From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, luto@kernel.org, ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: corbet@lwn.net, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org,
shuah@kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
tony.luck@intel.com, chang.seok.bae@intel.com,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, peterz@infradead.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com,
Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v13 02/16] x86/cpu: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 16:13:48 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200528201402.1708239-3-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200528201402.1708239-1-sashal@kernel.org>
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
This is temporary. It will allow the next few patches to be tested
incrementally.
Setting unsafe_fsgsbase is a root hole. Don't do it.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1557309753-24073-4-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 7bc83f3d9bdf..af3aaade195b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3033,6 +3033,9 @@
no5lvl [X86-64] Disable 5-level paging mode. Forces
kernel to use 4-level paging instead.
+ unsafe_fsgsbase [X86] Allow FSGSBASE instructions. This will be
+ replaced with a nofsgsbase flag.
+
no_console_suspend
[HW] Never suspend the console
Disable suspending of consoles during suspend and
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index bed0cb83fe24..4224760c74e2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -418,6 +418,22 @@ static void __init setup_cr_pinning(void)
static_key_enable(&cr_pinning.key);
}
+/*
+ * Temporary hack: FSGSBASE is unsafe until a few kernel code paths are
+ * updated. This allows us to get the kernel ready incrementally.
+ *
+ * Once all the pieces are in place, these will go away and be replaced with
+ * a nofsgsbase chicken flag.
+ */
+static bool unsafe_fsgsbase;
+
+static __init int setup_unsafe_fsgsbase(char *arg)
+{
+ unsafe_fsgsbase = true;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("unsafe_fsgsbase", setup_unsafe_fsgsbase);
+
/*
* Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
*/
@@ -1478,6 +1494,14 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_smap(c);
setup_umip(c);
+ /* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
+ if (unsafe_fsgsbase)
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
+ else
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
+ }
+
/*
* The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
* Now we do "generic changes."
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-28 20:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-28 20:13 [PATCH v13 00/16] Enable FSGSBASE instructions Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 01/16] x86/ptrace: Prevent ptrace from clearing the FS/GS selector Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 03/16] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics for FSGSBASE instructions Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 04/16] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in helper functions Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 05/16] x86/process/64: Use FSBSBASE in switch_to() if available Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 06/16] x86/process/64: Make save_fsgs() public available Sasha Levin
2020-06-18 13:50 ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] x86/process/64: Make save_fsgs_for_kvm() ready for FSGSBASE tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 07/16] x86/process/64: Use FSGSBASE instructions on thread copy and ptrace Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 08/16] x86/speculation/swapgs: Check FSGSBASE in enabling SWAPGS mitigation Sasha Levin
2020-06-18 13:50 ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Tony Luck
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 09/16] x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 10/16] x86/entry/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 11/16] x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 12/16] x86/cpu: Enable FSGSBASE on 64bit by default and add a chicken bit Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 13/16] x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2 Sasha Levin
2020-10-26 17:18 ` [PATCH] x86/elf: Fix use of internal macro BIT in uapi header Thiago Macieira
2020-05-28 20:14 ` [PATCH v13 14/16] Documentation/x86/64: Add documentation for GS/FS addressing mode Sasha Levin
2020-06-18 13:50 ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-28 20:14 ` [PATCH v13 15/16] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test GS selector on ptracer-induced GS base write Sasha Levin
2020-05-29 14:40 ` Shuah Khan
2020-06-18 13:50 ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Chang S. Bae
2020-05-28 20:14 ` [PATCH v13 16/16] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test ptracer-induced GS base write with FSGSBASE Sasha Levin
2020-05-29 14:42 ` Shuah Khan
2020-06-18 13:50 ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Chang S. Bae
2020-06-18 14:18 ` [PATCH v13 00/16] Enable FSGSBASE instructions Thomas Gleixner
2020-06-18 18:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-18 18:25 ` Thomas Gleixner
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