Re: [PATCH] sysctl: Make sure proc handlers can't expose heap memory

From: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sysctl: Make sure proc handlers can't expose heap memory
Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 22:03:27 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200505220327.GV11244@42.do-not-panic.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202005051339.5F1979C4DF@keescook>

On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 01:41:44PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 08:34:41AM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 09:59:03PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > > On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 01:32:07PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 07:59:37PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> > > > > On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 12:08:55PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > > > Just as a precaution, make sure that proc handlers don't accidentally
> > > > > > grow "count" beyond the allocated kbuf size.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > > This applies to hch's sysctl cleanup tree...
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > >  fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c | 3 +++
> > > > > >  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> > > > > > index 15030784566c..535ab26473af 100644
> > > > > > --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> > > > > > +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> > > > > > @@ -546,6 +546,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct file *filp, void __user *ubuf,
> > > > > >  	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
> > > > > >  	struct ctl_table_header *head = grab_header(inode);
> > > > > >  	struct ctl_table *table = PROC_I(inode)->sysctl_entry;
> > > > > > +	size_t count_max = count;
> > > > > >  	void *kbuf;
> > > > > >  	ssize_t error;
> > > > > >  
> > > > > > @@ -590,6 +591,8 @@ static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct file *filp, void __user *ubuf,
> > > > > >  
> > > > > >  	if (!write) {
> > > > > >  		error = -EFAULT;
> > > > > > +		if (WARN_ON(count > count_max))
> > > > > > +			count = count_max;
> > > > > 
> > > > > That would crash a system with panic-on-warn. I don't think we want that?
> > > > 
> > > > Eh? None of the handlers should be making this mistake currently and
> > > > it's not a mistake that can be controlled from userspace. WARN() is
> > > > absolutely what's wanted here: report an impossible situation (and
> > > > handle it gracefully for the bulk of users that don't have
> > > > panic_on_warn set).
> > > 
> > > Alrighty, Greg are you OK with this type of WARN_ON()? You recently
> > > expressed concerns over its use due to panic-on-warn on another patch.
> > 
> > We should never call WARN() on any path that a user can trigger.
> > 
> > If it is just a "the developer called this api in a foolish way" then we
> > could use a WARN_ON() to have them realize their mistake, but in my
> > personal experience, foolish developers don't even notice that kind of
> > mistake :(
> 
> Right -- while it'd be nice if the developer noticed it, it is _usually_
> an unsuspecting end user (or fuzzer), in which case we absolutely want a
> WARN (and not a BUG![1]) and have the situations handled gracefully, so
> it can be reported and fixed.

I've been using WARN*() for this exact purpose before, so I am as
surprised as you are bout these concerns. However if we have folks
shipping with panic-on-warn this would be rather detrimental to our
goals.

Greg, are you aware of folks shipping with panic-on-warn on some products?

  Luis