From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 02/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2020 13:39:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201229123910.GB29947@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201209222320.1724-3-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
On Wed, Dec 09, 2020 at 02:22:56PM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
> corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
> CONFIG_X86_CET_USER, and the application is built for the feature.
^
enabled.
> This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy
> non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without protection.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
> 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
Rest looks good, thanks.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-29 12:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-12-09 22:22 [PATCH v16 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:22 ` [PATCH v16 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:22 ` [PATCH v16 02/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-29 12:39 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2020-12-29 16:34 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-12-29 18:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-12-29 19:45 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-12-09 22:22 ` [PATCH v16 03/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:22 ` [PATCH v16 04/26] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:22 ` [PATCH v16 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 06/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 19/26] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 22/26] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-12-09 22:23 ` [PATCH v16 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK " Yu-cheng Yu
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