From: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC 5/7] KVM: MMU: Add support for PKS emulation
Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2020 16:48:39 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200807084841.7112-6-chenyi.qiang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200807084841.7112-1-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Advertise pkr_mask to cache the conditions where pretection key checks
for supervisor pages are needed. When the accessed pages are those with
a translation for which the U/S flag is 0 in at least one
paging-structure entry controlling the translation, they are the
supervisor pages and PKRS enforces the access rights check.
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 +++---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 12 ++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++----------------
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 6b739d0d1c97..736e56e023d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -422,10 +422,10 @@ struct kvm_mmu {
u8 permissions[16];
/*
- * The pkru_mask indicates if protection key checks are needed. It
- * consists of 16 domains indexed by page fault error code bits [4:1],
- * with PFEC.RSVD replaced by ACC_USER_MASK from the page tables.
- * Each domain has 2 bits which are ANDed with AD and WD from PKRU.
+ * The pkr_mask indicates if protection key checks are needed.
+ * It consists of 16 domains indexed by page fault error code
+ * bits[4:1]. Each domain has 2 bits which are ANDed with AD
+ * and WD from PKRU/PKRS.
*/
u32 pkr_mask;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index 7fb4c63d5704..b840b2d9ee9f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -195,15 +195,19 @@ static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
WARN_ON(pfec & (PFERR_PK_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK));
if (unlikely(mmu->pkr_mask)) {
u32 pkr_bits, offset;
+ u64 pkrs;
/*
- * PKRU defines 32 bits, there are 16 domains and 2
- * attribute bits per domain in pkru. pte_pkey is the
- * index of the protection domain, so pte_pkey * 2 is
- * is the index of the first bit for the domain.
+ * PKRU and PKRS both define 32 bits. There are 16 domains
+ * and 2 attribute bits per domain in them. pte_key is the
+ * index of the protection domain, so pte_pkey * 2 is the
+ * index of the first bit for the domain. The choice of
+ * PKRU and PKRS is determined by the accessed pages.
*/
if (pte_access & PT_USER_MASK)
pkr_bits = (vcpu->arch.pkru >> (pte_pkey * 2)) & 3;
+ else if (!kvm_get_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PKRS, &pkrs))
+ pkr_bits = (pkrs >> (pte_pkey * 2)) & 3;
else
pkr_bits = 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 333b4da739f8..845aea86b138 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4693,28 +4693,29 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
/*
-* PKU is an additional mechanism by which the paging controls access to
-* user-mode addresses based on the value in the PKRU register. Protection
-* key violations are reported through a bit in the page fault error code.
+* Protection Keys (PKEY) is an additional mechanism by which
+* the paging controls access to user-mode/supervisor-mode address
+* based on the values in PKEY registers (PKRU/PKRS). Protection key
+* violations are reported through a bit in the page fault error code.
* Unlike other bits of the error code, the PK bit is not known at the
* call site of e.g. gva_to_gpa; it must be computed directly in
-* permission_fault based on two bits of PKRU, on some machine state (CR4,
-* CR0, EFER, CPL), and on other bits of the error code and the page tables.
+* permission_fault based on two bits of PKRU/PKRS, on some machine
+* state (CR4, CR0, EFER, CPL), and on other bits of the error code
+* and the page tables.
*
* In particular the following conditions come from the error code, the
* page tables and the machine state:
-* - PK is always zero unless CR4.PKE=1 and EFER.LMA=1
+* - PK is always zero unless CR4.PKE=1/CR4.PKS=1 and EFER.LMA=1
* - PK is always zero if RSVD=1 (reserved bit set) or F=1 (instruction fetch)
-* - PK is always zero if U=0 in the page tables
-* - PKRU.WD is ignored if CR0.WP=0 and the access is a supervisor access.
+* - (PKRU/PKRS).WD is ignored if CR0.WP=0 and the access is a supervisor access.
*
-* The PKRU bitmask caches the result of these four conditions. The error
-* code (minus the P bit) and the page table's U bit form an index into the
-* PKRU bitmask. Two bits of the PKRU bitmask are then extracted and ANDed
-* with the two bits of the PKRU register corresponding to the protection key.
-* For the first three conditions above the bits will be 00, thus masking
-* away both AD and WD. For all reads or if the last condition holds, WD
-* only will be masked away.
+* The pkr_mask caches the result of these three conditions. The error
+* code (minus the P bit) forms an index into the pkr_mask. Both PKU and
+* PKS shares the same bitmask. Two bits of the pkr_mask are then extracted
+* and ANDed with the two bits of the PKEY register corresponding to
+* the protection key. For the first two conditions above the bits will be 00,
+* thus masking away both AD and WD. For all reads or if the last condition
+* holds, WD only will be masked away.
*/
static void update_pkr_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
bool ept)
@@ -4727,8 +4728,9 @@ static void update_pkr_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
return;
}
- /* PKEY is enabled only if CR4.PKE and EFER.LMA are both set. */
- if (!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) || !is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
+ /* PKEY is enabled only if CR4.PKE/CR4.PKS and EFER.LMA are both set. */
+ if ((!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) &&
+ !kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKS)) || !is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
mmu->pkr_mask = 0;
return;
}
@@ -4757,14 +4759,14 @@ static void update_pkr_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
check_pkey = (!ff && !rsvdf);
/*
- * write access is controlled by PKRU if it is a
- * user access or CR0.WP = 1.
+ * write access is controlled by PKRU/PKRS if
+ * it is a user access or CR0.WP = 1.
*/
check_write = check_pkey && wf && (uf || wp);
- /* PKRU.AD stops both read and write access. */
+ /* PKRU/PKRS.AD stops both read and write access. */
pkey_bits = !!check_pkey;
- /* PKRU.WD stops write access. */
+ /* PKRU/PKRS.WD stops write access. */
pkey_bits |= (!!check_write) << 1;
mmu->pkr_mask |= (pkey_bits & 3) << pfec;
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-07 8:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-07 8:48 [RFC 0/7] KVM: PKS Virtualization support Chenyi Qiang
2020-08-07 8:48 ` [RFC 1/7] KVM: VMX: Introduce PKS VMCS fields Chenyi Qiang
2020-08-10 23:17 ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-07 8:48 ` [RFC 2/7] KVM: VMX: Expose IA32_PKRS MSR Chenyi Qiang
2020-08-12 21:21 ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-13 5:42 ` Chenyi Qiang
2020-08-13 17:31 ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-18 7:27 ` Chenyi Qiang
2020-08-18 18:23 ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-22 3:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-26 18:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-27 7:55 ` Chenyi Qiang
2021-02-01 9:53 ` Chenyi Qiang
2021-02-01 10:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-07 8:48 ` [RFC 3/7] KVM: MMU: Rename the pkru to pkr Chenyi Qiang
2021-01-26 18:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-07 8:48 ` [RFC 4/7] KVM: MMU: Refactor pkr_mask to cache condition Chenyi Qiang
2021-01-26 18:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-27 3:14 ` Chenyi Qiang
2020-08-07 8:48 ` Chenyi Qiang [this message]
2021-01-26 18:23 ` [RFC 5/7] KVM: MMU: Add support for PKS emulation Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-27 3:00 ` Chenyi Qiang
2021-01-27 8:37 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-07 8:48 ` [RFC 6/7] KVM: X86: Expose PKS to guest and userspace Chenyi Qiang
2020-08-13 19:04 ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-14 2:33 ` Chenyi Qiang
2020-09-30 4:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-26 18:24 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-26 19:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-01-26 20:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-08-07 8:48 ` [RFC 7/7] KVM: VMX: Enable PKS for nested VM Chenyi Qiang
2020-08-11 0:05 ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-12 15:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-12 18:32 ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-13 4:52 ` Chenyi Qiang
2020-08-13 17:52 ` Jim Mattson
2020-08-14 10:07 ` Chenyi Qiang
2020-08-14 17:34 ` Jim Mattson
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