[PATCH 4.19 00/25] 4.19.128-rc1 review

[PATCH 4.19 00/25] 4.19.128-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.128 release.
There are 25 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 11 Jun 2020 17:40:24 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.128-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.19.128-rc1

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Revert "net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns"

Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
    uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned

Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
    x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list

Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
    x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation

Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
    x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation

Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
    x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()

Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
    x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id

Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
    nvmem: qfprom: remove incorrect write support

Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
    CDC-ACM: heed quirk also in error handling

Pascal Terjan <pterjan@google.com>
    staging: rtl8712: Fix IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK

Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
    tty: hvc_console, fix crashes on parallel open/close

Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
    vt: keyboard: avoid signed integer overflow in k_ascii

Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
    usb: musb: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com>
    usb: musb: start session in resume for host port

Mathieu Othacehe <m.othacehe@gmail.com>
    iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading.

Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>
    USB: serial: option: add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions

Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com>
    USB: serial: usb_wwan: do not resubmit rx urb on fatal errors

Matt Jolly <Kangie@footclan.ninja>
    USB: serial: qcserial: add DW5816e QDL support

Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
    net: check untrusted gso_size at kernel entry

Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
    vsock: fix timeout in vsock_accept()

Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com>
    NFC: st21nfca: add missed kfree_skb() in an error path

Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>
    net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit LE910C1-EUX composition

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    l2tp: do not use inet_hash()/inet_unhash()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    l2tp: add sk_family checks to l2tp_validate_socket

Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
    devinet: fix memleak in inetdev_init()


-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |   1 +
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst        |   1 +
 .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst      | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt    |  20 +++
 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h               |  27 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h                 |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h                   |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                         | 106 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                       |  54 ++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h                          |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c                        |   7 +-
 drivers/base/cpu.c                                 |   8 ++
 drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c                       |   6 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c  |   6 -
 drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c                         |   1 +
 drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c                         |   4 +-
 drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c                             |  14 --
 drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h                     |   9 +-
 drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c                      |  23 ++--
 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c                          |  26 ++--
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c                        |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/musb/musb_core.c                       |   7 +
 drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c                    |  10 +-
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c                        |   4 +
 drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c                      |   1 +
 drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c                      |   4 +
 include/linux/mod_devicetable.h                    |   6 +
 include/linux/virtio_net.h                         |  14 +-
 kernel/events/uprobes.c                            |  16 ++-
 net/ipv4/devinet.c                                 |   1 +
 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c                               |   3 +
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c                                 |  29 +++-
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c                                |  30 +++--
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c                           |   2 +-
 35 files changed, 503 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)

[PATCH 4.19 01/25] devinet: fix memleak in inetdev_init()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit 1b49cd71b52403822731dc9f283185d1da355f97 ]

When devinet_sysctl_register() failed, the memory allocated
in neigh_parms_alloc() should be freed.

Fixes: 20e61da7ffcf ("ipv4: fail early when creating netdev named all or default")
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/devinet.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ static struct in_device *inetdev_init(st
 	err = devinet_sysctl_register(in_dev);
 	if (err) {
 		in_dev->dead = 1;
+		neigh_parms_release(&arp_tbl, in_dev->arp_parms);
 		in_dev_put(in_dev);
 		in_dev = NULL;
 		goto out;

[PATCH 4.19 02/25] l2tp: add sk_family checks to l2tp_validate_socket

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit d9a81a225277686eb629938986d97629ea102633 ]

syzbot was able to trigger a crash after using an ISDN socket
and fool l2tp.

Fix this by making sure the UDP socket is of the proper family.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78
Write of size 1 at addr ffff88808ed0c590 by task syz-executor.5/3018

CPU: 0 PID: 3018 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x413 mm/kasan/report.c:382
 __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 mm/kasan/report.c:511
 kasan_report+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:625
 setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78
 l2tp_tunnel_register+0xb15/0xdd0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1523
 l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create+0x4b2/0xa60 net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:249
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:673 [inline]
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:718 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x627/0xdf0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:735
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x15a/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2469
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:746
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x537/0x740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329
 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e6/0x810 net/socket.c:2352
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2406
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2439
 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
RIP: 0033:0x45ca29
Code: 0d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 db b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007effe76edc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004fe1c0 RCX: 000000000045ca29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 000000000078bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 000000000000094e R14: 00000000004d5d00 R15: 00007effe76ee6d4

Allocated by task 3018:
 save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:495 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:468
 __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3656 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x161/0x7a0 mm/slab.c:3665
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline]
 sk_prot_alloc+0x223/0x2f0 net/core/sock.c:1612
 sk_alloc+0x36/0x1100 net/core/sock.c:1666
 data_sock_create drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:600 [inline]
 mISDN_sock_create+0x272/0x400 drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:796
 __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428
 sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline]
 __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521
 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline]
 __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline]
 __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528
 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3

Freed by task 2484:
 save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
 kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:317 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:456
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
 kfree+0x109/0x2b0 mm/slab.c:3757
 kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:603
 __free_fdtable+0x2d/0x70 fs/file.c:31
 put_files_struct fs/file.c:420 [inline]
 put_files_struct+0x248/0x2e0 fs/file.c:413
 exit_files+0x7e/0xa0 fs/file.c:445
 do_exit+0xb04/0x2dd0 kernel/exit.c:791
 do_group_exit+0x125/0x340 kernel/exit.c:894
 get_signal+0x47b/0x24e0 kernel/signal.c:2739
 do_signal+0x81/0x2240 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:784
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x26c/0x360 arch/x86/entry/common.c:161
 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline]
 syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:279 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x6b1/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808ed0c000
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1424 bytes inside of
 2048-byte region [ffff88808ed0c000, ffff88808ed0c800)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00023b4300 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0002838208 ffffea00015ba288 ffff8880aa000e00
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88808ed0c000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88808ed0c480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff88808ed0c500: 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88808ed0c580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                         ^
 ffff88808ed0c600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88808ed0c680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

Fixes: 6b9f34239b00 ("l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation")
Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Cc: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
@@ -1463,6 +1463,9 @@ static int l2tp_validate_socket(const st
 	if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_DGRAM)
 		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
 
+	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+
 	if ((encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP && sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) ||
 	    (encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_IP && sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_L2TP))
 		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;

[PATCH 4.19 03/25] l2tp: do not use inet_hash()/inet_unhash()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 02c71b144c811bcdd865e0a1226d0407d11357e8 ]

syzbot recently found a way to crash the kernel [1]

Issue here is that inet_hash() & inet_unhash() are currently
only meant to be used by TCP & DCCP, since only these protocols
provide the needed hashinfo pointer.

L2TP uses a single list (instead of a hash table)

This old bug became an issue after commit 610236587600
("bpf: Add new cgroup attach type to enable sock modifications")
since after this commit, sk_common_release() can be called
while the L2TP socket is still considered 'hashed'.

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 PID: 7063 Comm: syz-executor654 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600
Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1
R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0
R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00
FS:  0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 sk_common_release+0xba/0x370 net/core/sock.c:3210
 inet_create net/ipv4/af_inet.c:390 [inline]
 inet_create+0x966/0xe00 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:248
 __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428
 sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline]
 __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521
 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline]
 __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline]
 __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528
 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
RIP: 0033:0x441e29
Code: e8 fc b3 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007ffdce184148 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000029
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000441e29
RDX: 0000000000000073 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000402c30 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 23b6578228ce553e ]---
RIP: 0010:inet_unhash+0x11f/0x770 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:600
Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e dd 04 00 00 48 8d 7d 08 44 8b 73 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 55 05 00 00 48 8d 7d 14 4c 8b 6d 08 48 b8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001777d30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88809a6df940 RCX: ffffffff8697c242
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8697c251 RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88809f3ae1c0 R09: fffffbfff1514cc1
R10: ffffffff8a8a6607 R11: fffffbfff1514cc0 R12: ffff88809a6df9b0
R13: 0000000000000007 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff873a4d00
FS:  0000000001d2b880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000006cd090 CR3: 000000009403a000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Fixes: 0d76751fad77 ("l2tp: Add L2TPv3 IP encapsulation (no UDP) support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+3610d489778b57cc8031@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c  |   29 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 #include <net/icmp.h>
 #include <net/udp.h>
 #include <net/inet_common.h>
-#include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
 #include <net/tcp_states.h>
 #include <net/protocol.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
@@ -213,15 +212,31 @@ discard:
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int l2tp_ip_open(struct sock *sk)
+static int l2tp_ip_hash(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	/* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */
-	inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP;
+	if (sk_unhashed(sk)) {
+		write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
+		sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_table);
+		write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
 
+static void l2tp_ip_unhash(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	if (sk_unhashed(sk))
+		return;
 	write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
-	sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_table);
+	sk_del_node_init(sk);
 	write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
+}
+
+static int l2tp_ip_open(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	/* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */
+	inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP;
 
+	l2tp_ip_hash(sk);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -598,8 +613,8 @@ static struct proto l2tp_ip_prot = {
 	.sendmsg	   = l2tp_ip_sendmsg,
 	.recvmsg	   = l2tp_ip_recvmsg,
 	.backlog_rcv	   = l2tp_ip_backlog_recv,
-	.hash		   = inet_hash,
-	.unhash		   = inet_unhash,
+	.hash		   = l2tp_ip_hash,
+	.unhash		   = l2tp_ip_unhash,
 	.obj_size	   = sizeof(struct l2tp_ip_sock),
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	.compat_setsockopt = compat_ip_setsockopt,
--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@
 #include <net/icmp.h>
 #include <net/udp.h>
 #include <net/inet_common.h>
-#include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
-#include <net/inet6_hashtables.h>
 #include <net/tcp_states.h>
 #include <net/protocol.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
@@ -226,15 +224,31 @@ discard:
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int l2tp_ip6_open(struct sock *sk)
+static int l2tp_ip6_hash(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	/* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */
-	inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP;
+	if (sk_unhashed(sk)) {
+		write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
+		sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_table);
+		write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
 
+static void l2tp_ip6_unhash(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	if (sk_unhashed(sk))
+		return;
 	write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
-	sk_add_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_table);
+	sk_del_node_init(sk);
 	write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
+}
+
+static int l2tp_ip6_open(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	/* Prevent autobind. We don't have ports. */
+	inet_sk(sk)->inet_num = IPPROTO_L2TP;
 
+	l2tp_ip6_hash(sk);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -732,8 +746,8 @@ static struct proto l2tp_ip6_prot = {
 	.sendmsg	   = l2tp_ip6_sendmsg,
 	.recvmsg	   = l2tp_ip6_recvmsg,
 	.backlog_rcv	   = l2tp_ip6_backlog_recv,
-	.hash		   = inet6_hash,
-	.unhash		   = inet_unhash,
+	.hash		   = l2tp_ip6_hash,
+	.unhash		   = l2tp_ip6_unhash,
 	.obj_size	   = sizeof(struct l2tp_ip6_sock),
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	.compat_setsockopt = compat_ipv6_setsockopt,

[PATCH 4.19 04/25] net: usb: qmi_wwan: add Telit LE910C1-EUX composition

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 591612aa578cd7148b7b9d74869ef40118978389 ]

Add support for Telit LE910C1-EUX composition

0x1031: tty, tty, tty, rmnet
Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c
@@ -1260,6 +1260,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id produc
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bbb, 0x0203, 2)},	/* Alcatel L800MA */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x0201, 4)},	/* TP-LINK HSUPA Modem MA180 */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x2357, 0x9000, 4)},	/* TP-LINK MA260 */
+	{QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1031, 3)}, /* Telit LE910C1-EUX */
 	{QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1bc7, 0x1040, 2)},	/* Telit LE922A */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1100, 3)},	/* Telit ME910 */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1bc7, 0x1101, 3)},	/* Telit ME910 dual modem */

[PATCH 4.19 05/25] NFC: st21nfca: add missed kfree_skb() in an error path

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 3decabdc714ca56c944f4669b4cdec5c2c1cea23 ]

st21nfca_tm_send_atr_res() misses to call kfree_skb() in an error path.
Add the missed function call to fix it.

Fixes: 1892bf844ea0 ("NFC: st21nfca: Adding P2P support to st21nfca in Initiator & Target mode")
Signed-off-by: Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c
+++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c
@@ -184,8 +184,10 @@ static int st21nfca_tm_send_atr_res(stru
 		memcpy(atr_res->gbi, atr_req->gbi, gb_len);
 		r = nfc_set_remote_general_bytes(hdev->ndev, atr_res->gbi,
 						  gb_len);
-		if (r < 0)
+		if (r < 0) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
 			return r;
+		}
 	}
 
 	info->dep_info.curr_nfc_dep_pni = 0;

[PATCH 4.19 06/25] vsock: fix timeout in vsock_accept()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 7e0afbdfd13d1e708fe96e31c46c4897101a6a43 ]

The accept(2) is an "input" socket interface, so we should use
SO_RCVTIMEO instead of SO_SNDTIMEO to set the timeout.

So this patch replace sock_sndtimeo() with sock_rcvtimeo() to
use the right timeout in the vsock_accept().

Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Hansen <jhansen@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c
@@ -1283,7 +1283,7 @@ static int vsock_accept(struct socket *s
 	/* Wait for children sockets to appear; these are the new sockets
 	 * created upon connection establishment.
 	 */
-	timeout = sock_sndtimeo(listener, flags & O_NONBLOCK);
+	timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(listener, flags & O_NONBLOCK);
 	prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(listener), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 
 	while ((connected = vsock_dequeue_accept(listener)) == NULL &&

[PATCH 4.19 07/25] net: check untrusted gso_size at kernel entry

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 6dd912f82680761d8fb6b1bb274a69d4c7010988 ]

Syzkaller again found a path to a kernel crash through bad gso input:
a packet with gso size exceeding len.

These packets are dropped in tcp_gso_segment and udp[46]_ufo_fragment.
But they may affect gso size calculations earlier in the path.

Now that we have thlen as of commit 9274124f023b ("net: stricter
validation of untrusted gso packets"), check gso_size at entry too.

Fixes: bfd5f4a3d605 ("packet: Add GSO/csum offload support.")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/virtio_net.h |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h
+++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(
 {
 	unsigned int gso_type = 0;
 	unsigned int thlen = 0;
+	unsigned int p_off = 0;
 	unsigned int ip_proto;
 
 	if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) {
@@ -68,7 +69,8 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(
 		if (!skb_partial_csum_set(skb, start, off))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		if (skb_transport_offset(skb) + thlen > skb_headlen(skb))
+		p_off = skb_transport_offset(skb) + thlen;
+		if (p_off > skb_headlen(skb))
 			return -EINVAL;
 	} else {
 		/* gso packets without NEEDS_CSUM do not set transport_offset.
@@ -92,17 +94,25 @@ retry:
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
-			if (keys.control.thoff + thlen > skb_headlen(skb) ||
+			p_off = keys.control.thoff + thlen;
+			if (p_off > skb_headlen(skb) ||
 			    keys.basic.ip_proto != ip_proto)
 				return -EINVAL;
 
 			skb_set_transport_header(skb, keys.control.thoff);
+		} else if (gso_type) {
+			p_off = thlen;
+			if (p_off > skb_headlen(skb))
+				return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
 
 	if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) {
 		u16 gso_size = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->gso_size);
 
+		if (skb->len - p_off <= gso_size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = gso_size;
 		skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = gso_type;
 

[PATCH 4.19 08/25] USB: serial: qcserial: add DW5816e QDL support

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Matt Jolly <Kangie@footclan.ninja>

commit 3429444abdd9dbd5faebd9bee552ec6162b17ad6 upstream.

Add support for Dell Wireless 5816e Download Mode (AKA boot & hold mode /
QDL download mode) to drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c

This is required to update device firmware.

Signed-off-by: Matt Jolly <Kangie@footclan.ninja>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/qcserial.c
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b3)},	/* Dell Wireless 5809e Gobi(TM) 4G LTE Mobile Broadband Card (rev3) */
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b5)},	/* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81b6)},	/* Dell Wireless 5811e QDL */
+	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cb)},	/* Dell Wireless 5816e QDL */
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cc)},	/* Dell Wireless 5816e */
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81cf)},   /* Dell Wireless 5819 */
 	{DEVICE_SWI(0x413c, 0x81d0)},   /* Dell Wireless 5819 */

[PATCH 4.19 09/25] USB: serial: usb_wwan: do not resubmit rx urb on fatal errors

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com>

commit 986c1748c84d7727defeaeca74a73b37f7d5cce1 upstream.

usb_wwan_indat_callback() shouldn't resubmit rx urb if the previous urb
status is a fatal error. Or the usb controller would keep processing the
new urbs then run into interrupt storm, and has no chance to recover.

Fixes: 6c1ee66a0b2b ("USB-Serial: Fix error handling of usb_wwan")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/usb_wwan.c
@@ -299,6 +299,10 @@ static void usb_wwan_indat_callback(stru
 	if (status) {
 		dev_dbg(dev, "%s: nonzero status: %d on endpoint %02x.\n",
 			__func__, status, endpoint);
+
+		/* don't resubmit on fatal errors */
+		if (status == -ESHUTDOWN || status == -ENOENT)
+			return;
 	} else {
 		if (urb->actual_length) {
 			tty_insert_flip_string(&port->port, data,

[PATCH 4.19 10/25] USB: serial: option: add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>

commit 399ad9477c523f721f8e51d4f824bdf7267f120c upstream.

Add Telit LE910C1-EUX compositions:

	0x1031: tty, tty, tty, rmnet
	0x1033: tty, tty, tty, ecm

Signed-off-by: Daniele Palmas <dnlplm@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525211106.27338-1-dnlplm@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c
@@ -1157,6 +1157,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_CC864_SINGLE) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_DE910_DUAL) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_UE910_V2) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1031, 0xff),	/* Telit LE910C1-EUX */
+	 .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(3) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1033, 0xff),	/* Telit LE910C1-EUX (ECM) */
+	 .driver_info = NCTRL(0) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG0),
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(0) | RSVD(1) | NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_LE922_USBCFG1),

[PATCH 4.19 11/25] iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mathieu Othacehe <m.othacehe@gmail.com>

commit 18dfb5326370991c81a6d1ed6d1aeee055cb8c05 upstream.

The bytes returned by the i2c reading need to be swapped
unconditionally. Otherwise, on be16 platforms, an incorrect value will be
returned.

Taking the slow path via next merge window as its been around a while
and we have a patch set dependent on this which would be held up.

Fixes: 62a1efb9f868 ("iio: add vcnl4000 combined ALS and proximity sensor")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Othacehe <m.othacehe@gmail.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c
@@ -166,7 +166,6 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4
 				u8 rdy_mask, u8 data_reg, int *val)
 {
 	int tries = 20;
-	__be16 buf;
 	int ret;
 
 	mutex_lock(&data->vcnl4000_lock);
@@ -193,13 +192,12 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
-	ret = i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data(data->client,
-		data_reg, sizeof(buf), (u8 *) &buf);
+	ret = i2c_smbus_read_word_swapped(data->client, data_reg);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto fail;
 
 	mutex_unlock(&data->vcnl4000_lock);
-	*val = be16_to_cpu(buf);
+	*val = ret;
 
 	return 0;
 

Re: [PATCH 4.19 11/25] iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading.

[Pavel Machek]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 801 bytes --]

Hi!

> From: Mathieu Othacehe <m.othacehe@gmail.com>
> 
> commit 18dfb5326370991c81a6d1ed6d1aeee055cb8c05 upstream.
> 
> The bytes returned by the i2c reading need to be swapped
> unconditionally. Otherwise, on be16 platforms, an incorrect value will be
> returned.
> 
> Taking the slow path via next merge window as its been around a while
> and we have a patch set dependent on this which would be held up.

Is there some explanation how this is correct Somewhere? I assume i2c
hardware has fixed endianity (not depending on CPU), so unconditional
swapping will cause problems either on le or on be machines...?

Best regards,
								Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 195 bytes --]

Re: [PATCH 4.19 11/25] iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading.

[Jonathan Cameron]

On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 15:30:18 +0200
Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de> wrote:

> Hi!
> 
> > From: Mathieu Othacehe <m.othacehe@gmail.com>
> > 
> > commit 18dfb5326370991c81a6d1ed6d1aeee055cb8c05 upstream.
> > 
> > The bytes returned by the i2c reading need to be swapped
> > unconditionally. Otherwise, on be16 platforms, an incorrect value will be
> > returned.
> > 
> > Taking the slow path via next merge window as its been around a while
> > and we have a patch set dependent on this which would be held up.  
> 
> Is there some explanation how this is correct Somewhere? I assume i2c
> hardware has fixed endianity (not depending on CPU), so unconditional
> swapping will cause problems either on le or on be machines...?
> 

Hmm, this isn't introducing a bug, but looking again, it appears
that the original code was fine as well..

smbus/I2C has a fixed ordering on the wire (when people actually obey the spec).
So when an i2c_smbus_read_word_data call is made, the drivers / subsystem
assume that ordering an provide the data in CPU endian order.

Unfortunately a reasonable set of devices provide data in the opposite
order from that required by the i2c spec.  Thus it needs to be unconditionally
swapped to put it back into the correct order.
i2c_smbus_read_word_data_swapped does that for us.

Now the reason it worked before was this was previously doing a
block read rather than a word read. i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data
which is just reading a bunch of bytes rather than doing a word read.

So this is a false positive as a fix.  Sorry about that.
Conversely it shouldn't break anything.

Looking back at the history, what happened was that up to v5 of this patchset
factored out the reads, but whilst doing that converted them to
i2c_smbus_read_word_data with a be16_to_cpu call which was buggy and
picked up in review.  Hence confusion occurred and I guess my eyes saw
what they expected to see once the fix was pulled to the front of the series.

Thanks,

Jonathan



> Best regards,
> 								Pavel

[PATCH 4.19 12/25] usb: musb: start session in resume for host port

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com>

commit 7f88a5ac393f39319f69b8b20cc8d5759878d1a1 upstream.

Commit 17539f2f4f0b ("usb: musb: fix enumeration after resume") replaced
musb_start() in musb_resume() to not override softconnect bit, but it
doesn't restart the session for host port which was done in musb_start().
The session could be disabled in musb_suspend(), which leads the host
port doesn't stay in host mode.

So let's start the session specifically for host port in musb_resume().

Fixes: 17539f2f4f0b ("usb: musb: fix enumeration after resume")

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525025049.3400-3-b-liu@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/musb/musb_core.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_core.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_core.c
@@ -2737,6 +2737,13 @@ static int musb_resume(struct device *de
 	musb_enable_interrupts(musb);
 	musb_platform_enable(musb);
 
+	/* session might be disabled in suspend */
+	if (musb->port_mode == MUSB_HOST &&
+	    !(musb->ops->quirks & MUSB_PRESERVE_SESSION)) {
+		devctl |= MUSB_DEVCTL_SESSION;
+		musb_writeb(musb->mregs, MUSB_DEVCTL, devctl);
+	}
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&musb->lock, flags);
 	error = musb_run_resume_work(musb);
 	if (error)

[PATCH 4.19 13/25] usb: musb: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>

commit e4befc121df03dc8ed2ac1031c98f9538e244bae upstream.

When copy_from_user() returns an error code, there
is a runtime PM usage counter imbalance.

Fix this by moving copy_from_user() to the beginning
of this function.

Fixes: 7b6c1b4c0e1e ("usb: musb: fix runtime PM in debugfs")

Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bin Liu <b-liu@ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525025049.3400-7-b-liu@ti.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_debugfs.c
@@ -168,6 +168,11 @@ static ssize_t musb_test_mode_write(stru
 	u8			test;
 	char			buf[24];
 
+	memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
+
+	if (copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, min_t(size_t, sizeof(buf) - 1, count)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
 	pm_runtime_get_sync(musb->controller);
 	test = musb_readb(musb->mregs, MUSB_TESTMODE);
 	if (test) {
@@ -176,11 +181,6 @@ static ssize_t musb_test_mode_write(stru
 		goto ret;
 	}
 
-	memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
-
-	if (copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, min_t(size_t, sizeof(buf) - 1, count)))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
 	if (strstarts(buf, "force host full-speed"))
 		test = MUSB_TEST_FORCE_HOST | MUSB_TEST_FORCE_FS;
 

[PATCH 4.19 14/25] vt: keyboard: avoid signed integer overflow in k_ascii

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>

commit b86dab054059b970111b5516ae548efaae5b3aae upstream.

When k_ascii is invoked several times in a row there is a potential for
signed integer overflow:

UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888:19 signed integer overflow:
10 * 1111111111 cannot be represented in type 'int'
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.11 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x30 lib/ubsan.c:154
 handle_overflow+0xdc/0xf0 lib/ubsan.c:184
 __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow+0x2a/0x40 lib/ubsan.c:205
 k_ascii+0xbf/0xd0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888
 kbd_keycode drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1477 [inline]
 kbd_event+0x888/0x3be0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1495

While it can be worked around by using check_mul_overflow()/
check_add_overflow(), it is better to introduce a separate flag to
signal that number pad is being used to compose a symbol, and
change type of the accumulator from signed to unsigned, thus
avoiding undefined behavior when it overflows.

Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525232740.GA262061@dtor-ws
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c
@@ -127,7 +127,11 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(func_buf_lock); /
 static unsigned long key_down[BITS_TO_LONGS(KEY_CNT)];	/* keyboard key bitmap */
 static unsigned char shift_down[NR_SHIFT];		/* shift state counters.. */
 static bool dead_key_next;
-static int npadch = -1;					/* -1 or number assembled on pad */
+
+/* Handles a number being assembled on the number pad */
+static bool npadch_active;
+static unsigned int npadch_value;
+
 static unsigned int diacr;
 static char rep;					/* flag telling character repeat */
 
@@ -845,12 +849,12 @@ static void k_shift(struct vc_data *vc,
 		shift_state &= ~(1 << value);
 
 	/* kludge */
-	if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch != -1) {
+	if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch_active) {
 		if (kbd->kbdmode == VC_UNICODE)
-			to_utf8(vc, npadch);
+			to_utf8(vc, npadch_value);
 		else
-			put_queue(vc, npadch & 0xff);
-		npadch = -1;
+			put_queue(vc, npadch_value & 0xff);
+		npadch_active = false;
 	}
 }
 
@@ -868,7 +872,7 @@ static void k_meta(struct vc_data *vc, u
 
 static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
 {
-	int base;
+	unsigned int base;
 
 	if (up_flag)
 		return;
@@ -882,10 +886,12 @@ static void k_ascii(struct vc_data *vc,
 		base = 16;
 	}
 
-	if (npadch == -1)
-		npadch = value;
-	else
-		npadch = npadch * base + value;
+	if (!npadch_active) {
+		npadch_value = 0;
+		npadch_active = true;
+	}
+
+	npadch_value = npadch_value * base + value;
 }
 
 static void k_lock(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)

[PATCH 4.19 15/25] tty: hvc_console, fix crashes on parallel open/close

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>

commit 24eb2377f977fe06d84fca558f891f95bc28a449 upstream.

hvc_open sets tty->driver_data to NULL when open fails at some point.
Typically, the failure happens in hp->ops->notifier_add(). If there is
a racing process which tries to open such mangled tty, which was not
closed yet, the process will crash in hvc_open as tty->driver_data is
NULL.

All this happens because close wants to know whether open failed or not.
But ->open should not NULL this and other tty fields for ->close to be
happy. ->open should call tty_port_set_initialized(true) and close
should check by tty_port_initialized() instead. So do this properly in
this driver.

So this patch removes these from ->open:
* tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL). This happens on last close.
* tty->driver_data = NULL. Dtto.
* tty_port_put(&hp->port). This happens in shutdown and until now, this
  must have been causing a reference underflow, if I am not missing
  something.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-and-tested-by: Raghavendra <rananta@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200526145632.13879-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c |   23 ++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_console.c
@@ -371,15 +371,14 @@ static int hvc_open(struct tty_struct *t
 	 * tty fields and return the kref reference.
 	 */
 	if (rc) {
-		tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL);
-		tty->driver_data = NULL;
-		tty_port_put(&hp->port);
 		printk(KERN_ERR "hvc_open: request_irq failed with rc %d.\n", rc);
-	} else
+	} else {
 		/* We are ready... raise DTR/RTS */
 		if (C_BAUD(tty))
 			if (hp->ops->dtr_rts)
 				hp->ops->dtr_rts(hp, 1);
+		tty_port_set_initialized(&hp->port, true);
+	}
 
 	/* Force wakeup of the polling thread */
 	hvc_kick();
@@ -389,22 +388,12 @@ static int hvc_open(struct tty_struct *t
 
 static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * filp)
 {
-	struct hvc_struct *hp;
+	struct hvc_struct *hp = tty->driver_data;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (tty_hung_up_p(filp))
 		return;
 
-	/*
-	 * No driver_data means that this close was issued after a failed
-	 * hvc_open by the tty layer's release_dev() function and we can just
-	 * exit cleanly because the kref reference wasn't made.
-	 */
-	if (!tty->driver_data)
-		return;
-
-	hp = tty->driver_data;
-
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&hp->port.lock, flags);
 
 	if (--hp->port.count == 0) {
@@ -412,6 +401,9 @@ static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct
 		/* We are done with the tty pointer now. */
 		tty_port_tty_set(&hp->port, NULL);
 
+		if (!tty_port_initialized(&hp->port))
+			return;
+
 		if (C_HUPCL(tty))
 			if (hp->ops->dtr_rts)
 				hp->ops->dtr_rts(hp, 0);
@@ -428,6 +420,7 @@ static void hvc_close(struct tty_struct
 		 * waking periodically to check chars_in_buffer().
 		 */
 		tty_wait_until_sent(tty, HVC_CLOSE_WAIT);
+		tty_port_set_initialized(&hp->port, false);
 	} else {
 		if (hp->port.count < 0)
 			printk(KERN_ERR "hvc_close %X: oops, count is %d\n",

[PATCH 4.19 16/25] staging: rtl8712: Fix IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Pascal Terjan <pterjan@google.com>

commit 15ea976a1f12b5fd76b1bd6ff3eb5132fd28047f upstream.

The value in shared headers was fixed 9 years ago in commit 8d661f1e462d
("ieee80211: correct IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK macro") and
while looking at using shared headers for other duplicated constants
I noticed this driver uses the old value.

The macros are also defined twice in this file so I am deleting the
second definition.

Signed-off-by: Pascal Terjan <pterjan@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200523211247.23262-1-pterjan@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h |    9 +--------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8712/wifi.h
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ static inline unsigned char *get_hdr_bss
 /* block-ack parameters */
 #define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002
 #define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0
+#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFC0
 #define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000
 #define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800
 
@@ -562,13 +562,6 @@ struct ieee80211_ht_addt_info {
 #define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_GF_STA_PRSNT	0x0004
 #define IEEE80211_HT_IE_NON_HT_STA_PRSNT	0x0010
 
-/* block-ack parameters */
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_POLICY_MASK 0x0002
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0x003C
-#define IEEE80211_ADDBA_PARAM_BUF_SIZE_MASK 0xFFA0
-#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_TID_MASK 0xF000
-#define IEEE80211_DELBA_PARAM_INITIATOR_MASK 0x0800
-
 /*
  * A-PMDU buffer sizes
  * According to IEEE802.11n spec size varies from 8K to 64K (in powers of 2)

[PATCH 4.19 17/25] CDC-ACM: heed quirk also in error handling

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>

commit 97fe809934dd2b0b37dfef3a2fc70417f485d7af upstream.

If buffers are iterated over in the error case, the lower limits
for quirky devices must be heeded.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Reported-by: Jean Rene Dawin <jdawin@math.uni-bielefeld.de>
Fixes: a4e7279cd1d19 ("cdc-acm: introduce a cool down")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200526124420.22160-1-oneukum@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ static void acm_softint(struct work_stru
 	}
 
 	if (test_and_clear_bit(ACM_ERROR_DELAY, &acm->flags)) {
-		for (i = 0; i < ACM_NR; i++)
+		for (i = 0; i < acm->rx_buflimit; i++)
 			if (test_and_clear_bit(i, &acm->urbs_in_error_delay))
 					acm_submit_read_urb(acm, i, GFP_NOIO);
 	}

[PATCH 4.19 18/25] nvmem: qfprom: remove incorrect write support

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>

commit 8d9eb0d6d59a5d7028c80a30831143d3e75515a7 upstream.

qfprom has different address spaces for read and write. Reads are
always done from corrected address space, where as writes are done
on raw address space.
Writing to corrected address space is invalid and ignored, so it
does not make sense to have this support in the driver which only
supports corrected address space regions at the moment.

Fixes: 4ab11996b489 ("nvmem: qfprom: Add Qualcomm QFPROM support.")
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200522113341.7728-1-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c |   14 --------------
 1 file changed, 14 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c
+++ b/drivers/nvmem/qfprom.c
@@ -35,25 +35,11 @@ static int qfprom_reg_read(void *context
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int qfprom_reg_write(void *context,
-			 unsigned int reg, void *_val, size_t bytes)
-{
-	struct qfprom_priv *priv = context;
-	u8 *val = _val;
-	int i = 0, words = bytes;
-
-	while (words--)
-		writeb(*val++, priv->base + reg + i++);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static struct nvmem_config econfig = {
 	.name = "qfprom",
 	.stride = 1,
 	.word_size = 1,
 	.reg_read = qfprom_reg_read,
-	.reg_write = qfprom_reg_write,
 };
 
 static int qfprom_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)

[PATCH 4.19 19/25] x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_id

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>

commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream

Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the
stepping must be checked to tell them apart.

On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to
x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro
and support for matching against family/model/stepping.

 [ bp: Massage.
   tglx: Lightweight variant for backporting ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c          |    7 ++++++-
 include/linux/mod_devicetable.h      |    6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h
@@ -9,6 +9,33 @@
 
 #include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
 
+#define X86_STEPPINGS(mins, maxs)    GENMASK(maxs, mins)
+
+/**
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE - Base macro for CPU matching
+ * @_vendor:	The vendor name, e.g. INTEL, AMD, HYGON, ..., ANY
+ *		The name is expanded to X86_VENDOR_@_vendor
+ * @_family:	The family number or X86_FAMILY_ANY
+ * @_model:	The model number, model constant or X86_MODEL_ANY
+ * @_steppings:	Bitmask for steppings, stepping constant or X86_STEPPING_ANY
+ * @_feature:	A X86_FEATURE bit or X86_FEATURE_ANY
+ * @_data:	Driver specific data or NULL. The internal storage
+ *		format is unsigned long. The supplied value, pointer
+ *		etc. is casted to unsigned long internally.
+ *
+ * Backport version to keep the SRBDS pile consistant. No shorter variants
+ * required for this.
+ */
+#define X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(_vendor, _family, _model, \
+						    _steppings, _feature, _data) { \
+	.vendor		= X86_VENDOR_##_vendor,				\
+	.family		= _family,					\
+	.model		= _model,					\
+	.steppings	= _steppings,					\
+	.feature	= _feature,					\
+	.driver_data	= (unsigned long) _data				\
+}
+
 extern const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match);
 
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
@@ -34,13 +34,18 @@ const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(c
 	const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
 	struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
 
-	for (m = match; m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->feature; m++) {
+	for (m = match;
+	     m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
+	     m++) {
 		if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor)
 			continue;
 		if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family)
 			continue;
 		if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model)
 			continue;
+		if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY &&
+		    !(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings))
+			continue;
 		if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature))
 			continue;
 		return m;
--- a/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
+++ b/include/linux/mod_devicetable.h
@@ -621,6 +621,10 @@ struct mips_cdmm_device_id {
 /*
  * MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE expects this struct to be called x86cpu_device_id.
  * Although gcc seems to ignore this error, clang fails without this define.
+ *
+ * Note: The ordering of the struct is different from upstream because the
+ * static initializers in kernels < 5.7 still use C89 style while upstream
+ * has been converted to proper C99 initializers.
  */
 #define x86cpu_device_id x86_cpu_id
 struct x86_cpu_id {
@@ -629,6 +633,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
 	__u16 model;
 	__u16 feature;	/* bit index */
 	kernel_ulong_t driver_data;
+	__u16 steppings;
 };
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_MATCH(x) \
@@ -637,6 +642,7 @@ struct x86_cpu_id {
 #define X86_VENDOR_ANY 0xffff
 #define X86_FAMILY_ANY 0
 #define X86_MODEL_ANY  0
+#define X86_STEPPING_ANY 0
 #define X86_FEATURE_ANY 0	/* Same as FPU, you can't test for that */
 
 /*

[PATCH 4.19 20/25] x86/cpu: Add table argument to cpu_matches()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>

commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

 [ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c |   23 +++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1013,9 +1013,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	{}
 };
 
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
 {
-	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
 
 	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
 }
@@ -1035,29 +1035,32 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 
 	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
-		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
 	}
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+	if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
 
 	/*
@@ -1075,7 +1078,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1084,7 +1087,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);

[PATCH 4.19 21/25] x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>

commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream

SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.

While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.

The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.

* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
  either mitigations=off or srbds=off.

* Export vulnerability status via sysfs

* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.

 [ bp: Massage,
   - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
   - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
   - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
   - reflow comments.
   jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
   tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
 ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |    1 
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt    |   20 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h                 |    2 
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h                   |    4 
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                         |  106 +++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                       |   31 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h                          |    1 
 drivers/base/cpu.c                                 |    8 +
 8 files changed, 173 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -478,6 +478,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 Date:		January 2018
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4415,6 +4415,26 @@
 	spia_pedr=
 	spia_peddr=
 
+	srbds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+			(SRBDS) mitigation.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
+			exploit which can leak bits from the random
+			number generator.
+
+			By default, this issue is mitigated by
+			microcode.  However, the microcode fix can cause
+			the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become
+			much slower.  Among other effects, this will
+			result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom.
+
+			The microcode mitigation can be disabled with
+			the following option:
+
+			off:    Disable mitigation and remove
+				performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED
+
 	srcutree.counter_wrap_check [KNL]
 			Specifies how frequently to check for
 			grace-period sequence counter wrap for the
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -347,6 +347,7 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL		(18*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT	(18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR		(18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
@@ -391,5 +392,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS			X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
 #define X86_BUG_TAA			X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
 #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
+#define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -110,6 +110,10 @@
 #define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE		BIT(0)	/* Disable RTM feature */
 #define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR		BIT(1)	/* Disable TSX enumeration */
 
+/* SRBDS support */
+#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL		0x00000123
+#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS			BIT(0)
+
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS		0x00000174
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP		0x00000175
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP		0x00000176
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigatio
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
 static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 	mds_select_mitigation();
 	taa_select_mitigation();
+	srbds_select_mitigation();
 
 	/*
 	 * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
@@ -391,6 +393,97 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_
 early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"SRBDS: " fmt
+
+enum srbds_mitigations {
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
+};
+
+static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL]		= "Mitigation: Microcode",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF]	= "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR]	= "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
+};
+
+static bool srbds_off;
+
+void update_srbds_msr(void)
+{
+	u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+		return;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		return;
+
+	if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED)
+		return;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+
+	switch (srbds_mitigation) {
+	case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+	case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF:
+		mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+		break;
+	case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
+	 * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
+	 */
+	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+	if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
+	else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
+	else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+	update_srbds_msr();
+	pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+		return 0;
+
+	srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off");
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V1 : " fmt
 
 enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
@@ -1491,6 +1584,11 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
 	return "";
 }
 
+static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
@@ -1535,6 +1633,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
 	case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
 		return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
+		return srbds_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1581,4 +1682,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct de
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+}
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1013,6 +1013,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	{}
 };
 
+#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues)		   \
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6,		   \
+					    INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
+					    X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
+
+#define SRBDS		BIT(0)
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_CORE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_ULT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_GT3E,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_GT3E,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_CORE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_DESKTOP,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_MOBILE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC),	SRBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD),	SRBDS),
+	{}
+};
+
 static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
 {
 	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
@@ -1078,6 +1099,15 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
+	/*
+	 * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
+	 * in the vulnerability blacklist.
+	 */
+	if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
+	     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
+	    cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+		    setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
@@ -1522,6 +1552,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuin
 	mtrr_ap_init();
 	validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
 	x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
+	update_srbds_msr();
 }
 
 static __init int setup_noclflush(char *arg)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86
 unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
 
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
+extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
 
 extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
 
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -565,6 +565,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(st
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev,
+			      struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -573,6 +579,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_
 static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -583,6 +590,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
 	&dev_attr_mds.attr,
 	&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
 	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
+	&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 

[PATCH 4.19 22/25] x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>

commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream

Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation.

 [ bp: Massage.
   jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst                                 |    1 
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst |  148 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run
    mds
    tsx_async_abort
    multihit.rst
+   special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+SRBDS - Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+=============================================
+
+SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows MDS :doc:`mds` techniques to
+infer values returned from special register accesses.  Special register
+accesses are accesses to off core registers.  According to Intel's evaluation,
+the special register reads that have a security expectation of privacy are
+RDRAND, RDSEED and SGX EGETKEY.
+
+When RDRAND, RDSEED and EGETKEY instructions are used, the data is moved
+to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
+to MDS attacks.
+
+Affected processors
+--------------------
+Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
+be affected.
+
+A processor is affected by SRBDS if its Family_Model and stepping is
+in the following list, with the exception of the listed processors
+exporting MDS_NO while Intel TSX is available yet not enabled. The
+latter class of processors are only affected when Intel TSX is enabled
+by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise they are not affected.
+
+  =============  ============  ========
+  common name    Family_Model  Stepping
+  =============  ============  ========
+  Haswell        06_3CH        All
+  Haswell_L      06_45H        All
+  Haswell_G      06_46H        All
+
+  Broadwell_G    06_47H        All
+  Broadwell      06_3DH        All
+
+  Skylake_L      06_4EH        All
+  Skylake        06_5EH        All
+
+  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        <=0xC
+
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        <=0xD
+  =============  ============  ========
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this SRBDS issue:
+
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+    CVE-2020-0543   SRBDS  Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+    ==============  =====  =====================================
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+An unprivileged user can extract values returned from RDRAND and RDSEED
+executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------
+Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
+EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
+staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
+processor.
+
+During execution of the RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions, off-core
+accesses from other logical processors will be delayed until the special
+register read is complete and the secret data in the shared staging buffer is
+overwritten.
+
+This has three effects on performance:
+
+#. RDRAND, RDSEED, or EGETKEY instructions have higher latency.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND at the same time on multiple logical processors will be
+   serialized, resulting in an overall reduction in the maximum RDRAND
+   bandwidth.
+
+#. Executing RDRAND, RDSEED or EGETKEY will delay memory accesses from other
+   logical processors that miss their core caches, with an impact similar to
+   legacy locked cache-line-split accesses.
+
+The microcode updates provide an opt-out mechanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to disable
+the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions executed outside of Intel
+Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) enclaves. On logical processors that
+disable the mitigation using this opt-out mechanism, RDRAND and RDSEED do not
+take longer to execute and do not impact performance of sibling logical
+processors memory accesses. The opt-out mechanism does not affect Intel SGX
+enclaves (including execution of RDRAND or RDSEED inside an enclave, as well
+as EGETKEY execution).
+
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR Definition
+--------------------------------
+Along with the mitigation for this issue, Intel added a new thread-scope
+IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL MSR, (address 0x123). The presence of this MSR and
+RNGDS_MITG_DIS (bit 0) is enumerated by CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0).EDX[SRBDS_CTRL =
+9]==1. This MSR is introduced through the microcode update.
+
+Setting IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[0] (RNGDS_MITG_DIS) to 1 for a logical processor
+disables the mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED executed outside of an Intel SGX
+enclave on that logical processor. Opting out of the mitigation for a
+particular logical processor does not affect the RDRAND and RDSEED mitigations
+for other logical processors.
+
+Note that inside of an Intel SGX enclave, the mitigation is applied regardless
+of the value of RNGDS_MITG_DS.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows control over the SRBDS mitigation at boot time
+with the option "srbds=".  The option for this is:
+
+  ============= =============================================================
+  off           This option disables SRBDS mitigation for RDRAND and RDSEED on
+                affected platforms.
+  ============= =============================================================
+
+SRBDS System Information
+-----------------------
+The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs.  For
+SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
+
+The possible values contained in this file are:
+
+ ============================== =============================================
+ Not affected                   Processor not vulnerable
+ Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled
+ Vulnerable: No microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
+                                mitigation
+ Mitigation: Microcode          Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
+                                effect.
+ Mitigation: TSX disabled       Processor is only vulnerable when TSX is
+                                enabled while this system was booted with TSX
+                                disabled.
+ Unknown: Dependent on
+ hypervisor status              Running on virtual guest processor that is
+                                affected but with no way to know if host
+                                processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
+ ============================== =============================================
+
+SRBDS Default mitigation
+------------------------
+This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND,
+RDSEED ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for
+reuse.  Use the "srbds=off" kernel command line to disable the mitigation for
+RDRAND and RDSEED.

[PATCH 4.19 23/25] x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

commit 3798cc4d106e91382bfe016caa2edada27c2bb3f upstream

Make the docs match the code.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise
   =============  ============  ========
   common name    Family_Model  Stepping
   =============  ============  ========
+  IvyBridge      06_3AH        All
+
   Haswell        06_3CH        All
   Haswell_L      06_45H        All
   Haswell_G      06_46H        All
@@ -37,9 +39,8 @@ by software using TSX_CTRL_MSR otherwise
   Skylake_L      06_4EH        All
   Skylake        06_5EH        All
 
-  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        <=0xC
-
-  Kabylake       06_9EH        <=0xD
+  Kabylake_L     06_8EH        <= 0xC
+  Kabylake       06_9EH        <= 0xD
   =============  ============  ========
 
 Related CVEs

[PATCH 4.19 24/25] uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>

commit 013b2deba9a6b80ca02f4fafd7dedf875e9b4450 upstream.

uprobe_write_opcode() must not cross page boundary; prepare_uprobe()
relies on arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() which should validate "vaddr" but
some architectures (csky, s390, and sparc) don't do this.

We can remove the BUG_ON() check in prepare_uprobe() and validate the
offset early in __uprobe_register(). The new IS_ALIGNED() check matches
the alignment check in arch_prepare_kprobe() on supported architectures,
so I think that all insns must be aligned to UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE.

Another problem is __update_ref_ctr() which was wrong from the very
beginning, it can read/write outside of kmap'ed page unless "vaddr" is
aligned to sizeof(short), __uprobe_register() should check this too.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/events/uprobes.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -612,10 +612,6 @@ static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
-	/* uprobe_write_opcode() assumes we don't cross page boundary */
-	BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) +
-			UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE);
-
 	smp_wmb(); /* pairs with the smp_rmb() in handle_swbp() */
 	set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags);
 
@@ -911,6 +907,15 @@ static int __uprobe_register(struct inod
 	if (offset > i_size_read(inode))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/*
+	 * This ensures that copy_from_page(), copy_to_page() and
+	 * __update_ref_ctr() can't cross page boundary.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
  retry:
 	uprobe = alloc_uprobe(inode, offset);
 	if (!uprobe)
@@ -1708,6 +1713,9 @@ static int is_trap_at_addr(struct mm_str
 	uprobe_opcode_t opcode;
 	int result;
 
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	pagefault_disable();
 	result = __get_user(opcode, (uprobe_opcode_t __user *)vaddr);
 	pagefault_enable();

Re: [PATCH 4.19 24/25] uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned

[Naresh Kamboju]

On Tue, 9 Jun 2020 at 23:35, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
>
> commit 013b2deba9a6b80ca02f4fafd7dedf875e9b4450 upstream.
>
> uprobe_write_opcode() must not cross page boundary; prepare_uprobe()
> relies on arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() which should validate "vaddr" but
> some architectures (csky, s390, and sparc) don't do this.
>
> We can remove the BUG_ON() check in prepare_uprobe() and validate the
> offset early in __uprobe_register(). The new IS_ALIGNED() check matches
> the alignment check in arch_prepare_kprobe() on supported architectures,
> so I think that all insns must be aligned to UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE.
>
> Another problem is __update_ref_ctr() which was wrong from the very
> beginning, it can read/write outside of kmap'ed page unless "vaddr" is
> aligned to sizeof(short), __uprobe_register() should check this too.
>
> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
> Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>
> ---
>  kernel/events/uprobes.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> @@ -612,10 +612,6 @@ static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe
>         if (ret)
>                 goto out;
>
> -       /* uprobe_write_opcode() assumes we don't cross page boundary */
> -       BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) +
> -                       UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE);
> -
>         smp_wmb(); /* pairs with the smp_rmb() in handle_swbp() */
>         set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags);
>
> @@ -911,6 +907,15 @@ static int __uprobe_register(struct inod
>         if (offset > i_size_read(inode))
>                 return -EINVAL;
>
> +       /*
> +        * This ensures that copy_from_page(), copy_to_page() and
> +        * __update_ref_ctr() can't cross page boundary.
> +        */
> +       if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE))
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +       if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))

stable-rc 4.19 build failure for x86_64, i386 and arm.
make -sk KBUILD_BUILD_USER=TuxBuild -C/linux -j16 ARCH=x86 HOSTCC=gcc
CC="sccache gcc" O=build

75 #
76 In file included from ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:25:
77 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c: In function ‘__uprobe_register’:
78 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: error: ‘ref_ctr_offset’
undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean
‘per_cpu_offset’?
79  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
80  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
81 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
82  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
83  | ^
84 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: note: each undeclared identifier
is reported only once for each function it appears in
85  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
86  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
87 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
88  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
89  | ^
90 make[3]: *** [../scripts/Makefile.build:304: kernel/events/uprobes.o] Error 1

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Re: [PATCH 4.19 24/25] uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 12:25:56AM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> On Tue, 9 Jun 2020 at 23:35, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
> >
> > commit 013b2deba9a6b80ca02f4fafd7dedf875e9b4450 upstream.
> >
> > uprobe_write_opcode() must not cross page boundary; prepare_uprobe()
> > relies on arch_uprobe_analyze_insn() which should validate "vaddr" but
> > some architectures (csky, s390, and sparc) don't do this.
> >
> > We can remove the BUG_ON() check in prepare_uprobe() and validate the
> > offset early in __uprobe_register(). The new IS_ALIGNED() check matches
> > the alignment check in arch_prepare_kprobe() on supported architectures,
> > so I think that all insns must be aligned to UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE.
> >
> > Another problem is __update_ref_ctr() which was wrong from the very
> > beginning, it can read/write outside of kmap'ed page unless "vaddr" is
> > aligned to sizeof(short), __uprobe_register() should check this too.
> >
> > Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> > Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
> > Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
> > Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> >
> > ---
> >  kernel/events/uprobes.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
> >  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > --- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> > +++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
> > @@ -612,10 +612,6 @@ static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe
> >         if (ret)
> >                 goto out;
> >
> > -       /* uprobe_write_opcode() assumes we don't cross page boundary */
> > -       BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) +
> > -                       UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE);
> > -
> >         smp_wmb(); /* pairs with the smp_rmb() in handle_swbp() */
> >         set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags);
> >
> > @@ -911,6 +907,15 @@ static int __uprobe_register(struct inod
> >         if (offset > i_size_read(inode))
> >                 return -EINVAL;
> >
> > +       /*
> > +        * This ensures that copy_from_page(), copy_to_page() and
> > +        * __update_ref_ctr() can't cross page boundary.
> > +        */
> > +       if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE))
> > +               return -EINVAL;
> > +       if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> 
> stable-rc 4.19 build failure for x86_64, i386 and arm.
> make -sk KBUILD_BUILD_USER=TuxBuild -C/linux -j16 ARCH=x86 HOSTCC=gcc
> CC="sccache gcc" O=build
> 
> 75 #
> 76 In file included from ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:25:
> 77 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c: In function ‘__uprobe_register’:
> 78 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: error: ‘ref_ctr_offset’
> undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean
> ‘per_cpu_offset’?
> 79  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> 80  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> 81 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
> 82  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
> 83  | ^
> 84 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: note: each undeclared identifier
> is reported only once for each function it appears in
> 85  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> 86  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> 87 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
> 88  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
> 89  | ^
> 90 make[3]: *** [../scripts/Makefile.build:304: kernel/events/uprobes.o] Error 1
> 
> --
> Linaro LKFT
> https://lkft.linaro.org

Good catch, my builders just caught it too :(

4.19, 4.14, 4.9, and 4.4 are all broken, I have a fix will test it and
push out -rc2 for all of those with it in a bit, thanks.

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.19 24/25] uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned

[Oleg Nesterov]

On 06/09, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 12:25:56AM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > > @@ -911,6 +907,15 @@ static int __uprobe_register(struct inod
> > >         if (offset > i_size_read(inode))
> > >                 return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > > +       /*
> > > +        * This ensures that copy_from_page(), copy_to_page() and
> > > +        * __update_ref_ctr() can't cross page boundary.
> > > +        */
> > > +       if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE))
> > > +               return -EINVAL;
> > > +       if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> >
> > stable-rc 4.19 build failure for x86_64, i386 and arm.
> > make -sk KBUILD_BUILD_USER=TuxBuild -C/linux -j16 ARCH=x86 HOSTCC=gcc
> > CC="sccache gcc" O=build
> >
> > 75 #
> > 76 In file included from ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:25:
> > 77 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c: In function ‘__uprobe_register’:
> > 78 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: error: ‘ref_ctr_offset’
> > undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean
> > ‘per_cpu_offset’?
> > 79  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> > 80  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > 81 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
> > 82  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
> > 83  | ^
> > 84 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: note: each undeclared identifier
> > is reported only once for each function it appears in
> > 85  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> > 86  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > 87 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
> > 88  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
> > 89  | ^
> > 90 make[3]: *** [../scripts/Makefile.build:304: kernel/events/uprobes.o] Error 1
> >
> > --
> > Linaro LKFT
> > https://lkft.linaro.org
>
> Good catch, my builders just caught it too :(
>
> 4.19, 4.14, 4.9, and 4.4 are all broken, I have a fix will test it and
> push out -rc2 for all of those with it in a bit, thanks.

Yes, SDT markers were added by 1cc33161a83d20b5462b1e93f95d3ce6388079ee in v4.20.

See the patch for v4.4 below. It changes uprobe_register(), not __uprobe_register()
to check IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE) only.

Greg, please let me know if you want me to send the patches for 4.9/4.14/4.19.

Oleg.

--- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c
+++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c
@@ -601,10 +601,6 @@ static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct file *file,
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
-	/* uprobe_write_opcode() assumes we don't cross page boundary */
-	BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) +
-			UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE);
-
 	smp_wmb(); /* pairs with rmb() in find_active_uprobe() */
 	set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags);
 
@@ -883,6 +879,13 @@ int uprobe_register(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, struct uprobe_consumer *
 	if (offset > i_size_read(inode))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/*
+	 * This ensures that copy_from_page() an copy_to_page()
+	 * can't cross page boundary.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
  retry:
 	uprobe = alloc_uprobe(inode, offset);
 	if (!uprobe)
@@ -1691,6 +1694,9 @@ static int is_trap_at_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr)
 	uprobe_opcode_t opcode;
 	int result;
 
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ALIGNED(vaddr, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	pagefault_disable();
 	result = __copy_from_user_inatomic(&opcode, (void __user*)vaddr,
 							sizeof(opcode));

Re: [PATCH 4.19 24/25] uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 04:53:06PM +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 06/09, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Jun 10, 2020 at 12:25:56AM +0530, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > > > @@ -911,6 +907,15 @@ static int __uprobe_register(struct inod
> > > >         if (offset > i_size_read(inode))
> > > >                 return -EINVAL;
> > > >
> > > > +       /*
> > > > +        * This ensures that copy_from_page(), copy_to_page() and
> > > > +        * __update_ref_ctr() can't cross page boundary.
> > > > +        */
> > > > +       if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE))
> > > > +               return -EINVAL;
> > > > +       if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> > >
> > > stable-rc 4.19 build failure for x86_64, i386 and arm.
> > > make -sk KBUILD_BUILD_USER=TuxBuild -C/linux -j16 ARCH=x86 HOSTCC=gcc
> > > CC="sccache gcc" O=build
> > >
> > > 75 #
> > > 76 In file included from ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:25:
> > > 77 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c: In function ‘__uprobe_register’:
> > > 78 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: error: ‘ref_ctr_offset’
> > > undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean
> > > ‘per_cpu_offset’?
> > > 79  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> > > 80  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > > 81 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
> > > 82  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
> > > 83  | ^
> > > 84 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: note: each undeclared identifier
> > > is reported only once for each function it appears in
> > > 85  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> > > 86  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > > 87 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
> > > 88  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
> > > 89  | ^
> > > 90 make[3]: *** [../scripts/Makefile.build:304: kernel/events/uprobes.o] Error 1
> > >
> > > --
> > > Linaro LKFT
> > > https://lkft.linaro.org
> >
> > Good catch, my builders just caught it too :(
> >
> > 4.19, 4.14, 4.9, and 4.4 are all broken, I have a fix will test it and
> > push out -rc2 for all of those with it in a bit, thanks.
> 
> Yes, SDT markers were added by 1cc33161a83d20b5462b1e93f95d3ce6388079ee in v4.20.
> 
> See the patch for v4.4 below. It changes uprobe_register(), not __uprobe_register()
> to check IS_ALIGNED(offset, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE) only.
> 
> Greg, please let me know if you want me to send the patches for 4.9/4.14/4.19.

Please do.  I tried to backport it to those trees, and it seems to
build/boot/run, but I would like verification I didn't mess anything up
:)

Your 4.4 version below matched my version, so I think I'm ok...

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.19 24/25] uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned

[Oleg Nesterov]

On 06/10, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>
> > Greg, please let me know if you want me to send the patches for 4.9/4.14/4.19.
>
> Please do.  I tried to backport it to those trees, and it seems to
> build/boot/run, but I would like verification I didn't mess anything up
> :)
>
> Your 4.4 version below matched my version, so I think I'm ok...

Greg, I was going to send the patches, but after I've cloned
git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git I see that you have already updated these

	origin/queue/4.14
	origin/queue/4.19
	origin/queue/4.4
	origin/queue/4.9

branches, and the new patches look good to me.

So I think I can relax? ;)

Thanks!

Oleg.

Re: [PATCH 4.19 24/25] uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Thu, Jun 11, 2020 at 06:51:17PM +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 06/10, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> >
> > > Greg, please let me know if you want me to send the patches for 4.9/4.14/4.19.
> >
> > Please do.  I tried to backport it to those trees, and it seems to
> > build/boot/run, but I would like verification I didn't mess anything up
> > :)
> >
> > Your 4.4 version below matched my version, so I think I'm ok...
> 
> Greg, I was going to send the patches, but after I've cloned
> git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git I see that you have already updated these
> 
> 	origin/queue/4.14
> 	origin/queue/4.19
> 	origin/queue/4.4
> 	origin/queue/4.9
> 
> branches, and the new patches look good to me.
> 
> So I think I can relax? ;)

Yes, please relax, all is fine, thanks for verifying.

greg k-h

[PATCH 4.19 25/25] Revert "net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This reverts commit 95fde2e46860c183f6f47a99381a3b9bff488bd5 which is
commit 9ca415399dae133b00273a4283ef31d003a6818d upstream.

It was backported incorrectly, Paul writes at:
	https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200607203425.GD23662@windriver.com

	I happened to notice this commit:

	9ca415399dae - "net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns"

	...was backported to 4.19 and 5.4 and v5.6 in linux-stable.

	It patches del_sw_root_ns() - which only exists after v5.7-rc7 from:

	6eb7a268a99b - "net/mlx5: Don't maintain a case of del_sw_func being
	null"

	which creates the one line del_sw_root_ns stub function around
	kfree(node) by breaking it out of tree_put_node().

	In the absense of del_sw_root_ns - the backport finds an identical one
	line kfree stub fcn - named del_sw_prio from this earlier commit:

	139ed6c6c46a - "net/mlx5: Fix steering memory leak"  [in v4.15-rc5]

	and then puts the mutex_destroy() into that (wrong) function, instead of
	putting it into tree_put_node where the root ns case used to be hand

Reported-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
Cc: Mark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
Cc: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c |    6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fs_core.c
@@ -364,12 +364,6 @@ static void del_sw_ns(struct fs_node *no
 
 static void del_sw_prio(struct fs_node *node)
 {
-	struct mlx5_flow_root_namespace *root_ns;
-	struct mlx5_flow_namespace *ns;
-
-	fs_get_obj(ns, node);
-	root_ns = container_of(ns, struct mlx5_flow_root_namespace, ns);
-	mutex_destroy(&root_ns->chain_lock);
 	kfree(node);
 }
 

Re: [PATCH 4.19 25/25] Revert "net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns"

[Saeed Mahameed]

On Tue, 2020-06-09 at 19:45 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> 
> This reverts commit 95fde2e46860c183f6f47a99381a3b9bff488bd5 which is
> commit 9ca415399dae133b00273a4283ef31d003a6818d upstream.
> 
> It was backported incorrectly, Paul writes at:
> 	https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200607203425.GD23662@windriver.com
> 
> 	I happened to notice this commit:
> 
> 	9ca415399dae - "net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns"
> 
> 	...was backported to 4.19 and 5.4 and v5.6 in linux-stable.
> 
> 	It patches del_sw_root_ns() - which only exists after v5.7-rc7
> from:
> 
> 	6eb7a268a99b - "net/mlx5: Don't maintain a case of del_sw_func
> being
> 	null"
> 
> 	which creates the one line del_sw_root_ns stub function around
> 	kfree(node) by breaking it out of tree_put_node().
> 
> 	In the absense of del_sw_root_ns - the backport finds an
> identical one
> 	line kfree stub fcn - named del_sw_prio from this earlier
> commit:
> 
> 	139ed6c6c46a - "net/mlx5: Fix steering memory leak"  [in v4.15-
> rc5]
> 
> 	and then puts the mutex_destroy() into that (wrong) function,
> instead of
> 	putting it into tree_put_node where the root ns case used to be
> hand
> 
> Reported-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
> Cc: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
> Cc: Mark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
> Cc: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>


I don't know if this was due to something wrong in my backporting
process or AUTOSEL/wrong Fixes tag related. I will check later and will
try my best to avoid this in the future. 

Thanks,
Saeed.

Re: [PATCH 4.19 25/25] Revert "net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns"

[Sasha Levin]

On Thu, Jun 11, 2020 at 10:17:33PM +0000, Saeed Mahameed wrote:
>On Tue, 2020-06-09 at 19:45 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>>
>> This reverts commit 95fde2e46860c183f6f47a99381a3b9bff488bd5 which is
>> commit 9ca415399dae133b00273a4283ef31d003a6818d upstream.
>>
>> It was backported incorrectly, Paul writes at:
>> 	https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200607203425.GD23662@windriver.com
>>
>> 	I happened to notice this commit:
>>
>> 	9ca415399dae - "net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns"
>>
>> 	...was backported to 4.19 and 5.4 and v5.6 in linux-stable.
>>
>> 	It patches del_sw_root_ns() - which only exists after v5.7-rc7
>> from:
>>
>> 	6eb7a268a99b - "net/mlx5: Don't maintain a case of del_sw_func
>> being
>> 	null"
>>
>> 	which creates the one line del_sw_root_ns stub function around
>> 	kfree(node) by breaking it out of tree_put_node().
>>
>> 	In the absense of del_sw_root_ns - the backport finds an
>> identical one
>> 	line kfree stub fcn - named del_sw_prio from this earlier
>> commit:
>>
>> 	139ed6c6c46a - "net/mlx5: Fix steering memory leak"  [in v4.15-
>> rc5]
>>
>> 	and then puts the mutex_destroy() into that (wrong) function,
>> instead of
>> 	putting it into tree_put_node where the root ns case used to be
>> hand
>>
>> Reported-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
>> Cc: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
>> Cc: Mark Bloch <markb@mellanox.com>
>> Cc: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>
>Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
>
>
>I don't know if this was due to something wrong in my backporting
>process or AUTOSEL/wrong Fixes tag related. I will check later and will
>try my best to avoid this in the future.

I'm not sure what happened there, but FWIW - AUTOSEL wasn't involved.

-- 
Thanks,
Sasha

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/25] 4.19.128-rc1 review

[Naresh Kamboju]

On Tue, 9 Jun 2020 at 23:21, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.128 release.
> There are 25 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Thu, 11 Jun 2020 17:40:24 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.128-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
> -------------
> Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
>
> Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>     Linux 4.19.128-rc1
>
> Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>     Revert "net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns"
>
> Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
>     uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned

stable-rc 4.19 build failure for x86_64, i386 and arm.

 make -sk KBUILD_BUILD_USER=TuxBuild -C/linux -j16 ARCH=x86 HOSTCC=gcc
CC="sccache gcc" O=build
75 #
76 In file included from ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:25:
77 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c: In function ‘__uprobe_register’:
78 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: error: ‘ref_ctr_offset’
undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean
‘per_cpu_offset’?
79  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
80  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
81 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
82  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
83  | ^
84 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: note: each undeclared identifier
is reported only once for each function it appears in
85  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
86  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
87 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
88  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
89  | ^
90 make[3]: *** [../scripts/Makefile.build:304: kernel/events/uprobes.o] Error 1

kernel config:
https://builds.tuxbuild.com/I3PT6_HS4PTt7EFgJUIPxA/kernel.config

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/25] 4.19.128-rc1 review

[Shuah Khan]

On 6/9/20 1:01 PM, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> On Tue, 9 Jun 2020 at 23:21, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.128 release.
>> There are 25 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
>> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
>> let me know.
>>
>> Responses should be made by Thu, 11 Jun 2020 17:40:24 +0000.
>> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>>
>> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>>          https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.128-rc1.gz
>> or in the git tree and branch at:
>>          git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
>> and the diffstat can be found below.
>>
>> thanks,
>>
>> greg k-h
>>
>> -------------
>> Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
>>
>> Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>>      Linux 4.19.128-rc1
>>
>> Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
>>      Revert "net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns"
>>
>> Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
>>      uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned
> 
> stable-rc 4.19 build failure for x86_64, i386 and arm.
> 
>   make -sk KBUILD_BUILD_USER=TuxBuild -C/linux -j16 ARCH=x86 HOSTCC=gcc
> CC="sccache gcc" O=build
> 75 #
> 76 In file included from ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:25:
> 77 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c: In function ‘__uprobe_register’:
> 78 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: error: ‘ref_ctr_offset’
> undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean
> ‘per_cpu_offset’?
> 79  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> 80  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> 81 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
> 82  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
> 83  | ^
> 84 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: note: each undeclared identifier
> is reported only once for each function it appears in
> 85  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> 86  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> 87 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
> 88  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
> 89  | ^
> 90 make[3]: *** [../scripts/Makefile.build:304: kernel/events/uprobes.o] Error 1
> 
> kernel config:
> https://builds.tuxbuild.com/I3PT6_HS4PTt7EFgJUIPxA/kernel.config
> 

I am seeing the same problem on x86_64

CONFIG_UPROBES is enabled in my config.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/25] 4.19.128-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Tue, Jun 09, 2020 at 01:20:42PM -0600, Shuah Khan wrote:
> On 6/9/20 1:01 PM, Naresh Kamboju wrote:
> > On Tue, 9 Jun 2020 at 23:21, Greg Kroah-Hartman
> > <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > 
> > > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.128 release.
> > > There are 25 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > > let me know.
> > > 
> > > Responses should be made by Thu, 11 Jun 2020 17:40:24 +0000.
> > > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > > 
> > > The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> > >          https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.128-rc1.gz
> > > or in the git tree and branch at:
> > >          git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
> > > and the diffstat can be found below.
> > > 
> > > thanks,
> > > 
> > > greg k-h
> > > 
> > > -------------
> > > Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
> > > 
> > > Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> > >      Linux 4.19.128-rc1
> > > 
> > > Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> > >      Revert "net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns"
> > > 
> > > Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
> > >      uprobes: ensure that uprobe->offset and ->ref_ctr_offset are properly aligned
> > 
> > stable-rc 4.19 build failure for x86_64, i386 and arm.
> > 
> >   make -sk KBUILD_BUILD_USER=TuxBuild -C/linux -j16 ARCH=x86 HOSTCC=gcc
> > CC="sccache gcc" O=build
> > 75 #
> > 76 In file included from ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:25:
> > 77 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c: In function ‘__uprobe_register’:
> > 78 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: error: ‘ref_ctr_offset’
> > undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean
> > ‘per_cpu_offset’?
> > 79  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> > 80  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > 81 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
> > 82  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
> > 83  | ^
> > 84 ../kernel/events/uprobes.c:916:18: note: each undeclared identifier
> > is reported only once for each function it appears in
> > 85  916 | if (!IS_ALIGNED(ref_ctr_offset, sizeof(short)))
> > 86  | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > 87 ../include/linux/kernel.h:62:30: note: in definition of macro ‘IS_ALIGNED’
> > 88  62 | #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0)
> > 89  | ^
> > 90 make[3]: *** [../scripts/Makefile.build:304: kernel/events/uprobes.o] Error 1
> > 
> > kernel config:
> > https://builds.tuxbuild.com/I3PT6_HS4PTt7EFgJUIPxA/kernel.config
> > 
> 
> I am seeing the same problem on x86_64
> 
> CONFIG_UPROBES is enabled in my config.

Should be fixed in the -rc2 release, sorry about that.

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.19 00/25] 4.19.128-rc1 review

[Jon Hunter]

On 09/06/2020 18:44, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.128 release.
> There are 25 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Thu, 11 Jun 2020 17:40:24 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.128-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h

All tests are passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.19:
    11 builds:	11 pass, 0 fail
    22 boots:	22 pass, 0 fail
    36 tests:	36 pass, 0 fail

Linux version:	4.19.128-rc2-gf6c346f2d42d
Boards tested:	tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Cheers
Jon

-- 
nvpublic