From: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] doc: x86/speculation: length of underlines
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 22:36:45 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200615203645.11545-1-xypron.glpk@gmx.de> (raw)
The lengths of underlines must match the titles to avoid build warnings.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
---
.../hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
index 47b1b3afac99..3b1ce68d2456 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ to the core through the special register mechanism that is susceptible
to MDS attacks.
Affected processors
---------------------
+-------------------
Core models (desktop, mobile, Xeon-E3) that implement RDRAND and/or RDSEED may
be affected.
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ executed on another core or sibling thread using MDS techniques.
Mitigation mechanism
--------------------
+--------------------
Intel will release microcode updates that modify the RDRAND, RDSEED, and
EGETKEY instructions to overwrite secret special register data in the shared
staging buffer before the secret data can be accessed by another logical
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ with the option "srbds=". The option for this is:
============= =============================================================
SRBDS System Information
------------------------
+------------------------
The Linux kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
SRBDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
--
2.27.0
next reply other threads:[~2020-06-15 20:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-15 20:36 Heinrich Schuchardt [this message]
2020-06-16 15:53 ` [PATCH 1/1] doc: x86/speculation: length of underlines mark gross
2020-06-19 19:18 ` Jonathan Corbet
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