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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <kernel.org@kernel.org>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
	asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com,
	chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com,
	cyhanish@google.com, haitao.huang@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com,
	kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com, ludloff@google.com,
	nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com,
	rientjes@google.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com, mikko.ylinen@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v39 15/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2020 14:34:03 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201024113403.GA29427@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f2ff64e6-8fe1-55ee-ae7c-f19d7907d60e@intel.com>

On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 07:19:05AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 10/23/20 3:17 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 02:19:26PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> >> On 10/2/20 9:50 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> >>> + * Failure to explicitly request access to a restricted attribute will cause
> >>> + * sgx_ioc_enclave_init() to fail.  Currently, the only restricted attribute
> >>> + * is access to the PROVISION_KEY.
> >> Could we also justify why access is restricted, please?  Maybe:
> >>
> >> 	Access is restricted because PROVISION_KEY is burned uniquely
> >> 	into each each processor, making it a perfect unique identifier
> >> 	with privacy and fingerprinting implications.
> >>
> >> Are there any other reasons for doing it this way?
> > AFAIK, if I interperet the SDM correctl, PROVISION_KEY and
> > PROVISION_SEALING_KEY also have random salt added, i.e. they change
> > every boot cycle.
> > 
> > There is "RAND = yes" on those keys in Table 40-64 of Intel SDM volume
> > 3D :-)
> 
> Does that mean there are no privacy implications from access to the
> provisioning keys?  If that's true, why do we need a separate permission
> framework for creating provisioning enclaves?

As I've understood it, the key material for those keys is not even
required in the current SGX architecture, it was used in the legacy EPID
scheme, but the attribute itself is useful.

Let's assume that we have some sort of quoting enclave Q, which guards a
public key pair, which signs quotes of other enclaves. Let's assume we
have an attestation server A, which will enable some capabilities [*],
if it receives a quote signed with that public key pair.

1. E gets the report key with EGETKEY.
2. E constructs REPORTDATA (37.16) and TARGETINFO (37.17) structures.
   The former describes the enclaves contents and attributes and latter
   the target, i.e. Q in this artitificial example.
3. E calls EREPORT to generate a structure called REPORT MAC'd with the
   *targets* report key. It knows, which key to usue from REPORTDATA.
4. The runtime will then pass this to Q.
5. Q will check if ATTRIBUTE.PROVISION_KEY is set. If it is, Q will
   know that the enclave is allowed to get attested. Then it will
   sign the report with the guarded public key pair and send it to
   the attestation server.

The example is artificial, e.g. there could be something more complex,
but the idea is essentially this.

[*] With TPM and measured boot this could be to open network for a data
    center node. Quote is just the term used for a signed measurement in
    remote attestation schemes generally.

/Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2020-10-24 11:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 117+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-03  4:50 [PATCH v39 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 14:10   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-19 17:49     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 02/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 03/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 04/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 05/24] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 14:30   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-19 17:38     ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-19 17:48       ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-19 17:53         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-19 17:58           ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 06/24] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 07/24] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 08/24] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19  8:45   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 12:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2020-10-23  9:01       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 13:40     ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-23  9:03       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 09/24] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 10/24] mm: Add 'mprotect' hook to struct vm_operations_struct Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 11/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX enclave driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03 14:39   ` Greg KH
2020-10-04 14:32     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-04 15:01       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-05  9:42       ` Greg KH
2020-10-05 12:42         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07 18:09           ` Haitao Huang
2020-10-07 19:26             ` Greg KH
2020-10-09  6:44               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-14 20:16                 ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-05  8:45     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-10-05 11:42       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-05 11:50         ` Greg KH
2020-10-05 14:23           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-05 15:02             ` Greg KH
2020-10-05 16:40               ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-05 20:02                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-09  7:10     ` Pavel Machek
2020-10-09  7:21       ` Greg KH
2020-10-09  8:21         ` Pavel Machek
2020-10-03 19:54   ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-04 21:50     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-04 22:02       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-04 22:27       ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-04 23:41         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-05  1:30           ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-10-05  3:06             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 12/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-16 17:07   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-18  4:26     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 20:21       ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-19 20:48         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-16 21:25   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-18  5:03     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19  7:03       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-19 20:48       ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-19 21:15         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-19 21:44           ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-23 10:11             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 14/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 15/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-20 15:48   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-23 10:14     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-20 21:19   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-23 10:17     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-23 14:19       ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-24 11:34         ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2020-10-24 15:47           ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-24 20:23             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-27 10:38               ` Dr. Greg
2020-10-23 14:23       ` Jethro Beekman
2020-10-24 11:40         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 16/24] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  5:22   ` Haitao Huang
2020-10-03 13:32     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03 18:23       ` Haitao Huang
2020-10-04 22:39         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07 17:25           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 17/24] x86/sgx: Add ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 18/24] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 19/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 20/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-06  2:57   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-06  8:30     ` Jethro Beekman
2020-10-06 15:15       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-06 17:28         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-06 23:21           ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-07  0:22             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07  1:17               ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-07  3:14                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07  4:34                   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-07  7:39                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07  8:04                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07 15:25                       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-07 17:08                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07 17:13                           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-06 15:49       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-06 15:36     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-06 21:39     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-07  0:23       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-17  1:48   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-17 21:02     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 22/24] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-12 16:50   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03  4:50 ` [PATCH v39 24/24] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-16 21:04   ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-18  4:27     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03 14:32 ` [PATCH v39 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Greg KH
2020-10-03 14:53   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-15 19:06 ` Dave Hansen
2020-10-17 20:43   ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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