From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A521DC433E1 for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:04:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 869E7207C4 for ; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 16:04:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1592323462; bh=rmHaqUT/vvmNrOYOGcZbtU0Y3rBcuPm4m+Rq9ThEigU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=iTATT0e5QN8b48jkxA/5kT3WRQzjHHe0nEXTOt8n1+h2Nop9NpAdczg5Mlw7aD8eD 6CXLqCsHg5a5UaR3fLvwSM6UT6vSyx1/5CJaS4P6ZFZSYTNWdMmOPMJFehnV0hLEYi EM0RuWRPdxxdCxIjY9GYFcx9MpCQ7KxNxcR9BwjI= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1733163AbgFPQEV (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:04:21 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:44952 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732542AbgFPPtr (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Jun 2020 11:49:47 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A772E21473; Tue, 16 Jun 2020 15:49:45 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1592322586; bh=rmHaqUT/vvmNrOYOGcZbtU0Y3rBcuPm4m+Rq9ThEigU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=TGvj7jY0849Ji/C7kQAuwQYvhrDG932aSkTfScu2Bk5VpAIoo3h70yR4U4eqfjTsh U3qLeB9RMOjeoWrq89oY3siJJnH/i7EJ03Dndz0sUI+GMMuGDL6/jJ7vGSOIRo+E3O SyHOoXcIe7nmYNK5lWc2xecNr7k/lUNPc0jBYTCM= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds , Waiman Long , Andrew Morton , Eric Biggers , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Joe Perches , Matthew Wilcox , David Rientjes , Uladzislau Rezki , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.6 025/161] mm: add kvfree_sensitive() for freeing sensitive data objects Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 17:33:35 +0200 Message-Id: <20200616153107.597339297@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20200616153106.402291280@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200616153106.402291280@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Waiman Long [ Upstream commit d4eaa2837851db2bfed572898bfc17f9a9f9151e ] For kvmalloc'ed data object that contains sensitive information like cryptographic keys, we need to make sure that the buffer is always cleared before freeing it. Using memset() alone for buffer clearing may not provide certainty as the compiler may compile it away. To be sure, the special memzero_explicit() has to be used. This patch introduces a new kvfree_sensitive() for freeing those sensitive data objects allocated by kvmalloc(). The relevant places where kvfree_sensitive() can be used are modified to use it. Fixes: 4f0882491a14 ("KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read") Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Waiman Long Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: David Howells Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Joe Perches Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Uladzislau Rezki Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407200318.11711-1-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/mm.h | 1 + mm/util.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/internal.h | 11 ----------- security/keys/keyctl.c | 16 +++++----------- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 96deeecd9179..9b9f48489576 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -669,6 +669,7 @@ static inline void *kvcalloc(size_t n, size_t size, gfp_t flags) } extern void kvfree(const void *addr); +extern void kvfree_sensitive(const void *addr, size_t len); /* * Mapcount of compound page as a whole, does not include mapped sub-pages. diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c index 988d11e6c17c..dc1c877d5481 100644 --- a/mm/util.c +++ b/mm/util.c @@ -604,6 +604,24 @@ void kvfree(const void *addr) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvfree); +/** + * kvfree_sensitive - Free a data object containing sensitive information. + * @addr: address of the data object to be freed. + * @len: length of the data object. + * + * Use the special memzero_explicit() function to clear the content of a + * kvmalloc'ed object containing sensitive data to make sure that the + * compiler won't optimize out the data clearing. + */ +void kvfree_sensitive(const void *addr, size_t len) +{ + if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(addr))) { + memzero_explicit((void *)addr, len); + kvfree(addr); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvfree_sensitive); + static inline void *__page_rmapping(struct page *page) { unsigned long mapping; diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 6d0ca48ae9a5..153d35c20d3d 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -350,15 +350,4 @@ static inline void key_check(const struct key *key) #define key_check(key) do {} while(0) #endif - -/* - * Helper function to clear and free a kvmalloc'ed memory object. - */ -static inline void __kvzfree(const void *addr, size_t len) -{ - if (addr) { - memset((void *)addr, 0, len); - kvfree(addr); - } -} #endif /* _INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 5e01192e222a..edde63a63007 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -142,10 +142,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, key_ref_put(keyring_ref); error3: - if (payload) { - memzero_explicit(payload, plen); - kvfree(payload); - } + kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen); error2: kfree(description); error: @@ -360,7 +357,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id, key_ref_put(key_ref); error2: - __kvzfree(payload, plen); + kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen); error: return ret; } @@ -914,7 +911,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) */ if (ret > key_data_len) { if (unlikely(key_data)) - __kvzfree(key_data, key_data_len); + kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len); key_data_len = ret; continue; /* Allocate buffer */ } @@ -923,7 +920,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) ret = -EFAULT; break; } - __kvzfree(key_data, key_data_len); + kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len); key_put_out: key_put(key); @@ -1225,10 +1222,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id, keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL); error2: - if (payload) { - memzero_explicit(payload, plen); - kvfree(payload); - } + kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen); error: return ret; } -- 2.25.1