linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com,
	gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com, sashal@kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 18:13:43 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201212001343.GE4951@sequoia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201211235807.30815-4-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>

On 2020-12-11 15:58:02, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> IMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer
> data. However, various data structures, policies, and states
> stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system.
> Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data. These
> kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Currently,
> IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure
> their integrity critical data.
>  
> Define a new IMA hook - ima_measure_critical_data to measure kernel
> integrity critical data.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>

Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>

Tyler

> ---
>  include/linux/ima.h               |  6 ++++++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h      |  1 +
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  |  2 +-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index ac3d82f962f2..675f54db6264 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
>  extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
>  extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
>  extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
> +extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
> +				      const void *buf, int buf_len,
> +				      bool measure_buf_hash);
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
>  extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void);
> @@ -122,6 +125,9 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
>  }
>  
>  static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
> +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
> +					     const void *buf, int buf_len,
> +					     bool measure_buf_hash) {}
>  #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
>  
>  #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index fa3044a7539f..7d9deda6a8b3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
>  	hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy)			\
>  	hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline)		\
>  	hook(KEY_CHECK, key)				\
> +	hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data)		\
>  	hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
>  
>  #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str)	ENUM,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index af218babd198..9917e1730cb6 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
>   *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
>   *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
>   *	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
> - *	| KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK
> + *	| KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA
>   *	mask: contains the permission mask
>   *	fsmagic: hex value
>   *
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 0f8409d77602..dff4bce4fb09 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -922,6 +922,40 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
>  	fdput(f);
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data
> + * @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry
> + * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure
> + * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes)
> + * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash
> + *
> + * Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel,
> + * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr.
> + *
> + * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change.
> + * Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures,
> + * policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrity
> + * of the system.
> + *
> + * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data,
> + * else measure the buffer data itself.
> + * @measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured
> + * is too large.
> + *
> + * The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised.
> + */
> +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name,
> +			       const void *buf, int buf_len,
> +			       bool measure_buf_hash)
> +{
> +	if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len)
> +		return;
> +
> +	process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name,
> +				   CRITICAL_DATA, 0, NULL,
> +				   measure_buf_hash);
> +}
> +
>  static int __init init_ima(void)
>  {
>  	int error;
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2020-12-12  0:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-11 23:57 [PATCH v8 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-12  0:08   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-12  0:09   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-12  0:13   ` Tyler Hicks [this message]
2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-12  0:25   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-12  1:17     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-12 14:47       ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-12 17:34         ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 6/8] IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-11 23:58 ` [PATCH v8 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook Tushar Sugandhi
2020-12-12  0:32   ` Tyler Hicks
2020-12-12  0:33     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20201212001343.GE4951@sequoia \
    --to=tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=agk@redhat.com \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=dm-devel@redhat.com \
    --cc=gmazyland@gmail.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=nramas@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=sashal@kernel.org \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=snitzer@redhat.com \
    --cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
    --cc=tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).