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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Anton Ivanov" <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Jeff Dike" <jdike@addtoit.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Vincent Dagonneau" <vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 08:21:28 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210203142128.GA21770@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210202162710.657398-2-mic@digikod.net>

On Tue, Feb 02, 2021 at 05:26:59PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> 
> A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode).
> A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object.  Rules
> are grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e.
> subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain).
> 
> Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especially
> unprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we cannot rely on a
> system-wide object identification such as file extended attributes.
> Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls.
> 
> The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objects
> while this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makes
> use of this object).  But this identification data should be freed once
> no policy is using it.  This ephemeral tagging should not and may not be
> written in the filesystem.  We then need to manage the lifetime of a
> rule according to the lifetime of its objects.  To avoid a global lock,
> this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely reference
> objects.
> 
> A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes.
> 
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

Just a few suggestions for the description below.

> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> ---
> 
> Changes since v27:
> * Update Kconfig for landlock_restrict_self(2).
> * Cosmetic fixes: use 80 columns in Kconfig and align Makefile
>   declarations.
> 
> Changes since v26:
> * Update Kconfig for landlock_enforce_ruleset_self(2).
> * Fix spelling.
> 
> Changes since v24:
> * Fix typo in comment (spotted by Jann Horn).
> * Add Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> 
> Changes since v23:
> * Update landlock_create_object() to return error codes instead of NULL.
>   This help error handling in callers.
> * When using make oldconfig with a previous configuration already
>   including the CONFIG_LSM variable, no question is asked to update its
>   content.  Update the Kconfig help to warn about LSM stacking
>   configuration.
> * Constify variable (spotted by Vincent Dagonneau).
> 
> Changes since v22:
> * Fix spelling (spotted by Jann Horn).
> 
> Changes since v21:
> * Update Kconfig help.
> * Clean up comments.
> 
> Changes since v18:
> * Account objects to kmemcg.
> 
> Changes since v14:
> * Simplify the object, rule and ruleset management at the expense of a
>   less aggressive memory freeing (contributed by Jann Horn, with
>   additional modifications):
>   - Remove object->list aggregating the rules tied to an object.
>   - Remove landlock_get_object(), landlock_drop_object(),
>     {get,put}_object_cleaner() and landlock_rule_is_disabled().
>   - Rewrite landlock_put_object() to use a more simple mechanism
>     (no tricky RCU).
>   - Replace enum landlock_object_type and landlock_release_object() with
>     landlock_object_underops->release()
>   - Adjust unions and Sparse annotations.
>   Cf. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez21bEn0wL1bbmTiiu8j9jP5iEWtHOwz4tURUJ+ki0ydYw@mail.gmail.com/
> * Merge struct landlock_rule into landlock_ruleset_elem to simplify the
>   rule management.
> * Constify variables.
> * Improve kernel documentation.
> * Cosmetic variable renames.
> * Remove the "default" in the Kconfig (suggested by Jann Horn).
> * Only use refcount_inc() through getter helpers.
> * Update Kconfig description.
> 
> Changes since v13:
> * New dedicated implementation, removing the need for eBPF.
> 
> Previous changes:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190721213116.23476-6-mic@digikod.net/
> ---
>  MAINTAINERS                | 10 +++++
>  security/Kconfig           |  1 +
>  security/Makefile          |  2 +
>  security/landlock/Kconfig  | 21 +++++++++
>  security/landlock/Makefile |  3 ++
>  security/landlock/object.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/landlock/object.h | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  7 files changed, 195 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig
>  create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.c
>  create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.h
> 
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index d3e847f7f3dc..a0e57ade0524 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -9936,6 +9936,16 @@ F:	net/core/sock_map.c
>  F:	net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c
>  F:	net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c
>  
> +LANDLOCK SECURITY MODULE
> +M:	Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> +L:	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> +S:	Supported
> +W:	https://landlock.io
> +T:	git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git
> +F:	security/landlock/
> +K:	landlock
> +K:	LANDLOCK
> +
>  LANTIQ / INTEL Ethernet drivers
>  M:	Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
>  L:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 7561f6f99f1d..15a4342b5d01 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
>  source "security/yama/Kconfig"
>  source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
>  source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
> +source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
>  
>  source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
>  
> diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
> index 3baf435de541..47e432900e24 100644
> --- a/security/Makefile
> +++ b/security/Makefile
> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)	+= loadpin
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID)    += safesetid
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM)	+= lockdown
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM)		+= bpf
> +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK)	+= landlock
>  
>  # always enable default capabilities
>  obj-y					+= commoncap.o
> @@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID)       += safesetid/
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM)	+= lockdown/
>  obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS)			+= device_cgroup.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM)			+= bpf/
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK)		+= landlock/
>  
>  # Object integrity file lists
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY)		+= integrity
> diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..79b7d0c3b11e
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig
> @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +
> +config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
> +	bool "Landlock support"
> +	depends on SECURITY
> +	select SECURITY_PATH
> +	help
> +	  Landlock is a safe sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to

"safe" probably doesn't need to be there :)

> +	  restrict themselves (and their future children) by gradually
> +	  enforcing tailored access control policies.  A security policy is a

You're redefining "security policy" which could be confusing.  How about
saying "a landlock security policy is a..."?

> +	  set of access rights (e.g. open a file in read-only, make a
> +	  directory, etc.) tied to a file hierarchy.  Such policy can be
> +	  configured and enforced by any processes for themselves thanks to

s/thanks to/using the/ ?

> +	  dedicated system calls: landlock_create_ruleset(),
> +	  landlock_add_rule(), and landlock_restrict_self().
> +
> +	  See Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst for further information.
> +
> +	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.  Otherwise,
> +	  you should also prepend "landlock," to the content of CONFIG_LSM to
> +	  enable Landlock at boot time.
> diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..cb6deefbf4c0
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
> @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
> +
> +landlock-y := object.o
> diff --git a/security/landlock/object.c b/security/landlock/object.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..d674fdf9ff04
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/object.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Landlock LSM - Object management
> + *
> + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/bug.h>
> +#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
> +#include <linux/err.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> +#include <linux/refcount.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> +
> +#include "object.h"
> +
> +struct landlock_object *landlock_create_object(
> +		const struct landlock_object_underops *const underops,
> +		void *const underobj)
> +{
> +	struct landlock_object *new_object;
> +
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!underops || !underobj))
> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
> +	new_object = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_object), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> +	if (!new_object)
> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +	refcount_set(&new_object->usage, 1);
> +	spin_lock_init(&new_object->lock);
> +	new_object->underops = underops;
> +	new_object->underobj = underobj;
> +	return new_object;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * The caller must own the object (i.e. thanks to object->usage) to safely put
> + * it.
> + */
> +void landlock_put_object(struct landlock_object *const object)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * The call to @object->underops->release(object) might sleep, e.g.
> +	 * because of iput().
> +	 */
> +	might_sleep();
> +	if (!object)
> +		return;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If the @object's refcount cannot drop to zero, we can just decrement
> +	 * the refcount without holding a lock. Otherwise, the decrement must
> +	 * happen under @object->lock for synchronization with things like
> +	 * get_inode_object().
> +	 */
> +	if (refcount_dec_and_lock(&object->usage, &object->lock)) {
> +		__acquire(&object->lock);
> +		/*
> +		 * With @object->lock initially held, remove the reference from
> +		 * @object->underobj to @object (if it still exists).
> +		 */
> +		object->underops->release(object);
> +		kfree_rcu(object, rcu_free);
> +	}
> +}
> diff --git a/security/landlock/object.h b/security/landlock/object.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..56f17c51df01
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/object.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * Landlock LSM - Object management
> + *
> + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H
> +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H
> +
> +#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
> +#include <linux/refcount.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> +
> +struct landlock_object;
> +
> +/**
> + * struct landlock_object_underops - Operations on an underlying object
> + */
> +struct landlock_object_underops {
> +	/**
> +	 * @release: Releases the underlying object (e.g. iput() for an inode).
> +	 */
> +	void (*release)(struct landlock_object *const object)
> +		__releases(object->lock);
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * struct landlock_object - Security blob tied to a kernel object
> + *
> + * The goal of this structure is to enable to tie a set of ephemeral access
> + * rights (pertaining to different domains) to a kernel object (e.g an inode)
> + * in a safe way.  This implies to handle concurrent use and modification.
> + *
> + * The lifetime of a &struct landlock_object depends of the rules referring to
> + * it.
> + */
> +struct landlock_object {
> +	/**
> +	 * @usage: This counter is used to tie an object to the rules matching
> +	 * it or to keep it alive while adding a new rule.  If this counter
> +	 * reaches zero, this struct must not be modified, but this counter can
> +	 * still be read from within an RCU read-side critical section.  When
> +	 * adding a new rule to an object with a usage counter of zero, we must
> +	 * wait until the pointer to this object is set to NULL (or recycled).
> +	 */
> +	refcount_t usage;
> +	/**
> +	 * @lock: Guards against concurrent modifications.  This lock must be
> +	 * held from the time @usage drops to zero until any weak references
> +	 * from @underobj to this object have been cleaned up.
> +	 *
> +	 * Lock ordering: inode->i_lock nests inside this.
> +	 */
> +	spinlock_t lock;
> +	/**
> +	 * @underobj: Used when cleaning up an object and to mark an object as
> +	 * tied to its underlying kernel structure.  This pointer is protected
> +	 * by @lock.  Cf. landlock_release_inodes() and release_inode().
> +	 */
> +	void *underobj;
> +	union {
> +		/**
> +		 * @rcu_free: Enables lockless use of @usage, @lock and
> +		 * @underobj from within an RCU read-side critical section.
> +		 * @rcu_free and @underops are only used by
> +		 * landlock_put_object().
> +		 */
> +		struct rcu_head rcu_free;
> +		/**
> +		 * @underops: Enables landlock_put_object() to release the
> +		 * underlying object (e.g. inode).
> +		 */
> +		const struct landlock_object_underops *underops;
> +	};
> +};
> +
> +struct landlock_object *landlock_create_object(
> +		const struct landlock_object_underops *const underops,
> +		void *const underobj);
> +
> +void landlock_put_object(struct landlock_object *const object);
> +
> +static inline void landlock_get_object(struct landlock_object *const object)
> +{
> +	if (object)
> +		refcount_inc(&object->usage);
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H */
> -- 
> 2.30.0

  reply	other threads:[~2021-02-03 14:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-02 16:26 [PATCH v28 00/12] Landlock LSM Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-02 16:26 ` [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-03 14:21   ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2021-02-03 15:27     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-04  3:30   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-04  3:46   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-05 13:48   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-05 14:17   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-05 16:51     ` Casey Schaufler
2021-02-05 16:51     ` Casey Schaufler
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-05 14:21   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-05 14:57     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-07  4:18       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-10 19:36   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-10 20:17     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-19 15:34       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-03 15:04   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation Mickaël Salaün

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