From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/mm: Don't try to change poison pages to uncacheable in a guest
Date: Sat, 16 May 2020 08:54:31 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200516065431.GB25771@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200505184648.2264-1-tony.luck@intel.com>
On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 11:46:48AM -0700, Tony Luck wrote:
> An interesting thing happened when a guest Linux instance took
> a machine check. The VMM unmapped the bad page from guest physical
> space and passed the machine check to the guest.
>
> Linux took all the normal actions to offline the page from the process
> that was using it. But then guest Linux crashed because it said there
> was a second machine check inside the kernel with this stack trace:
>
> do_memory_failure
> set_mce_nospec
> set_memory_uc
> _set_memory_uc
> change_page_attr_set_clr
> cpa_flush
> clflush_cache_range_opt
Maybe I don't see it but how can clflush_cache_range_opt() call
cpa_flush() ?
> This was odd, because a CLFLUSH instruction shouldn't raise a machine
> check (it isn't consuming the data). Further investigation showed that
> the VMM had passed in another machine check because is appeared that the
> guest was accessing the bad page.
This is where you lost me - if the VMM unmaps the page during the first
MCE, how can the guest even attempt to touch it and do this stack trace
above?
/me is confused.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-16 6:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-05 18:46 [PATCH] x86/mm: Don't try to change poison pages to uncacheable in a guest Tony Luck
2020-05-16 6:54 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2020-05-16 14:47 ` Luck, Tony
2020-05-16 15:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-05-17 1:52 ` Luck, Tony
[not found] ` <CAPcxDJ50pbuTbittyvPwKq1uUT8q8jJ+dHH8rCug8a1DDZXVYw@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <CAPcxDJ6f3pBpwiR9nvXN_g_HBa1RAMG+aOmgfXLFT6aZ9HQn3w@mail.gmail.com>
2020-05-18 13:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-05-18 15:36 ` Luck, Tony
2020-05-18 16:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-05-18 18:26 ` Luck, Tony
2020-05-18 19:20 ` Dan Williams
2020-05-19 5:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-05-19 8:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-05-20 16:35 ` [PATCH v2] x86/mm: Change so poison pages are either unmapped or marked uncacheable Luck, Tony
2020-05-25 11:00 ` [tip: ras/core] x86/{mce,mm}: " tip-bot2 for Tony Luck
2020-05-25 20:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-05-26 17:37 ` Luck, Tony
[not found] ` <CAPcxDJ5arJojbY4pzOvYh=waSPd3X_JJb1_PSuzd+jQ0qbvFsA@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <CAPcxDJ54EgX-SaDV=Lm+a2-43O68LhomyYfYdCDz38HGJCkh7g@mail.gmail.com>
2020-05-26 19:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-05-26 19:56 ` [tip: ras/core] x86/{mce,mm}: Unmap the entire page if the whole page is affected and poisoned tip-bot2 for Tony Luck
2020-05-19 5:04 ` [PATCH] x86/mm: Don't try to change poison pages to uncacheable in a guest Sean Christopherson
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