From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,UNPARSEABLE_RELAY, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 07ED1C47247 for ; Tue, 5 May 2020 22:50:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D0A40206B8 for ; Tue, 5 May 2020 22:50:46 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=oracle.com header.i=@oracle.com header.b="uNstaW1h" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729423AbgEEWuq (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 May 2020 18:50:46 -0400 Received: from aserp2120.oracle.com ([141.146.126.78]:40068 "EHLO aserp2120.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726568AbgEEWup (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 May 2020 18:50:45 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (aserp2120.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by aserp2120.oracle.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 045MnEwN097921; Tue, 5 May 2020 22:50:17 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=oracle.com; h=date : from : to : cc : subject : message-id : references : mime-version : content-type : content-transfer-encoding : in-reply-to; s=corp-2020-01-29; bh=S6WxU5dSqS5Vf2BGX4o5lxPf66YtA9m2G3u26r24NCA=; b=uNstaW1h39mejeH8FZNXbVAHRuJ1LwHHCHhpJ3XIPvuvzqfi2vdnZrg0dsMRnQ7ltWRW gXF9gbuedc3d6kEMzoYDFW2S0wmIlkBpzjBSVx2Dqz96nWh4Mq3trDjOuhw+a+So7jTJ 052t1KA9dKLPKydmLAOqIuK/Se76+rPPrFeWAKmcdg02H5oE07vUt6+MKERlawhjy2Ju WjMpiY5tqwIA2LFFD2hqGdTCH848DHMi5dkDnRgoZ1h72pNrXunIDm03RMARpTctnsER EB6VDu2DWadktTcJUeaouaWsPWeRmndl0OlbQ67TNTxxcnCd4clDkn6qbqUfEJe5owqY iA== Received: from userp3020.oracle.com (userp3020.oracle.com [156.151.31.79]) by aserp2120.oracle.com with ESMTP id 30s0tmfeg8-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 05 May 2020 22:50:17 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (userp3020.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by userp3020.oracle.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 045MkZXL051613; Tue, 5 May 2020 22:48:16 GMT Received: from userv0121.oracle.com (userv0121.oracle.com [156.151.31.72]) by userp3020.oracle.com with ESMTP id 30sjk0qx5n-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 05 May 2020 22:48:16 +0000 Received: from abhmp0001.oracle.com (abhmp0001.oracle.com [141.146.116.7]) by userv0121.oracle.com (8.14.4/8.13.8) with ESMTP id 045MmBnT032639; Tue, 5 May 2020 22:48:11 GMT Received: from vbusired-dt (/10.154.183.230) by default (Oracle Beehive Gateway v4.0) with ESMTP ; Tue, 05 May 2020 15:48:10 -0700 Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 17:48:11 -0500 From: Venu Busireddy To: Ashish Kalra Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, joro@8bytes.org, bp@suse.de, Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, srutherford@google.com, rientjes@google.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 02/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Message-ID: <20200505224811.GA1721674@vbusired-dt> References: <1f43054f423c956e5fdf9c0fbad0c18be4ea3935.1588711355.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <1f43054f423c956e5fdf9c0fbad0c18be4ea3935.1588711355.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=6000 definitions=9612 signatures=668687 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 suspectscore=5 mlxscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 malwarescore=0 spamscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2003020000 definitions=main-2005050171 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=6000 definitions=9612 signatures=668687 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 malwarescore=0 mlxscore=0 priorityscore=1501 lowpriorityscore=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=5 phishscore=0 clxscore=1015 bulkscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 impostorscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2003020000 definitions=main-2005050171 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 2020-05-05 21:14:54 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh > > The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the encryption > context created with KVM_SEV_SEND_START. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner > Cc: Ingo Molnar > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" > Cc: Paolo Bonzini > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" > Cc: Joerg Roedel > Cc: Borislav Petkov > Cc: Tom Lendacky > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Reviewed-by : Steve Rutherford > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy > --- > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 24 ++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 135 +++++++++++++++++- > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 ++ > 3 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index 59cb59bd4675..d0dfa5b54e4f 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -290,6 +290,30 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > __u32 session_len; > }; > > +11. KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA > +---------------------------- > + > +The KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to encrypt the > +outgoing guest memory region with the encryption context creating using > +KVM_SEV_SEND_START. > + > +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_update_data > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > +:: > + > + struct kvm_sev_launch_send_update_data { > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */ > + __u32 hdr_len; > + > + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the source memory region to be encrypted */ > + __u32 guest_len; > + > + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the destition memory region */ > + __u32 trans_len; > + }; > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index 5a15b43b4349..7031b660f64d 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock); > static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock); > unsigned int max_sev_asid; > static unsigned int min_sev_asid; > +static unsigned long sev_me_mask; > static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap; > static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap; > #define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT) > @@ -1035,6 +1036,123 @@ static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +/* Userspace wants to query either header or trans length. */ > +static int > +__sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, > + struct kvm_sev_send_update_data *params) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_send_update_data *data; > + int ret; > + > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > + if (!data) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + data->handle = sev->handle; > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error); > + > + params->hdr_len = data->hdr_len; > + params->trans_len = data->trans_len; > + > + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params, > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data))) > + ret = -EFAULT; > + > + kfree(data); > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_send_update_data *data; > + struct kvm_sev_send_update_data params; > + void *hdr, *trans_data; > + struct page **guest_page; > + unsigned long n; > + int ret, offset; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -ENOTTY; > + > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* userspace wants to query either header or trans length */ > + if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len) > + return __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(kvm, argp, ¶ms); > + > + if (!params.trans_uaddr || !params.guest_uaddr || > + !params.guest_len || !params.hdr_uaddr) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */ > + offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); > + if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Pin guest memory */ > + guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK, > + PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0); > + if (!guest_page) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* allocate memory for header and transport buffer */ > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + hdr = kmalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > + if (!hdr) > + goto e_unpin; > + > + trans_data = kmalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); > + if (!trans_data) > + goto e_free_hdr; > + > + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!data) > + goto e_free_trans_data; > + > + data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr); > + data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len; > + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans_data); > + data->trans_len = params.trans_len; > + > + /* The SEND_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */ > + data->guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + > + offset; > + data->guest_address |= sev_me_mask; > + data->guest_len = params.guest_len; > + data->handle = sev->handle; > + > + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error); > + > + if (ret) > + goto e_free; > + > + /* copy transport buffer to user space */ > + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.trans_uaddr, > + trans_data, params.trans_len)) { > + ret = -EFAULT; > + goto e_free; > + } > + > + /* Copy packet header to userspace. */ > + ret = copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.hdr_uaddr, hdr, > + params.hdr_len); > + > +e_free: > + kfree(data); > +e_free_trans_data: > + kfree(trans_data); > +e_free_hdr: > + kfree(hdr); > +e_unpin: > + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -1082,6 +1200,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_SEND_START: > r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: > + r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; > @@ -1238,16 +1359,22 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) > int __init sev_hardware_setup(void) > { > struct sev_user_data_status *status; > + u32 eax, ebx; > int rc; > > - /* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */ > - max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F); > + /* > + * Query the memory encryption information. > + * EBX: Bit 0:5 Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption > + * (aka Cbit). > + * ECX: Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously. > + * EDX: Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest. > + */ > + cpuid(0x8000001f, &eax, &ebx, &max_sev_asid, &min_sev_asid); > > if (!svm_sev_enabled()) > return 1; > > - /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */ > - min_sev_asid = cpuid_edx(0x8000001F); > + sev_me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f); > > /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmaps */ > sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(max_sev_asid, GFP_KERNEL); > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index 8827d43e2684..7aaed8ee33cf 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -1610,6 +1610,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_send_start { > __u32 session_len; > }; > > +struct kvm_sev_send_update_data { > + __u64 hdr_uaddr; > + __u32 hdr_len; > + __u64 guest_uaddr; > + __u32 guest_len; > + __u64 trans_uaddr; > + __u32 trans_len; > +}; > + > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) > -- > 2.17.1 >