From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D133C47254 for ; Tue, 5 May 2020 22:55:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E83B206B8 for ; Tue, 5 May 2020 22:55:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=oracle.com header.i=@oracle.com header.b="HDE5035Y" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729412AbgEEWzS (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 May 2020 18:55:18 -0400 Received: from userp2130.oracle.com ([156.151.31.86]:41684 "EHLO userp2130.oracle.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727989AbgEEWzS (ORCPT ); Tue, 5 May 2020 18:55:18 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (userp2130.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by userp2130.oracle.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 045MlwlA142083; Tue, 5 May 2020 22:54:56 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=oracle.com; h=date : from : to : cc : subject : message-id : references : mime-version : content-type : content-transfer-encoding : in-reply-to; s=corp-2020-01-29; bh=3DnnHFYUXigKZxsq+0pIPNnX7HcTxYgu9fs6oxrXSGY=; b=HDE5035Ykm3hj2ylBXNnyIGEdNm5kSVEVPjWhaeO/sJGqHaQoaGVU3UuA7ZZzPsZOzX1 u9QBbiY6YqxfQOuE2u/RLvzcrwu2t85K9QNqDi0Z5TwDoAi4P8cPcyWVW0fOfxKsujRh /NpDEUPxMizbJj8f0xLml5d8LLs5stwx282Ze9nM49VK5vxlxAJuWCpkbiTHWQapyV4t Ga+NLhNUCMoppdrDX3op/86HYHWKnIJW2MvVXKAZdoOVEan3gfXsp3oztmr6HY1nd0XV W8XV/DXFpn7qmGTKo6T7D464Qq9SGvZfEnILHIri1j6UbIObujkSmx5uujUnWDINTk4V CA== Received: from userp3030.oracle.com (userp3030.oracle.com [156.151.31.80]) by userp2130.oracle.com with ESMTP id 30s09r7fbx-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 05 May 2020 22:54:56 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (userp3030.oracle.com [127.0.0.1]) by userp3030.oracle.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 045Mlik5098289; Tue, 5 May 2020 22:52:56 GMT Received: from userv0122.oracle.com (userv0122.oracle.com [156.151.31.75]) by userp3030.oracle.com with ESMTP id 30t1r65yu6-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 05 May 2020 22:52:56 +0000 Received: from abhmp0018.oracle.com (abhmp0018.oracle.com [141.146.116.24]) by userv0122.oracle.com (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id 045MqsEI010496; Tue, 5 May 2020 22:52:54 GMT Received: from vbusired-dt (/10.154.183.230) by default (Oracle Beehive Gateway v4.0) with ESMTP ; Tue, 05 May 2020 15:52:54 -0700 Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 17:52:55 -0500 From: Venu Busireddy To: Ashish Kalra Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, joro@8bytes.org, bp@suse.de, Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, srutherford@google.com, rientjes@google.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 04/18] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Message-ID: <20200505225255.GC1721674@vbusired-dt> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=6000 definitions=9612 signatures=668687 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 suspectscore=5 spamscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 mlxscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2003020000 definitions=main-2005050171 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=nai engine=6000 definitions=9612 signatures=668687 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 bulkscore=0 mlxscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 spamscore=0 adultscore=0 clxscore=1015 suspectscore=5 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 mlxlogscore=999 phishscore=0 impostorscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2003020000 definitions=main-2005050171 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 2020-05-05 21:15:40 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote: > From: Brijesh Singh > > The command is used to create the encryption context for an incoming > SEV guest. The encryption context can be later used by the hypervisor > to import the incoming data into the SEV guest memory space. > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner > Cc: Ingo Molnar > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" > Cc: Paolo Bonzini > Cc: "Radim Krčmář" > Cc: Joerg Roedel > Cc: Borislav Petkov > Cc: Tom Lendacky > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy > --- > .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 29 +++++++ > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 81 +++++++++++++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 +++ > 3 files changed, 119 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > index 93884ec8918e..337bf6a8a3ee 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst > @@ -322,6 +322,35 @@ issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context. > > Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > > +13. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START > +------------------------ > + > +The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command is used for creating the memory encryption > +context for an incoming SEV guest. To create the encryption context, the user must > +provide a guest policy, the platform public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session > +information. > + > +Parameters: struct kvm_sev_receive_start (in/out) > + > +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error > + > +:: > + > + struct kvm_sev_receive_start { > + __u32 handle; /* if zero then firmware creates a new handle */ > + __u32 policy; /* guest's policy */ > + > + __u64 pdh_uaddr; /* userspace address pointing to the PDH key */ > + __u32 pdh_len; > + > + __u64 session_uaddr; /* userspace address which points to the guest session information */ > + __u32 session_len; > + }; > + > +On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative value. > + > +For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12. > + > References > ========== > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > index 4d3031c9fdcf..b575aa8e27af 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c > @@ -1173,6 +1173,84 @@ static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > return ret; > } > > +static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) > +{ > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; > + struct sev_data_receive_start *start; > + struct kvm_sev_receive_start params; > + int *error = &argp->error; > + void *session_data; > + void *pdh_data; > + int ret; > + > + if (!sev_guest(kvm)) > + return -ENOTTY; > + > + /* Get parameter from the userspace */ > + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, > + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) > + return -EFAULT; > + > + /* some sanity checks */ > + if (!params.pdh_uaddr || !params.pdh_len || > + !params.session_uaddr || !params.session_len) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + pdh_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_uaddr, params.pdh_len); > + if (IS_ERR(pdh_data)) > + return PTR_ERR(pdh_data); > + > + session_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, > + params.session_len); > + if (IS_ERR(session_data)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(session_data); > + goto e_free_pdh; > + } > + > + ret = -ENOMEM; > + start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!start) > + goto e_free_session; > + > + start->handle = params.handle; > + start->policy = params.policy; > + start->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_data); > + start->pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_len; > + start->session_address = __psp_pa(session_data); > + start->session_len = params.session_len; > + > + /* create memory encryption context */ > + ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START, start, > + error); > + if (ret) > + goto e_free; > + > + /* Bind ASID to this guest */ > + ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error); > + if (ret) > + goto e_free; > + > + params.handle = start->handle; > + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, > + ¶ms, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) { > + ret = -EFAULT; > + sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start->handle); > + goto e_free; > + } > + > + sev->handle = start->handle; > + sev->fd = argp->sev_fd; > + > +e_free: > + kfree(start); > +e_free_session: > + kfree(session_data); > +e_free_pdh: > + kfree(pdh_data); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > { > struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; > @@ -1226,6 +1304,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) > case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH: > r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd); > break; > + case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START: > + r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd); > + break; > default: > r = -EINVAL; > goto out; > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > index 7aaed8ee33cf..24ac57151d53 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h > @@ -1619,6 +1619,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_send_update_data { > __u32 trans_len; > }; > > +struct kvm_sev_receive_start { > + __u32 handle; > + __u32 policy; > + __u64 pdh_uaddr; > + __u32 pdh_len; > + __u64 session_uaddr; > + __u32 session_len; > +}; > + > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1) > #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2) > -- > 2.17.1 >