From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC4C5C433DF for ; Mon, 18 May 2020 18:07:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AF6CE207D3 for ; Mon, 18 May 2020 18:07:30 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589825250; bh=tAt1cr0a+MsZFss6QR0805je8mZPTx//0IaCX7J2qMI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=KcRl0kX9m7emssjP6hgmhhVrwklEk2279D1Q5NNSzJ7XOK4DuUtDnhkYQYBmSW9s8 bzmpOvuFOrD+mouFZOkjJoxmCMrWRGUPq195ftuE2m6ctdKzcrJ8V9936MxziD3V1k 8Ch3ALj036tLC0bXjMDN1SuIeqfUk719b81ORZ68= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729876AbgERSH3 (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 May 2020 14:07:29 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:56114 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732304AbgERSHX (ORCPT ); Mon, 18 May 2020 14:07:23 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D7FD820715; Mon, 18 May 2020 18:07:21 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1589825242; bh=tAt1cr0a+MsZFss6QR0805je8mZPTx//0IaCX7J2qMI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=I1ygG2a0GIdJX1Jarrppf4HQ1ctvNW1NS9R0GaBv3l/Bkc1IEAd2BPAymQhCDShsy V8hqUg/7x2C+NONW1Lkji2lr+Ex6yIwLrQnDvxsUD9lUzg0a5gLCfrQx+9EIQZHl3M 6oiVQCmNWnU2Z1FSQFGEkq8RjZlKtRl156jCB/1A= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Nayna Jain , Michael Ellerman , Mimi Zohar Subject: [PATCH 5.6 186/194] powerpc/ima: Fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy Date: Mon, 18 May 2020 19:37:56 +0200 Message-Id: <20200518173546.947786203@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200518173531.455604187@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200518173531.455604187@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Nayna Jain commit fa4f3f56ccd28ac031ab275e673ed4098855fed4 upstream. To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature twice (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA, powerpc secure boot rules define an IMA architecture specific policy rule only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not enabled. This, unfortunately, does not take into account the ability of enabling "sig_enforce" on the boot command line (module.sig_enforce=1). Including the IMA module appraise rule results in failing the finit_module syscall, unless the module signing public key is loaded onto the IMA keyring. This patch fixes secure boot policy rules to be based on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG instead. Fixes: 4238fad366a6 ("powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules") Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1588342612-14532-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) * to be stored as an xattr or as an appended signature. * * To avoid duplicate signature verification as much as possible, the IMA - * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE + * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG * is not enabled. */ static const char *const secure_rules[] = { "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", -#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", #endif NULL @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static const char *const secure_and_trus "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig", "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig", "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", -#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist appraise_type=imasig|modsig", #endif NULL