From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E573C433B4 for ; Mon, 12 Apr 2021 00:55:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F39B1611F2 for ; Mon, 12 Apr 2021 00:55:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236225AbhDLAz5 (ORCPT ); Sun, 11 Apr 2021 20:55:57 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:46372 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S235388AbhDLAz4 (ORCPT ); Sun, 11 Apr 2021 20:55:56 -0400 Received: from casper.infradead.org (casper.infradead.org [IPv6:2001:8b0:10b:1236::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6A118C061574; Sun, 11 Apr 2021 17:55:39 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=casper.20170209; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version: Message-Id:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From:Sender:Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-ID: Content-Description:In-Reply-To:References; bh=muzQgvMbWiB+qCG5peNj017kfJ/xeW6UXxHnnXZVDyw=; b=PylK84hPe591LzpDK0rrkdrjOs 1kCuxFTs89VZlnv9gmoOia+RzDHJz57UjvhdidtJ/1BiNaHSLVcvBRkpVUl3VzR5HlZ0QzfsyTXsT dDwxFfp9nuhQYzFtVdYdHVpFl9PwEf8nXVk5IVszQ04v67GcnALz58OU5WvQrFm43sPJCEtBgyzbR WHi05GHUXTOSwuMPKYlUMnARjKqX/c3qp/KrHHqO52OsUSvfRlKdUoBMpGMkGk3SiTFD+ujUOY5vS 2nAZbfQ2wo+fdT+7Q3gqOLFd+V5z3OA1xtOx1SviEmR9AqDm/dMulJ+LcDzAl4/gKEzW6IiZjo8KD kCZr7erA==; Received: from [2601:1c0:6280:3f0::e0e1] (helo=smtpauth.infradead.org) by casper.infradead.org with esmtpsa (Exim 4.94 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1lVkrU-003eYL-EO; Mon, 12 Apr 2021 00:55:34 +0000 From: Randy Dunlap To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Randy Dunlap , Serge Hallyn , James Morris , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] security: commoncap: clean up kernel-doc comments Date: Sun, 11 Apr 2021 17:55:28 -0700 Message-Id: <20210412005528.3326-1-rdunlap@infradead.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fix kernel-doc notation in commoncap.c. Use correct (matching) function name in comments as in code. Use correct function argument names in kernel-doc comments. Use kernel-doc's "Return:" format for function return values. Fixes these kernel-doc warnings: ../security/commoncap.c:1206: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setioprio() instead ../security/commoncap.c:1219: warning: expecting prototype for cap_task_ioprio(). Prototype was for cap_task_setnice() instead Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Cc: Serge Hallyn Cc: James Morris Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org --- security/commoncap.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) --- linux-next-20210409.orig/security/commoncap.c +++ linux-next-20210409/security/commoncap.c @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed( /** * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability * @cred: The credentials to use - * @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability + * @targ_ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability * @cap: The capability to check for * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h * @@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new, * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected. * - * Returns 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv() + * Return: 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv() * is required, 0 otherwise, meaning inode_killpriv() is not required. */ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentr * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be * performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns. * - * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. + * Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error. */ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry) { @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static bool validheader(size_t size, con * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be * performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns. * - * If all is ok, we return the new size, on error return < 0. + * Return: On success, return the new size; on error, return < 0. */ int cap_convert_nscap(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const void **ivalue, size_t size) @@ -881,7 +881,9 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(str * * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being * constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered, - * which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. + * which won't take effect immediately. + * + * Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error. */ int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { @@ -1117,7 +1119,9 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(s * @flags: Indications of what has changed * * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are - * actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them. + * actually applied. + * + * Return: 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them. */ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) { @@ -1187,7 +1191,9 @@ static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_str * @p: The task to affect * * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the - * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. + * specified task. + * + * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. */ int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { @@ -1195,12 +1201,14 @@ int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_st } /** - * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted + * cap_task_setioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted * @p: The task to affect * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set * * Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified - * task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. + * task. + * + * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. */ int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { @@ -1208,12 +1216,14 @@ int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struc } /** - * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted + * cap_task_setnice - Detemine if task priority change is permitted * @p: The task to affect * @nice: The nice value to set * * Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the - * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. + * specified task. + * + * Return: 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. */ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { @@ -1243,12 +1253,15 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long /** * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module * @option: The process control function requested - * @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function + * @arg2: The argument data for this function + * @arg3: The argument data for this function + * @arg4: The argument data for this function + * @arg5: The argument data for this function * * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may * also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here. * - * Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented + * Return: 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented * here, other -ve on error. If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM * modules will consider performing the function. */ @@ -1383,7 +1396,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned * @pages: The size of the mapping * * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current - * task is permitted, returning 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not. + * task is permitted. + * + * Return: 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not. */ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { @@ -1396,14 +1411,15 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struc return cap_sys_admin; } -/* +/** * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr * @addr: address attempting to be mapped * * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the - * capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed - * -EPERM if not. + * capability security module. + * + * Return: 0 if this mapping should be allowed or -EPERM if not. */ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) {