From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CCE7EC4363D for ; Fri, 25 Sep 2020 17:12:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 76A9220936 for ; Fri, 25 Sep 2020 17:12:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729445AbgIYRMo (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Sep 2020 13:12:44 -0400 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:29630 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727874AbgIYRMn (ORCPT ); Fri, 25 Sep 2020 13:12:43 -0400 IronPort-SDR: 3TGoqDEj0bB4Rze2/OUfoQwqRxXZclznBrj6ghRjA3BaBNUocFf0nJbjNSu4Xc6krmMnqD6ekE fqNdkvDAzfNQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9755"; a="158942356" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,302,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="158942356" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Sep 2020 07:57:31 -0700 IronPort-SDR: 1Hb9j2LyV9QwAOiAqYpd5eKTmtyJUtzDG4aN/F1NWOJroAq0GcWjvgA6Xm99qHKtgu0W8dCXc/ a4ykrY2aCpTw== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,302,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="487499277" Received: from yyu32-desk.sc.intel.com ([143.183.136.146]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Sep 2020 07:57:31 -0700 From: Yu-cheng Yu To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue , Dave Martin , Weijiang Yang , Pengfei Xu Cc: Yu-cheng Yu Subject: [PATCH v13 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 07:56:49 -0700 Message-Id: <20200925145649.5438-27-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20200925145649.5438-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> References: <20200925145649.5438-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API: an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect(). Each has its advantages and compromises. An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86 arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in registers [1], but no active discussion on that. A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of mmap()/mprotect(). The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to VM_SHSTK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing the wheel. There are potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the attacker would have to get to the syscall first. Since arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() is modified, I have moved arch_vm_get_page _prot() and arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to x86/include/asm/mman.h. This will be more consistent with other architectures. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu --- v13: - Add VM_SHSTK to VM_ARCH_CLEAR. arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 28 ++--------- include/linux/mm.h | 1 + include/linux/mman.h | 8 ++++ mm/mmap.c | 8 +++- mm/mprotect.c | 4 ++ 6 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5cd6040d5c10 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H + +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS +/* + * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags + * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in + * to a pte. + * + * Only override these if Protection Keys are available + * (which is only on 64-bit). + */ +#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ + ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) + +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \ + ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ + ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) +#else +#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0) +#endif + +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot, + unsigned long pkey) +{ + unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey); + + if (!(prot & PROT_WRITE) && (prot & PROT_SHSTK)) + vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHSTK; + + return vm_prot_bits; +} +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) + +static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr) +{ + unsigned long supported = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM; + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER) && + static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && (prot & PROT_SHSTK)) { + + supported |= PROT_SHSTK; + + /* + * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only + * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write + * instructions). PROT_SHSTK and PROT_WRITE are mutually + * exclusive. + */ + supported &= ~PROT_WRITE; + } + + return (prot & ~supported) == 0; +} +#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot + +static inline bool arch_vma_can_mprot(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long prot) +{ + bool can_mprot; + + /* + * Function call stack should not be backed by a file or shared. + */ + can_mprot = !(prot & PROT_SHSTK) || + !(vma->vm_file || (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)); + return can_mprot; +} +#define arch_vma_can_mprot arch_vma_can_mprot + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h index d4a8d0424bfb..39bb7db344a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h @@ -1,31 +1,11 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ -#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H -#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H +#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H #define MAP_32BIT 0x40 /* only give out 32bit addresses */ -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS -/* - * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags - * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in - * to a pte. - * - * Only override these if Protection Keys are available - * (which is only on 64-bit). - */ -#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ - ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) - -#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \ - ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \ - ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0)) -#endif +#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10 /* shadow stack pages */ #include -#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ +#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 9b6a0f22cd89..da4f7d3a14b7 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); #if defined(CONFIG_X86) # define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ +# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SHSTK #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC) # define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */ #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC) diff --git a/include/linux/mman.h b/include/linux/mman.h index 6f34c33075f9..4d776adb0fdf 100644 --- a/include/linux/mman.h +++ b/include/linux/mman.h @@ -103,6 +103,14 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr) #define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot #endif +#ifndef arch_vma_can_mprot +/* + * Allow architectures to check if the vma can support the new + * protection. + */ +#define arch_vma_can_mprot(vma, prot) true +#endif + /* * Optimisation macro. It is equivalent to: * (x & bit1) ? bit2 : 0 diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 81d4a00092da..4c403dfccff0 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -1445,6 +1445,12 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); unsigned long flags_mask; + /* + * Call stack cannot be backed by a file. + */ + if (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK) + return -EINVAL; + if (!file_mmap_ok(file, inode, pgoff, len)) return -EOVERFLOW; @@ -1509,7 +1515,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, } else { switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) { case MAP_SHARED: - if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP)) + if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP|VM_SHSTK)) return -EINVAL; /* * Ignore pgoff. diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c index a8edbcb3af99..cf73b59a36da 100644 --- a/mm/mprotect.c +++ b/mm/mprotect.c @@ -553,6 +553,10 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len, error = -ENOMEM; if (!vma) goto out; + if (!arch_vma_can_mprot(vma, prot)) { + error = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } prev = vma->vm_prev; if (unlikely(grows & PROT_GROWSDOWN)) { if (vma->vm_start >= end) -- 2.21.0