From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Anton Ivanov" <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Jeff Dike" <jdike@addtoit.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Vincent Dagonneau" <vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v28 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2021 07:48:58 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210205134857.GA17981@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210202162710.657398-5-mic@digikod.net>
On Tue, Feb 02, 2021 at 05:27:02PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>
> Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead
> to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker
> to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing
> malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of
> the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.
>
> A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process
> and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating
> processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a
> target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target
> process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).
>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Thanks, I appreciate that things are well named and easy to reason
about.
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v25:
> * Rename function to landlock_add_ptrace_hooks().
>
> Changes since v22:
> * Add Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
>
> Changes since v21:
> * Fix copyright dates.
>
> Changes since v14:
> * Constify variables.
>
> Changes since v13:
> * Make the ptrace restriction mandatory, like in the v10.
> * Remove the eBPF dependency.
>
> Previous changes:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191104172146.30797-5-mic@digikod.net/
> ---
> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +-
> security/landlock/ptrace.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/landlock/ptrace.h | 14 +++++
> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
> 4 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.c
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/ptrace.h
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
> index 041ea242e627..f1d1eb72fa76 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/Makefile
> +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
> @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
> obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
>
> landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \
> - cred.o
> + cred.o ptrace.o
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..f55b82446de2
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Landlock LSM - Ptrace hooks
> + *
> + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> + * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI
> + */
> +
> +#include <asm/current.h>
> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> +#include <linux/errno.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +
> +#include "common.h"
> +#include "cred.h"
> +#include "ptrace.h"
> +#include "ruleset.h"
> +#include "setup.h"
> +
> +/**
> + * domain_scope_le - Checks domain ordering for scoped ptrace
> + *
> + * @parent: Parent domain.
> + * @child: Potential child of @parent.
> + *
> + * Checks if the @parent domain is less or equal to (i.e. an ancestor, which
> + * means a subset of) the @child domain.
> + */
> +static bool domain_scope_le(const struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
> +{
> + const struct landlock_hierarchy *walker;
> +
> + if (!parent)
> + return true;
> + if (!child)
> + return false;
> + for (walker = child->hierarchy; walker; walker = walker->parent) {
> + if (walker == parent->hierarchy)
> + /* @parent is in the scoped hierarchy of @child. */
> + return true;
> + }
> + /* There is no relationship between @parent and @child. */
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static bool task_is_scoped(const struct task_struct *const parent,
> + const struct task_struct *const child)
> +{
> + bool is_scoped;
> + const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_parent, *dom_child;
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + dom_parent = landlock_get_task_domain(parent);
> + dom_child = landlock_get_task_domain(child);
> + is_scoped = domain_scope_le(dom_parent, dom_child);
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + return is_scoped;
> +}
> +
> +static int task_ptrace(const struct task_struct *const parent,
> + const struct task_struct *const child)
> +{
> + /* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */
> + if (!landlocked(parent))
> + return 0;
> + if (task_is_scoped(parent, child))
> + return 0;
> + return -EPERM;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * hook_ptrace_access_check - Determines whether the current process may access
> + * another
> + *
> + * @child: Process to be accessed.
> + * @mode: Mode of attachment.
> + *
> + * If the current task has Landlock rules, then the child must have at least
> + * the same rules. Else denied.
> + *
> + * Determines whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
> + * granted, -errno if denied.
> + */
> +static int hook_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *const child,
> + const unsigned int mode)
> +{
> + return task_ptrace(current, child);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * hook_ptrace_traceme - Determines whether another process may trace the
> + * current one
> + *
> + * @parent: Task proposed to be the tracer.
> + *
> + * If the parent has Landlock rules, then the current task must have the same
> + * or more rules. Else denied.
> + *
> + * Determines whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
> + * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -errno if denied.
> + */
> +static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *const parent)
> +{
> + return task_ptrace(parent, current);
> +}
> +
> +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme),
> +};
> +
> +__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
> +{
> + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> + LANDLOCK_NAME);
> +}
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.h b/security/landlock/ptrace.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..265b220ae3bf
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * Landlock LSM - Ptrace hooks
> + *
> + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> + * Copyright © 2019 ANSSI
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H
> +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H
> +
> +__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void);
> +
> +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
> index 8661112fb238..a5d6ef334991 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>
> #include "common.h"
> #include "cred.h"
> +#include "ptrace.h"
> #include "setup.h"
>
> struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> @@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> static int __init landlock_init(void)
> {
> landlock_add_cred_hooks();
> + landlock_add_ptrace_hooks();
> pr_info("Up and running.\n");
> return 0;
> }
> --
> 2.30.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-05 13:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-02 16:26 [PATCH v28 00/12] Landlock LSM Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-02 16:26 ` [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-03 14:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-03 15:27 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-04 3:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-04 3:46 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-05 13:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-05 14:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-05 16:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-02-05 16:51 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-05 14:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-05 14:57 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-07 4:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-10 19:36 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-10 20:17 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-19 15:34 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-03 15:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-02 16:27 ` [PATCH v28 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation Mickaël Salaün
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