From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v19 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 14:55:47 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210203225547.32221-26-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210203225547.32221-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API:
an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect().
Each has its advantages and compromises.
An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86
arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be
passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in
registers [1], but no active discussion on that.
A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame
work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of
mmap()/mprotect().
The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of
existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to VM_SHSTK and
a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing the wheel. There are
potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one would be using this as a
bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the attacker would have to get
to the syscall first.
Since arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() is modified, I have moved arch_vm_get_page
_prot() and arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to x86/include/asm/mman.h.
This will be more consistent with other architectures.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 28 ++---------
include/linux/mm.h | 1 +
mm/mmap.c | 8 ++-
4 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..db897d14fc37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/mman.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+/*
+ * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags
+ * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in
+ * to a pte.
+ *
+ * Only override these if Protection Keys are available
+ * (which is only on 64-bit).
+ */
+#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
+ ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
+ ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
+ ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
+ ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+#else
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0)
+#endif
+
+static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long pkey)
+{
+ unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey);
+
+ if (!(prot & PROT_WRITE) && (prot & PROT_SHSTK))
+ vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHSTK;
+
+ return vm_prot_bits;
+}
+
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
+{
+ unsigned long valid = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM;
+
+ if (prot & ~(valid | PROT_SHSTK))
+ return false;
+
+ if (prot & PROT_SHSTK) {
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+ if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only
+ * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write
+ * instructions). PROT_SHSTK and PROT_WRITE are mutually
+ * exclusive.
+ */
+ if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
+ return false;
+
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr);
+ if (!vma)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Shadow stack cannot be backed by a file or shared.
+ */
+ if (vma->vm_file || (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
index d4a8d0424bfb..39bb7db344a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
@@ -1,31 +1,11 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
-#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
-#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H
#define MAP_32BIT 0x40 /* only give out 32bit addresses */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
-/*
- * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags
- * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in
- * to a pte.
- *
- * Only override these if Protection Keys are available
- * (which is only on 64-bit).
- */
-#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
-
-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
- ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
- ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
- ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
- ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
-#endif
+#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10 /* shadow stack pages */
#include <asm-generic/mman.h>
-#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
+#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 06e9899e13b8..f3a3b6be97e2 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
+# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SHSTK
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
# define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */
#elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC)
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 95ce7cd68654..9434469db2ce 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1483,6 +1483,12 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
unsigned long flags_mask;
+ /*
+ * Call stack cannot be backed by a file.
+ */
+ if (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (!file_mmap_ok(file, inode, pgoff, len))
return -EOVERFLOW;
@@ -1547,7 +1553,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
} else {
switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) {
case MAP_SHARED:
- if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP))
+ if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP|VM_SHSTK))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Ignore pgoff.
--
2.21.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-03 23:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-03 22:55 [PATCH v19 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 19:52 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 20:03 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 19:56 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-05 0:05 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 19:57 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 19:58 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-05 13:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-05 16:15 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 19:59 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:09 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-05 0:10 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-05 13:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-05 18:00 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-05 18:29 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-08 18:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-08 18:50 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-08 18:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-08 19:23 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-08 19:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-08 20:11 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:10 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:19 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 20:27 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-05 18:41 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-08 23:03 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-05 18:58 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:21 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:46 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2021-02-04 21:48 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:22 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:22 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:24 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:24 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:27 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:28 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:29 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:33 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 23/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-03 22:55 ` [PATCH v19 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-04 20:35 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-04 23:41 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-05 18:26 ` Kees Cook
2021-02-03 22:55 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
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