From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 24A83C433E6 for ; Mon, 28 Dec 2020 13:17:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ECE8422B3A for ; Mon, 28 Dec 2020 13:17:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731557AbgL1NRY (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Dec 2020 08:17:24 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:45242 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731528AbgL1NRQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Dec 2020 08:17:16 -0500 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 10B89207CF; Mon, 28 Dec 2020 13:16:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1609161420; bh=jtUNsOUZ5vABG6kent2Hwsx8WvaniRysXjh/JP2XXyM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=A//vHyDZwcHyUgA5DHAQIoB5yT1vaUOW2YCeC22fblWRR4GZ2VQmuOtQ5jygspSWJ lj1cFJSX6X0dxhxCV7YJpHHKsNi2xmmH8xR1LVcdyovPEmD3ahxivAUAE0ts5kR6ha HSjt8Qa88wY1hqTBAdz+e7uouqeFH00LUotgtm+M= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, =?UTF-8?q?Herv=C3=A9=20Guillemet?= , Casey Schaufler , Serge Hallyn , "Andrew G. Morgan" , James Morris , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.14 178/242] [SECURITY] fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2020 13:49:43 +0100 Message-Id: <20201228124913.445936891@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: <20201228124904.654293249@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20201228124904.654293249@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Serge Hallyn [ Upstream commit ed9b25d1970a4787ac6a39c2091e63b127ecbfc1 ] Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one. To test this using libcap-bin (*1), $ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK "setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail: $ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in [] Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n. *1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689 Cc: Hervé Guillemet Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index ce6265960d6c4..dab093af4ee8d 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc); } static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) -- 2.27.0