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From: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	KarimAllah Raslan <karahmed@amazon.de>,
	Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/3] Allow user space to restrict and augment MSR emulation
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 23:49:44 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200731214947.16885-1-graf@amazon.com> (raw)

While tying to add support for the MSR_CORE_THREAD_COUNT MSR in KVM,
I realized that we were still in a world where user space has no control
over what happens with MSR emulation in KVM.

That is bad for multiple reasons. In my case, I wanted to emulate the
MSR in user space, because it's a CPU specific register that does not
exist on older CPUs and that really only contains informational data that
is on the package level, so it's a natural fit for user space to provide
it.

However, it is also bad on a platform compatibility level. Currrently,
KVM has no way to expose different MSRs based on the selected target CPU
type.

This patch set introduces a way for user space to indicate to KVM which
MSRs should be handled in kernel space. With that, we can solve part of
the platform compatibility story. Or at least we can not handle AMD specific
MSRs on an Intel platform and vice versa.

In addition, it introduces a way for user space to get into the loop
when an MSR access would generate a #GP fault, such as when KVM finds an
MSR that is not handled by the in-kernel MSR emulation or when the guest
is trying to access reserved registers.

In combination with the allow list, the user space trapping allows us
to emulate arbitrary MSRs in user space, paving the way for target CPU
specific MSR implementations from user space.

v1 -> v2:

  - s/ETRAP_TO_USER_SPACE/ENOENT/g
  - deflect all #GP injection events to user space, not just unknown MSRs.
    That was we can also deflect allowlist errors later
  - fix emulator case
  - new patch: KVM: x86: Introduce allow list for MSR emulation
  - new patch: KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling

v2 -> v3:

  - return r if r == X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED
  - s/KVM_EXIT_RDMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR/g
  - s/KVM_EXIT_WRMSR/KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR/g
  - Use complete_userspace_io logic instead of reply field
  - Simplify trapping code
  - document flags for KVM_X86_ADD_MSR_ALLOWLIST
  - generalize exit path, always unlock when returning
  - s/KVM_CAP_ADD_MSR_ALLOWLIST/KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_ALLOWLIST/g
  - Add KVM_X86_CLEAR_MSR_ALLOWLIST
  - Add test to clear whitelist
  - Adjust to reply-less API
  - Fix asserts
  - Actually trap on MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL writes

Alexander Graf (3):
  KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space
  KVM: x86: Introduce allow list for MSR emulation
  KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling

 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst                | 153 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h               |  16 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h               |  15 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c                        |  18 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                            | 241 +++++++++++++++++-
 include/trace/events/kvm.h                    |   2 +-
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |  15 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile          |   1 +
 .../selftests/kvm/x86_64/user_msr_test.c      | 221 ++++++++++++++++
 9 files changed, 675 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/user_msr_test.c

-- 
2.17.1




Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879




             reply	other threads:[~2020-07-31 21:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-31 21:49 Alexander Graf [this message]
2020-07-31 21:49 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] KVM: x86: Deflect unknown MSR accesses to user space Alexander Graf
2020-07-31 23:36   ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-03 10:08     ` Alexander Graf
2020-08-03 11:27   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-08-03 11:34     ` Alexander Graf
2020-07-31 21:49 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] KVM: x86: Introduce allow list for MSR emulation Alexander Graf
2020-08-03 11:37   ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-08-03 20:50     ` Alexander Graf
2020-08-03 21:23       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-07-31 21:49 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] KVM: selftests: Add test for user space MSR handling Alexander Graf

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