2020-03-20 13:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-13 17:27 [PATCH v1] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control Alexey Budankov
2020-03-19  6:23 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-03-19 19:01   ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-03-19 19:05     ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-03-20 12:24       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-03-20 13:48         ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20200320134822.GA29833@kernel.org \
    --to=arnaldo.melo@gmail.com \
    --cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=jolsa@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=namhyung@kernel.org \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).