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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Cc: luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	willy@infradead.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	shuah@kernel.org, kernel@collabora.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2020 12:44:21 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202009221243.6BC5635E@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200904203147.2908430-2-krisman@collabora.com>

On Fri, Sep 04, 2020 at 04:31:39PM -0400, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi wrote:
> Convert TIF_SECCOMP into a generic TI flag for any syscall interception
> work being done by the kernel.  The actual type of work is exposed by a
> new flag field outside of thread_info.  This ensures that the
> syscall_intercept field is only accessed if struct seccomp has to be
> accessed already, such that it doesn't incur in a much higher cost to
> the seccomp path.
> 
> In order to avoid modifying every architecture at once, this patch has a
> transition mechanism, such that architectures that define TIF_SECCOMP
> continue to work by ignoring the syscall_intercept flag, as long as they
> don't support other syscall interception mechanisms like the future
> syscall user dispatch.  When migrating TIF_SECCOMP to
> TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT, they should adopt the semantics of checking the
> syscall_intercept flag, like it is done in the common entry syscall
> code, or even better, migrate to the common syscall entry code.

Can we "eat" all the other flags like ptrace, audit, etc, too? Doing
this only for seccomp seems strange.

-- 
Kees Cook

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-09-22 19:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-04 20:31 [PATCH v6 0/9] Syscall User Dispatch Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-07 10:16   ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-08  4:59     ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-22 19:42       ` Kees Cook
2020-09-23 20:28         ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-11  9:32   ` peterz
2020-09-11 20:08     ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-24 11:24       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-22 19:44   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-09-23 20:18     ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-23 20:49       ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25  8:00         ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-09-25 16:15           ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-25 20:30             ` Kees Cook
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 2/9] kernel: entry: Support TIF_SYSCAL_INTERCEPT on common entry code Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-07 10:16   ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-11  9:35   ` peterz
2020-09-11 20:11     ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 3/9] x86: vdso: Expose sigreturn address on vdso to the kernel Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-22 19:40   ` Kees Cook
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 4/9] signal: Expose SYS_USER_DISPATCH si_code type Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-07 10:15   ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-22 19:39   ` Kees Cook
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 5/9] kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-05 11:24   ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-11  9:44   ` peterz
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 6/9] kernel: entry: Support Syscall User Dispatch for common syscall entry Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-07 10:15   ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-07 14:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-07 14:25       ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-07 20:20         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-11  9:46   ` peterz
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 7/9] x86: Enable Syscall User Dispatch Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-22 19:37   ` Kees Cook
2020-09-23 20:23     ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 8/9] selftests: Add kselftest for syscall user dispatch Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-22 19:35   ` Kees Cook
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 9/9] doc: Document Syscall User Dispatch Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-22 19:35   ` Kees Cook

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