From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7155CC8303A for ; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 02:42:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A22120674 for ; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 02:42:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728435AbgJMBwj (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Oct 2020 21:52:39 -0400 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:56760 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726248AbgJMBwi (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Oct 2020 21:52:38 -0400 IronPort-SDR: QCDggtnZb8WFn3eGuOSJ8eHyDBy3JXGcKuwXRns018L3j6F0wUnYNcj3I7kvP1q0zjyn6jy34b tFExkvPs87XA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9772"; a="163195794" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,369,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="163195794" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Oct 2020 18:52:37 -0700 IronPort-SDR: BQdJ4I7KckKrwMHetR6HkGIDuCjoGCWcC+k6iy8SpmUWGFhJJ8ux1dqheC4iqZbIXfiQHEah5f U72KNgLDPbYg== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,369,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="530193933" Received: from lusin-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.252.53.81]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Oct 2020 18:52:32 -0700 Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 04:52:30 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Sumit Garg Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, jens.wiklander@linaro.org, corbet@lwn.net, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, janne.karhunen@gmail.com, daniel.thompson@linaro.org, Markus.Wamser@mixed-mode.de, lhinds@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 2/4] KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys Message-ID: <20201013015230.GA45644@linux.intel.com> References: <1602065268-26017-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> <1602065268-26017-3-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1602065268-26017-3-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org> Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 03:37:46PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: > Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality > to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. > > Refer to Documentation/tee.txt for detailed information about TEE. > > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg > --- > include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 55 ++++++ > security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 4 + > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 278 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 338 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h > create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tee.h b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..2e2bb15 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h > @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ > +/* > + * Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Linaro Ltd. > + * > + * Author: > + * Sumit Garg > + */ > + > +#ifndef __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H > +#define __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H > + > +#include > + > +#define DRIVER_NAME "tee-trusted-key" > + > +/* > + * Get random data for symmetric key > + * > + * [out] memref[0] Random data > + */ > +#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM 0x0 > + > +/* > + * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key > + * > + * [in] memref[0] Plain key > + * [out] memref[1] Sealed key datablob > + */ > +#define TA_CMD_SEAL 0x1 > + > +/* > + * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key > + * > + * [in] memref[0] Sealed key datablob > + * [out] memref[1] Plain key > + */ > +#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL 0x2 > + > +/** > + * struct trusted_key_private - TEE Trusted key private data > + * @dev: TEE based Trusted key device. > + * @ctx: TEE context handler. > + * @session_id: Trusted key TA session identifier. > + * @shm_pool: Memory pool shared with TEE device. > + */ > +struct trusted_key_private { > + struct device *dev; > + struct tee_context *ctx; > + u32 session_id; > + struct tee_shm *shm_pool; > +}; > + > +extern struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops; > + > +#endif > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile > index 49e3bcf..012dd78 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile > @@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o > trusted-y += trusted_core.o > trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o > trusted-y += trusted_tpm2.o > +trusted-y += trusted_tee.o > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > index 71a5e27..74a3d80 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c > @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ > > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > #include > @@ -28,6 +29,9 @@ static struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { > #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) > { "tpm", &tpm_trusted_key_ops }, > #endif > +#if defined(CONFIG_TEE) > + { "tee", &tee_trusted_key_ops }, > +#endif > }; > static struct trusted_key_ops *trusted_key_ops; > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..b414d52 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c > @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 > +/* > + * Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Linaro Ltd. > + * > + * Author: > + * Sumit Garg > + */ > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > +#include > +#include > + > +static struct trusted_key_private pvt_data; > + > +/* > + * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key > + */ > +static int tee_trusted_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) Use trusted_tee_* prefix. > +{ > + int ret = 0; "int ret;" It is never used uninitialized. > + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; > + struct tee_param param[4]; > + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; > + > + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); > + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); > + > + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, > + p->key_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); > + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); > + } > + > + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, > + sizeof(p->blob), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); > + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); > + goto out; > + } > + > + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL; > + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; > + inv_arg.num_params = 4; > + > + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; > + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; > + param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len; > + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; > + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; > + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob); > + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); > + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_SEAL invoke err: %x\n", > + inv_arg.ret); > + ret = -EFAULT; > + } else { > + p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size; > + } > + > +out: > + if (reg_shm_out) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); > + if (reg_shm_in) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Have the TEE unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key > + */ > +static int tee_trusted_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) > +{ > + int ret = 0; Ditto. > + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; > + struct tee_param param[4]; > + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; > + > + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); > + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); > + > + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, > + p->blob_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); > + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); > + } > + > + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, > + sizeof(p->key), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | > + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); > + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); > + goto out; > + } > + > + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL; > + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; > + inv_arg.num_params = 4; > + > + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; > + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; > + param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len; > + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; > + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; > + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key); > + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); > + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_UNSEAL invoke err: %x\n", > + inv_arg.ret); > + ret = -EFAULT; > + } else { > + p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size; > + } > + > +out: > + if (reg_shm_out) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); > + if (reg_shm_in) > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/* > + * Have the TEE generate random symmetric key > + */ > +static int tee_trusted_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) > +{ > + int ret = 0; Ditto. > + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; > + struct tee_param param[4]; > + struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL; > + > + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); > + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); > + > + reg_shm = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)key, key_len, > + TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); > + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); > + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm); > + } > + > + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM; > + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; > + inv_arg.num_params = 4; > + > + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; > + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm; > + param[0].u.memref.size = key_len; > + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); > + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM invoke err: %x\n", > + inv_arg.ret); > + ret = -EFAULT; > + } else { > + ret = param[0].u.memref.size; > + } > + > + tee_shm_free(reg_shm); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data) > +{ > + if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE) > + return 1; > + else > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int trusted_key_probe(struct device *dev) > +{ > + struct tee_client_device *rng_device = to_tee_client_device(dev); > + int ret = 0, err = -ENODEV; > + struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg; Ditto. I'm not sure why you need both 'ret' and 'err'. > + > + memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg)); > + > + pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL, > + NULL); > + if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx)) > + return -ENODEV; > + > + memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN); > + sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL; > + sess_arg.num_params = 0; > + > + ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL); > + if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) { > + dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n", > + sess_arg.ret); > + err = -EINVAL; Couldn't you just overwrite 'ret'? > + goto out_ctx; > + } > + pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session; > + > + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto out_sess; > + > + pvt_data.dev = dev; > + > + return 0; > + > +out_sess: > + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); > +out_ctx: > + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); > + > + return err; > +} > + > +static int trusted_key_remove(struct device *dev) > +{ > + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); > + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); > + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = { > + {UUID_INIT(0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b, > + 0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c)}, > + {} > +}; > +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, trusted_key_id_table); > + > +static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = { > + .id_table = trusted_key_id_table, > + .driver = { > + .name = DRIVER_NAME, > + .bus = &tee_bus_type, > + .probe = trusted_key_probe, > + .remove = trusted_key_remove, > + }, > +}; > + > +static int __init init_tee_trusted(void) > +{ > + return driver_register(&trusted_key_driver.driver); > +} > + > +static void __exit exit_tee_trusted(void) > +{ > + driver_unregister(&trusted_key_driver.driver); > +} > + > +struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops = { > + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ > + .init = init_tee_trusted, > + .seal = tee_trusted_seal, > + .unseal = tee_trusted_unseal, > + .get_random = tee_trusted_get_random, > + .exit = exit_tee_trusted, > +}; > -- > 2.7.4 > /Jarkko