Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/4] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and user_write_access_begin/end - Russell King

From: Russell King - ARM Linux admin <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	airlied@linux.ie, daniel@ffwll.ch, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/4] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and user_write_access_begin/end
Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2020 10:49:40 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200403094940.GA25745@shell.armlinux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200403005831.GI23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Fri, Apr 03, 2020 at 01:58:31AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 02, 2020 at 11:35:57AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> 
> > Yup, I think it's a weakness of the ARM implementation and I'd like to
> > not extend it further. AFAIK we should never nest, but I would not be
> > surprised at all if we did.
> > 
> > If we were looking at a design goal for all architectures, I'd like
> > to be doing what the public PaX patchset did for their memory access
> > switching, which is to alarm if calling into "enable" found the access
> > already enabled, etc. Such a condition would show an unexpected nesting
> > (like we've seen with similar constructs with set_fs() not getting reset
> > during an exception handler, etc etc).
> 
> FWIW, maybe I'm misreading the ARM uaccess logics, but... it smells like
> KERNEL_DS is somewhat more dangerous there than on e.g. x86.
> 
> Look: with CONFIG_CPU_DOMAINS, set_fs(KERNEL_DS) tells MMU to ignore
> per-page permission bits in DOMAIN_KERNEL (i.e. for kernel address
> ranges), allowing them even if they would normally be denied.  We need
> that for actual uaccess loads/stores, since those use insns that pretend
> to be done in user mode and we want them to access the kernel pages.
> But that affects the normal loads/stores as well; unless I'm misreading
> that code, it will ignore (supervisor) r/o on a page.  And that's not
> just for the code inside the uaccess blocks; *everything* done under
> KERNEL_DS is subject to that.
> 
> Why do we do that (modify_domain(), that is) inside set_fs() and not
> in uaccess_enable() et.al.?

First, CONFIG_CPU_DOMAINS is used on older ARMs, not ARMv7. Second,
the kernel image itself is not RO-protected on any ARM32 platform.

If we get rid of CONFIG_CPU_DOMAINS, we will use the ARMv7 method of
user access, which is to use normal load/stores for the user accessors
and every access must check against the address limit, even the
__-accessors.

-- 
RMK's Patch system: https://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
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