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From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 3/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on per_cpu cpu_tss_rw
Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 14:51:00 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200525145102.122557-4-laijs@linux.alibaba.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200525145102.122557-1-laijs@linux.alibaba.com>

cpu_tss_rw is not directly referenced by hardware, but
cpu_tss_rw is also used in CPU entry code, especially
when #DB shifts its stacks. If a data breakpoint is on
the cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DB], it will cause
recursive #DB (and then #DF soon for #DB is generated
after the access, IST-shifting, is done).

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
index f859095c1b6c..7d3966b9aa12 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
@@ -255,6 +255,19 @@ static inline bool within_cpu_entry(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
 		if (within_area(addr, end, (unsigned long)get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu),
 				GDT_SIZE))
 			return true;
+
+		/*
+		 * cpu_tss_rw is not directly referenced by hardware, but
+		 * cpu_tss_rw is also used in CPU entry code, especially
+		 * when #DB shifts its stacks. If a data breakpoint is on
+		 * the cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DB], it will cause
+		 * recursive #DB (and then #DF soon for #DB is generated
+		 * after the access, IST-shifting, is done).
+		 */
+		if (within_area(addr, end,
+				(unsigned long)&per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu),
+				sizeof(struct tss_struct)))
+			return true;
 	}
 
 	return false;
-- 
2.20.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-25 14:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-25 14:50 [RFC PATCH 0/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: protects more cpu entry data Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-25 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH 1/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: add within_area() to check data breakpoints Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-25 14:50 ` [RFC PATCH 2/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on direct GDT Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-25 14:51 ` Lai Jiangshan [this message]
2020-05-25 14:51 ` [RFC PATCH 4/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on user_pcid_flush_mask Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-25 14:51 ` [RFC PATCH 5/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on debug_idt_table Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-25 15:25 ` [RFC PATCH 0/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: protects more cpu entry data Peter Zijlstra
2020-05-26  1:42   ` [RFC PATCH V2 0/7] x86/DB: protects more cpu entry data and Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26  1:42     ` [RFC PATCH V2 1/7] x86/hw_breakpoint: add within_area() to check data breakpoints Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-30  9:57       ` [tip: x86/entry] x86/hw_breakpoint: Add " tip-bot2 for Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26  1:42     ` [RFC PATCH V2 2/7] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on direct GDT Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-30  9:57       ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26  1:42     ` [RFC PATCH V2 3/7] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on per_cpu cpu_tss_rw Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-30  9:57       ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26  1:42     ` [RFC PATCH V2 4/7] x86/hw_breakpoint: Prevent data breakpoints on user_pcid_flush_mask Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26  4:17       ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-26  4:31         ` Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26  4:38           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-26  5:48             ` Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-30  9:57       ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26  1:42     ` [RFC PATCH V2 5/7] x86/entry: don't shift stack on #DB Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26  9:10       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-05-26  1:42     ` [RFC PATCH V2 6/7] x86/entry: is_debug_stack() don't check of DB1 stack Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26  1:42     ` [RFC PATCH V2 7/7] x86/entry: remove DB1 stack and DB2 hole from cpu entry area Lai Jiangshan
2020-05-26  1:48   ` [RFC PATCH 0/5] x86/hw_breakpoint: protects more cpu entry data Lai Jiangshan

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