From: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
To: timmurray@google.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
paul@paul-moore.com, nnk@google.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
lokeshgidra@google.com, jmorris@namei.org
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux
Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2020 14:39:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200401213903.182112-4-dancol@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200401213903.182112-1-dancol@google.com>
This change gives userfaultfd file descriptors a real security
context, allowing policy to act on them.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
---
fs/userfaultfd.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
index 37df7c9eedb1..78ff5d898733 100644
--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ struct userfaultfd_ctx {
bool mmap_changing;
/* mm with one ore more vmas attached to this userfaultfd_ctx */
struct mm_struct *mm;
+ /* The inode that owns this context --- not a strong reference. */
+ const struct inode *owner;
};
struct userfaultfd_fork_ctx {
@@ -1022,8 +1024,10 @@ static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx,
{
int fd;
- fd = anon_inode_getfd("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new,
- O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS));
+ fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure(
+ "[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new,
+ O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS),
+ ctx->owner);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
@@ -1945,6 +1949,7 @@ static void init_once_userfaultfd_ctx(void *mem)
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
{
+ struct file *file;
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx;
int fd;
@@ -1974,8 +1979,25 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
/* prevent the mm struct to be freed */
mmgrab(ctx->mm);
- fd = anon_inode_getfd("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx,
- O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS));
+ file = anon_inode_getfile_secure(
+ "[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx,
+ O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS),
+ NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+ fd = PTR_ERR(file);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ fd = get_unused_fd_flags(O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ fput(file);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctx->owner = file_inode(file);
+ fd_install(fd, file);
+
+out:
if (fd < 0) {
mmdrop(ctx->mm);
kmem_cache_free(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, ctx);
--
2.26.0.rc2.310.g2932bb562d-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-01 21:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-11 22:55 [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd Daniel Colascione
2020-02-11 22:55 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] Add a new flags-accepting interface for anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 16:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 17:23 ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-11 22:55 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] Add a concept of a "secure" anonymous file Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 16:49 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14 22:13 ` kbuild test robot
2020-02-11 22:55 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 17:05 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 17:19 ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 18:04 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 18:59 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 19:04 ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 19:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 19:13 ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 19:17 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-11 22:55 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-02-11 22:55 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] Let userfaultfd opt out of handling kernel-mode faults Daniel Colascione
2020-02-11 22:55 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] Add a new sysctl for limiting userfaultfd to user mode faults Daniel Colascione
2020-02-11 23:13 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd Casey Schaufler
2020-02-11 23:27 ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 16:09 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-21 17:56 ` James Morris
2020-02-12 7:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-02-12 16:54 ` Jann Horn
2020-02-12 17:14 ` Peter Xu
2020-02-12 19:41 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-02-12 20:04 ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-12 23:41 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2020-02-12 17:12 ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14 3:26 ` [PATCH 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14 3:26 ` [PATCH 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14 3:26 ` [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14 16:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14 17:21 ` Daniel Colascione
2020-02-14 18:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14 18:08 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14 20:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-14 3:26 ` [PATCH 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-03-25 23:02 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-03-25 23:02 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 13:53 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-25 23:02 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 13:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 17:59 ` Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 17:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-25 23:02 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-03-25 23:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-03-26 18:14 ` [PATCH v3 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 18:14 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 19:00 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 18:14 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 19:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 18:14 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 20:06 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-03-26 20:06 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-03-27 13:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 20:06 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-03-27 13:41 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-03-26 20:06 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Daniel Colascione
2020-04-01 21:39 ` [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-04-01 21:39 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface Daniel Colascione
2020-05-07 16:02 ` James Morris
2020-08-04 21:22 ` Eric Biggers
2020-04-01 21:39 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes Daniel Colascione
2020-04-01 21:39 ` Daniel Colascione [this message]
2020-08-04 21:16 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux Eric Biggers
2020-04-13 13:29 ` [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD Daniel Colascione
2020-04-22 16:55 ` James Morris
2020-04-22 17:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-23 22:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-27 16:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-27 16:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-04-27 17:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-29 17:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-04-27 17:15 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-04-27 19:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-06-04 3:56 ` James Morris
2020-06-04 18:51 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-06-04 19:24 ` Lokesh Gidra
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