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From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: [RFC][PATCH] x86/ftrace: Have ftrace trampolines turn read-only at the end of system boot up
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 20:21:47 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200430202147.4dc6e2de@oasis.local.home> (raw)

From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Booting one of my machines, it triggered the following crash:

 Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled
 ftrace: allocating 36577 entries in 143 pages
 Starting tracer 'function'
 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffa000005c
 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
 PGD 2014067 P4D 2014067 PUD 2015063 PMD 7b253067 PTE 7b252061
 Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.4.0-test+ #24
 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS SDBLI944.86P 05/08/2007
 RIP: 0010:text_poke_early+0x4a/0x58
 Code: 34 24 48 89 54 24 08 e8 bf 72 0b 00 48 8b 34 24 48 8b 4c 24 08 84 c0 74 0b 48 89 df f3 a4 48 83 c4 10 5b c3 9c 58 fa 48 89 df <f3> a4 50 9d 48 83 c4 10 5b e9 d6 f9 ff ff
0 41 57 49
 RSP: 0000:ffffffff82003d38 EFLAGS: 00010046
 RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: ffffffffa000005c RCX: 0000000000000005
 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff825b9a90 RDI: ffffffffa000005c
 RBP: ffffffffa000005c R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8206e6e0
 R10: ffff88807b01f4c0 R11: ffffffff8176c106 R12: ffffffff8206e6e0
 R13: ffffffff824f2440 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff8206eac0
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88807d400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: ffffffffa000005c CR3: 0000000002012000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
 Call Trace:
  text_poke_bp+0x27/0x64
  ? mutex_lock+0x36/0x5d
  arch_ftrace_update_trampoline+0x287/0x2d5
  ? ftrace_replace_code+0x14b/0x160
  ? ftrace_update_ftrace_func+0x65/0x6c
  __register_ftrace_function+0x6d/0x81
  ftrace_startup+0x23/0xc1
  register_ftrace_function+0x20/0x37
  func_set_flag+0x59/0x77
  __set_tracer_option.isra.19+0x20/0x3e
  trace_set_options+0xd6/0x13e
  apply_trace_boot_options+0x44/0x6d
  register_tracer+0x19e/0x1ac
  early_trace_init+0x21b/0x2c9
  start_kernel+0x241/0x518
  ? load_ucode_intel_bsp+0x21/0x52
  secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0

I was able to trigger it on other machines, when I added to the kernel
command line of both "ftrace=function" and "trace_options=func_stack_trace".

The cause is the "ftrace=function" would register the function tracer
and create a trampoline, and it will set it as executable and
read-only. Then the "trace_options=func_stack_trace" would then update
the same trampoline to include the stack tracer version of the function
tracer. But since the trampoline already exists, it updates it with
text_poke_bp(). The problem is that text_poke_bp() called while
system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING, it will simply do a memcpy() and not
the page mapping, as it would think that the text is still read-write.
But in this case it is not, and we take a fault and crash.

Instead, lets keep the ftrace trampolines read-write during boot up,
and then when the kernel executable text is set to read-only, the
ftrace trampolines get set to read-only as well.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 768ae4406a5c ("x86/ftrace: Use text_poke()")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/ftrace.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/ftrace.h
index dbd9b08bf173..e14f792b106c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/ftrace.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/ftrace.h
@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ struct dyn_arch_ftrace {
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
+extern void set_ftrace_ops_ro(void);
+#else
+static inline void set_ftrace_ops_ro(void) { }
+#endif
+
 #define ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_MATCH_SYM_NAME
 static inline bool arch_syscall_match_sym_name(const char *sym, const char *name)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 3d8adeba2651..dd30ba1e0244 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -419,7 +419,8 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
 
 	set_vm_flush_reset_perms(trampoline);
 
-	set_memory_ro((unsigned long)trampoline, npages);
+	if (likely(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING))
+		set_memory_ro((unsigned long)trampoline, npages);
 	set_memory_x((unsigned long)trampoline, npages);
 	return (unsigned long)trampoline;
 fail:
@@ -427,6 +428,32 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void set_ftrace_ops_ro(void)
+{
+	struct ftrace_ops *ops;
+	unsigned long start_offset;
+	unsigned long end_offset;
+	unsigned long npages;
+	unsigned long size;
+
+	do_for_each_ftrace_op(ops, ftrace_ops_list) {
+		if (!(ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_ALLOC_TRAMP))
+			continue;
+
+		if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS) {
+			start_offset = (unsigned long)ftrace_regs_caller;
+			end_offset = (unsigned long)ftrace_regs_caller_end;
+		} else {
+			start_offset = (unsigned long)ftrace_caller;
+			end_offset = (unsigned long)ftrace_epilogue;
+		}
+		size = end_offset - start_offset;
+		size = size + RET_SIZE + sizeof(void *);
+		npages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE);
+		set_memory_ro((unsigned long)ops->trampoline, npages);
+	} while_for_each_ftrace_op(ops);
+}
+
 static unsigned long calc_trampoline_call_offset(bool save_regs)
 {
 	unsigned long start_offset;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
index 930edeb41ec3..75d5d2e591ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include <asm/page_types.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
 #include <asm/init.h>
+#include <asm/ftrace.h>
 
 #include "mm_internal.h"
 
@@ -930,6 +931,8 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
 
 	kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
 
+	set_ftrace_ops_ro();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPA_DEBUG
 	pr_info("Testing CPA: Reverting %lx-%lx\n", start, start + size);
 	set_pages_rw(virt_to_page(start), size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index dcb9bc961b39..d36da393a947 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
 #include <asm/init.h>
 #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/ftrace.h>
 
 #include "mm_internal.h"
 
@@ -1326,6 +1327,8 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
 	all_end = roundup((unsigned long)_brk_end, PMD_SIZE);
 	set_memory_nx(text_end, (all_end - text_end) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 
+	set_ftrace_ops_ro();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPA_DEBUG
 	printk(KERN_INFO "Testing CPA: undo %lx-%lx\n", start, end);
 	set_memory_rw(start, (end-start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
diff --git a/include/linux/ftrace.h b/include/linux/ftrace.h
index 9141f2263286..f97626cbfbdf 100644
--- a/include/linux/ftrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ftrace.h
@@ -203,6 +203,29 @@ struct ftrace_ops {
 #endif
 };
 
+extern struct ftrace_ops __rcu *ftrace_ops_list;
+extern struct ftrace_ops ftrace_list_end;
+
+/*
+ * Traverse the ftrace_global_list, invoking all entries.  The reason that we
+ * can use rcu_dereference_raw_check() is that elements removed from this list
+ * are simply leaked, so there is no need to interact with a grace-period
+ * mechanism.  The rcu_dereference_raw_check() calls are needed to handle
+ * concurrent insertions into the ftrace_global_list.
+ *
+ * Silly Alpha and silly pointer-speculation compiler optimizations!
+ */
+#define do_for_each_ftrace_op(op, list)			\
+	op = rcu_dereference_raw_check(list);			\
+	do
+
+/*
+ * Optimized for just a single item in the list (as that is the normal case).
+ */
+#define while_for_each_ftrace_op(op)				\
+	while (likely(op = rcu_dereference_raw_check((op)->next)) &&	\
+	       unlikely((op) != &ftrace_list_end))
+
 /*
  * Type of the current tracing.
  */
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace_internal.h b/kernel/trace/ftrace_internal.h
index 0456e0a3dab1..382775edf690 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace_internal.h
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace_internal.h
@@ -4,28 +4,6 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
 
-/*
- * Traverse the ftrace_global_list, invoking all entries.  The reason that we
- * can use rcu_dereference_raw_check() is that elements removed from this list
- * are simply leaked, so there is no need to interact with a grace-period
- * mechanism.  The rcu_dereference_raw_check() calls are needed to handle
- * concurrent insertions into the ftrace_global_list.
- *
- * Silly Alpha and silly pointer-speculation compiler optimizations!
- */
-#define do_for_each_ftrace_op(op, list)			\
-	op = rcu_dereference_raw_check(list);			\
-	do
-
-/*
- * Optimized for just a single item in the list (as that is the normal case).
- */
-#define while_for_each_ftrace_op(op)				\
-	while (likely(op = rcu_dereference_raw_check((op)->next)) &&	\
-	       unlikely((op) != &ftrace_list_end))
-
-extern struct ftrace_ops __rcu *ftrace_ops_list;
-extern struct ftrace_ops ftrace_list_end;
 extern struct mutex ftrace_lock;
 extern struct ftrace_ops global_ops;
 

             reply	other threads:[~2020-05-01  0:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-01  0:21 Steven Rostedt [this message]
2020-05-01  4:47 ` [RFC][PATCH] x86/ftrace: Have ftrace trampolines turn read-only at the end of system boot up Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-01  5:17   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-01 13:24     ` Steven Rostedt
2020-05-01 15:13       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-05-01 16:19         ` Steven Rostedt
2020-05-01 17:29           ` Peter Zijlstra

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