linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>, lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [GIT PULL] x86/seves fixes for v5.10-rc3
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 11:00:12 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201103100012.GA7825@zn.tnic> (raw)

Hi Linus,

please pull a couple of SEV-ES hardening fixes against a malicious
hypervisor.

Thx.

---

The following changes since commit 3650b228f83adda7e5ee532e2b90429c03f7b9ec:

  Linux 5.10-rc1 (2020-10-25 15:14:11 -0700)

are available in the Git repository at:

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git tags/x86_seves_for_v5.10_rc3

for you to fetch changes up to 2411cd82112397bfb9d8f0f19cd46c3d71e0ce67:

  x86/sev-es: Do not support MMIO to/from encrypted memory (2020-10-29 19:27:42 +0100)

----------------------------------------------------------------
A couple of changes to the SEV-ES code to perform more stringent
hypervisor checks before enabling encryption. (Joerg Roedel)

----------------------------------------------------------------
Joerg Roedel (5):
      x86/boot/compressed/64: Introduce sev_status
      x86/boot/compressed/64: Sanity-check CPUID results in the early #VC handler
      x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in 64-bit boot-path
      x86/head/64: Check SEV encryption before switching to kernel page-table
      x86/sev-es: Do not support MMIO to/from encrypted memory

 arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c |  1 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S  | 20 +++++++-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h         |  2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S               | 16 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c         | 26 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c                | 20 +++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S       | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c               |  1 +
 8 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg

             reply	other threads:[~2020-11-03 10:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-03 10:00 Borislav Petkov [this message]
2020-11-03 18:00 ` [GIT PULL] x86/seves fixes for v5.10-rc3 pr-tracker-bot

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20201103100012.GA7825@zn.tnic \
    --to=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).