From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.6 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43D66C433E0 for ; Fri, 26 Jun 2020 22:40:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1F50A2067D for ; Fri, 26 Jun 2020 22:40:20 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="SYNtdukF" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726566AbgFZWkT (ORCPT ); Fri, 26 Jun 2020 18:40:19 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:37860 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726438AbgFZWji (ORCPT ); Fri, 26 Jun 2020 18:39:38 -0400 Received: from sequoia.work.tihix.com (162-237-133-238.lightspeed.rcsntx.sbcglobal.net [162.237.133.238]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4C9B220B4901; Fri, 26 Jun 2020 15:39:37 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 4C9B220B4901 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1593211178; bh=D75oD57lun0GUBDulxMpvcNQCA9bpPWPblxeS6BsHiQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SYNtdukF8WEuz0MozMQkGjt/TuIV1td+43ZBbQaQYfXdSMHB7c7JnasCv+ABi4s58 Yrs4vxRExlI6ToqPUWxi7kFrS73ra+bGLwRG4feO1XSnsul1fTAWcFptNfUuRJ6Mse h6TVINC7vEgxKpaYPE5Xe0zsQta2Rwrv8rax/mYY= From: Tyler Hicks To: Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin Cc: James Morris , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian , Prakhar Srivastava , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 05/11] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2020 17:38:54 -0500 Message-Id: <20200626223900.253615-6-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200626223900.253615-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20200626223900.253615-1-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function only supports the pcr conditional. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that other conditionals are supported. Since KEXEC_CMDLINE's inception, ima_match_rules() has always returned true on any loaded KEXEC_CMDLINE rule without any consideration for other conditionals present in the rule. Make it clear that pcr is the only supported KEXEC_CMDLINE conditional by returning an error during policy load. An example of why this is a problem can be explained with the following rule: dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t An IMA policy author would have assumed that rule is valid because the parser accepted it but the result was that measurements for all KEXEC_CMDLINE operations would be disabled. Fixes: b0935123a183 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments") Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- * v2 - Added Mimi's Reviewed-by security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 166124d67774..676d5557af1a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -343,6 +343,17 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) return 0; } +static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) + if (entry->lsm[i].args_p) + return true; + + return false; +} + /* * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect @@ -993,6 +1004,16 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) case POLICY_CHECK: break; case KEXEC_CMDLINE: + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) + return false; + + if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR)) + return false; + + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) + return false; + + break; case KEY_CHECK: if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) return false; -- 2.25.1