From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, "Kenneth R. Crudup" <kenny@panix.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>, Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] x86,module: Detect VMX modules and disable Split-Lock-Detect
Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2020 09:36:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200403163605.GC2701@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200402124205.242674296@linutronix.de>
On Thu, Apr 02, 2020 at 02:32:59PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/module.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> #include <asm/setup.h>
> #include <asm/unwind.h>
> +#include <asm/cpu.h>
>
> #if 0
> #define DEBUGP(fmt, ...) \
> @@ -253,6 +254,11 @@ int module_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
> tseg, tseg + text->sh_size);
> }
>
> + if (text && !me->sld_safe) {
As also reported by the test bot, sld_safe only exist if CPU_SUP_INTEL=y.
This can also be conditioned on boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX), or the
static variant. If CPU_SUP_INTEL=y, X86_FEATURE_VMX will be set if and
only if VMX is fully enabled, i.e. supported by the CPU and enabled in
MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROl.
> + void *tseg = (void *)text->sh_addr;
> + split_lock_validate_module_text(me, tseg, tseg + text->sh_size);
> + }
> +
> if (para) {
> void *pseg = (void *)para->sh_addr;
> apply_paravirt(pseg, pseg + para->sh_size);
> --- a/include/linux/module.h
> +++ b/include/linux/module.h
> @@ -407,6 +407,10 @@ struct module {
> bool sig_ok;
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
> + bool sld_safe;
> +#endif
> +
> bool async_probe_requested;
>
> /* symbols that will be GPL-only in the near future. */
> --- a/kernel/module.c
> +++ b/kernel/module.c
> @@ -3096,6 +3096,11 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *
> "is unknown, you have been warned.\n", mod->name);
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
> + if (get_modinfo(info, "sld_safe"))
> + mod->sld_safe = true;
> +#endif
> +
> err = check_modinfo_livepatch(mod, info);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-03 16:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-02 12:32 [patch 0/2] x86: Prevent Split-Lock-Detection wreckage on VMX hypervisors Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 12:32 ` [patch 1/2] x86,module: Detect VMX modules and disable Split-Lock-Detect Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 15:23 ` [patch v2 " Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 16:20 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-02 16:25 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 16:39 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 16:41 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-02 17:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 17:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 18:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 20:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 21:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 21:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 8:09 ` David Laight
2020-04-03 14:33 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 23:42 ` [patch " Rasmus Villemoes
2020-04-03 14:35 ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-03 15:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 16:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:16 ` David Laight
2020-04-03 16:39 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 16:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 16:48 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-03 17:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-03 18:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-03 20:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-04-03 21:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-03 11:29 ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-03 14:43 ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-03 16:36 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2020-04-03 16:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-03 18:35 ` Jessica Yu
2020-04-06 12:23 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-06 14:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-06 15:18 ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-04-06 15:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-06 18:27 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-02 12:33 ` [patch 2/2] x86/kvm/vmx: Prevent split lock detection induced #AC wreckage Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 15:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 15:44 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 16:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 16:56 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 15:55 ` [PATCH 0/3] x86: KVM: VMX: Add basic split-lock #AC handling Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 15:55 ` [PATCH 1/3] KVM: x86: Emulate split-lock access as a write in emulator Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 15:55 ` [PATCH 2/3] x86/split_lock: Refactor and export handle_user_split_lock() for KVM Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 17:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 17:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 19:06 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-10 4:39 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-04-10 10:21 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-02 15:55 ` [PATCH 3/3] KVM: VMX: Extend VMX's #AC interceptor to handle split lock #AC in guest Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 17:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 17:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 20:07 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 20:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-04-02 20:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 20:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-04-02 22:27 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 22:40 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 23:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 23:08 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-04-02 23:16 ` Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 23:18 ` Jim Mattson
2020-04-03 12:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-10 10:23 ` [PATCH 0/3] x86: KVM: VMX: Add basic split-lock #AC handling Paolo Bonzini
2020-04-10 11:14 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 13:43 ` [patch 0/2] x86: Prevent Split-Lock-Detection wreckage on VMX hypervisors Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 14:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 14:41 ` Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 14:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 14:53 ` Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 14:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-02 14:47 ` Nadav Amit
2020-04-02 15:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-04-02 14:53 [patch 1/2] x86,module: Detect VMX modules and disable Split-Lock-Detect Andy Lutomirski
2020-04-02 15:02 ` Kenneth R. Crudup
2020-04-02 16:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
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