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From: Mike Rapoport <>
To: Andrew Morton <>
Cc: Alexander Viro <>,
	Andy Lutomirski <>, Arnd Bergmann <>,
	Borislav Petkov <>,
	Catalin Marinas <>,
	Christopher Lameter <>,
	Dan Williams <>,
	Dave Hansen <>,
	Elena Reshetova <>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <>, Idan Yaniv <>,
	Ingo Molnar <>,
	James Bottomley <>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <>,
	Matthew Wilcox <>,
	Mark Rutland <>,
	Mike Rapoport <>,
	Mike Rapoport <>,
	Michael Kerrisk <>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <>,
	Paul Walmsley <>,
	Peter Zijlstra <>,
	Thomas Gleixner <>,
	Tycho Andersen <>, Will Deacon <>,,,,,,,,,
Subject: [PATCH v4 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 17:15:48 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <> (raw)

From: Mike Rapoport <>


This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. 

v4 changes:
* rebase on v5.9-rc1
* Do not redefine PMD_PAGE_ORDER in fs/dax.c, thanks Kirill
* Make secret mappings exclusive by default and only require flags to
  memfd_secret() system call for uncached mappings, thanks again Kirill :)

v3 changes:
* Squash kernel-parameters.txt update into the commit that added the
  command line option.
* Make uncached mode explicitly selectable by architectures. For now enable
  it only on x86.

v2 changes:
* Follow Michael's suggestion and name the new system call 'memfd_secret'
* Add kernel-parameters documentation about the boot option
* Fix i386-tinyconfig regression reported by the kbuild bot.
  CONFIG_SECRETMEM now depends on !EMBEDDED to disable it on small systems
  from one side and still make it available unconditionally on
  architectures that support SET_DIRECT_MAP.

The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.

Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, 
such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is
trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants

Additionally, the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest
memory in a virtual machine host.

For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library
[1] that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to
redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret
keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is
expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the
use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with
secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give
them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the
toolkits without any need for user application modification.

I've hesitated whether to continue to use new flags to memfd_create() or to
add a new system call and I've decided to use a new system call after I've
started to look into man pages update. There would have been two completely
independent descriptions and I think it would have been very confusing.

Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows (ab)use of
the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as
well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks.

The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to
implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm
ABIs in the future.

As the fragmentation of the direct map was one of the major concerns raised
during the previous postings, I've added an amortizing cache of PMD-size
pages to each file descriptor and an ability to reserve large chunks of the
physical memory at boot time and then use this memory as an allocation pool
for the secret memory areas.


Mike Rapoport (6):
  mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
  mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
  mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant
  mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot

 arch/Kconfig                           |   7 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h        |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h      |   2 +
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h   |   1 +
 arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h        |   1 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig                       |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl |   1 +
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl |   1 +
 fs/dax.c                               |  11 +-
 include/linux/pgtable.h                |   3 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h               |   1 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h      |   7 +-
 include/uapi/linux/magic.h             |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h         |   8 +
 kernel/sys_ni.c                        |   2 +
 mm/Kconfig                             |   4 +
 mm/Makefile                            |   1 +
 mm/internal.h                          |   3 +
 mm/mmap.c                              |   5 +-
 mm/secretmem.c                         | 451 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 20 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/secretmem.h
 create mode 100644 mm/secretmem.c


             reply	other threads:[~2020-08-18 14:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-18 14:15 Mike Rapoport [this message]
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant Mike Rapoport
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 5/6] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation Mike Rapoport
2020-08-18 14:15 ` [PATCH v4 6/6] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot Mike Rapoport
2020-08-19 10:49   ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-19 11:53     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-08-19 12:10       ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-19 17:33         ` Mike Rapoport
2020-08-19 17:45           ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-20 15:52             ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-08  9:09               ` David Hildenbrand
2020-09-08 12:31                 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-08-19 10:47 ` [PATCH v4 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas David Hildenbrand
2020-08-19 11:42   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-08-19 12:05     ` David Hildenbrand
2020-08-26 11:01 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-09-03  7:46 ` Mike Rapoport

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