From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 13:54:52 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210331205458.1871746-1-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
Hi Will (and Mark and Catalin),
Can you take this via the arm64 tree for v5.13 please? Thomas has added
his Reviewed-by, so it only leaves arm64's. :)
v9:
- comment position nit (tglx)
- Added tglx's Reviewed-by
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210330205750.428816-1-keescook@chromium.org/
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210319212835.3928492-1-keescook@chromium.org/
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210315180229.1224655-1-keescook@chromium.org/
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210309214301.678739-1-keescook@chromium.org/
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200622193146.2985288-1-keescook@chromium.org/
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200406231606.37619-1-keescook@chromium.org/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200324203231.64324-1-keescook@chromium.org/
rfc: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/
This is a continuation and refactoring of Elena's earlier effort to add
kernel stack base offset randomization. In the time since the earlier
discussions, two attacks[1][2] were made public that depended on stack
determinism, so we're no longer in the position of "this is a good idea
but we have no examples of attacks". :)
Earlier discussions also devolved into debates on entropy sources, which
is mostly a red herring, given the already low entropy available due
to stack size. Regardless, entropy can be changed/improved separately
from this series as needed.
Earlier discussions also got stuck debating how much syscall overhead
was too much, but this is also a red herring since the feature itself
needs to be selectable at boot with no cost for those that don't want it:
this is solved here with static branches.
So, here is the latest improved version, made as arch-agnostic as
possible, with usage added for x86 and arm64. It also includes some small
static branch clean ups, and addresses some surprise performance issues
due to the stack canary[3].
Thanks!
-Kees
[1] https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html
[2] https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202003281520.A9BFF461@keescook/
Kees Cook (6):
jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 ++++
Makefile | 4 ++
arch/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 5 ++
arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 16 ++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 16 ++++++
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 17 ++++++
drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 +
drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 +
include/linux/jump_label.h | 19 +++++++
include/linux/mm.h | 10 ++--
include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 54 +++++++++++++++++++
init/main.c | 23 ++++++++
mm/page_alloc.c | 4 +-
mm/slab.h | 6 ++-
18 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
--
2.25.1
next reply other threads:[~2021-03-31 20:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-31 20:54 Kees Cook [this message]
2021-03-31 20:54 ` [PATCH v9 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults Kees Cook
2021-03-31 20:54 ` [PATCH v9 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches Kees Cook
2021-03-31 20:54 ` [PATCH v9 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Kees Cook
2021-03-31 20:54 ` [PATCH v9 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Kees Cook
2021-03-31 20:54 ` [PATCH v9 5/6] arm64: entry: " Kees Cook
2021-03-31 20:54 ` [PATCH v9 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets Kees Cook
2021-04-01 8:37 ` [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall Will Deacon
2021-04-01 13:33 ` Thomas Gleixner
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