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From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
To: "tglx@linutronix.de"@aserv0121.oracle.com,
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	"alexandre.chartre@oracle.com"@aserv0121.oracle.com
Subject: [RFC][PATCH 18/24] x86/pti: Execute system vector handlers on the kernel stack
Date: Mon,  9 Nov 2020 12:23:13 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201109112319.264511-19-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201109112319.264511-1-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>

After an interrupt/exception in userland, the kernel is entered
and it switches the stack to the PTI stack which is mapped both in
the kernel and in the user page-table. When executing the interrupt
function, switch to the kernel stack (which is mapped only in the
kernel page-table) so that no kernel data leak to the userland
through the stack.

Changes system vector handlers to execute on the kernel stack.

Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index a82e31b45442..0c5d9f027112 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -66,6 +66,17 @@ void run_idt_errcode(void (*func)(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long),
 	CALL_ON_STACK_2(pti_kernel_stack(regs), func, regs, error_code);
 }
 
+static __always_inline
+void run_sysvec(void (*func)(struct pt_regs *regs), struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	void *stack = pti_kernel_stack(regs);
+
+	if (stack)
+		asm_call_on_stack_1(stack, (void (*)(void))func, regs);
+	else
+		run_sysvec_on_irqstack_cond(func, regs);
+}
+
 /**
  * DECLARE_IDTENTRY - Declare functions for simple IDT entry points
  *		      No error code pushed by hardware
@@ -295,7 +306,7 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs)			\
 	instrumentation_begin();					\
 	irq_enter_rcu();						\
 	kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();					\
-	run_sysvec_on_irqstack_cond(__##func, regs);			\
+	run_sysvec(__##func, regs);					\
 	irq_exit_rcu();							\
 	instrumentation_end();						\
 	irqentry_exit(regs, state);					\
-- 
2.18.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-11-09 11:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-09 11:22 [RFC][PATCH 00/24] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:22 ` [RFC][PATCH 01/24] x86/syscall: Add wrapper for invoking syscall function Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 17:25   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-09 17:45     ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:22 ` [RFC][PATCH 02/24] x86/entry: Update asm_call_on_stack to support more function arguments Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:22 ` [RFC][PATCH 03/24] x86/entry: Consolidate IST entry from userspace Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:22 ` [RFC][PATCH 04/24] x86/sev-es: Define a setup stack function for the VC idtentry Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 05/24] x86/entry: Implement ret_from_fork body with C code Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 06/24] x86/pti: Provide C variants of PTI switch CR3 macros Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 07/24] x86/entry: Fill ESPFIX stack using C code Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 08/24] x86/entry: Add C version of SWAPGS and SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 17:38   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-09 18:04     ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 09/24] x86/entry: Add C version of paranoid_entry/exit Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 10/24] x86/pti: Introduce per-task PTI trampoline stack Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 11/24] x86/pti: Function to clone page-table entries from a specified mm Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 12/24] x86/pti: Function to map per-cpu page-table entry Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 13/24] x86/pti: Extend PTI user mappings Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 17:28   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-11-09 17:52     ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 14/24] x86/pti: Use PTI stack instead of trampoline stack Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 15/24] x86/pti: Execute syscall functions on the kernel stack Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 16/24] x86/pti: Execute IDT handlers " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 17/24] x86/pti: Execute IDT handlers with error code " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` Alexandre Chartre [this message]
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 19/24] x86/pti: Execute page fault handler " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 20/24] x86/pti: Execute NMI " Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 21/24] x86/entry: Disable stack-protector for IST entry C handlers Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 22/24] x86/entry: Defer paranoid entry/exit to C code Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 23/24] x86/entry: Remove paranoid_entry and paranoid_exit Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 11:23 ` [RFC][PATCH 24/24] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code for non-IST and syscall entries Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:00 ` [RFC][PATCH 00/24] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 Alexandre Chartre
2020-11-09 14:44 ` [RFC][PATCH 18/24] x86/pti: Execute system vector handlers on the kernel stack Alexandre Chartre

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