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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v15 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2020 08:21:56 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201110162211.9207-12-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201110162211.9207-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

When shadow stack is introduced, [R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW] PTE is reserved
for shadow stack.  Copy-on-write PTEs have [R/O + _PAGE_COW].

When a PTE goes from [R/W + _PAGE_DIRTY_HW] to [R/O + _PAGE_COW], it could
become a transient shadow stack PTE in two cases:

The first case is that some processors can start a write but end up seeing
a read-only PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit, creating a transient
shadow stack PTE.  However, this will not occur on processors supporting
shadow stack, therefore we don't need a TLB flush here.

The second case is that when the software, without atomic, tests & replaces
_PAGE_DIRTY_HW with _PAGE_COW, a transient shadow stack PTE can exist.
This is prevented with cmpxchg.

Dave Hansen, Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski, and Peter Zijlstra provided many
insights to the issue.  Jann Horn provided the cmpxchg solution.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 07a08e763bce..5fd4d6b60383 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1229,6 +1229,32 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,
 static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				      unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Some processors can start a write, but end up seeing a read-only
+	 * PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit.  In this case, they
+	 * will set the Dirty bit, leaving a read-only, Dirty PTE which
+	 * looks like a shadow stack PTE.
+	 *
+	 * However, this behavior has been improved and will not occur on
+	 * processors supporting shadow stack.  Without this guarantee, a
+	 * transition to a non-present PTE and flush the TLB would be
+	 * needed.
+	 *
+	 * When changing a writable PTE to read-only and if the PTE has
+	 * _PAGE_DIRTY_HW set, move that bit to _PAGE_COW so that the
+	 * PTE is not a shadow stack PTE.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		pte_t old_pte, new_pte;
+
+		do {
+			old_pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
+			new_pte = pte_wrprotect(old_pte);
+
+		} while (!try_cmpxchg(&ptep->pte, &old_pte.pte, new_pte.pte));
+
+		return;
+	}
 	clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)&ptep->pte);
 }
 
@@ -1285,6 +1311,32 @@ static inline pud_t pudp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
 static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				      unsigned long addr, pmd_t *pmdp)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Some processors can start a write, but end up seeing a read-only
+	 * PMD by the time they get to the Dirty bit.  In this case, they
+	 * will set the Dirty bit, leaving a read-only, Dirty PMD which
+	 * looks like a Shadow Stack PMD.
+	 *
+	 * However, this behavior has been improved and will not occur on
+	 * processors supporting Shadow Stack.  Without this guarantee, a
+	 * transition to a non-present PMD and flush the TLB would be
+	 * needed.
+	 *
+	 * When changing a writable PMD to read-only and if the PMD has
+	 * _PAGE_DIRTY_HW set, we move that bit to _PAGE_COW so that the
+	 * PMD is not a shadow stack PMD.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		pmd_t old_pmd, new_pmd;
+
+		do {
+			old_pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
+			new_pmd = pmd_wrprotect(old_pmd);
+
+		} while (!try_cmpxchg((pmdval_t *)pmdp, (pmdval_t *)&old_pmd, pmd_val(new_pmd)));
+
+		return;
+	}
 	clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp);
 }
 
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-11-10 16:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-10 16:21 [PATCH v15 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-30 18:26   ` Nick Desaulniers
2020-11-30 18:34     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-30 19:38       ` Fāng-ruì Sòng
2020-11-30 19:47         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-26 11:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-30 17:45   ` [NEEDS-REVIEW] " Dave Hansen
2020-11-30 18:06     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-30 18:12       ` Dave Hansen
2020-11-30 18:17         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-30 23:16     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-12-01 22:26       ` Dave Hansen
2020-12-01 22:35         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-26 18:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-27 17:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-28 16:23     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-30 18:15       ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-30 22:48         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-12-01 16:02           ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-30 19:56   ` Nick Desaulniers
2020-11-30 20:30     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-03  9:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-12-03 15:12     ` Dave Hansen
2020-12-03 15:56       ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-07 16:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-12-07 17:11     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-08 17:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-12-08 18:25     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-12-08 18:47       ` Borislav Petkov
2020-12-08 19:24         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-12-10 17:41           ` Borislav Petkov
2020-12-10 18:10             ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:21 ` [PATCH v15 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 19/26] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 22/26] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-10 16:22 ` [PATCH v15 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-27  9:29 ` [PATCH v15 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Balbir Singh
2020-11-28 16:31   ` Yu, Yu-cheng

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