From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-20.4 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A4D9C433E1 for ; Sat, 22 Aug 2020 00:38:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B6A92072D for ; Sat, 22 Aug 2020 00:38:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="EXmMl8AD" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726991AbgHVAit (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 Aug 2020 20:38:49 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:39356 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726906AbgHVAip (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 Aug 2020 20:38:45 -0400 Received: from tusharsu-Ubuntu.lan (c-71-197-163-6.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [71.197.163.6]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1CDEA20B490D; Fri, 21 Aug 2020 17:38:43 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 1CDEA20B490D DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1598056723; bh=1x024vbFSoeKtXP/E5IWzkmZnPo+YBzXbBC68lCFXOA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=EXmMl8ADQv0QeKrIFS/WuoZsyY1tD/bBRL2sqKb0y5Fa3nXVMIHJRLIbHZ7RP7Sut /sEYFxF+A1dArqob7KJGJL47wI4vmHnadkz2qMLTo3bXOKOmMjm5WIHpfBFfMavmLX 73NJ3hltz8bx49ZJWscvCoChks3YVMeFK3IkIeGo= From: Tushar Sugandhi To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v2 2/2] dm-crypt: collect data and submit to DM to measure Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 17:38:34 -0700 Message-Id: <20200822003834.5696-3-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20200822003834.5696-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20200822003834.5696-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Currently, dm-crypt does not take advantage of IMA measuring capabilities, and ultimately the benefits of remote attestation. Measure various dm-crypt constructs by calling various device-mapper functions - dm_ima_*() that use IMA measuring capabilities. Implement ima_measure_dm_crypt_data() to measure various dm-crypt constructs. Ensure that ima_measure_dm_crypt_data() is non intrusive, i.e. failures in this function and the call-stack below should not affect the core functionality of dm-crypt. A demonstrative usage of above functionality on a system: If the IMA policy contains the following rule: measure func=CRITICAL_DATA data_sources=dm-crypt template=ima-buf and, the following commands are used to setup a crypt target: #key="faf453b4ee938cff2f0d2c869a0b743f59125c0a37f5bcd8f1dbbd911a78abaa" #arg="'0 1953125 crypt aes-xts-plain64 " #arg="$arg $key 0 " #arg="$arg /dev/loop0 0 1 allow_discards'" #tgt_name="test-crypt" #cmd="dmsetup create $tgt_name --table $arg" #eval $cmd then, the IMA log at /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements should contain the dm-crypt measurements. And, the following IMA log entry should be added in the IMA log, ima-buf sha1:4cbca71967d6b48e13ff5283d8e657899b005f70 1597518359:539244018:dm-crypt:add_target 74695f6e756d5f646973636172645f62696f733d313b7065725f62696f5f646 174615f73697a653d3830383b646d7265715f73746172743d3136383b74666d 735f636f756e743d313b6f6e5f6469736b5f7461675f73697a653d303b696e7 46567726974795f69765f73697a653d303b696e746567726974795f7461675f 73697a653d303b69765f73697a653d31363b69765f6f66667365743d303b736 563746f725f73686966743d303b736563746f725f73697a653d3531323b666c 6167733d323b6369706865725f666c6167733d303b73746172743d303b6b657 95f6d61635f73697a653d303b6b65795f65787472615f73697a653d303b6b65 795f70617274733d313b6b65795f73697a653d33323b6369706865725f73747 2696e673d6165732d7874732d706c61696e36343b6465766963655f6e616d65 3d3235333a303b where, the ascii representation of the above data is: ti_num_discard_bios=1;per_bio_data_size=808;dmreq_start=168; tfms_count=1;on_disk_tag_size=0;integrity_iv_size=0; integrity_tag_size=0;iv_size=16;iv_offset=0;sector_shift=0; sector_size=512;flags=2;cipher_flags=0;start=0;key_mac_size=0; key_extra_size=0;key_parts=1;key_size=32; cipher_string=aes-xts-plain64;device_name=253:0; Some of the above values can be verified using: #dmsetup table --showkeys where, the output of the command should be similar to: test-crypt: 0 1953125 crypt aes-xts-plain64 faf453b4ee938cff2f0d2c869a0b743f59125c0a37f5bcd8f1dbbd911a78abaa 0 7:0 0 1 allow_discards Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi --- drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 170 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 3 +- 2 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c index 000ddfab5ba0..aaca9594ec98 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c @@ -2465,6 +2465,8 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti) ti->private = NULL; + dm_ima_exit_measurements(ti->type); + if (!cc) return; @@ -2908,6 +2910,166 @@ static int crypt_ctr_optional(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **ar return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +/* + * append integer values to dm-crypt specific data + * to be measured through IMA + */ +static int ima_append_num_values(struct dm_target *ti, + const char *key, + long long num_val) +{ + char *num_str = NULL; + int length = 0; + int r = 0; + + if (!ti || !key) { + r = -EINVAL; + goto error; + } + + length = snprintf(NULL, 0, "%lld", num_val); + num_str = kzalloc(length + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!num_str) { + r = -ENOMEM; + goto error; + } + snprintf(num_str, length + 1, "%lld", num_val); + dm_ima_append_measurement_list(ti->type, + key, + (const void *)num_str, + length); + kzfree(num_str); + return r; +error: + DMERR("appending num values to IMA measurement list failed %d", r); + return r; +} +/* + * Measure dm-crypt specific data through IMA. + * It appends all the needed data to the list as a key-val pair using + * dm_ima_append_measurement_list() and internal ima_append_num_values(), + * and finally measures the list using dm_ima_finalize_and_measure(). + */ +static void ima_measure_dm_crypt_data(struct dm_target *ti, const char *desc) +{ + int r = 0; + struct crypt_config *cc = NULL; + const char *devname = dm_table_device_name(ti->table); + + if (!ti) { + r = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + cc = ti->private; + + if (devname) { + dm_ima_append_measurement_list(ti->type, + "device_name", + (const void *)devname, + strlen(devname)); + } + + if (cc->cipher_string) { + dm_ima_append_measurement_list(ti->type, + "cipher_string", + (const void *)cc->cipher_string, + strlen(cc->cipher_string)); + } + + if (cc->cipher_auth) { + dm_ima_append_measurement_list(ti->type, + "cipher_auth", + (const void *)cc->cipher_auth, + strlen(cc->cipher_auth)); + } + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "key_size", cc->key_size); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "key_parts", cc->key_parts); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "key_extra_size", cc->key_extra_size); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "key_mac_size", cc->key_mac_size); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "start", cc->start); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "cipher_flags", cc->cipher_flags); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "flags", cc->flags); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "sector_size", cc->sector_size); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "sector_shift", cc->sector_shift); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "iv_offset", cc->iv_offset); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "iv_size", cc->iv_size); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "integrity_tag_size", cc->integrity_tag_size); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "integrity_iv_size", cc->integrity_iv_size); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "on_disk_tag_size", cc->on_disk_tag_size); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "tfms_count", cc->tfms_count); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "dmreq_start", cc->dmreq_start); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "per_bio_data_size", cc->per_bio_data_size); + if (r) + goto out; + + r = ima_append_num_values(ti, "ti_num_discard_bios", + ti->num_discard_bios); + if (r) + goto out; + + dm_ima_finalize_and_measure(ti->type, desc, false); + return; + +out: + DMERR("IMA measurement of dm-crypt data failed %d", r); + +} +#else +static inline void ima_measure_dm_crypt_data(struct dm_target *ti, + const char *desc) {} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ + /* * Construct an encryption mapping: * [|:::] @@ -3093,6 +3255,10 @@ static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv) ti->num_flush_bios = 1; + dm_ima_init_measurements(ti->type); + + ima_measure_dm_crypt_data(ti, "add_target"); + return 0; bad: @@ -3225,6 +3391,8 @@ static void crypt_postsuspend(struct dm_target *ti) struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; set_bit(DM_CRYPT_SUSPENDED, &cc->flags); + + ima_measure_dm_crypt_data(ti, "post_suspend"); } static int crypt_preresume(struct dm_target *ti) @@ -3244,6 +3412,8 @@ static void crypt_resume(struct dm_target *ti) struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private; clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_SUSPENDED, &cc->flags); + + ima_measure_dm_crypt_data(ti, "resume"); } /* Message interface diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index bc2adab7bae2..2078db4c16e2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -324,8 +324,7 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS config IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_DATA bool - depends on IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on (IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) || DM_CRYPT default y config IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT -- 2.17.1