From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.9 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9140CC433E1 for ; Mon, 15 Jun 2020 07:23:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62CF32068E for ; Mon, 15 Jun 2020 07:23:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="L07X6N0e" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728609AbgFOHXU (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Jun 2020 03:23:20 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-2.mimecast.com ([205.139.110.61]:60173 "EHLO us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728597AbgFOHXT (ORCPT ); Mon, 15 Jun 2020 03:23:19 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1592205797; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=DWSQ7TzFCPTxWe8HmQSmBV7hNMRZ/Fyl0silEj6pvAY=; b=L07X6N0efN3OscpE/X9wIg0ITYpUCyeLn6R+nsTDnbaKUGabIjvYc5TJ1d0ZIpzx/QfcHf fFqtI0j6BtBtuHrnBc7VC0WRr+uVYMBaRtbBmTF4TtfZTpY3k82kqp3FjWdg/yRzIQm2K0 4cxJHf4PPoX9Zl3I/GBbcMnQPmicsGQ= Received: from mail-wm1-f71.google.com (mail-wm1-f71.google.com [209.85.128.71]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-510-ecXJ71sHM66H_jmQIYvxrg-1; Mon, 15 Jun 2020 03:23:15 -0400 X-MC-Unique: ecXJ71sHM66H_jmQIYvxrg-1 Received: by mail-wm1-f71.google.com with SMTP id a18so4658054wmm.3 for ; Mon, 15 Jun 2020 00:23:15 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=DWSQ7TzFCPTxWe8HmQSmBV7hNMRZ/Fyl0silEj6pvAY=; b=JIKw2skAzM4bq5KV6hUrS3zX4GvZq0hMpj5vVOD25WnIgdQvfLCqAhNNvWVZoJdcAF zQj/fXd8TiR3CPVHPJBsJQ20eJkUBPuo2/WoltHhmh9BQLJ3t6A96LUXWF35jfI+pOwQ IWnrXgLBIy15pHSNa56oy3yHM0seuPdHi2S7t62fHFZNC5xzdg15Ve5swhNvw4mcWWmI 2Tf/ntpjXPVd/WKtbhYm58yCXJj+1RSRfLgyIKNXLMmbvIdv1Occpf8OB4eG3LPGNIgw nVUE2x5VDLHp0oTeEWf0cL6sbVsZQw6qffwWqLFS54zL6EEX7P+r9CJqsUsndV3KT9Fc 93Yg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531MpIcKo3aobLhgh6VnErychfbbITytMGTeI8FG+XCTphMrJuPi j75wugM7LbmCS7rNz157tFCvi6yfqf+F5s6WI1O8dxHIYYkSiAw4XywHhPlDNOQXye+2pLg1DFD gU5/jKX8xJ6qdgpxUbYrvyICV X-Received: by 2002:adf:f847:: with SMTP id d7mr26632558wrq.261.1592205794211; Mon, 15 Jun 2020 00:23:14 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJx4AzRkEmQ5p+prTmG2+DllWCywp5X3TfYTIV/yAdbItyMD18ixBFX0caqeDHHMcD/75TVyHg== X-Received: by 2002:adf:f847:: with SMTP id d7mr26632537wrq.261.1592205793927; Mon, 15 Jun 2020 00:23:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: from steredhat ([5.180.207.22]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a6sm22724347wrn.38.2020.06.15.00.23.12 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 15 Jun 2020 00:23:13 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 09:23:10 +0200 From: Stefano Garzarella To: Jens Axboe Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi , Jeff Moyer , io-uring@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests Message-ID: <20200615072310.iymkgr4dqdwzafg3@steredhat> References: <20200609142406.upuwpfmgqjeji4lc@steredhat> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Sun, Jun 14, 2020 at 09:52:30AM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote: > On 6/9/20 8:24 AM, Stefano Garzarella wrote: > > Hi Jens, > > Stefan and I have a proposal to share with io_uring community. > > Before implementing it we would like to discuss it to receive feedbacks and > > to see if it could be accepted: > > > > Adding restrictions to io_uring > > ===================================== > > The io_uring API provides submission and completion queues for performing > > asynchronous I/O operations. The queues are located in memory that is > > accessible to both the host userspace application and the kernel, making it > > possible to monitor for activity through polling instead of system calls. This > > design offers good performance and this makes exposing io_uring to guests an > > attractive idea for improving I/O performance in virtualization. > > > > PoC and preliminary benchmarks > > --------------------------- > > We realized a PoC, using QEMU and virtio-blk device, to share io_uring > > CQ and SQ rings with the guest. > > QEMU initializes io_uring, registers the device (NVMe) fd through > > io_uring_register(2), and maps the rings in the guest memory. > > The virtio-blk driver uses these rings to send requests instead of using > > the standard virtqueues. > > > > The PoC implements a pure polling solution where the application is polling > > (IOPOLL enabled) in the guest and the sqpoll_kthread is polling in the host > > (SQPOLL and IOPOLL enabled). > > > > These are the encouraging results we obtained from this preliminary work; > > we used fio (rw=randread bs=4k) to measure the kIOPS on a NVMe device: > > > > - bare-metal > > iodepth > > | fio ioengine | 1 | 8 | 16 | 32 | > > |-------------------------------------------|----:|----:|----:|----:| > > | io_uring (SQPOLL + IOPOLL) | 119 | 550 | 581 | 585 | > > | io_uring (IOPOLL) | 122 | 502 | 519 | 538 | > > > > - QEMU/KVM guest (aio=io_uring) > > iodepth > > | virtio-blk | fio ioengine | 1 | 8 | 16 | 32 | > > |-----------------------|-------------------|----:|----:|----:|----:| > > | virtqueues | io_uring (IOPOLL) | 27 | 144 | 209 | 266 | > > | virtqueues + iothread | io_uring (IOPOLL) | 73 | 264 | 306 | 312 | > > | io_uring passthrough | io_uring (IOPOLL) | 104 | 532 | 577 | 585 | > > > > All guest experiments are using the QEMU io_uring backend with SQPOLL and > > IOPOLL enabled. The virtio-blk driver is modified to support blovk io_poll > > on both virtqueues and io_uring passthrough. > > > > Before developing this proof-of-concept further we would like to discuss > > io_uring changes required to restrict rings since this mechanism is a > > prerequisite for real-world use cases where guests are untrusted. > > > > Restrictions > > ------------ > > This document proposes io_uring API changes that safely allow untrusted > > applications or guests to use io_uring. io_uring's existing security model is > > that of kernel system call handler code. It is designed to reject invalid > > inputs from host userspace applications. Supporting guests as io_uring API > > clients adds a new trust domain with access to even fewer resources than host > > userspace applications. > > > > Guests do not have direct access to host userspace application file descriptors > > or memory. The host userspace application, a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) such > > as QEMU, grants access to a subset of its file descriptors and memory. The > > allowed file descriptors are typically the disk image files belonging to the > > guest. The memory is typically the virtual machine's RAM that the VMM has > > allocated on behalf of the guest. > > > > The following extensions to the io_uring API allow the host application to > > grant access to some of its file descriptors. > > > > These extensions are designed to be applicable to other use cases besides > > untrusted guests and are not virtualization-specific. For example, the > > restrictions can be used to allow only a subset of sqe operations available to > > an application similar to seccomp syscall whitelisting. > > > > An address translation and memory restriction mechanism would also be > > necessary, but we can discuss this later. > > > > The IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode > > ---------------------------------------- > > The new io_uring_register(2) IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode permanently > > installs a feature whitelist on an io_ring_ctx. The io_ring_ctx can then be > > passed to untrusted code with the knowledge that only operations present in the > > whitelist can be executed. > > > > The whitelist approach ensures that new features added to io_uring do not > > accidentally become available when an existing application is launched on a > > newer kernel version. > > > > The IORING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode takes an array of struct > > io_uring_restriction elements that describe whitelisted features: > > > > #define IORING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS 11 > > > > /* struct io_uring_restriction::opcode values */ > > enum { > > /* Allow an io_uring_register(2) opcode */ > > IORING_RESTRICTION_REGISTER_OP, > > > > /* Allow an sqe opcode */ > > IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_OP, > > > > /* Only allow fixed files */ > > IORING_RESTRICTION_FIXED_FILES_ONLY, > > > > /* Only allow registered addresses and translate them */ > > IORING_RESTRICTION_BUFFER_CHECK > > }; > > > > struct io_uring_restriction { > > __u16 opcode; > > union { > > __u8 register_op; /* IORING_RESTRICTION_REGISTER_OP */ > > __u8 sqe_op; /* IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_OP */ > > }; > > __u8 resv; > > __u32 resv2[3]; > > }; > > > > This call can only be made once. Afterwards it is not possible to change > > restrictions anymore. This prevents untrusted code from removing restrictions. > > > > Limiting access to io_uring operations > > -------------------------------------- > > The following example shows how to whitelist IORING_OP_READV, IORING_OP_WRITEV, > > and IORING_OP_FSYNC: > > > > struct io_uring_restriction restrictions[] = { > > { > > .opcode = IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_OP, > > .sqe_op = IORING_OP_READV, > > }, > > { > > .opcode = IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_OP, > > .sqe_op = IORING_OP_WRITEV, > > }, > > { > > .opcode = IORING_RESTRICTION_SQE_OP, > > .sqe_op = IORING_OP_FSYNC, > > }, > > ... > > }; > > > > io_uring_register(ringfd, IORING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS, > > restrictions, ARRAY_SIZE(restrictions)); > > > > Limiting access to file descriptors > > ----------------------------------- > > The fixed files mechanism can be used to limit access to a set of file > > descriptors: > > > > struct io_uring_restriction restrictions[] = { > > { > > .opcode = IORING_RESTRICTION_FIXED_FILES_ONLY, > > }, > > ... > > }; > > > > io_uring_register(ringfd, IORING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS, > > restrictions, ARRAY_SIZE(restrictions)); > > > > Only requests with the sqe->flags IOSQE_FIXED_FILE bit set will be allowed. > > I don't think this sounds unreasonable, but I'd really like to see a > prototype hacked up before rendering any further opinions on it :-) Yeah :-) I'll be back with a prototype of this changes ASAP. Thanks for you feedback, Stefano