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From: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
	Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org,
	Raj Ashok <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
	lalithambika.krishnakumar@intel.com,
	Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>,
	Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>,
	Prashant Malani <pmalani@google.com>,
	Benson Leung <bleung@google.com>, Todd Broch <tbroch@google.com>,
	Alex Levin <levinale@google.com>,
	Mattias Nissler <mnissler@google.com>,
	Rajat Jain <rajatxjain@gmail.com>,
	Bernie Keany <bernie.keany@intel.com>,
	Aaron Durbin <adurbin@google.com>,
	Diego Rivas <diegorivas@google.com>,
	Duncan Laurie <dlaurie@google.com>,
	Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>,
	Jesse Barnes <jsbarnes@google.com>,
	Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me>,
	Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	oohall@gmail.com, Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/7] Tighten PCI security, expose dev location in sysfs
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2020 21:49:36 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200630044943.3425049-1-rajatja@google.com> (raw)

This is a set of loosely related patches most of whom emerged out of
discussion in the following threads. In a nutshell the goal was to allow
an administrator to specify which driver he wants to allow on external
ports, and a strategy was chalked out:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20200609210400.GA1461839@bjorn-Precision-5520/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20200618184621.GA446639@kroah.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20200627050225.GA226238@kroah.com/

* The first 3 patches tighten the PCI security using ACS, and take care
  of a border case.
* The 4th patch takes care of PCI bug.
* 5th and 6th patches expose a device's location into the sysfs to allow
  admin to make decision based on that.
* 7th patch is to ensure that the external devices don't bind to drivers
  during boot.

Rajat Jain (7):
  PCI: Keep the ACS capability offset in device
  PCI: Set "untrusted" flag for truly external devices only
  PCI/ACS: Enable PCI_ACS_TB for untrusted/external-facing devices
  PCI: Add device even if driver attach failed
  driver core: Add device location to "struct device" and expose it in
    sysfs
  PCI: Move pci_dev->untrusted logic to use device location instead
  PCI: Add parameter to disable attaching external devices

 drivers/base/core.c         | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++---------
 drivers/pci/ats.c           |  2 +-
 drivers/pci/bus.c           | 13 ++++++------
 drivers/pci/of.c            |  2 +-
 drivers/pci/p2pdma.c        |  2 +-
 drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c      | 13 ++++++------
 drivers/pci/pci-driver.c    |  1 +
 drivers/pci/pci.c           | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 drivers/pci/pci.h           |  3 ++-
 drivers/pci/probe.c         | 20 +++++++++++-------
 drivers/pci/quirks.c        | 19 +++++++++++++----
 include/linux/device.h      | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/device/bus.h  |  8 +++++++
 include/linux/pci.h         | 13 ++++++------
 15 files changed, 191 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)

-- 
2.27.0.212.ge8ba1cc988-goog


             reply	other threads:[~2020-06-30  4:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-30  4:49 Rajat Jain [this message]
2020-06-30  4:49 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] PCI: Keep the ACS capability offset in device Rajat Jain
2020-07-06 15:58   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-07-06 22:16     ` Rajat Jain
2020-07-06 23:18       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-06-30  4:49 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] PCI: Set "untrusted" flag for truly external devices only Rajat Jain
2020-06-30  7:38   ` Lu Baolu
2020-06-30  7:55   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-06 16:41     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-07-06 18:48       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-06 16:38   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-07-06 22:31     ` Rajat Jain
2020-07-06 23:30       ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-07-06 23:40         ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-30  4:49 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] PCI/ACS: Enable PCI_ACS_TB for untrusted/external-facing devices Rajat Jain
2020-07-06 16:45   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-07-06 23:12     ` Rajat Jain
2020-07-06 17:07   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2020-07-06 23:19     ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-30  4:49 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] PCI: Add device even if driver attach failed Rajat Jain
2020-06-30  8:02   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-06 23:35     ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-30  4:49 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] driver core: Add device location to "struct device" and expose it in sysfs Rajat Jain
2020-06-30  8:01   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-30 10:49   ` Heikki Krogerus
2020-06-30 12:52     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-30 13:00       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2020-06-30 15:38         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-30 16:08           ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2020-06-30 17:00             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-01 18:06               ` Rajat Jain
2020-07-02  5:23                 ` Oliver O'Halloran
2020-07-02  7:32                   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-02  8:40                     ` Oliver O'Halloran
2020-07-02  8:52                       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-02  8:53                         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-07-07  6:03                   ` Rajat Jain
2020-06-30 17:43   ` Saravana Kannan
2020-06-30  4:49 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] PCI: Move pci_dev->untrusted logic to use device location instead Rajat Jain
2020-06-30  7:39   ` Lu Baolu
2020-06-30  4:49 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] PCI: Add parameter to disable attaching external devices Rajat Jain
2020-07-04 11:44 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] Tighten PCI security, expose dev location in sysfs Pavel Machek
2020-07-06 22:18   ` Rajat Jain

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