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From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pasic@linux.ibm.com,
	borntraeger@de.ibm.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
	jasowang@redhat.com, cohuck@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, david@gibson.dropbear.id.au,
	linuxram@us.ibm.com, heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com,
	gor@linux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] s390: virtio: let arch accept devices without IOMMU feature
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 12:09:01 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200629115952-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1592390637-17441-2-git-send-email-pmorel@linux.ibm.com>

On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 12:43:57PM +0200, Pierre Morel wrote:
> An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
> access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
> use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
> Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices
> without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.

I agree it's a bit misleading. Protection is enforced by memory
encryption, you can't trust the hypervisor to report the bit correctly
so using that as a securoty measure would be pointless.
The real gain here is that broken configs are easier to
debug.

Here's an attempt at a better description:

	On some architectures, guest knows that VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM is
	required for virtio to function: e.g. this is the case on s390 protected
	virt guests, since otherwise guest passes encrypted guest memory to devices,
	which the device can't read. Without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM the
	result is that affected memory (or even a whole page containing
	it is corrupted). Detect and fail probe instead - that is easier
	to debug.

however, now that we have described what it is (hypervisor
misconfiguration) I ask a question: can we be sure this will never
ever work? E.g. what if some future hypervisor gains ability to
access the protected guest memory in some abstractly secure manner?
We are blocking this here, and it's hard to predict the future,
and a broken hypervisor can always find ways to crash the guest ...

IMHO it would be safer to just print a warning.
What do you think?



> 
> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
> ---
>  arch/s390/mm/init.c     |  6 ++++++
>  drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/virtio.h  |  2 ++
>  3 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/init.c b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
> index 6dc7c3b60ef6..215070c03226 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/mm/init.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/mm/init.c
> @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
>  #include <asm/kasan.h>
>  #include <asm/dma-mapping.h>
>  #include <asm/uv.h>
> +#include <linux/virtio.h>
>  
>  pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD] __section(.bss..swapper_pg_dir);
>  
> @@ -161,6 +162,11 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
>  	return is_prot_virt_guest();
>  }
>  
> +int arch_needs_virtio_iommu_platform(struct virtio_device *dev)
> +{
> +	return is_prot_virt_guest();
> +}
> +
>  /* protected virtualization */
>  static void pv_init(void)
>  {
> diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c
> index a977e32a88f2..aa8e01104f86 100644
> --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio.c
> +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio.c
> @@ -167,6 +167,21 @@ void virtio_add_status(struct virtio_device *dev, unsigned int status)
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(virtio_add_status);
>  
> +/*
> + * arch_needs_virtio_iommu_platform - provide arch specific hook when finalizing
> + *				      features for VIRTIO device dev
> + * @dev: the VIRTIO device being added
> + *
> + * Permits the platform to provide architecture specific functionality when
> + * devices features are finalized. This is the default implementation.
> + * Architecture implementations can override this.
> + */
> +
> +int __weak arch_needs_virtio_iommu_platform(struct virtio_device *dev)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev)
>  {
>  	int ret = dev->config->finalize_features(dev);
> @@ -179,6 +194,13 @@ int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev)
>  	if (!virtio_has_feature(dev, VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1))
>  		return 0;
>  
> +	if (arch_needs_virtio_iommu_platform(dev) &&
> +		!virtio_has_feature(dev, VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM)) {
> +		dev_warn(&dev->dev,
> +			 "virtio: device must provide VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM\n");
> +		return -ENODEV;
> +	}
> +
>  	virtio_add_status(dev, VIRTIO_CONFIG_S_FEATURES_OK);
>  	status = dev->config->get_status(dev);
>  	if (!(status & VIRTIO_CONFIG_S_FEATURES_OK)) {
> diff --git a/include/linux/virtio.h b/include/linux/virtio.h
> index a493eac08393..e8526ae3463e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/virtio.h
> +++ b/include/linux/virtio.h
> @@ -195,4 +195,6 @@ void unregister_virtio_driver(struct virtio_driver *drv);
>  #define module_virtio_driver(__virtio_driver) \
>  	module_driver(__virtio_driver, register_virtio_driver, \
>  			unregister_virtio_driver)
> +
> +int arch_needs_virtio_iommu_platform(struct virtio_device *dev);
>  #endif /* _LINUX_VIRTIO_H */
> -- 
> 2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-29 19:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-17 10:43 [PATCH v3 0/1] s390: virtio: let arch choose to accept devices without IOMMU feature Pierre Morel
2020-06-17 10:43 ` [PATCH v3 1/1] s390: virtio: let arch " Pierre Morel
2020-06-17 11:22   ` Heiko Carstens
2020-06-17 11:59     ` Pierre Morel
2020-06-17 13:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2020-06-17 14:12     ` Pierre Morel
2020-06-17 22:29   ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-19  9:20     ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-19 12:02       ` Halil Pasic
2020-06-29 13:15         ` Pierre Morel
2020-06-29 13:14       ` Pierre Morel
2020-06-29 13:44         ` Cornelia Huck
2020-06-29 16:10           ` Pierre Morel
2020-06-29 13:21     ` Pierre Morel
2020-06-29 15:57   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-29 16:05     ` Cornelia Huck
2020-07-02 13:03       ` Pierre Morel
2020-07-06 13:37         ` Pierre Morel
2020-07-06 14:33           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-07-06 15:01             ` Pierre Morel
2020-06-29 16:09     ` Pierre Morel
2020-06-29 16:09   ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2020-06-29 16:48     ` Pierre Morel
2020-06-29 21:18       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2020-06-30  7:08         ` Cornelia Huck

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