[PATCH v7 0/9] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector

[PATCH v7 0/9] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector

[Marco Elver]

[ From v7 we think this series is ready to be included in the mm tree.
  Where appropriate, we would welcome additional Acks / Reviews by MM,
  x86, and arm64 maintainers. Thank you! ]

This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a
low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap
use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors.  This
series enables KFENCE for the x86 and arm64 architectures, and adds
KFENCE hooks to the SLAB and SLUB allocators.

KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near
zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance
for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with
enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically
exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a
large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large
fleet of machines.

KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or
right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object
page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected
state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page
faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault
gracefully by reporting a memory access error.

Guarded allocations are set up based on a sample interval (can be set
via kfence.sample_interval). After expiration of the sample interval,
the next allocation through the main allocator (SLAB or SLUB) returns a
guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool. At this point, the timer
is reset, and the next allocation is set up after the expiration of the
interval.

To enable/disable a KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's
fast-path without overhead, KFENCE relies on static branches via the
static keys infrastructure. The static branch is toggled to redirect the
allocation to KFENCE.

The KFENCE memory pool is of fixed size, and if the pool is exhausted no
further KFENCE allocations occur. The default config is conservative
with only 255 objects, resulting in a pool size of 2 MiB (with 4 KiB
pages).

We have verified by running synthetic benchmarks (sysbench I/O,
hackbench) and production server-workload benchmarks that a kernel with
KFENCE (using sample intervals 100-500ms) is performance-neutral
compared to a non-KFENCE baseline kernel.

KFENCE is inspired by GWP-ASan [1], a userspace tool with similar
properties. The name "KFENCE" is a homage to the Electric Fence Malloc
Debugger [2].

For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst added in the
series -- also viewable here:

	https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/kasan/kfence/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst

[1] http://llvm.org/docs/GwpAsan.html
[2] https://linux.die.net/man/3/efence

v7:
* Clean up print_diff_canary() boundary calculation.
* Cleaner CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS, using "if EXPERT".
* Make __kfence_free() part of the public API.
* Only not-present faults should be handled by KFENCE.
* Remove arm64 dependency on 4K page size.
* Move kmemleak_free_recursive() before kfence_free() in SLAB.
* Revert unused orig_size in SLUB.
* For KASAN compatibility, also skip kasan_poison_*().
* Various smaller fixes (see details in patches).

v6: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201029131649.182037-1-elver@google.com
* Record allocation and free task pids, and show them in reports. This
  information helps more easily identify e.g. racy use-after-frees.

v5: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201027141606.426816-1-elver@google.com
* Lots of smaller fixes (see details in patches).
* Optimize is_kfence_address() by using better in-range check.
* Removal of HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE_STATIC_POOL and static pool
  support in favor of memblock_alloc'd pool only, as it avoids all
  issues with virt_to translations. With the new optimizations to
  is_kfence_address(), we measure no noticeable performance impact.
* Taint with TAINT_BAD_PAGE, to distinguish memory errors from regular
  warnings (also used by SL*B/KASAN/etc. for memory errors).
* Rework sample_interval parameter dynamic setting semantics.
* Rework kfence_shutdown_cache().
* Fix obj_to_index+objs_per_slab_page, which among other things is
  required when using memcg accounted allocations.
* Rebase to 5.10-rc1.

v4: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200929133814.2834621-1-elver@google.com
* MAINTAINERS: Split out from first patch.
* Make static memory pool's attrs entirely arch-dependent.
* Fix report generation if __slab_free tail-called.
* Clarify RCU test comment [reported by Paul E. McKenney].

v3: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921132611.1700350-1-elver@google.com
* Rewrite SLAB/SLUB patch descriptions to clarify need for 'orig_size'.
* Various smaller fixes (see details in patches).

v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915132046.3332537-1-elver@google.com
* Various comment/documentation changes (see details in patches).
* Various smaller fixes (see details in patches).
* Change all reports to reference the kfence object, "kfence-#nn".
* Skip allocation/free internals stack trace.
* Rework KMEMLEAK compatibility patch.

RFC/v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907134055.2878499-1-elver@google.com

Alexander Potapenko (5):
  mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure
  x86, kfence: enable KFENCE for x86
  mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB
  mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLUB
  kfence, kasan: make KFENCE compatible with KASAN

Marco Elver (4):
  arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64
  kfence, Documentation: add KFENCE documentation
  kfence: add test suite
  MAINTAINERS: add entry for KFENCE

 Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst  |   1 +
 Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst | 297 +++++++++++
 MAINTAINERS                        |  12 +
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                 |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h    |  19 +
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c              |   4 +
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c                |   7 +-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                   |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h      |  65 +++
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                |   5 +
 include/linux/kfence.h             | 201 +++++++
 include/linux/slab_def.h           |   3 +
 include/linux/slub_def.h           |   3 +
 init/main.c                        |   3 +
 lib/Kconfig.debug                  |   1 +
 lib/Kconfig.kfence                 |  72 +++
 mm/Makefile                        |   1 +
 mm/kasan/common.c                  |  19 +
 mm/kasan/generic.c                 |   3 +-
 mm/kfence/Makefile                 |   6 +
 mm/kfence/core.c                   | 826 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/kfence/kfence.h                 | 107 ++++
 mm/kfence/kfence_test.c            | 823 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/kfence/report.c                 | 235 ++++++++
 mm/slab.c                          |  38 +-
 mm/slab_common.c                   |   5 +-
 mm/slub.c                          |  60 ++-
 27 files changed, 2792 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/kfence.h
 create mode 100644 lib/Kconfig.kfence
 create mode 100644 mm/kfence/Makefile
 create mode 100644 mm/kfence/core.c
 create mode 100644 mm/kfence/kfence.h
 create mode 100644 mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
 create mode 100644 mm/kfence/report.c

-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog

[PATCH v7 1/9] mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure

[Marco Elver]

From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a
low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap
use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors.

KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near
zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance
for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with
enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically
exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a
large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large
fleet of machines.

KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or
right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object
page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected
state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page
faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault
gracefully by reporting a memory access error. To detect out-of-bounds
writes to memory within the object's page itself, KFENCE also uses
pattern-based redzones. The following figure illustrates the page
layout:

  ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+---
     | xxxxxxxxx | O :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : O | xxxxxxxxx |
     | xxxxxxxxx | B :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : B | xxxxxxxxx |
     | x GUARD x | J : RED-  | x GUARD x | RED-  : J | x GUARD x |
     | xxxxxxxxx | E :  ZONE | xxxxxxxxx |  ZONE : E | xxxxxxxxx |
     | xxxxxxxxx | C :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : C | xxxxxxxxx |
     | xxxxxxxxx | T :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : T | xxxxxxxxx |
  ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+---

Guarded allocations are set up based on a sample interval (can be set
via kfence.sample_interval). After expiration of the sample interval, a
guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool is returned to the main
allocator (SLAB or SLUB). At this point, the timer is reset, and the
next allocation is set up after the expiration of the interval.

To enable/disable a KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's
fast-path without overhead, KFENCE relies on static branches via the
static keys infrastructure. The static branch is toggled to redirect the
allocation to KFENCE. To date, we have verified by running synthetic
benchmarks (sysbench I/O, hackbench) that a kernel compiled with KFENCE
is performance-neutral compared to the non-KFENCE baseline.

For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst (added later in
the series).

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
v7:
* Reports by Jann Horn:
  * Comment about is_kfence_address() performance.
  * Cleaner CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS, using "if EXPERT".
  * Fix comment in metadata_to_pageaddr().
  * Fix comment above get_stack_skipnr().
  * Update comment for for_each_canary().
  * Clean up print_diff_canary() boundary calculation.
  * Remove SLUB/SLAB specific code and move to later patches.
* Make __kfence_free() part of the public API.

v6:
* Record allocation and free task pids, and show them in reports. This
  information helps more easily identify e.g. racy use-after-frees.

v5:
* MAJOR CHANGE: Removal of HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE_STATIC_POOL and static pool
  support in favor of memblock_alloc'd pool only, as it avoids all issues
  with virt_to translations. With the new optimizations to
  is_kfence_address(), we measure no noticeable performance impact.
* Verify we do not end up with a compound head page.
* Fix reporting of corruptions to never show object contents.
* Reformat kfence_alloc [suggested by Mark Rutland].
* Taint with TAINT_BAD_PAGE, to distinguish memory errors from regular
  warnings (also used by SL*B/KASAN/etc. for memory errors).
* Show OOB offset bytes in report.
* Rework kfence_shutdown_cache().
* Set page fields to fix obj_to_index+objs_per_slab_page.
* Suggestions/Reports by Jann Horn:
  * Move generic page allocation code to core.c.
  * Use KERN_ERR for dump_stack_print_info.
  * Make __kfence_pool pointer __ro_after_init.
  * Fix typos.
  * Add likely hint for check_canary_byte.
  * Make for_each_canary __always_inline.
  * Add comment about IPIs for static key toggling.
  * Check for non-null pointer in is_kfence_address(), in case KFENCE is never initialized.
  * Rework sample_interval parameter dynamic setting semantics.
  * Fix redzone checking.
  * Optimize is_kfence_address() by using better in-range check.

v4:
* Make static memory pool's attrs entirely arch-dependent.
* Revert MAINTAINERS, and make separate patch.
* Fix report generation if __slab_free tail-called.

v3:
* Reports by SeongJae Park:
  * Remove reference to Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst.
  * Remove redundant braces.
  * Use CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS instead of ARRAY_SIZE(...).
  * Align some comments.
* Add figure from Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst added later in
  series to patch description.

v2:
* Add missing __printf attribute to seq_con_printf, and fix new warning.
  [reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>]
* Fix up some comments [reported by Jonathan Cameron].
* Remove 2 cases of redundant stack variable initialization
  [reported by Jonathan Cameron].
* Fix printf format [reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>].
* Print (in kfence-#nn) after address, to more clearly establish link
  between first and second stacktrace [reported by Andrey Konovalov].
* Make choice between KASAN and KFENCE clearer in Kconfig help text
  [suggested by Dave Hansen].
* Document CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL=0.
* Shorten memory corruption report line length.
* Make /sys/module/kfence/parameters/sample_interval root-writable for
  all builds (to enable debugging, automatic dynamic tweaking).
* Reports by Dmitry Vyukov:
  * Do not store negative size for right-located objects
  * Only cache-align addresses of right-located objects.
  * Run toggle_allocation_gate() after KFENCE is enabled.
  * Add empty line between allocation and free stacks.
  * Add comment about SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU.
  * Also skip internals for allocation/free stacks.
  * s/KFENCE_FAULT_INJECTION/KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS/ as FAULT_INJECTION
    is already overloaded in different contexts.
  * Parenthesis for macro variable.
  * Lower max of KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS config variable.
---
 include/linux/kfence.h | 201 ++++++++++
 init/main.c            |   3 +
 lib/Kconfig.debug      |   1 +
 lib/Kconfig.kfence     |  57 +++
 mm/Makefile            |   1 +
 mm/kfence/Makefile     |   3 +
 mm/kfence/core.c       | 822 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/kfence/kfence.h     | 107 ++++++
 mm/kfence/report.c     | 235 ++++++++++++
 9 files changed, 1430 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/kfence.h
 create mode 100644 lib/Kconfig.kfence
 create mode 100644 mm/kfence/Makefile
 create mode 100644 mm/kfence/core.c
 create mode 100644 mm/kfence/kfence.h
 create mode 100644 mm/kfence/report.c

diff --git a/include/linux/kfence.h b/include/linux/kfence.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ed2d48acdafe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/kfence.h
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_KFENCE_H
+#define _LINUX_KFENCE_H
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/static_key.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE
+
+/*
+ * We allocate an even number of pages, as it simplifies calculations to map
+ * address to metadata indices; effectively, the very first page serves as an
+ * extended guard page, but otherwise has no special purpose.
+ */
+#define KFENCE_POOL_SIZE ((CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS + 1) * 2 * PAGE_SIZE)
+extern char *__kfence_pool;
+
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kfence_allocation_key);
+
+/**
+ * is_kfence_address() - check if an address belongs to KFENCE pool
+ * @addr: address to check
+ *
+ * Return: true or false depending on whether the address is within the KFENCE
+ * object range.
+ *
+ * KFENCE objects live in a separate page range and are not to be intermixed
+ * with regular heap objects (e.g. KFENCE objects must never be added to the
+ * allocator freelists). Failing to do so may and will result in heap
+ * corruptions, therefore is_kfence_address() must be used to check whether
+ * an object requires specific handling.
+ *
+ * Note: This function may be used in fast-paths, and is performance critical.
+ * Future changes should take this into account; for instance, we want to avoid
+ * introducing another load and therefore need to keep KFENCE_POOL_SIZE a
+ * constant (until immediate patching support is added to the kernel).
+ */
+static __always_inline bool is_kfence_address(const void *addr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The non-NULL check is required in case the __kfence_pool pointer was
+	 * never initialized; keep it in the slow-path after the range-check.
+	 */
+	return unlikely((unsigned long)((char *)addr - __kfence_pool) < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE && addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * kfence_alloc_pool() - allocate the KFENCE pool via memblock
+ */
+void __init kfence_alloc_pool(void);
+
+/**
+ * kfence_init() - perform KFENCE initialization at boot time
+ *
+ * Requires that kfence_alloc_pool() was called before. This sets up the
+ * allocation gate timer, and requires that workqueues are available.
+ */
+void __init kfence_init(void);
+
+/**
+ * kfence_shutdown_cache() - handle shutdown_cache() for KFENCE objects
+ * @s: cache being shut down
+ *
+ * Before shutting down a cache, one must ensure there are no remaining objects
+ * allocated from it. Because KFENCE objects are not referenced from the cache
+ * directly, we need to check them here.
+ *
+ * Note that shutdown_cache() is internal to SL*B, and kmem_cache_destroy() does
+ * not return if allocated objects still exist: it prints an error message and
+ * simply aborts destruction of a cache, leaking memory.
+ *
+ * If the only such objects are KFENCE objects, we will not leak the entire
+ * cache, but instead try to provide more useful debug info by making allocated
+ * objects "zombie allocations". Objects may then still be used or freed (which
+ * is handled gracefully), but usage will result in showing KFENCE error reports
+ * which include stack traces to the user of the object, the original allocation
+ * site, and caller to shutdown_cache().
+ */
+void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s);
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a KFENCE object. Allocators must not call this function directly,
+ * use kfence_alloc() instead.
+ */
+void *__kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * kfence_alloc() - allocate a KFENCE object with a low probability
+ * @s:     struct kmem_cache with object requirements
+ * @size:  exact size of the object to allocate (can be less than @s->size
+ *         e.g. for kmalloc caches)
+ * @flags: GFP flags
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * NULL     - must proceed with allocating as usual,
+ * * non-NULL - pointer to a KFENCE object.
+ *
+ * kfence_alloc() should be inserted into the heap allocation fast path,
+ * allowing it to transparently return KFENCE-allocated objects with a low
+ * probability using a static branch (the probability is controlled by the
+ * kfence.sample_interval boot parameter).
+ */
+static __always_inline void *kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&kfence_allocation_key))
+		return __kfence_alloc(s, size, flags);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * kfence_ksize() - get actual amount of memory allocated for a KFENCE object
+ * @addr: pointer to a heap object
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0     - not a KFENCE object, must call __ksize() instead,
+ * * non-0 - this many bytes can be accessed without causing a memory error.
+ *
+ * kfence_ksize() returns the number of bytes requested for a KFENCE object at
+ * allocation time. This number may be less than the object size of the
+ * corresponding struct kmem_cache.
+ */
+size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr);
+
+/**
+ * kfence_object_start() - find the beginning of a KFENCE object
+ * @addr - address within a KFENCE-allocated object
+ *
+ * Return: address of the beginning of the object.
+ *
+ * SL[AU]B-allocated objects are laid out within a page one by one, so it is
+ * easy to calculate the beginning of an object given a pointer inside it and
+ * the object size. The same is not true for KFENCE, which places a single
+ * object at either end of the page. This helper function is used to find the
+ * beginning of a KFENCE-allocated object.
+ */
+void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr);
+
+/**
+ * __kfence_free() - release a KFENCE heap object to KFENCE pool
+ * @addr: object to be freed
+ *
+ * Requires: is_kfence_address(addr)
+ *
+ * Release a KFENCE object and mark it as freed.
+ */
+void __kfence_free(void *addr);
+
+/**
+ * kfence_free() - try to release an arbitrary heap object to KFENCE pool
+ * @addr: object to be freed
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * false - object doesn't belong to KFENCE pool and was ignored,
+ * * true  - object was released to KFENCE pool.
+ *
+ * Release a KFENCE object and mark it as freed. May be called on any object,
+ * even non-KFENCE objects, to simplify integration of the hooks into the
+ * allocator's free codepath. The allocator must check the return value to
+ * determine if it was a KFENCE object or not.
+ */
+static __always_inline __must_check bool kfence_free(void *addr)
+{
+	if (!is_kfence_address(addr))
+		return false;
+	__kfence_free(addr);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * kfence_handle_page_fault() - perform page fault handling for KFENCE pages
+ * @addr: faulting address
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * false - address outside KFENCE pool,
+ * * true  - page fault handled by KFENCE, no additional handling required.
+ *
+ * A page fault inside KFENCE pool indicates a memory error, such as an
+ * out-of-bounds access, a use-after-free or an invalid memory access. In these
+ * cases KFENCE prints an error message and marks the offending page as
+ * present, so that the kernel can proceed.
+ */
+bool __must_check kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_KFENCE */
+
+static inline bool is_kfence_address(const void *addr) { return false; }
+static inline void kfence_alloc_pool(void) { }
+static inline void kfence_init(void) { }
+static inline void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) { }
+static inline void *kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags) { return NULL; }
+static inline size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr) { return 0; }
+static inline void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr) { return NULL; }
+static inline void __kfence_free(void *addr) { }
+static inline bool __must_check kfence_free(void *addr) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr) { return false; }
+
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_KFENCE_H */
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 130376ec10ba..548746bd6fd6 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 #include <linux/profile.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
@@ -816,6 +817,7 @@ static void __init mm_init(void)
 	 */
 	page_ext_init_flatmem();
 	init_debug_pagealloc();
+	kfence_alloc_pool();
 	report_meminit();
 	mem_init();
 	kmem_cache_init();
@@ -945,6 +947,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
 	hrtimers_init();
 	softirq_init();
 	timekeeping_init();
+	kfence_init();
 
 	/*
 	 * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index c789b39ed527..abb4e117cd8c 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -878,6 +878,7 @@ config DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
 	  If in doubt, say "N".
 
 source "lib/Kconfig.kasan"
+source "lib/Kconfig.kfence"
 
 endmenu # "Memory Debugging"
 
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kfence b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b209cd02042b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
+	bool
+
+menuconfig KFENCE
+	bool "KFENCE: low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector"
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE && !KASAN && (SLAB || SLUB)
+	depends on JUMP_LABEL # To ensure performance, require jump labels
+	select STACKTRACE
+	help
+	  KFENCE is a low-overhead sampling-based detector of heap out-of-bounds
+	  access, use-after-free, and invalid-free errors. KFENCE is designed
+	  to have negligible cost to permit enabling it in production
+	  environments.
+
+	  Note that, KFENCE is not a substitute for explicit testing with tools
+	  such as KASAN. KFENCE can detect a subset of bugs that KASAN can
+	  detect, albeit at very different performance profiles. If you can
+	  afford to use KASAN, continue using KASAN, for example in test
+	  environments. If your kernel targets production use, and cannot
+	  enable KASAN due to its cost, consider using KFENCE.
+
+if KFENCE
+
+config KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL
+	int "Default sample interval in milliseconds"
+	default 100
+	help
+	  The KFENCE sample interval determines the frequency with which heap
+	  allocations will be guarded by KFENCE. May be overridden via boot
+	  parameter "kfence.sample_interval".
+
+	  Set this to 0 to disable KFENCE by default, in which case only
+	  setting "kfence.sample_interval" to a non-zero value enables KFENCE.
+
+config KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS
+	int "Number of guarded objects available"
+	range 1 65535
+	default 255
+	help
+	  The number of guarded objects available. For each KFENCE object, 2
+	  pages are required; with one containing the object and two adjacent
+	  ones used as guard pages.
+
+config KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS
+	int "Stress testing of fault handling and error reporting" if EXPERT
+	default 0
+	help
+	  The inverse probability with which to randomly protect KFENCE object
+	  pages, resulting in spurious use-after-frees. The main purpose of
+	  this option is to stress test KFENCE with concurrent error reports
+	  and allocations/frees. A value of 0 disables stress testing logic.
+
+	  Only for KFENCE testing; set to 0 if you are not a KFENCE developer.
+
+endif # KFENCE
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index d73aed0fc99c..eb0993adb49e 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING) += page_poison.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SLAB) += slab.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SLUB) += slub.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN)	+= kasan/
+obj-$(CONFIG_KFENCE) += kfence/
 obj-$(CONFIG_FAILSLAB) += failslab.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG) += memory_hotplug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MEMTEST)		+= memtest.o
diff --git a/mm/kfence/Makefile b/mm/kfence/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d991e9a349f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kfence/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_KFENCE) := core.o report.o
diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..64f33b93223b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,822 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kfence: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#include <asm/kfence.h>
+
+#include "kfence.h"
+
+/* Disables KFENCE on the first warning assuming an irrecoverable error. */
+#define KFENCE_WARN_ON(cond)                                                   \
+	({                                                                     \
+		const bool __cond = WARN_ON(cond);                             \
+		if (unlikely(__cond))                                          \
+			WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false);                     \
+		__cond;                                                        \
+	})
+
+/* === Data ================================================================= */
+
+static bool kfence_enabled __read_mostly;
+
+static unsigned long kfence_sample_interval __read_mostly = CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL;
+
+#ifdef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
+#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
+#endif
+#define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "kfence."
+
+static int param_set_sample_interval(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	unsigned long num;
+	int ret = kstrtoul(val, 0, &num);
+
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (!num) /* Using 0 to indicate KFENCE is disabled. */
+		WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false);
+	else if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled) && system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING)
+		return -EINVAL; /* Cannot (re-)enable KFENCE on-the-fly. */
+
+	*((unsigned long *)kp->arg) = num;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int param_get_sample_interval(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled))
+		return sprintf(buffer, "0\n");
+
+	return param_get_ulong(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static const struct kernel_param_ops sample_interval_param_ops = {
+	.set = param_set_sample_interval,
+	.get = param_get_sample_interval,
+};
+module_param_cb(sample_interval, &sample_interval_param_ops, &kfence_sample_interval, 0600);
+
+/* The pool of pages used for guard pages and objects. */
+char *__kfence_pool __ro_after_init;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kfence_pool); /* Export for test modules. */
+
+/*
+ * Per-object metadata, with one-to-one mapping of object metadata to
+ * backing pages (in __kfence_pool).
+ */
+static_assert(CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS > 0);
+struct kfence_metadata kfence_metadata[CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS];
+
+/* Freelist with available objects. */
+static struct list_head kfence_freelist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist);
+static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freelist. */
+
+/* The static key to set up a KFENCE allocation. */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kfence_allocation_key);
+
+/* Gates the allocation, ensuring only one succeeds in a given period. */
+static atomic_t allocation_gate = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
+
+/* Wait queue to wake up allocation-gate timer task. */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(allocation_wait);
+
+/* Statistics counters for debugfs. */
+enum kfence_counter_id {
+	KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED,
+	KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS,
+	KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES,
+	KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES,
+	KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS,
+	KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT,
+};
+static atomic_long_t counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT];
+static const char *const counter_names[] = {
+	[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]	= "currently allocated",
+	[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS]		= "total allocations",
+	[KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES]		= "total frees",
+	[KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES]	= "zombie allocations",
+	[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]		= "total bugs",
+};
+static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(counter_names) == KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT);
+
+/* === Internals ============================================================ */
+
+static bool kfence_protect(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), true));
+}
+
+static bool kfence_unprotect(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), false));
+}
+
+static inline struct kfence_metadata *addr_to_metadata(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	long index;
+
+	/* The checks do not affect performance; only called from slow-paths. */
+
+	if (!is_kfence_address((void *)addr))
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * May be an invalid index if called with an address at the edge of
+	 * __kfence_pool, in which case we would report an "invalid access"
+	 * error.
+	 */
+	index = (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / (PAGE_SIZE * 2) - 1;
+	if (index < 0 || index >= CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return &kfence_metadata[index];
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long metadata_to_pageaddr(const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+{
+	unsigned long offset = (meta - kfence_metadata + 1) * PAGE_SIZE * 2;
+	unsigned long pageaddr = (unsigned long)&__kfence_pool[offset];
+
+	/* The checks do not affect performance; only called from slow-paths. */
+
+	/* Only call with a pointer into kfence_metadata. */
+	if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(meta < kfence_metadata ||
+			   meta >= kfence_metadata + CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * This metadata object only ever maps to 1 page; verify that the stored
+	 * address is in the expected range.
+	 */
+	if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE) != pageaddr))
+		return 0;
+
+	return pageaddr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update the object's metadata state, including updating the alloc/free stacks
+ * depending on the state transition.
+ */
+static noinline void metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta,
+					   enum kfence_object_state next)
+{
+	struct kfence_track *track =
+		next == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED ? &meta->free_track : &meta->alloc_track;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * Skip over 1 (this) functions; noinline ensures we do not accidentally
+	 * skip over the caller by never inlining.
+	 */
+	track->num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(track->stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 1);
+	track->pid = task_pid_nr(current);
+
+	/*
+	 * Pairs with READ_ONCE() in
+	 *	kfence_shutdown_cache(),
+	 *	kfence_handle_page_fault().
+	 */
+	WRITE_ONCE(meta->state, next);
+}
+
+/* Write canary byte to @addr. */
+static inline bool set_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
+{
+	*addr = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/* Check canary byte at @addr. */
+static inline bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr)
+{
+	if (likely(*addr == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr)))
+		return true;
+
+	atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]);
+	kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr),
+			    KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION);
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* __always_inline this to ensure we won't do an indirect call to fn. */
+static __always_inline void for_each_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool (*fn)(u8 *))
+{
+	const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+	unsigned long addr;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
+
+	/*
+	 * We'll iterate over each canary byte per-side until fn() returns
+	 * false. However, we'll still iterate over the canary bytes to the
+	 * right of the object even if there was an error in the canary bytes to
+	 * the left of the object. Specifically, if check_canary_byte()
+	 * generates an error, showing both sides might give more clues as to
+	 * what the error is about when displaying which bytes were corrupted.
+	 */
+
+	/* Apply to left of object. */
+	for (addr = pageaddr; addr < meta->addr; addr++) {
+		if (!fn((u8 *)addr))
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/* Apply to right of object. */
+	for (addr = meta->addr + meta->size; addr < pageaddr + PAGE_SIZE; addr++) {
+		if (!fn((u8 *)addr))
+			break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct kfence_metadata *meta = NULL;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct page *page;
+	void *addr;
+
+	/* Try to obtain a free object. */
+	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+	if (!list_empty(&kfence_freelist)) {
+		meta = list_entry(kfence_freelist.next, struct kfence_metadata, list);
+		list_del_init(&meta->list);
+	}
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+	if (!meta)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (unlikely(!raw_spin_trylock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags))) {
+		/*
+		 * This is extremely unlikely -- we are reporting on a
+		 * use-after-free, which locked meta->lock, and the reporting
+		 * code via printk calls kmalloc() which ends up in
+		 * kfence_alloc() and tries to grab the same object that we're
+		 * reporting on. While it has never been observed, lockdep does
+		 * report that there is a possibility of deadlock. Fix it by
+		 * using trylock and bailing out gracefully.
+		 */
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+		/* Put the object back on the freelist. */
+		list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist);
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	meta->addr = metadata_to_pageaddr(meta);
+	/* Unprotect if we're reusing this page. */
+	if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED)
+		kfence_unprotect(meta->addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Note: for allocations made before RNG initialization, will always
+	 * return zero. We still benefit from enabling KFENCE as early as
+	 * possible, even when the RNG is not yet available, as this will allow
+	 * KFENCE to detect bugs due to earlier allocations. The only downside
+	 * is that the out-of-bounds accesses detected are deterministic for
+	 * such allocations.
+	 */
+	if (prandom_u32_max(2)) {
+		/* Allocate on the "right" side, re-calculate address. */
+		meta->addr += PAGE_SIZE - size;
+		meta->addr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, cache->align);
+	}
+
+	addr = (void *)meta->addr;
+
+	/* Update remaining metadata. */
+	metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED);
+	/* Pairs with READ_ONCE() in kfence_shutdown_cache(). */
+	WRITE_ONCE(meta->cache, cache);
+	meta->size = size;
+	for_each_canary(meta, set_canary_byte);
+
+	/* Set required struct page fields. */
+	page = virt_to_page(meta->addr);
+	page->slab_cache = cache;
+
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+
+	/* Memory initialization. */
+
+	/*
+	 * We check slab_want_init_on_alloc() ourselves, rather than letting
+	 * SL*B do the initialization, as otherwise we might overwrite KFENCE's
+	 * redzone.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp, cache)))
+		memzero_explicit(addr, size);
+	if (cache->ctor)
+		cache->ctor(addr);
+
+	if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS && !prandom_u32_max(CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS))
+		kfence_protect(meta->addr); /* Random "faults" by protecting the object. */
+
+	atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]);
+	atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS]);
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
+static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool zombie)
+{
+	struct kcsan_scoped_access assert_page_exclusive;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags);
+
+	if (meta->state != KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED || meta->addr != (unsigned long)addr) {
+		/* Invalid or double-free, bail out. */
+		atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]);
+		kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, meta, KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE);
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Detect racy use-after-free, or incorrect reallocation of this page by KFENCE. */
+	kcsan_begin_scoped_access((void *)ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)addr, PAGE_SIZE), PAGE_SIZE,
+				  KCSAN_ACCESS_SCOPED | KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT,
+				  &assert_page_exclusive);
+
+	if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS)
+		kfence_unprotect((unsigned long)addr); /* To check canary bytes. */
+
+	/* Restore page protection if there was an OOB access. */
+	if (meta->unprotected_page) {
+		kfence_protect(meta->unprotected_page);
+		meta->unprotected_page = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Check canary bytes for memory corruption. */
+	for_each_canary(meta, check_canary_byte);
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear memory if init-on-free is set. While we protect the page, the
+	 * data is still there, and after a use-after-free is detected, we
+	 * unprotect the page, so the data is still accessible.
+	 */
+	if (!zombie && unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(meta->cache)))
+		memzero_explicit(addr, meta->size);
+
+	/* Mark the object as freed. */
+	metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED);
+
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+
+	/* Protect to detect use-after-frees. */
+	kfence_protect((unsigned long)addr);
+
+	kcsan_end_scoped_access(&assert_page_exclusive);
+	if (!zombie) {
+		/* Add it to the tail of the freelist for reuse. */
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+		KFENCE_WARN_ON(!list_empty(&meta->list));
+		list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist);
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags);
+
+		atomic_long_dec(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]);
+		atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES]);
+	} else {
+		/* See kfence_shutdown_cache(). */
+		atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES]);
+	}
+}
+
+static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h)
+{
+	struct kfence_metadata *meta = container_of(h, struct kfence_metadata, rcu_head);
+
+	kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, false);
+}
+
+static bool __init kfence_init_pool(void)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)__kfence_pool;
+	struct page *pages;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!__kfence_pool)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!arch_kfence_init_pool())
+		goto err;
+
+	pages = virt_to_page(addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set up object pages: they must have PG_slab set, to avoid freeing
+	 * these as real pages.
+	 *
+	 * We also want to avoid inserting kfence_free() in the kfree()
+	 * fast-path in SLUB, and therefore need to ensure kfree() correctly
+	 * enters __slab_free() slow-path.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) {
+		if (!i || (i % 2))
+			continue;
+
+		/* Verify we do not have a compound head page. */
+		if (WARN_ON(compound_head(&pages[i]) != &pages[i]))
+			goto err;
+
+		__SetPageSlab(&pages[i]);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Protect the first 2 pages. The first page is mostly unnecessary, and
+	 * merely serves as an extended guard page. However, adding one
+	 * additional page in the beginning gives us an even number of pages,
+	 * which simplifies the mapping of address to metadata index.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+		if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr)))
+			goto err;
+
+		addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) {
+		struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[i];
+
+		/* Initialize metadata. */
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&meta->list);
+		raw_spin_lock_init(&meta->lock);
+		meta->state = KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED;
+		meta->addr = addr; /* Initialize for validation in metadata_to_pageaddr(). */
+		list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist);
+
+		/* Protect the right redzone. */
+		if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr + PAGE_SIZE)))
+			goto err;
+
+		addr += 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+
+err:
+	/*
+	 * Only release unprotected pages, and do not try to go back and change
+	 * page attributes due to risk of failing to do so as well. If changing
+	 * page attributes for some pages fails, it is very likely that it also
+	 * fails for the first page, and therefore expect addr==__kfence_pool in
+	 * most failure cases.
+	 */
+	memblock_free_late(__pa(addr), KFENCE_POOL_SIZE - (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool));
+	__kfence_pool = NULL;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* === DebugFS Interface ==================================================== */
+
+static int stats_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	seq_printf(seq, "enabled: %i\n", READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled));
+	for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT; i++)
+		seq_printf(seq, "%s: %ld\n", counter_names[i], atomic_long_read(&counters[i]));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(stats);
+
+/*
+ * debugfs seq_file operations for /sys/kernel/debug/kfence/objects.
+ * start_object() and next_object() return the object index + 1, because NULL is used
+ * to stop iteration.
+ */
+static void *start_object(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS)
+		return (void *)((long)*pos + 1);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void stop_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+}
+
+static void *next_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	++*pos;
+	if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS)
+		return (void *)((long)*pos + 1);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int show_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[(long)v - 1];
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags);
+	kfence_print_object(seq, meta);
+	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+	seq_puts(seq, "---------------------------------\n");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations object_seqops = {
+	.start = start_object,
+	.next = next_object,
+	.stop = stop_object,
+	.show = show_object,
+};
+
+static int open_objects(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &object_seqops);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations objects_fops = {
+	.open = open_objects,
+	.read = seq_read,
+	.llseek = seq_lseek,
+};
+
+static int __init kfence_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+	struct dentry *kfence_dir = debugfs_create_dir("kfence", NULL);
+
+	debugfs_create_file("stats", 0444, kfence_dir, NULL, &stats_fops);
+	debugfs_create_file("objects", 0400, kfence_dir, NULL, &objects_fops);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+late_initcall(kfence_debugfs_init);
+
+/* === Allocation Gate Timer ================================================ */
+
+/*
+ * Set up delayed work, which will enable and disable the static key. We need to
+ * use a work queue (rather than a simple timer), since enabling and disabling a
+ * static key cannot be done from an interrupt.
+ *
+ * Note: Toggling a static branch currently causes IPIs, and here we'll end up
+ * with a total of 2 IPIs to all CPUs. If this ends up a problem in future (with
+ * more aggressive sampling intervals), we could get away with a variant that
+ * avoids IPIs, at the cost of not immediately capturing allocations if the
+ * instructions remain cached.
+ */
+static struct delayed_work kfence_timer;
+static void toggle_allocation_gate(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled))
+		return;
+
+	/* Enable static key, and await allocation to happen. */
+	atomic_set(&allocation_gate, 0);
+	static_branch_enable(&kfence_allocation_key);
+	wait_event(allocation_wait, atomic_read(&allocation_gate) != 0);
+
+	/* Disable static key and reset timer. */
+	static_branch_disable(&kfence_allocation_key);
+	schedule_delayed_work(&kfence_timer, msecs_to_jiffies(kfence_sample_interval));
+}
+static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate);
+
+/* === Public interface ===================================================== */
+
+void __init kfence_alloc_pool(void)
+{
+	if (!kfence_sample_interval)
+		return;
+
+	__kfence_pool = memblock_alloc(KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	if (!__kfence_pool)
+		pr_err("failed to allocate pool\n");
+}
+
+void __init kfence_init(void)
+{
+	/* Setting kfence_sample_interval to 0 on boot disables KFENCE. */
+	if (!kfence_sample_interval)
+		return;
+
+	if (!kfence_init_pool()) {
+		pr_err("%s failed\n", __func__);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true);
+	schedule_delayed_work(&kfence_timer, 0);
+	pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE,
+		CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
+		pr_cont(" at 0x%px-0x%px\n", (void *)__kfence_pool,
+			(void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE));
+	else
+		pr_cont("\n");
+}
+
+void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct kfence_metadata *meta;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) {
+		bool in_use;
+
+		meta = &kfence_metadata[i];
+
+		/*
+		 * If we observe some inconsistent cache and state pair where we
+		 * should have returned false here, cache destruction is racing
+		 * with either kmem_cache_alloc() or kmem_cache_free(). Taking
+		 * the lock will not help, as different critical section
+		 * serialization will have the same outcome.
+		 */
+		if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s ||
+		    READ_ONCE(meta->state) != KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED)
+			continue;
+
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags);
+		in_use = meta->cache == s && meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED;
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+
+		if (in_use) {
+			/*
+			 * This cache still has allocations, and we should not
+			 * release them back into the freelist so they can still
+			 * safely be used and retain the kernel's default
+			 * behaviour of keeping the allocations alive (leak the
+			 * cache); however, they effectively become "zombie
+			 * allocations" as the KFENCE objects are the only ones
+			 * still in use and the owning cache is being destroyed.
+			 *
+			 * We mark them freed, so that any subsequent use shows
+			 * more useful error messages that will include stack
+			 * traces of the user of the object, the original
+			 * allocation, and caller to shutdown_cache().
+			 */
+			kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, /*zombie=*/true);
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) {
+		meta = &kfence_metadata[i];
+
+		/* See above. */
+		if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s || READ_ONCE(meta->state) != KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED)
+			continue;
+
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags);
+		if (meta->cache == s && meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED)
+			meta->cache = NULL;
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
+	}
+}
+
+void *__kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	/*
+	 * allocation_gate only needs to become non-zero, so it doesn't make
+	 * sense to continue writing to it and pay the associated contention
+	 * cost, in case we have a large number of concurrent allocations.
+	 */
+	if (atomic_read(&allocation_gate) || atomic_inc_return(&allocation_gate) > 1)
+		return NULL;
+	wake_up(&allocation_wait);
+
+	if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled))
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return kfence_guarded_alloc(s, size, flags);
+}
+
+size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr)
+{
+	const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is
+	 * either a use-after-free or invalid access.
+	 */
+	return meta ? meta->size : 0;
+}
+
+void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr)
+{
+	const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is
+	 * either a use-after-free or invalid access.
+	 */
+	return meta ? (void *)meta->addr : NULL;
+}
+
+void __kfence_free(void *addr)
+{
+	struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the objects of the cache are SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, defer freeing
+	 * the object, as the object page may be recycled for other-typed
+	 * objects once it has been freed. meta->cache may be NULL if the cache
+	 * was destroyed.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(meta->cache && (meta->cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)))
+		call_rcu(&meta->rcu_head, rcu_guarded_free);
+	else
+		kfence_guarded_free(addr, meta, false);
+}
+
+bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	const int page_index = (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / PAGE_SIZE;
+	struct kfence_metadata *to_report = NULL;
+	enum kfence_error_type error_type;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	if (!is_kfence_address((void *)addr))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) /* If disabled at runtime ... */
+		return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* ... unprotect and proceed. */
+
+	atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]);
+
+	if (page_index % 2) {
+		/* This is a redzone, report a buffer overflow. */
+		struct kfence_metadata *meta;
+		int distance = 0;
+
+		meta = addr_to_metadata(addr - PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (meta && READ_ONCE(meta->state) == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) {
+			to_report = meta;
+			/* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */
+			distance = addr - data_race(meta->addr + meta->size);
+		}
+
+		meta = addr_to_metadata(addr + PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (meta && READ_ONCE(meta->state) == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) {
+			/* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */
+			if (!to_report || distance > data_race(meta->addr) - addr)
+				to_report = meta;
+		}
+
+		if (!to_report)
+			goto out;
+
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags);
+		to_report->unprotected_page = addr;
+		error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB;
+
+		/*
+		 * If the object was freed before we took the look we can still
+		 * report this as an OOB -- the report will simply show the
+		 * stacktrace of the free as well.
+		 */
+	} else {
+		to_report = addr_to_metadata(addr);
+		if (!to_report)
+			goto out;
+
+		raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags);
+		error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF;
+		/*
+		 * We may race with __kfence_alloc(), and it is possible that a
+		 * freed object may be reallocated. We simply report this as a
+		 * use-after-free, with the stack trace showing the place where
+		 * the object was re-allocated.
+		 */
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (to_report) {
+		kfence_report_error(addr, to_report, error_type);
+		raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to_report->lock, flags);
+	} else {
+		/* This may be a UAF or OOB access, but we can't be sure. */
+		kfence_report_error(addr, NULL, KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID);
+	}
+
+	return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* Unprotect and let access proceed. */
+}
diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence.h b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f115aabc2052
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kfence/kfence.h
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H
+#define MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "../slab.h" /* for struct kmem_cache */
+
+/* For non-debug builds, avoid leaking kernel pointers into dmesg. */
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL
+#define PTR_FMT "%px"
+#else
+#define PTR_FMT "%p"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Get the canary byte pattern for @addr. Use a pattern that varies based on the
+ * lower 3 bits of the address, to detect memory corruptions with higher
+ * probability, where similar constants are used.
+ */
+#define KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr) ((u8)0xaa ^ (u8)((unsigned long)(addr) & 0x7))
+
+/* Maximum stack depth for reports. */
+#define KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH 64
+
+/* KFENCE object states. */
+enum kfence_object_state {
+	KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED,		/* Object is unused. */
+	KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED,	/* Object is currently allocated. */
+	KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED,		/* Object was allocated, and then freed. */
+};
+
+/* Alloc/free tracking information. */
+struct kfence_track {
+	pid_t pid;
+	int num_stack_entries;
+	unsigned long stack_entries[KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH];
+};
+
+/* KFENCE metadata per guarded allocation. */
+struct kfence_metadata {
+	struct list_head list;		/* Freelist node; access under kfence_freelist_lock. */
+	struct rcu_head rcu_head;	/* For delayed freeing. */
+
+	/*
+	 * Lock protecting below data; to ensure consistency of the below data,
+	 * since the following may execute concurrently: __kfence_alloc(),
+	 * __kfence_free(), kfence_handle_page_fault(). However, note that we
+	 * cannot grab the same metadata off the freelist twice, and multiple
+	 * __kfence_alloc() cannot run concurrently on the same metadata.
+	 */
+	raw_spinlock_t lock;
+
+	/* The current state of the object; see above. */
+	enum kfence_object_state state;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocated object address; cannot be calculated from size, because of
+	 * alignment requirements.
+	 *
+	 * Invariant: ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE) is constant.
+	 */
+	unsigned long addr;
+
+	/*
+	 * The size of the original allocation.
+	 */
+	size_t size;
+
+	/*
+	 * The kmem_cache cache of the last allocation; NULL if never allocated
+	 * or the cache has already been destroyed.
+	 */
+	struct kmem_cache *cache;
+
+	/*
+	 * In case of an invalid access, the page that was unprotected; we
+	 * optimistically only store one address.
+	 */
+	unsigned long unprotected_page;
+
+	/* Allocation and free stack information. */
+	struct kfence_track alloc_track;
+	struct kfence_track free_track;
+};
+
+extern struct kfence_metadata kfence_metadata[CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS];
+
+/* KFENCE error types for report generation. */
+enum kfence_error_type {
+	KFENCE_ERROR_OOB,		/* Detected a out-of-bounds access. */
+	KFENCE_ERROR_UAF,		/* Detected a use-after-free access. */
+	KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION,	/* Detected a memory corruption on free. */
+	KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID,		/* Invalid access of unknown type. */
+	KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE,	/* Invalid free. */
+};
+
+void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, const struct kfence_metadata *meta,
+			 enum kfence_error_type type);
+
+void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta);
+
+#endif /* MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H */
diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0fdaa3ddf1b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kfence/report.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#include <asm/kfence.h>
+
+#include "kfence.h"
+
+/* Helper function to either print to a seq_file or to console. */
+__printf(2, 3)
+static void seq_con_printf(struct seq_file *seq, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	if (seq)
+		seq_vprintf(seq, fmt, args);
+	else
+		vprintk(fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the number of stack entries to skip to get out of MM internals. @type is
+ * optional, and if set to NULL, assumes an allocation or free stack.
+ */
+static int get_stack_skipnr(const unsigned long stack_entries[], int num_entries,
+			    const enum kfence_error_type *type)
+{
+	char buf[64];
+	int skipnr, fallback = 0;
+	bool is_access_fault = false;
+
+	if (type) {
+		/* Depending on error type, find different stack entries. */
+		switch (*type) {
+		case KFENCE_ERROR_UAF:
+		case KFENCE_ERROR_OOB:
+		case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID:
+			is_access_fault = true;
+			break;
+		case KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION:
+		case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (skipnr = 0; skipnr < num_entries; skipnr++) {
+		int len = scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%ps", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+
+		if (is_access_fault) {
+			if (!strncmp(buf, KFENCE_SKIP_ARCH_FAULT_HANDLER, len))
+				goto found;
+		} else {
+			if (str_has_prefix(buf, "kfence_") || str_has_prefix(buf, "__kfence_") ||
+			    !strncmp(buf, "__slab_free", len)) {
+				/*
+				 * In case of tail calls from any of the below
+				 * to any of the above.
+				 */
+				fallback = skipnr + 1;
+			}
+
+			/* Also the *_bulk() variants by only checking prefixes. */
+			if (str_has_prefix(buf, "kfree") ||
+			    str_has_prefix(buf, "kmem_cache_free") ||
+			    str_has_prefix(buf, "__kmalloc") ||
+			    str_has_prefix(buf, "kmem_cache_alloc"))
+				goto found;
+		}
+	}
+	if (fallback < num_entries)
+		return fallback;
+found:
+	skipnr++;
+	return skipnr < num_entries ? skipnr : 0;
+}
+
+static void kfence_print_stack(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta,
+			       bool show_alloc)
+{
+	const struct kfence_track *track = show_alloc ? &meta->alloc_track : &meta->free_track;
+
+	if (track->num_stack_entries) {
+		/* Skip allocation/free internals stack. */
+		int i = get_stack_skipnr(track->stack_entries, track->num_stack_entries, NULL);
+
+		/* stack_trace_seq_print() does not exist; open code our own. */
+		for (; i < track->num_stack_entries; i++)
+			seq_con_printf(seq, " %pS\n", (void *)track->stack_entries[i]);
+	} else {
+		seq_con_printf(seq, " no %s stack\n", show_alloc ? "allocation" : "deallocation");
+	}
+}
+
+void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+{
+	const int size = abs(meta->size);
+	const unsigned long start = meta->addr;
+	const struct kmem_cache *const cache = meta->cache;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
+
+	if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED) {
+		seq_con_printf(seq, "kfence-#%zd unused\n", meta - kfence_metadata);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	seq_con_printf(seq,
+		       "kfence-#%zd [0x" PTR_FMT "-0x" PTR_FMT
+		       ", size=%d, cache=%s] allocated by task %d:\n",
+		       meta - kfence_metadata, (void *)start, (void *)(start + size - 1), size,
+		       (cache && cache->name) ? cache->name : "<destroyed>", meta->alloc_track.pid);
+	kfence_print_stack(seq, meta, true);
+
+	if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) {
+		seq_con_printf(seq, "\nfreed by task %d:\n", meta->free_track.pid);
+		kfence_print_stack(seq, meta, false);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Show bytes at @addr that are different from the expected canary values, up to
+ * @max_bytes.
+ */
+static void print_diff_canary(unsigned long address, size_t bytes_to_show,
+			      const struct kfence_metadata *meta)
+{
+	const unsigned long show_until_addr = address + bytes_to_show;
+	const u8 *cur, *end;
+
+	/* Do not show contents of object nor read into following guard page. */
+	end = (const u8 *)(address < meta->addr ? min(show_until_addr, meta->addr)
+						: min(show_until_addr, PAGE_ALIGN(address)));
+
+	pr_cont("[");
+	for (cur = (const u8 *)address; cur < end; cur++) {
+		if (*cur == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(cur))
+			pr_cont(" .");
+		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
+			pr_cont(" 0x%02x", *cur);
+		else /* Do not leak kernel memory in non-debug builds. */
+			pr_cont(" !");
+	}
+	pr_cont(" ]");
+}
+
+void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, const struct kfence_metadata *meta,
+			 enum kfence_error_type type)
+{
+	unsigned long stack_entries[KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH] = { 0 };
+	int num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 1);
+	int skipnr = get_stack_skipnr(stack_entries, num_stack_entries, &type);
+	const ptrdiff_t object_index = meta ? meta - kfence_metadata : -1;
+
+	/* Require non-NULL meta, except if KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID. */
+	if (WARN_ON(type != KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID && !meta))
+		return;
+
+	if (meta)
+		lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock);
+	/*
+	 * Because we may generate reports in printk-unfriendly parts of the
+	 * kernel, such as scheduler code, the use of printk() could deadlock.
+	 * Until such time that all printing code here is safe in all parts of
+	 * the kernel, accept the risk, and just get our message out (given the
+	 * system might already behave unpredictably due to the memory error).
+	 * As such, also disable lockdep to hide warnings, and avoid disabling
+	 * lockdep for the rest of the kernel.
+	 */
+	lockdep_off();
+
+	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
+	/* Print report header. */
+	switch (type) {
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_OOB: {
+		const bool left_of_object = address < meta->addr;
+
+		pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+		pr_err("Out-of-bounds access at 0x" PTR_FMT " (%luB %s of kfence-#%zd):\n",
+		       (void *)address,
+		       left_of_object ? meta->addr - address : address - meta->addr,
+		       left_of_object ? "left" : "right", object_index);
+		break;
+	}
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_UAF:
+		pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+		pr_err("Use-after-free access at 0x" PTR_FMT " (in kfence-#%zd):\n",
+		       (void *)address, object_index);
+		break;
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION:
+		pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: memory corruption in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+		pr_err("Corrupted memory at 0x" PTR_FMT " ", (void *)address);
+		print_diff_canary(address, 16, meta);
+		pr_cont(" (in kfence-#%zd):\n", object_index);
+		break;
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID:
+		pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: invalid access in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+		pr_err("Invalid access at 0x" PTR_FMT ":\n", (void *)address);
+		break;
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE:
+		pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: invalid free in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]);
+		pr_err("Invalid free of 0x" PTR_FMT " (in kfence-#%zd):\n", (void *)address,
+		       object_index);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Print stack trace and object info. */
+	stack_trace_print(stack_entries + skipnr, num_stack_entries - skipnr, 0);
+
+	if (meta) {
+		pr_err("\n");
+		kfence_print_object(NULL, meta);
+	}
+
+	/* Print report footer. */
+	pr_err("\n");
+	dump_stack_print_info(KERN_ERR);
+	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
+
+	lockdep_on();
+
+	if (panic_on_warn)
+		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+
+	/* We encountered a memory unsafety error, taint the kernel! */
+	add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+}
-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog

[PATCH v7 2/9] x86, kfence: enable KFENCE for x86

[Marco Elver]

From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

Add architecture specific implementation details for KFENCE and enable
KFENCE for the x86 architecture. In particular, this implements the
required interface in <asm/kfence.h> for setting up the pool and
providing helper functions for protecting and unprotecting pages.

For x86, we need to ensure that the pool uses 4K pages, which is done
using the set_memory_4k() helper function.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
v7:
* Only not-present faults should be handled by kfence [reported by Jann Horn].

v5:
* MAJOR CHANGE: Switch to the memblock_alloc'd pool. Running benchmarks
  with the newly optimized is_kfence_address(), no difference between
  baseline and KFENCE is observed.
* Suggested by Jann Horn:
  * Move x86 kfence_handle_page_fault before oops handling.
  * WARN_ON in kfence_protect_page if non-4K pages.
  * Better comments for x86 kfence_protect_page.

v4:
* Define __kfence_pool_attrs.
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig              |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c           |  5 +++
 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index f6946b81f74a..c9ec6b5ba358 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN			if X86_64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC		if X86_64
+	select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS		if MMU
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS	if MMU && COMPAT
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..beeac105dae7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kfence.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_KFENCE_H
+#define _ASM_X86_KFENCE_H
+
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
+
+#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+
+/*
+ * The page fault handler entry function, up to which the stack trace is
+ * truncated in reports.
+ */
+#define KFENCE_SKIP_ARCH_FAULT_HANDLER "asm_exc_page_fault"
+
+/* Force 4K pages for __kfence_pool. */
+static inline bool arch_kfence_init_pool(void)
+{
+	unsigned long addr;
+
+	for (addr = (unsigned long)__kfence_pool; is_kfence_address((void *)addr);
+	     addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
+		unsigned int level;
+
+		if (!lookup_address(addr, &level))
+			return false;
+
+		if (level != PG_LEVEL_4K)
+			set_memory_4k(addr, 1);
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+/* Protect the given page and flush TLB. */
+static inline bool kfence_protect_page(unsigned long addr, bool protect)
+{
+	unsigned int level;
+	pte_t *pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!pte || level != PG_LEVEL_4K))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to avoid IPIs, as we may get KFENCE allocations or faults
+	 * with interrupts disabled. Therefore, the below is best-effort, and
+	 * does not flush TLBs on all CPUs. We can tolerate some inaccuracy;
+	 * lazy fault handling takes care of faults after the page is PRESENT.
+	 */
+
+	if (protect)
+		set_pte(pte, __pte(pte_val(*pte) & ~_PAGE_PRESENT));
+	else
+		set_pte(pte, __pte(pte_val(*pte) | _PAGE_PRESENT));
+
+	/* Flush this CPU's TLB. */
+	flush_tlb_one_kernel(addr);
+	return true;
+}
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_KFENCE_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 82bf37a5c9ec..e42db2836438 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/kdebug.h>		/* oops_begin/end, ...		*/
 #include <linux/extable.h>		/* search_exception_tables	*/
 #include <linux/memblock.h>		/* max_low_pfn			*/
+#include <linux/kfence.h>		/* kfence_handle_page_fault	*/
 #include <linux/kprobes.h>		/* NOKPROBE_SYMBOL, ...		*/
 #include <linux/mmiotrace.h>		/* kmmio_handler, ...		*/
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>		/* perf_sw_event		*/
@@ -725,6 +726,10 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI))
 		efi_recover_from_page_fault(address);
 
+	/* Only not-present faults should be handled by KFENCE. */
+	if (!(error_code & X86_PF_PROT) && kfence_handle_page_fault(address))
+		return;
+
 oops:
 	/*
 	 * Oops. The kernel tried to access some bad page. We'll have to
-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog

[PATCH v7 3/9] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64

[Marco Elver]

Add architecture specific implementation details for KFENCE and enable
KFENCE for the arm64 architecture. In particular, this implements the
required interface in <asm/kfence.h>.

KFENCE requires that attributes for pages from its memory pool can
individually be set. Therefore, force the entire linear map to be mapped
at page granularity. Doing so may result in extra memory allocated for
page tables in case rodata=full is not set; however, currently
CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=y is the default, and the common case
is therefore not affected by this change.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
v7:
* Remove dependency on page size [reported by Mark Rutland].
* fault normally on permission faults [reported by Jann Horn].

v5:
* Move generic page allocation code to core.c [suggested by Jann Horn].
* Remove comment about HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE_STATIC_POOL, since we no longer
  support static pools.
* Force page granularity for the linear map [suggested by Mark Rutland].
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig              |  1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c           |  4 ++++
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c             |  7 ++++++-
 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 1d466addb078..e524c07c3eda 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL_RELATIVE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if !(ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48)
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS if HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
+	select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
 	select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
 	select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5ac0f599cc9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef __ASM_KFENCE_H
+#define __ASM_KFENCE_H
+
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+
+#define KFENCE_SKIP_ARCH_FAULT_HANDLER "el1_sync"
+
+static inline bool arch_kfence_init_pool(void) { return true; }
+
+static inline bool kfence_protect_page(unsigned long addr, bool protect)
+{
+	set_memory_valid(addr, 1, !protect);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+#endif /* __ASM_KFENCE_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 1ee94002801f..2d60204b4ed2 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
 #include <linux/bitfield.h>
 #include <linux/extable.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
 #include <linux/signal.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/hardirq.h>
@@ -322,6 +323,9 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
 	} else if (addr < PAGE_SIZE) {
 		msg = "NULL pointer dereference";
 	} else {
+		if (kfence_handle_page_fault(addr))
+			return;
+
 		msg = "paging request";
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index 1c0f3e02f731..86be6d1a78ab 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -1449,7 +1449,12 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size,
 {
 	int ret, flags = 0;
 
-	if (rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled())
+	/*
+	 * KFENCE requires linear map to be mapped at page granularity, so that
+	 * it is possible to protect/unprotect single pages in the KFENCE pool.
+	 */
+	if (rodata_full || debug_pagealloc_enabled() ||
+	    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE))
 		flags = NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS;
 
 	__create_pgd_mapping(swapper_pg_dir, start, __phys_to_virt(start),
-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog

[PATCH v7 4/9] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB

[Marco Elver]

From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

Inserts KFENCE hooks into the SLAB allocator.

To pass the originally requested size to KFENCE, add an argument
'orig_size' to slab_alloc*(). The additional argument is required to
preserve the requested original size for kmalloc() allocations, which
uses size classes (e.g. an allocation of 272 bytes will return an object
of size 512). Therefore, kmem_cache::size does not represent the
kmalloc-caller's requested size, and we must introduce the argument
'orig_size' to propagate the originally requested size to KFENCE.

Without the originally requested size, we would not be able to detect
out-of-bounds accesses for objects placed at the end of a KFENCE object
page if that object is not equal to the kmalloc-size class it was
bucketed into.

When KFENCE is disabled, there is no additional overhead, since
slab_alloc*() functions are __always_inline.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
v7:
* Move kmemleak_free_recursive() before kfence_free() for KFENCE
  objects. kmemleak_free_recursive() should be before releasing the
  object, to avoid a potential race where the object may immediately be
  reused [reported by Jann Horn].
* Re-add SLAB-specific code setting page->s_mem.

v5:
* New kfence_shutdown_cache(): we need to defer kfence_shutdown_cache()
  to before the cache is actually freed. In case of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU,
  the objects may still legally be used until the next RCU grace period.
* Fix objs_per_slab_page for kfence objects.
* Revert and use fixed obj_to_index() in __check_heap_object().

v3:
* Rewrite patch description to clarify need for 'orig_size'
  [reported by Christopher Lameter].
---
 include/linux/slab_def.h |  3 +++
 mm/kfence/core.c         |  2 ++
 mm/slab.c                | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 mm/slab_common.c         |  5 ++++-
 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/slab_def.h b/include/linux/slab_def.h
index 9eb430c163c2..3aa5e1e73ab6 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab_def.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab_def.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_SLAB_DEF_H
 #define	_LINUX_SLAB_DEF_H
 
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
 #include <linux/reciprocal_div.h>
 
 /*
@@ -114,6 +115,8 @@ static inline unsigned int obj_to_index(const struct kmem_cache *cache,
 static inline int objs_per_slab_page(const struct kmem_cache *cache,
 				     const struct page *page)
 {
+	if (is_kfence_address(page_address(page)))
+		return 1;
 	return cache->num;
 }
 
diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index 64f33b93223b..721fd6318c91 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -313,6 +313,8 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
 	/* Set required struct page fields. */
 	page = virt_to_page(meta->addr);
 	page->slab_cache = cache;
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB))
+		page->s_mem = addr;
 
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags);
 
diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
index b1113561b98b..a1c2809731c6 100644
--- a/mm/slab.c
+++ b/mm/slab.c
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
 #include	<linux/seq_file.h>
 #include	<linux/notifier.h>
 #include	<linux/kallsyms.h>
+#include	<linux/kfence.h>
 #include	<linux/cpu.h>
 #include	<linux/sysctl.h>
 #include	<linux/module.h>
@@ -3208,7 +3209,7 @@ static void *____cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags,
 }
 
 static __always_inline void *
-slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid,
+slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid, size_t orig_size,
 		   unsigned long caller)
 {
 	unsigned long save_flags;
@@ -3221,6 +3222,10 @@ slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid,
 	if (unlikely(!cachep))
 		return NULL;
 
+	ptr = kfence_alloc(cachep, orig_size, flags);
+	if (unlikely(ptr))
+		goto out_hooks;
+
 	cache_alloc_debugcheck_before(cachep, flags);
 	local_irq_save(save_flags);
 
@@ -3253,6 +3258,7 @@ slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid,
 	if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && ptr)
 		memset(ptr, 0, cachep->object_size);
 
+out_hooks:
 	slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, objcg, flags, 1, &ptr);
 	return ptr;
 }
@@ -3290,7 +3296,7 @@ __do_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags)
 #endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */
 
 static __always_inline void *
-slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller)
+slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, size_t orig_size, unsigned long caller)
 {
 	unsigned long save_flags;
 	void *objp;
@@ -3301,6 +3307,10 @@ slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller)
 	if (unlikely(!cachep))
 		return NULL;
 
+	objp = kfence_alloc(cachep, orig_size, flags);
+	if (unlikely(objp))
+		goto out;
+
 	cache_alloc_debugcheck_before(cachep, flags);
 	local_irq_save(save_flags);
 	objp = __do_cache_alloc(cachep, flags);
@@ -3311,6 +3321,7 @@ slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller)
 	if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && objp)
 		memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size);
 
+out:
 	slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, objcg, flags, 1, &objp);
 	return objp;
 }
@@ -3416,6 +3427,12 @@ static void cache_flusharray(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct array_cache *ac)
 static __always_inline void __cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp,
 					 unsigned long caller)
 {
+	if (is_kfence_address(objp)) {
+		kmemleak_free_recursive(objp, cachep->flags);
+		__kfence_free(objp);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	/* Put the object into the quarantine, don't touch it for now. */
 	if (kasan_slab_free(cachep, objp, _RET_IP_))
 		return;
@@ -3481,7 +3498,7 @@ void ___cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp,
  */
 void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags)
 {
-	void *ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, _RET_IP_);
+	void *ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, cachep->object_size, _RET_IP_);
 
 	trace_kmem_cache_alloc(_RET_IP_, ret,
 			       cachep->object_size, cachep->size, flags);
@@ -3514,7 +3531,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
 
 	local_irq_disable();
 	for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-		void *objp = __do_cache_alloc(s, flags);
+		void *objp = kfence_alloc(s, s->object_size, flags) ?: __do_cache_alloc(s, flags);
 
 		if (unlikely(!objp))
 			goto error;
@@ -3547,7 +3564,7 @@ kmem_cache_alloc_trace(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, size_t size)
 {
 	void *ret;
 
-	ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, _RET_IP_);
+	ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, size, _RET_IP_);
 
 	ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags);
 	trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret,
@@ -3573,7 +3590,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_trace);
  */
 void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid)
 {
-	void *ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, _RET_IP_);
+	void *ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, cachep->object_size, _RET_IP_);
 
 	trace_kmem_cache_alloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret,
 				    cachep->object_size, cachep->size,
@@ -3591,7 +3608,7 @@ void *kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
 {
 	void *ret;
 
-	ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, _RET_IP_);
+	ret = slab_alloc_node(cachep, flags, nodeid, size, _RET_IP_);
 
 	ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags);
 	trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret,
@@ -3652,7 +3669,7 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags,
 	cachep = kmalloc_slab(size, flags);
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(cachep)))
 		return cachep;
-	ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, caller);
+	ret = slab_alloc(cachep, flags, size, caller);
 
 	ret = kasan_kmalloc(cachep, ret, size, flags);
 	trace_kmalloc(caller, ret,
@@ -4151,7 +4168,10 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
 	BUG_ON(objnr >= cachep->num);
 
 	/* Find offset within object. */
-	offset = ptr - index_to_obj(cachep, page, objnr) - obj_offset(cachep);
+	if (is_kfence_address(ptr))
+		offset = ptr - kfence_object_start(ptr);
+	else
+		offset = ptr - index_to_obj(cachep, page, objnr) - obj_offset(cachep);
 
 	/* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */
 	if (offset >= cachep->useroffset &&
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index f9ccd5dc13f3..13125773dae2 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/memory.h>
 #include <linux/cache.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -435,6 +436,7 @@ static void slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
 	rcu_barrier();
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(s, s2, &to_destroy, list) {
+		kfence_shutdown_cache(s);
 #ifdef SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS
 		sysfs_slab_release(s);
 #else
@@ -460,6 +462,7 @@ static int shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
 		list_add_tail(&s->list, &slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy);
 		schedule_work(&slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work);
 	} else {
+		kfence_shutdown_cache(s);
 #ifdef SLAB_SUPPORTS_SYSFS
 		sysfs_slab_unlink(s);
 		sysfs_slab_release(s);
@@ -1171,7 +1174,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !__kasan_check_read(objp, 1))
 		return 0;
 
-	size = __ksize(objp);
+	size = kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
 	/*
 	 * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
 	 * so we need to unpoison this area.
-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog

[PATCH v7 5/9] mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLUB

[Marco Elver]

From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

Inserts KFENCE hooks into the SLUB allocator.

To pass the originally requested size to KFENCE, add an argument
'orig_size' to slab_alloc*(). The additional argument is required to
preserve the requested original size for kmalloc() allocations, which
uses size classes (e.g. an allocation of 272 bytes will return an object
of size 512). Therefore, kmem_cache::size does not represent the
kmalloc-caller's requested size, and we must introduce the argument
'orig_size' to propagate the originally requested size to KFENCE.

Without the originally requested size, we would not be able to detect
out-of-bounds accesses for objects placed at the end of a KFENCE object
page if that object is not equal to the kmalloc-size class it was
bucketed into.

When KFENCE is disabled, there is no additional overhead, since
slab_alloc*() functions are __always_inline.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
v7:
* Revert unused orig_size [reported by Jann Horn].
* Add Jann's Reviewed-by.
* Use __kfence_free() where we know is_kfence_address() is true.
* Re-add SLUB-specific code setting page->objects.

v5:
* Fix obj_to_index for kfence objects.

v3:
* Rewrite patch description to clarify need for 'orig_size'
  [reported by Christopher Lameter].
---
 include/linux/slub_def.h |  3 ++
 mm/kfence/core.c         |  2 ++
 mm/slub.c                | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h
index 1be0ed5befa1..dcde82a4434c 100644
--- a/include/linux/slub_def.h
+++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
  *
  * (C) 2007 SGI, Christoph Lameter
  */
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
 #include <linux/kobject.h>
 #include <linux/reciprocal_div.h>
 
@@ -185,6 +186,8 @@ static inline unsigned int __obj_to_index(const struct kmem_cache *cache,
 static inline unsigned int obj_to_index(const struct kmem_cache *cache,
 					const struct page *page, void *obj)
 {
+	if (is_kfence_address(obj))
+		return 0;
 	return __obj_to_index(cache, page_address(page), obj);
 }
 
diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c
index 721fd6318c91..9d597013cd5d 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/core.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/core.c
@@ -313,6 +313,8 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t g
 	/* Set required struct page fields. */
 	page = virt_to_page(meta->addr);
 	page->slab_cache = cache;
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB))
+		page->objects = 1;
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB))
 		page->s_mem = addr;
 
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index b30be2385d1c..c15998718ea5 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/ctype.h>
 #include <linux/debugobjects.h>
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
 #include <linux/memory.h>
 #include <linux/math64.h>
 #include <linux/fault-inject.h>
@@ -1553,6 +1554,11 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
 	void *old_tail = *tail ? *tail : *head;
 	int rsize;
 
+	if (is_kfence_address(next)) {
+		slab_free_hook(s, next);
+		return true;
+	}
+
 	/* Head and tail of the reconstructed freelist */
 	*head = NULL;
 	*tail = NULL;
@@ -2805,7 +2811,7 @@ static __always_inline void maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(struct kmem_cache *s,
  * Otherwise we can simply pick the next object from the lockless free list.
  */
 static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
-		gfp_t gfpflags, int node, unsigned long addr)
+		gfp_t gfpflags, int node, unsigned long addr, size_t orig_size)
 {
 	void *object;
 	struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
@@ -2816,6 +2822,11 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
 	s = slab_pre_alloc_hook(s, &objcg, 1, gfpflags);
 	if (!s)
 		return NULL;
+
+	object = kfence_alloc(s, orig_size, gfpflags);
+	if (unlikely(object))
+		goto out;
+
 redo:
 	/*
 	 * Must read kmem_cache cpu data via this cpu ptr. Preemption is
@@ -2888,20 +2899,21 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
 	if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfpflags, s)) && object)
 		memset(object, 0, s->object_size);
 
+out:
 	slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, gfpflags, 1, &object);
 
 	return object;
 }
 
 static __always_inline void *slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s,
-		gfp_t gfpflags, unsigned long addr)
+		gfp_t gfpflags, unsigned long addr, size_t orig_size)
 {
-	return slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, NUMA_NO_NODE, addr);
+	return slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, NUMA_NO_NODE, addr, orig_size);
 }
 
 void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags)
 {
-	void *ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, _RET_IP_);
+	void *ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, _RET_IP_, s->object_size);
 
 	trace_kmem_cache_alloc(_RET_IP_, ret, s->object_size,
 				s->size, gfpflags);
@@ -2913,7 +2925,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc);
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
 void *kmem_cache_alloc_trace(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags, size_t size)
 {
-	void *ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, _RET_IP_);
+	void *ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, _RET_IP_, size);
 	trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, gfpflags);
 	ret = kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size, gfpflags);
 	return ret;
@@ -2924,7 +2936,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmem_cache_alloc_trace);
 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
 void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t gfpflags, int node)
 {
-	void *ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, _RET_IP_);
+	void *ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, _RET_IP_, s->object_size);
 
 	trace_kmem_cache_alloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret,
 				    s->object_size, s->size, gfpflags, node);
@@ -2938,7 +2950,7 @@ void *kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace(struct kmem_cache *s,
 				    gfp_t gfpflags,
 				    int node, size_t size)
 {
-	void *ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, _RET_IP_);
+	void *ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, _RET_IP_, size);
 
 	trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret,
 			   size, s->size, gfpflags, node);
@@ -2972,6 +2984,9 @@ static void __slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
 
 	stat(s, FREE_SLOWPATH);
 
+	if (kfence_free(head))
+		return;
+
 	if (kmem_cache_debug(s) &&
 	    !free_debug_processing(s, page, head, tail, cnt, addr))
 		return;
@@ -3216,6 +3231,13 @@ int build_detached_freelist(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size,
 		df->s = cache_from_obj(s, object); /* Support for memcg */
 	}
 
+	if (is_kfence_address(object)) {
+		slab_free_hook(df->s, object);
+		__kfence_free(object);
+		p[size] = NULL; /* mark object processed */
+		return size;
+	}
+
 	/* Start new detached freelist */
 	df->page = page;
 	set_freepointer(df->s, object, NULL);
@@ -3291,8 +3313,14 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
 	c = this_cpu_ptr(s->cpu_slab);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-		void *object = c->freelist;
+		void *object = kfence_alloc(s, s->object_size, flags);
 
+		if (unlikely(object)) {
+			p[i] = object;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		object = c->freelist;
 		if (unlikely(!object)) {
 			/*
 			 * We may have removed an object from c->freelist using
@@ -3963,7 +3991,7 @@ void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s)))
 		return s;
 
-	ret = slab_alloc(s, flags, _RET_IP_);
+	ret = slab_alloc(s, flags, _RET_IP_, size);
 
 	trace_kmalloc(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, flags);
 
@@ -4011,7 +4039,7 @@ void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s)))
 		return s;
 
-	ret = slab_alloc_node(s, flags, node, _RET_IP_);
+	ret = slab_alloc_node(s, flags, node, _RET_IP_, size);
 
 	trace_kmalloc_node(_RET_IP_, ret, size, s->size, flags, node);
 
@@ -4037,6 +4065,7 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
 	struct kmem_cache *s;
 	unsigned int offset;
 	size_t object_size;
+	bool is_kfence = is_kfence_address(ptr);
 
 	ptr = kasan_reset_tag(ptr);
 
@@ -4049,10 +4078,13 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
 			       to_user, 0, n);
 
 	/* Find offset within object. */
-	offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
+	if (is_kfence)
+		offset = ptr - kfence_object_start(ptr);
+	else
+		offset = (ptr - page_address(page)) % s->size;
 
 	/* Adjust for redzone and reject if within the redzone. */
-	if (kmem_cache_debug_flags(s, SLAB_RED_ZONE)) {
+	if (!is_kfence && kmem_cache_debug_flags(s, SLAB_RED_ZONE)) {
 		if (offset < s->red_left_pad)
 			usercopy_abort("SLUB object in left red zone",
 				       s->name, to_user, offset, n);
@@ -4461,7 +4493,7 @@ void *__kmalloc_track_caller(size_t size, gfp_t gfpflags, unsigned long caller)
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s)))
 		return s;
 
-	ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, caller);
+	ret = slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, caller, size);
 
 	/* Honor the call site pointer we received. */
 	trace_kmalloc(caller, ret, size, s->size, gfpflags);
@@ -4492,7 +4524,7 @@ void *__kmalloc_node_track_caller(size_t size, gfp_t gfpflags,
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s)))
 		return s;
 
-	ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, caller);
+	ret = slab_alloc_node(s, gfpflags, node, caller, size);
 
 	/* Honor the call site pointer we received. */
 	trace_kmalloc_node(caller, ret, size, s->size, gfpflags, node);
-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog

[PATCH v7 6/9] kfence, kasan: make KFENCE compatible with KASAN

[Marco Elver]

From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

Make KFENCE compatible with KASAN. Currently this helps test KFENCE
itself, where KASAN can catch potential corruptions to KFENCE state, or
other corruptions that may be a result of freepointer corruptions in the
main allocators.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
---
v7:
* Remove EXPERT restriction for enabling KASAN+KFENCE. In future, MTE-based KASAN
  without stack traces will benefit from having KFENCE (which has stack
  traces). Removing EXPERT restriction allows this for production
  builds. The Kconfig help-text should still make it clear that in most
  cases KFENCE+KASAN does not make sense.
* Also skip kasan_poison_shadow() if KFENCE object. It turns out that
  kernel/scs.c is a user of kasan_{poison,unpoison}_object_data().
* Add Jann's Reviewed-by.

v5:
* Also guard kasan_unpoison_shadow with is_kfence_address(), as it may
  be called from SL*B internals, currently ksize().
* Make kasan_record_aux_stack() compatible with KFENCE, which may be
  called from outside KASAN runtime.
---
 lib/Kconfig.kfence |  2 +-
 mm/kasan/common.c  | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 mm/kasan/generic.c |  3 ++-
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kfence b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
index b209cd02042b..d2e3c6724226 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.kfence
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE
 
 menuconfig KFENCE
 	bool "KFENCE: low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector"
-	depends on HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE && !KASAN && (SLAB || SLUB)
+	depends on HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE && (SLAB || SLUB)
 	depends on JUMP_LABEL # To ensure performance, require jump labels
 	select STACKTRACE
 	help
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 950fd372a07e..de92da1b637a 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
 #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
@@ -124,6 +125,10 @@ void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value)
 	 */
 	address = reset_tag(address);
 
+	/* Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. */
+	if (is_kfence_address(address))
+		return;
+
 	shadow_start = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address);
 	shadow_end = kasan_mem_to_shadow(address + size);
 
@@ -141,6 +146,14 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size)
 	 */
 	address = reset_tag(address);
 
+	/*
+	 * Skip KFENCE memory if called explicitly outside of sl*b. Also note
+	 * that calls to ksize(), where size is not a multiple of machine-word
+	 * size, would otherwise poison the invalid portion of the word.
+	 */
+	if (is_kfence_address(address))
+		return;
+
 	kasan_poison_shadow(address, size, tag);
 
 	if (size & KASAN_SHADOW_MASK) {
@@ -396,6 +409,9 @@ static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 	tagged_object = object;
 	object = reset_tag(object);
 
+	if (is_kfence_address(object))
+		return false;
+
 	if (unlikely(nearest_obj(cache, virt_to_head_page(object), object) !=
 	    object)) {
 		kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
@@ -444,6 +460,9 @@ static void *__kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
 	if (unlikely(object == NULL))
 		return NULL;
 
+	if (is_kfence_address(object))
+		return (void *)object;
+
 	redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
 				KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
 	redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index 248264b9cb76..1069ecd1cd55 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
 #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/memblock.h>
@@ -332,7 +333,7 @@ void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr)
 	struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info;
 	void *object;
 
-	if (!(page && PageSlab(page)))
+	if (is_kfence_address(addr) || !(page && PageSlab(page)))
 		return;
 
 	cache = page->slab_cache;
-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog

[PATCH v7 7/9] kfence, Documentation: add KFENCE documentation

[Marco Elver]

Add KFENCE documentation in dev-tools/kfence.rst, and add to index.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
v7:
* Suggestions by Jann Horn:
  * Add a note about huge tables.
  * Note about graceful handling of errors (and mention panic_on_warn).
  * More spelling/grammar fixes.
* Add __kfence_free() to public API.

v3:
* Re-introduce reference to Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst.

v2:
* Many clarifications based on comments from Andrey Konovalov.
* Document CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL=0 usage.
* Make use-cases between KASAN and KFENCE clearer.
* Be clearer about the fact the pool is fixed size.
* Update based on reporting changes.
* Explicitly mention max supported allocation size is PAGE_SIZE.
---
 Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst  |   1 +
 Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst | 297 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 lib/Kconfig.kfence                 |   2 +
 3 files changed, 300 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
index f7809c7b1ba9..1b1cf4f5c9d9 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/index.rst
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ whole; patches welcome!
    ubsan
    kmemleak
    kcsan
+   kfence
    gdb-kernel-debugging
    kgdb
    kselftest
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d7329f2caa5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE)
+==============================
+
+Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) is a low-overhead sampling-based memory safety
+error detector. KFENCE detects heap out-of-bounds access, use-after-free, and
+invalid-free errors.
+
+KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near zero
+performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance for
+precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with enough
+total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically exercised by
+non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a large enough total
+uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large fleet of machines.
+
+Usage
+-----
+
+To enable KFENCE, configure the kernel with::
+
+    CONFIG_KFENCE=y
+
+To build a kernel with KFENCE support, but disabled by default (to enable, set
+``kfence.sample_interval`` to non-zero value), configure the kernel with::
+
+    CONFIG_KFENCE=y
+    CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL=0
+
+KFENCE provides several other configuration options to customize behaviour (see
+the respective help text in ``lib/Kconfig.kfence`` for more info).
+
+Tuning performance
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The most important parameter is KFENCE's sample interval, which can be set via
+the kernel boot parameter ``kfence.sample_interval`` in milliseconds. The
+sample interval determines the frequency with which heap allocations will be
+guarded by KFENCE. The default is configurable via the Kconfig option
+``CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL``. Setting ``kfence.sample_interval=0``
+disables KFENCE.
+
+The KFENCE memory pool is of fixed size, and if the pool is exhausted, no
+further KFENCE allocations occur. With ``CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS`` (default
+255), the number of available guarded objects can be controlled. Each object
+requires 2 pages, one for the object itself and the other one used as a guard
+page; object pages are interleaved with guard pages, and every object page is
+therefore surrounded by two guard pages.
+
+The total memory dedicated to the KFENCE memory pool can be computed as::
+
+    ( #objects + 1 ) * 2 * PAGE_SIZE
+
+Using the default config, and assuming a page size of 4 KiB, results in
+dedicating 2 MiB to the KFENCE memory pool.
+
+Note: On architectures that support huge pages, KFENCE will ensure that the
+pool is using pages of size ``PAGE_SIZE``. This will result in additional page
+tables being allocated.
+
+Error reports
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+A typical out-of-bounds access looks like this::
+
+    ==================================================================
+    BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds in test_out_of_bounds_read+0xa3/0x22b
+
+    Out-of-bounds access at 0xffffffffb672efff (1B left of kfence-#17):
+     test_out_of_bounds_read+0xa3/0x22b
+     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+     kthread+0x137/0x160
+     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+    kfence-#17 [0xffffffffb672f000-0xffffffffb672f01f, size=32, cache=kmalloc-32] allocated by task 507:
+     test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
+     test_out_of_bounds_read+0x98/0x22b
+     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+     kthread+0x137/0x160
+     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+    CPU: 4 PID: 107 Comm: kunit_try_catch Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6+ #7
+    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
+    ==================================================================
+
+The header of the report provides a short summary of the function involved in
+the access. It is followed by more detailed information about the access and
+its origin. Note that, real kernel addresses are only shown for
+``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds.
+
+Use-after-free accesses are reported as::
+
+    ==================================================================
+    BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free in test_use_after_free_read+0xb3/0x143
+
+    Use-after-free access at 0xffffffffb673dfe0 (in kfence-#24):
+     test_use_after_free_read+0xb3/0x143
+     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+     kthread+0x137/0x160
+     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+    kfence-#24 [0xffffffffb673dfe0-0xffffffffb673dfff, size=32, cache=kmalloc-32] allocated by task 507:
+     test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
+     test_use_after_free_read+0x76/0x143
+     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+     kthread+0x137/0x160
+     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+    freed by task 507:
+     test_use_after_free_read+0xa8/0x143
+     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+     kthread+0x137/0x160
+     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+    CPU: 4 PID: 109 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G        W         5.8.0-rc6+ #7
+    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
+    ==================================================================
+
+KFENCE also reports on invalid frees, such as double-frees::
+
+    ==================================================================
+    BUG: KFENCE: invalid free in test_double_free+0xdc/0x171
+
+    Invalid free of 0xffffffffb6741000:
+     test_double_free+0xdc/0x171
+     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+     kthread+0x137/0x160
+     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+    kfence-#26 [0xffffffffb6741000-0xffffffffb674101f, size=32, cache=kmalloc-32] allocated by task 507:
+     test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
+     test_double_free+0x76/0x171
+     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+     kthread+0x137/0x160
+     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+    freed by task 507:
+     test_double_free+0xa8/0x171
+     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+     kthread+0x137/0x160
+     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+    CPU: 4 PID: 111 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G        W         5.8.0-rc6+ #7
+    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
+    ==================================================================
+
+KFENCE also uses pattern-based redzones on the other side of an object's guard
+page, to detect out-of-bounds writes on the unprotected side of the object.
+These are reported on frees::
+
+    ==================================================================
+    BUG: KFENCE: memory corruption in test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write+0xef/0x184
+
+    Corrupted memory at 0xffffffffb6797ff9 [ 0xac . . . . . . ] (in kfence-#69):
+     test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write+0xef/0x184
+     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+     kthread+0x137/0x160
+     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+    kfence-#69 [0xffffffffb6797fb0-0xffffffffb6797ff8, size=73, cache=kmalloc-96] allocated by task 507:
+     test_alloc+0xf3/0x25b
+     test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write+0x57/0x184
+     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+     kthread+0x137/0x160
+     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+    CPU: 4 PID: 120 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G        W         5.8.0-rc6+ #7
+    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
+    ==================================================================
+
+For such errors, the address where the corruption occurred as well as the
+invalidly written bytes (offset from the address) are shown; in this
+representation, '.' denote untouched bytes. In the example above ``0xac`` is
+the value written to the invalid address at offset 0, and the remaining '.'
+denote that no following bytes have been touched. Note that, real values are
+only shown for ``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds; to avoid information
+disclosure for non-debug builds, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
+written bytes.
+
+And finally, KFENCE may also report on invalid accesses to any protected page
+where it was not possible to determine an associated object, e.g. if adjacent
+object pages had not yet been allocated::
+
+    ==================================================================
+    BUG: KFENCE: invalid access in test_invalid_access+0x26/0xe0
+
+    Invalid access at 0xffffffffb670b00a:
+     test_invalid_access+0x26/0xe0
+     kunit_try_run_case+0x51/0x85
+     kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x16/0x30
+     kthread+0x137/0x160
+     ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
+
+    CPU: 4 PID: 124 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G        W         5.8.0-rc6+ #7
+    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
+    ==================================================================
+
+DebugFS interface
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Some debugging information is exposed via debugfs:
+
+* The file ``/sys/kernel/debug/kfence/stats`` provides runtime statistics.
+
+* The file ``/sys/kernel/debug/kfence/objects`` provides a list of objects
+  allocated via KFENCE, including those already freed but protected.
+
+Implementation Details
+----------------------
+
+Guarded allocations are set up based on the sample interval. After expiration
+of the sample interval, the next allocation through the main allocator (SLAB or
+SLUB) returns a guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool (allocation
+sizes up to PAGE_SIZE are supported). At this point, the timer is reset, and
+the next allocation is set up after the expiration of the interval. To "gate" a
+KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's fast-path without overhead,
+KFENCE relies on static branches via the static keys infrastructure. The static
+branch is toggled to redirect the allocation to KFENCE.
+
+KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or right
+page boundaries selected at random. The pages to the left and right of the
+object page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected
+state, and cause page faults on any attempted access. Such page faults are then
+intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault gracefully by reporting an
+out-of-bounds access, and marking the page as accessible so that the faulting
+code can (wrongly) continue executing (set ``panic_on_warn`` to panic instead).
+
+To detect out-of-bounds writes to memory within the object's page itself,
+KFENCE also uses pattern-based redzones. For each object page, a redzone is set
+up for all non-object memory. For typical alignments, the redzone is only
+required on the unguarded side of an object. Because KFENCE must honor the
+cache's requested alignment, special alignments may result in unprotected gaps
+on either side of an object, all of which are redzoned.
+
+The following figure illustrates the page layout::
+
+    ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+---
+       | xxxxxxxxx | O :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : O | xxxxxxxxx |
+       | xxxxxxxxx | B :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : B | xxxxxxxxx |
+       | x GUARD x | J : RED-  | x GUARD x | RED-  : J | x GUARD x |
+       | xxxxxxxxx | E :  ZONE | xxxxxxxxx |  ZONE : E | xxxxxxxxx |
+       | xxxxxxxxx | C :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : C | xxxxxxxxx |
+       | xxxxxxxxx | T :       | xxxxxxxxx |       : T | xxxxxxxxx |
+    ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+---
+
+Upon deallocation of a KFENCE object, the object's page is again protected and
+the object is marked as freed. Any further access to the object causes a fault
+and KFENCE reports a use-after-free access. Freed objects are inserted at the
+tail of KFENCE's freelist, so that the least recently freed objects are reused
+first, and the chances of detecting use-after-frees of recently freed objects
+is increased.
+
+Interface
+---------
+
+The following describes the functions which are used by allocators as well as
+page handling code to set up and deal with KFENCE allocations.
+
+.. kernel-doc:: include/linux/kfence.h
+   :functions: is_kfence_address
+               kfence_shutdown_cache
+               kfence_alloc kfence_free __kfence_free
+               kfence_ksize kfence_object_start
+               kfence_handle_page_fault
+
+Related Tools
+-------------
+
+In userspace, a similar approach is taken by `GWP-ASan
+<http://llvm.org/docs/GwpAsan.html>`_. GWP-ASan also relies on guard pages and
+a sampling strategy to detect memory unsafety bugs at scale. KFENCE's design is
+directly influenced by GWP-ASan, and can be seen as its kernel sibling. Another
+similar but non-sampling approach, that also inspired the name "KFENCE", can be
+found in the userspace `Electric Fence Malloc Debugger
+<https://linux.die.net/man/3/efence>`_.
+
+In the kernel, several tools exist to debug memory access errors, and in
+particular KASAN can detect all bug classes that KFENCE can detect. While KASAN
+is more precise, relying on compiler instrumentation, this comes at a
+performance cost.
+
+It is worth highlighting that KASAN and KFENCE are complementary, with
+different target environments. For instance, KASAN is the better debugging-aid,
+where test cases or reproducers exists: due to the lower chance to detect the
+error, it would require more effort using KFENCE to debug. Deployments at scale
+that cannot afford to enable KASAN, however, would benefit from using KFENCE to
+discover bugs due to code paths not exercised by test cases or fuzzers.
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kfence b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
index d2e3c6724226..d2173a3a423a 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.kfence
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ menuconfig KFENCE
 	  to have negligible cost to permit enabling it in production
 	  environments.
 
+	  See <file:Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst> for more details.
+
 	  Note that, KFENCE is not a substitute for explicit testing with tools
 	  such as KASAN. KFENCE can detect a subset of bugs that KASAN can
 	  detect, albeit at very different performance profiles. If you can
-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog

[PATCH v7 8/9] kfence: add test suite

[Marco Elver]

Add KFENCE test suite, testing various error detection scenarios. Makes
use of KUnit for test organization. Since KFENCE's interface to obtain
error reports is via the console, the test verifies that KFENCE outputs
expected reports to the console.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
v7:
* Reword comments per Jann Horn's suggestions.

v5:
* Add better memory corruption test.
* Test sl*b_def.h primitives.

v4:
* Clarify RCU test comment [reported by Paul E. McKenney].

v3:
* Lower line buffer size to avoid warnings of using more than 1024 bytes
  stack usage [reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>].

v2:
* Update for shortened memory corruption report.
---
 lib/Kconfig.kfence      |  13 +
 mm/kfence/Makefile      |   3 +
 mm/kfence/kfence_test.c | 823 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 839 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 mm/kfence/kfence_test.c

diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kfence b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
index d2173a3a423a..d3ea24fa30fc 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.kfence
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kfence
@@ -56,4 +56,17 @@ config KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS
 
 	  Only for KFENCE testing; set to 0 if you are not a KFENCE developer.
 
+config KFENCE_KUNIT_TEST
+	tristate "KFENCE integration test suite" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
+	depends on TRACEPOINTS && KUNIT
+	help
+	  Test suite for KFENCE, testing various error detection scenarios with
+	  various allocation types, and checking that reports are correctly
+	  output to console.
+
+	  Say Y here if you want the test to be built into the kernel and run
+	  during boot; say M if you want the test to build as a module; say N
+	  if you are unsure.
+
 endif # KFENCE
diff --git a/mm/kfence/Makefile b/mm/kfence/Makefile
index d991e9a349f0..6872cd5e5390 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/Makefile
+++ b/mm/kfence/Makefile
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_KFENCE) := core.o report.o
+
+CFLAGS_kfence_test.o := -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls
+obj-$(CONFIG_KFENCE_KUNIT_TEST) += kfence_test.o
diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1433a35a1644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,823 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Test cases for KFENCE memory safety error detector. Since the interface with
+ * which KFENCE's reports are obtained is via the console, this is the output we
+ * should verify. For each test case checks the presence (or absence) of
+ * generated reports. Relies on 'console' tracepoint to capture reports as they
+ * appear in the kernel log.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC.
+ * Author: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+ *         Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+ */
+
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kfence.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+#include <trace/events/printk.h>
+
+#include "kfence.h"
+
+/* Report as observed from console. */
+static struct {
+	spinlock_t lock;
+	int nlines;
+	char lines[2][256];
+} observed = {
+	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(observed.lock),
+};
+
+/* Probe for console output: obtains observed lines of interest. */
+static void probe_console(void *ignore, const char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int nlines;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&observed.lock, flags);
+	nlines = observed.nlines;
+
+	if (strnstr(buf, "BUG: KFENCE: ", len) && strnstr(buf, "test_", len)) {
+		/*
+		 * KFENCE report and related to the test.
+		 *
+		 * The provided @buf is not NUL-terminated; copy no more than
+		 * @len bytes and let strscpy() add the missing NUL-terminator.
+		 */
+		strscpy(observed.lines[0], buf, min(len + 1, sizeof(observed.lines[0])));
+		nlines = 1;
+	} else if (nlines == 1 && (strnstr(buf, "at 0x", len) || strnstr(buf, "of 0x", len))) {
+		strscpy(observed.lines[nlines++], buf, min(len + 1, sizeof(observed.lines[0])));
+	}
+
+	WRITE_ONCE(observed.nlines, nlines); /* Publish new nlines. */
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&observed.lock, flags);
+}
+
+/* Check if a report related to the test exists. */
+static bool report_available(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(observed.nlines) == ARRAY_SIZE(observed.lines);
+}
+
+/* Information we expect in a report. */
+struct expect_report {
+	enum kfence_error_type type; /* The type or error. */
+	void *fn; /* Function pointer to expected function where access occurred. */
+	char *addr; /* Address at which the bad access occurred. */
+};
+
+/* Check observed report matches information in @r. */
+static bool report_matches(const struct expect_report *r)
+{
+	bool ret = false;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	typeof(observed.lines) expect;
+	const char *end;
+	char *cur;
+
+	/* Doubled-checked locking. */
+	if (!report_available())
+		return false;
+
+	/* Generate expected report contents. */
+
+	/* Title */
+	cur = expect[0];
+	end = &expect[0][sizeof(expect[0]) - 1];
+	switch (r->type) {
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_OOB:
+		cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds");
+		break;
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_UAF:
+		cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free");
+		break;
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION:
+		cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "BUG: KFENCE: memory corruption");
+		break;
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID:
+		cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "BUG: KFENCE: invalid access");
+		break;
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE:
+		cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "BUG: KFENCE: invalid free");
+		break;
+	}
+
+	scnprintf(cur, end - cur, " in %pS", r->fn);
+	/* The exact offset won't match, remove it; also strip module name. */
+	cur = strchr(expect[0], '+');
+	if (cur)
+		*cur = '\0';
+
+	/* Access information */
+	cur = expect[1];
+	end = &expect[1][sizeof(expect[1]) - 1];
+
+	switch (r->type) {
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_OOB:
+		cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "Out-of-bounds access at");
+		break;
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_UAF:
+		cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "Use-after-free access at");
+		break;
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION:
+		cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "Corrupted memory at");
+		break;
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID:
+		cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "Invalid access at");
+		break;
+	case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE:
+		cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, "Invalid free of");
+		break;
+	}
+
+	cur += scnprintf(cur, end - cur, " 0x" PTR_FMT, (void *)r->addr);
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&observed.lock, flags);
+	if (!report_available())
+		goto out; /* A new report is being captured. */
+
+	/* Finally match expected output to what we actually observed. */
+	ret = strstr(observed.lines[0], expect[0]) && strstr(observed.lines[1], expect[1]);
+out:
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&observed.lock, flags);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* ===== Test cases ===== */
+
+#define TEST_PRIV_WANT_MEMCACHE ((void *)1)
+
+/* Cache used by tests; if NULL, allocate from kmalloc instead. */
+static struct kmem_cache *test_cache;
+
+static size_t setup_test_cache(struct kunit *test, size_t size, slab_flags_t flags,
+			       void (*ctor)(void *))
+{
+	if (test->priv != TEST_PRIV_WANT_MEMCACHE)
+		return size;
+
+	kunit_info(test, "%s: size=%zu, ctor=%ps\n", __func__, size, ctor);
+
+	/*
+	 * Use SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE to prevent merging with existing caches. Any
+	 * other flag in SLAB_NEVER_MERGE also works. Use SLAB_ACCOUNT to
+	 * allocate via memcg, if enabled.
+	 */
+	flags |= SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE | SLAB_ACCOUNT;
+	test_cache = kmem_cache_create("test", size, 1, flags, ctor);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG(test, test_cache, "could not create cache");
+
+	return size;
+}
+
+static void test_cache_destroy(void)
+{
+	if (!test_cache)
+		return;
+
+	kmem_cache_destroy(test_cache);
+	test_cache = NULL;
+}
+
+static inline size_t kmalloc_cache_alignment(size_t size)
+{
+	return kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][kmalloc_index(size)]->align;
+}
+
+/* Must always inline to match stack trace against caller. */
+static __always_inline void test_free(void *ptr)
+{
+	if (test_cache)
+		kmem_cache_free(test_cache, ptr);
+	else
+		kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * If this should be a KFENCE allocation, and on which side the allocation and
+ * the closest guard page should be.
+ */
+enum allocation_policy {
+	ALLOCATE_ANY, /* KFENCE, any side. */
+	ALLOCATE_LEFT, /* KFENCE, left side of page. */
+	ALLOCATE_RIGHT, /* KFENCE, right side of page. */
+	ALLOCATE_NONE, /* No KFENCE allocation. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Try to get a guarded allocation from KFENCE. Uses either kmalloc() or the
+ * current test_cache if set up.
+ */
+static void *test_alloc(struct kunit *test, size_t size, gfp_t gfp, enum allocation_policy policy)
+{
+	void *alloc;
+	unsigned long timeout, resched_after;
+	const char *policy_name;
+
+	switch (policy) {
+	case ALLOCATE_ANY:
+		policy_name = "any";
+		break;
+	case ALLOCATE_LEFT:
+		policy_name = "left";
+		break;
+	case ALLOCATE_RIGHT:
+		policy_name = "right";
+		break;
+	case ALLOCATE_NONE:
+		policy_name = "none";
+		break;
+	}
+
+	kunit_info(test, "%s: size=%zu, gfp=%x, policy=%s, cache=%i\n", __func__, size, gfp,
+		   policy_name, !!test_cache);
+
+	/*
+	 * 100x the sample interval should be more than enough to ensure we get
+	 * a KFENCE allocation eventually.
+	 */
+	timeout = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100 * CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL);
+	/*
+	 * Especially for non-preemption kernels, ensure the allocation-gate
+	 * timer can catch up: after @resched_after, every failed allocation
+	 * attempt yields, to ensure the allocation-gate timer is scheduled.
+	 */
+	resched_after = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL);
+	do {
+		if (test_cache)
+			alloc = kmem_cache_alloc(test_cache, gfp);
+		else
+			alloc = kmalloc(size, gfp);
+
+		if (is_kfence_address(alloc)) {
+			struct page *page = virt_to_head_page(alloc);
+			struct kmem_cache *s = test_cache ?: kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL)][kmalloc_index(size)];
+
+			/*
+			 * Verify that various helpers return the right values
+			 * even for KFENCE objects; these are required so that
+			 * memcg accounting works correctly.
+			 */
+			KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, obj_to_index(s, page, alloc), 0U);
+			KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, objs_per_slab_page(s, page), 1);
+
+			if (policy == ALLOCATE_ANY)
+				return alloc;
+			if (policy == ALLOCATE_LEFT && IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)alloc, PAGE_SIZE))
+				return alloc;
+			if (policy == ALLOCATE_RIGHT &&
+			    !IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)alloc, PAGE_SIZE))
+				return alloc;
+		} else if (policy == ALLOCATE_NONE)
+			return alloc;
+
+		test_free(alloc);
+
+		if (time_after(jiffies, resched_after))
+			cond_resched();
+	} while (time_before(jiffies, timeout));
+
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG(test, false, "failed to allocate from KFENCE");
+	return NULL; /* Unreachable. */
+}
+
+static void test_out_of_bounds_read(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	size_t size = 32;
+	struct expect_report expect = {
+		.type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB,
+		.fn = test_out_of_bounds_read,
+	};
+	char *buf;
+
+	setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we don't have our own cache, adjust based on alignment, so that we
+	 * actually access guard pages on either side.
+	 */
+	if (!test_cache)
+		size = kmalloc_cache_alignment(size);
+
+	/* Test both sides. */
+
+	buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_LEFT);
+	expect.addr = buf - 1;
+	READ_ONCE(*expect.addr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+	test_free(buf);
+
+	buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_RIGHT);
+	expect.addr = buf + size;
+	READ_ONCE(*expect.addr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+	test_free(buf);
+}
+
+static void test_use_after_free_read(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = 32;
+	struct expect_report expect = {
+		.type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF,
+		.fn = test_use_after_free_read,
+	};
+
+	setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+	expect.addr = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+	test_free(expect.addr);
+	READ_ONCE(*expect.addr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+static void test_double_free(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = 32;
+	struct expect_report expect = {
+		.type = KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE,
+		.fn = test_double_free,
+	};
+
+	setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+	expect.addr = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+	test_free(expect.addr);
+	test_free(expect.addr); /* Double-free. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+static void test_invalid_addr_free(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = 32;
+	struct expect_report expect = {
+		.type = KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE,
+		.fn = test_invalid_addr_free,
+	};
+	char *buf;
+
+	setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+	buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+	expect.addr = buf + 1; /* Free on invalid address. */
+	test_free(expect.addr); /* Invalid address free. */
+	test_free(buf); /* No error. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+static void test_corruption(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	size_t size = 32;
+	struct expect_report expect = {
+		.type = KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION,
+		.fn = test_corruption,
+	};
+	char *buf;
+
+	setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+
+	/* Test both sides. */
+
+	buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_LEFT);
+	expect.addr = buf + size;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*expect.addr, 42);
+	test_free(buf);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+
+	buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_RIGHT);
+	expect.addr = buf - 1;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*expect.addr, 42);
+	test_free(buf);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+/*
+ * KFENCE is unable to detect an OOB if the allocation's alignment requirements
+ * leave a gap between the object and the guard page. Specifically, an
+ * allocation of e.g. 73 bytes is aligned on 8 and 128 bytes for SLUB or SLAB
+ * respectively. Therefore it is impossible for the allocated object to
+ * contiguously line up with the right guard page.
+ *
+ * However, we test that an access to memory beyond the gap results in KFENCE
+ * detecting an OOB access.
+ */
+static void test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_read(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = 73;
+	const size_t align = kmalloc_cache_alignment(size);
+	struct expect_report expect = {
+		.type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB,
+		.fn = test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_read,
+	};
+	char *buf;
+
+	buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_RIGHT);
+
+	/*
+	 * The object is offset to the right, so there won't be an OOB to the
+	 * left of it.
+	 */
+	READ_ONCE(*(buf - 1));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+
+	/*
+	 * @buf must be aligned on @align, therefore buf + size belongs to the
+	 * same page -> no OOB.
+	 */
+	READ_ONCE(*(buf + size));
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+
+	/* Overflowing by @align bytes will result in an OOB. */
+	expect.addr = buf + size + align;
+	READ_ONCE(*expect.addr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+
+	test_free(buf);
+}
+
+static void test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = 73;
+	struct expect_report expect = {
+		.type = KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION,
+		.fn = test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write,
+	};
+	char *buf;
+
+	buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_RIGHT);
+	/*
+	 * The object is offset to the right, so we won't get a page
+	 * fault immediately after it.
+	 */
+	expect.addr = buf + size;
+	WRITE_ONCE(*expect.addr, READ_ONCE(*expect.addr) + 1);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+	test_free(buf);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+/* Test cache shrinking and destroying with KFENCE. */
+static void test_shrink_memcache(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = 32;
+	void *buf;
+
+	setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, test_cache);
+	buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+	kmem_cache_shrink(test_cache);
+	test_free(buf);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+}
+
+static void ctor_set_x(void *obj)
+{
+	/* Every object has at least 8 bytes. */
+	memset(obj, 'x', 8);
+}
+
+/* Ensure that SL*B does not modify KFENCE objects on bulk free. */
+static void test_free_bulk(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	int iter;
+
+	for (iter = 0; iter < 5; iter++) {
+		const size_t size = setup_test_cache(test, 8 + prandom_u32_max(300), 0,
+						     (iter & 1) ? ctor_set_x : NULL);
+		void *objects[] = {
+			test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_RIGHT),
+			test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_NONE),
+			test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_LEFT),
+			test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_NONE),
+			test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_NONE),
+		};
+
+		kmem_cache_free_bulk(test_cache, ARRAY_SIZE(objects), objects);
+		KUNIT_ASSERT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+		test_cache_destroy();
+	}
+}
+
+/* Test init-on-free works. */
+static void test_init_on_free(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = 32;
+	struct expect_report expect = {
+		.type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF,
+		.fn = test_init_on_free,
+	};
+	int i;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON))
+		return;
+	/* Assume it hasn't been disabled on command line. */
+
+	setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+	expect.addr = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+		expect.addr[i] = i + 1;
+	test_free(expect.addr);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+		/*
+		 * This may fail if the page was recycled by KFENCE and then
+		 * written to again -- this however, is near impossible with a
+		 * default config.
+		 */
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, expect.addr[i], (char)0);
+
+		if (!i) /* Only check first access to not fail test if page is ever re-protected. */
+			KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+	}
+}
+
+/* Ensure that constructors work properly. */
+static void test_memcache_ctor(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = 32;
+	char *buf;
+	int i;
+
+	setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, ctor_set_x);
+	buf = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, buf[i], (char)'x');
+
+	test_free(buf);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+}
+
+/* Test that memory is zeroed if requested. */
+static void test_gfpzero(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = PAGE_SIZE; /* PAGE_SIZE so we can use ALLOCATE_ANY. */
+	char *buf1, *buf2;
+	int i;
+
+	if (CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL > 100) {
+		kunit_warn(test, "skipping ... would take too long\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+	buf1 = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+		buf1[i] = i + 1;
+	test_free(buf1);
+
+	/* Try to get same address again -- this can take a while. */
+	for (i = 0;; i++) {
+		buf2 = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+		if (buf1 == buf2)
+			break;
+		test_free(buf2);
+
+		if (i == CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) {
+			kunit_warn(test, "giving up ... cannot get same object back\n");
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, buf2[i], (char)0);
+
+	test_free(buf2);
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+}
+
+static void test_invalid_access(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const struct expect_report expect = {
+		.type = KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID,
+		.fn = test_invalid_access,
+		.addr = &__kfence_pool[10],
+	};
+
+	READ_ONCE(__kfence_pool[10]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+/* Test SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU works. */
+static void test_memcache_typesafe_by_rcu(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = 32;
+	struct expect_report expect = {
+		.type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF,
+		.fn = test_memcache_typesafe_by_rcu,
+	};
+
+	setup_test_cache(test, size, SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, NULL);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, test_cache); /* Want memcache. */
+
+	expect.addr = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY);
+	*expect.addr = 42;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	test_free(expect.addr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, *expect.addr, (char)42);
+	/*
+	 * Up to this point, memory should not have been freed yet, and
+	 * therefore there should be no KFENCE report from the above access.
+	 */
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/* Above access to @expect.addr should not have generated a report! */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+
+	/* Only after rcu_barrier() is the memory guaranteed to be freed. */
+	rcu_barrier();
+
+	/* Expect use-after-free. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, *expect.addr, (char)42);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+/* Test krealloc(). */
+static void test_krealloc(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = 32;
+	const struct expect_report expect = {
+		.type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF,
+		.fn = test_krealloc,
+		.addr = test_alloc(test, size, GFP_KERNEL, ALLOCATE_ANY),
+	};
+	char *buf = expect.addr;
+	int i;
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, test_cache);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ksize(buf), size); /* Precise size match after KFENCE alloc. */
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+		buf[i] = i + 1;
+
+	/* Check that we successfully change the size. */
+	buf = krealloc(buf, size * 3, GFP_KERNEL); /* Grow. */
+	/* Note: Might no longer be a KFENCE alloc. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_GE(test, ksize(buf), size * 3);
+	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, buf[i], (char)(i + 1));
+	for (; i < size * 3; i++) /* Fill to extra bytes. */
+		buf[i] = i + 1;
+
+	buf = krealloc(buf, size * 2, GFP_KERNEL * 2); /* Shrink. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_GE(test, ksize(buf), size * 2);
+	for (i = 0; i < size * 2; i++)
+		KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, buf[i], (char)(i + 1));
+
+	buf = krealloc(buf, 0, GFP_KERNEL); /* Free. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, (unsigned long)buf, (unsigned long)ZERO_SIZE_PTR);
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_FALSE(test, report_available()); /* No reports yet! */
+
+	READ_ONCE(*expect.addr); /* Ensure krealloc() actually freed earlier KFENCE object. */
+	KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE(test, report_matches(&expect));
+}
+
+/* Test that some objects from a bulk allocation belong to KFENCE pool. */
+static void test_memcache_alloc_bulk(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	const size_t size = 32;
+	bool pass = false;
+	unsigned long timeout;
+
+	setup_test_cache(test, size, 0, NULL);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, test_cache); /* Want memcache. */
+	/*
+	 * 100x the sample interval should be more than enough to ensure we get
+	 * a KFENCE allocation eventually.
+	 */
+	timeout = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100 * CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL);
+	do {
+		void *objects[100];
+		int i, num = kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(test_cache, GFP_ATOMIC, ARRAY_SIZE(objects),
+						   objects);
+		if (!num)
+			continue;
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(objects); i++) {
+			if (is_kfence_address(objects[i])) {
+				pass = true;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		kmem_cache_free_bulk(test_cache, num, objects);
+		/*
+		 * kmem_cache_alloc_bulk() disables interrupts, and calling it
+		 * in a tight loop may not give KFENCE a chance to switch the
+		 * static branch. Call cond_resched() to let KFENCE chime in.
+		 */
+		cond_resched();
+	} while (!pass && time_before(jiffies, timeout));
+
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, pass);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, report_available());
+}
+
+/*
+ * KUnit does not provide a way to provide arguments to tests, and we encode
+ * additional info in the name. Set up 2 tests per test case, one using the
+ * default allocator, and another using a custom memcache (suffix '-memcache').
+ */
+#define KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_name)						\
+	{ .run_case = test_name, .name = #test_name },				\
+	{ .run_case = test_name, .name = #test_name "-memcache" }
+
+static struct kunit_case kfence_test_cases[] = {
+	KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_out_of_bounds_read),
+	KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_use_after_free_read),
+	KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_double_free),
+	KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_invalid_addr_free),
+	KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_corruption),
+	KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_free_bulk),
+	KFENCE_KUNIT_CASE(test_init_on_free),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_read),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_kmalloc_aligned_oob_write),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_shrink_memcache),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_memcache_ctor),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_invalid_access),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_gfpzero),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_memcache_typesafe_by_rcu),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_krealloc),
+	KUNIT_CASE(test_memcache_alloc_bulk),
+	{},
+};
+
+/* ===== End test cases ===== */
+
+static int test_init(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int i;
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&observed.lock, flags);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(observed.lines); i++)
+		observed.lines[i][0] = '\0';
+	observed.nlines = 0;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&observed.lock, flags);
+
+	/* Any test with 'memcache' in its name will want a memcache. */
+	if (strstr(test->name, "memcache"))
+		test->priv = TEST_PRIV_WANT_MEMCACHE;
+	else
+		test->priv = NULL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void test_exit(struct kunit *test)
+{
+	test_cache_destroy();
+}
+
+static struct kunit_suite kfence_test_suite = {
+	.name = "kfence",
+	.test_cases = kfence_test_cases,
+	.init = test_init,
+	.exit = test_exit,
+};
+static struct kunit_suite *kfence_test_suites[] = { &kfence_test_suite, NULL };
+
+static void register_tracepoints(struct tracepoint *tp, void *ignore)
+{
+	check_trace_callback_type_console(probe_console);
+	if (!strcmp(tp->name, "console"))
+		WARN_ON(tracepoint_probe_register(tp, probe_console, NULL));
+}
+
+static void unregister_tracepoints(struct tracepoint *tp, void *ignore)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(tp->name, "console"))
+		tracepoint_probe_unregister(tp, probe_console, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * We only want to do tracepoints setup and teardown once, therefore we have to
+ * customize the init and exit functions and cannot rely on kunit_test_suite().
+ */
+static int __init kfence_test_init(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Because we want to be able to build the test as a module, we need to
+	 * iterate through all known tracepoints, since the static registration
+	 * won't work here.
+	 */
+	for_each_kernel_tracepoint(register_tracepoints, NULL);
+	return __kunit_test_suites_init(kfence_test_suites);
+}
+
+static void kfence_test_exit(void)
+{
+	__kunit_test_suites_exit(kfence_test_suites);
+	for_each_kernel_tracepoint(unregister_tracepoints, NULL);
+	tracepoint_synchronize_unregister();
+}
+
+late_initcall(kfence_test_init);
+module_exit(kfence_test_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>, Marco Elver <elver@google.com>");
-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog

[PATCH v7 9/9] MAINTAINERS: add entry for KFENCE

[Marco Elver]

Add entry for KFENCE maintainers.

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
v7:
* Add asm/kfence.h [reported by Jann Horn].

v4:
* Split out from first patch.
---
 MAINTAINERS | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index b516bb34a8d5..09ad4771599d 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -9733,6 +9733,18 @@ F:	include/linux/keyctl.h
 F:	include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h
 F:	security/keys/
 
+KFENCE
+M:	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+M:	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+R:	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+L:	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
+S:	Maintained
+F:	Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
+F:	arch/*/include/asm/kfence.h
+F:	include/linux/kfence.h
+F:	lib/Kconfig.kfence
+F:	mm/kfence/
+
 KFIFO
 M:	Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>
 S:	Maintained
-- 
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog

Re: [PATCH v7 1/9] mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure

[Jann Horn]

On Tue, Nov 3, 2020 at 6:58 PM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a
> low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap
> use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors.

Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

Re: [PATCH v7 2/9] x86, kfence: enable KFENCE for x86

[Jann Horn]

On Tue, Nov 3, 2020 at 6:59 PM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> Add architecture specific implementation details for KFENCE and enable
> KFENCE for the x86 architecture. In particular, this implements the
> required interface in <asm/kfence.h> for setting up the pool and
> providing helper functions for protecting and unprotecting pages.
>
> For x86, we need to ensure that the pool uses 4K pages, which is done
> using the set_memory_4k() helper function.
>
> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

Re: [PATCH v7 3/9] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64

[Jann Horn]

On Tue, Nov 3, 2020 at 6:59 PM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> Add architecture specific implementation details for KFENCE and enable
> KFENCE for the arm64 architecture. In particular, this implements the
> required interface in <asm/kfence.h>.
>
> KFENCE requires that attributes for pages from its memory pool can
> individually be set. Therefore, force the entire linear map to be mapped
> at page granularity. Doing so may result in extra memory allocated for
> page tables in case rodata=full is not set; however, currently
> CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=y is the default, and the common case
> is therefore not affected by this change.
>
> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

Re: [PATCH v7 7/9] kfence, Documentation: add KFENCE documentation

[Jann Horn]

On Tue, Nov 3, 2020 at 6:59 PM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> Add KFENCE documentation in dev-tools/kfence.rst, and add to index.
>
> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

Re: [PATCH v7 8/9] kfence: add test suite

[Jann Horn]

On Tue, Nov 3, 2020 at 6:59 PM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> Add KFENCE test suite, testing various error detection scenarios. Makes
> use of KUnit for test organization. Since KFENCE's interface to obtain
> error reports is via the console, the test verifies that KFENCE outputs
> expected reports to the console.
>
> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector

[Andrew Morton]

On Tue,  3 Nov 2020 18:58:32 +0100 Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:

> This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a
> low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap
> use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors.  This
> series enables KFENCE for the x86 and arm64 architectures, and adds
> KFENCE hooks to the SLAB and SLUB allocators.
> 
> KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near
> zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance
> for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with
> enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically
> exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a
> large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large
> fleet of machines.

Has kfence detected any kernel bugs yet?  What is its track record?

Will a kfence merge permit us to remove some other memory debugging
subsystem?  We seem to have rather a lot of them.

Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector

[Marco Elver]

On Wed, 4 Nov 2020 at 01:31, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Tue,  3 Nov 2020 18:58:32 +0100 Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
>
> > This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a
> > low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap
> > use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors.  This
> > series enables KFENCE for the x86 and arm64 architectures, and adds
> > KFENCE hooks to the SLAB and SLUB allocators.
> >
> > KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near
> > zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance
> > for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with
> > enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically
> > exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a
> > large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large
> > fleet of machines.
>
> Has kfence detected any kernel bugs yet?  What is its track record?

Not yet, but once we deploy in various production kernels, we expect
to find new bugs (we'll report back with results once deployed).
Especially in drivers or subsystems that syzkaller+KASAN can't touch,
e.g. where real devices are required to get coverage. We expect to
have first results on this within 3 months, and can start backports
now that KFENCE for mainline is being finalized. This will likely also
make it into Android, but deployment there will take much longer.

The story is similar with the user space version of the tool
(GWP-ASan), where results started to materialize once it was deployed
across the fleet.

> Will a kfence merge permit us to remove some other memory debugging
> subsystem?  We seem to have rather a lot of them.

Nothing obvious I think. KFENCE is unique in that it is meant for
production fleets of machines (with ~zero overhead and no new HW
features), with the caveat that due to it being sampling based, it's
not so suitable for single machine testing. The other debugging tools
are suitable for the latter, but not former.

Thanks,
-- Marco

Re: [PATCH v7 3/9] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64

[Mark Rutland]

On Tue, Nov 03, 2020 at 06:58:35PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> Add architecture specific implementation details for KFENCE and enable
> KFENCE for the arm64 architecture. In particular, this implements the
> required interface in <asm/kfence.h>.
> 
> KFENCE requires that attributes for pages from its memory pool can
> individually be set. Therefore, force the entire linear map to be mapped
> at page granularity. Doing so may result in extra memory allocated for
> page tables in case rodata=full is not set; however, currently
> CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=y is the default, and the common case
> is therefore not affected by this change.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>

Thanks for dilligently handling all the review feedback. This looks good
to me now, so FWIW:

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

There is one thing that I thing we should improve as a subsequent
cleanup, but I don't think that should block this as-is.

> +#define KFENCE_SKIP_ARCH_FAULT_HANDLER "el1_sync"

IIUC, the core kfence code is using this to figure out where to trace
from when there's a fault taken on an access to a protected page.

It would be better if the arch code passed the exception's pt_regs into
the kfence fault handler, and the kfence began the trace began from
there. That would also allow for dumping the exception registers which
can help with debugging (e.g. figuring out how the address was derived
when it's calculated from multiple source registers). That would also be
a bit more robust to changes in an architectures' exception handling
code.

Thanks,
Mark.

Re: [PATCH v7 3/9] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64

[Marco Elver]

On Wed, 4 Nov 2020 at 14:06, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 03, 2020 at 06:58:35PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > Add architecture specific implementation details for KFENCE and enable
> > KFENCE for the arm64 architecture. In particular, this implements the
> > required interface in <asm/kfence.h>.
> >
> > KFENCE requires that attributes for pages from its memory pool can
> > individually be set. Therefore, force the entire linear map to be mapped
> > at page granularity. Doing so may result in extra memory allocated for
> > page tables in case rodata=full is not set; however, currently
> > CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=y is the default, and the common case
> > is therefore not affected by this change.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
>
> Thanks for dilligently handling all the review feedback. This looks good
> to me now, so FWIW:
>
> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>

Thank you!

> There is one thing that I thing we should improve as a subsequent
> cleanup, but I don't think that should block this as-is.
>
> > +#define KFENCE_SKIP_ARCH_FAULT_HANDLER "el1_sync"
>
> IIUC, the core kfence code is using this to figure out where to trace
> from when there's a fault taken on an access to a protected page.

Correct.

> It would be better if the arch code passed the exception's pt_regs into
> the kfence fault handler, and the kfence began the trace began from
> there. That would also allow for dumping the exception registers which
> can help with debugging (e.g. figuring out how the address was derived
> when it's calculated from multiple source registers). That would also be
> a bit more robust to changes in an architectures' exception handling
> code.

Good idea, thanks. I guess there's no reason to not want to always
skip to instruction_pointer(regs)?
In which case I can prepare a patch to make this change. If this
should go into a v8, please let me know. But it'd be easier as a
subsequent patch as you say, given it'll be easier to review and these
patches are in -mm now.

Thanks,
-- Marco

Re: [PATCH v7 3/9] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64

[Mark Rutland]

On Wed, Nov 04, 2020 at 03:23:48PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Wed, 4 Nov 2020 at 14:06, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Tue, Nov 03, 2020 at 06:58:35PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> > There is one thing that I thing we should improve as a subsequent
> > cleanup, but I don't think that should block this as-is.
> >
> > > +#define KFENCE_SKIP_ARCH_FAULT_HANDLER "el1_sync"
> >
> > IIUC, the core kfence code is using this to figure out where to trace
> > from when there's a fault taken on an access to a protected page.
> 
> Correct.
> 
> > It would be better if the arch code passed the exception's pt_regs into
> > the kfence fault handler, and the kfence began the trace began from
> > there. That would also allow for dumping the exception registers which
> > can help with debugging (e.g. figuring out how the address was derived
> > when it's calculated from multiple source registers). That would also be
> > a bit more robust to changes in an architectures' exception handling
> > code.
> 
> Good idea, thanks. I guess there's no reason to not want to always
> skip to instruction_pointer(regs)?

I don't think we need the exception handling gunk in the trace, but note
that you'd need to use stack_trace_save_regs(regs, ...) directly, rather
than using stack_trace_save() and skipping based on
instruction_pointer(regs). Otherwise, if the fault was somewhere in an
exception handler, and we invoked the same function on the path to the
kfence fault handler we might cut the trace at the wrong point.

> In which case I can prepare a patch to make this change. If this
> should go into a v8, please let me know. But it'd be easier as a
> subsequent patch as you say, given it'll be easier to review and these
> patches are in -mm now.

I think it'd make more sense as a subsequent change, since it's liable
to need a cycle or two of review, and I don't think it should block the
rest of the series.

Thanks,
Mark.

Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector

[Alexander Potapenko]

On Wed, Nov 4, 2020 at 1:36 PM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 4 Nov 2020 at 01:31, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > On Tue,  3 Nov 2020 18:58:32 +0100 Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > > This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a
> > > low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap
> > > use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors.  This
> > > series enables KFENCE for the x86 and arm64 architectures, and adds
> > > KFENCE hooks to the SLAB and SLUB allocators.
> > >
> > > KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near
> > > zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance
> > > for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with
> > > enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically
> > > exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a
> > > large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large
> > > fleet of machines.
> >
> > Has kfence detected any kernel bugs yet?  What is its track record?
>
> Not yet, but once we deploy in various production kernels, we expect
> to find new bugs (we'll report back with results once deployed).
> Especially in drivers or subsystems that syzkaller+KASAN can't touch,
> e.g. where real devices are required to get coverage. We expect to
> have first results on this within 3 months, and can start backports
> now that KFENCE for mainline is being finalized. This will likely also
> make it into Android, but deployment there will take much longer.
>
> The story is similar with the user space version of the tool
> (GWP-ASan), where results started to materialize once it was deployed
> across the fleet.
>
> > Will a kfence merge permit us to remove some other memory debugging
> > subsystem?  We seem to have rather a lot of them.
>
> Nothing obvious I think. KFENCE is unique in that it is meant for
> production fleets of machines (with ~zero overhead and no new HW
> features), with the caveat that due to it being sampling based, it's
> not so suitable for single machine testing. The other debugging tools
> are suitable for the latter, but not former.

Agreeing with everything Marco said I can only add that it would be
nice to have a separate discussion about the existing memory debugging
subsystems and the need to remove any of them.
Having many tools in a toolbox does not hurt, but we need to ensure
that all the tools in question are visible to the users (so that
people know when and how to use them), can find important bugs and do
not duplicate each other.


> Thanks,
> -- Marco



-- 
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

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