[PATCH v4 2/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add CPUID sanity check to early #VC handler

From: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>,
	Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@gmail.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 2/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add CPUID sanity check to early #VC handler
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 17:46:56 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201028164659.27002-3-joro@8bytes.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201028164659.27002-1-joro@8bytes.org>

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>

The early #VC handler which doesn't have a GHCB can only handle CPUID
exit codes. It is needed by the early boot code to handle #VC
exceptions raised in verify_cpu() and to get the position of the C
bit.

But the CPUID information comes from the hypervisor, which is untrusted
and might return results which trick the guest into the no-SEV boot path
with no C bit set in the page-tables. All data written to memory would
then be unencrypted and could leak sensitive data to the hypervisor.

Add sanity checks to the early #VC handlers to make sure the hypervisor
can not pretend that SEV is disabled.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 5f83ccaab877..56d16c405b03 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -178,6 +178,32 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
 		goto fail;
 	regs->dx = val >> 32;
 
+	/*
+	 * This is a VC handler and the #VC is only raised when SEV-ES is
+	 * active, which means SEV must be active too. Do sanity checks on the
+	 * CPUID results to make sure the hypervisor does not trick the kernel
+	 * into the no-sev path. This could map sensitive data unencrypted and
+	 * make it accessible to the hypervisor.
+	 *
+	 * In particular, check for:
+	 *	- Hypervisor CPUID bit
+	 *	- Availability of CPUID leaf 0x8000001f
+	 *	- SEV CPUID bit.
+	 *
+	 * The hypervisor might still report the wrong C-bit position, but this
+	 * can't be checked here.
+	 */
+
+	if ((fn == 1 && !(regs->cx & BIT(31))))
+		/* Hypervisor bit */
+		goto fail;
+	else if (fn == 0x80000000 && (regs->ax < 0x8000001f))
+		/* SEV Leaf check */
+		goto fail;
+	else if ((fn == 0x8000001f && !(regs->ax & BIT(1))))
+		/* SEV Bit */
+		goto fail;
+
 	/* Skip over the CPUID two-byte opcode */
 	regs->ip += 2;
 
-- 
2.28.0

