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* [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 01/30] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (30 more replies)
  0 siblings, 31 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks
return/jump-oriented programming attacks.  Details are in "Intel 64 and
IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].

CET can protect applications and the kernel.  This series enables only
application-level protection, and has three parts:

  - Shadow stack [2],
  - Indirect branch tracking [3], and
  - Selftests [4].

I have run tests on these patches for quite some time, and they have been
very stable.  Linux distributions with CET are available now, and Intel
processors with CET are already on the market.  It would be nice if CET
support can be accepted into the kernel.  I will be working to address any
issues should they come up.

Changes in v26:
- Patch #19: Instead of passing vm_flags, pass vma pointer to can_follow_*().
- Patch #29: Instead of passing vma is anonymous, pass vma pointer to
  arch_validate_flags().
- Patch #30: Change PROT_SHSTK to PROT_SHADOW_STACK, remove redundant
  VM_SHARED check.
- Rebase to Linus tree v5.12.

Changes in v25:
- Remove Kconfig X86_CET and software-defined feature flag X86_FEATURE_CET.
  Use X86_SHADOW_STACK and X86_FEATURE_SHSTK directly.  Update related
  areas accordingly.
- Patch #16: Make same changes to do_huge_pmd_numa_page() as to
  do_numa_page().
- Patch #25: Update signal handling, use restorer address already
  retrieved, update MSR restoring code.
- Smaller changes are called out in each patch.
- Rebase to Linus tree v5.12-rc7.

[1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual:

    https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32-
    architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4

[2] Shadow Stack patches v25:

    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210415221419.31835-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/

[3] Indirect Branch Tracking patches v25

    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210415221734.32628-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/

[4] I am holding off the selftests changes and working to get Reviewed-by's.
    The earlier version of the selftests patches:

    https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521211720.20236-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com/

[5] The kernel ptrace patch is tested with an Intel-internal updated GDB.
    I am holding off the kernel ptrace patch to re-test it with my earlier
    patch for fixing regset holes.

Yu-cheng Yu (30):
  Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack
  x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow
    Enforcement Technology (CET)
  x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET
  x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
  x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file
  x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
  x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
  x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for
    transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory
  x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
  x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
  mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
  mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
  mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
  mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
  mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write
  mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
  x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
  x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines
  x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
  x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
  mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to include vma anonymous
  mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |   6 +
 Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst            |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/index.rst                   |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst               | 136 ++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h                  |   5 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h                 |   4 +-
 arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h                 |   4 +-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |  24 ++
 arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler                    |   5 +
 arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c                   |  24 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h                    |  52 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h      |   8 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h                    |  13 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h           |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h              |  23 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h             |   6 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h               |   4 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h                   |  88 +++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h            |   3 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |  19 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h             |   7 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h                | 299 +++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h          |  48 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h              |   5 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h          |  32 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h                |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h              |  28 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h             |   4 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h   |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h        |   9 +
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                      |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c                   |  60 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  |  14 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c              |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c                  | 137 +++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c                  |  10 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/idt.c                         |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                     |  21 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c                  |  32 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c                       | 304 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c                      |   9 +
 arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c               |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c                       |  63 ++++
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                           |  19 ++
 arch/x86/mm/mmap.c                            |  48 +++
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c                  |   2 +-
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c                         |  25 ++
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c                |   2 +-
 fs/aio.c                                      |   2 +-
 fs/binfmt_elf.c                               |   4 +
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                            |   3 +
 include/linux/elf.h                           |   6 +
 include/linux/mm.h                            |  18 +-
 include/linux/mman.h                          |   2 +-
 include/linux/pgtable.h                       |   7 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h            |   3 +-
 include/uapi/linux/elf.h                      |   9 +
 ipc/shm.c                                     |   2 +-
 mm/gup.c                                      |  16 +-
 mm/huge_memory.c                              |  27 +-
 mm/memory.c                                   |   5 +-
 mm/migrate.c                                  |   3 +-
 mm/mmap.c                                     |  17 +-
 mm/mprotect.c                                 |  11 +-
 mm/nommu.c                                    |   4 +-
 mm/util.c                                     |   2 +-
 67 files changed, 1644 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c

-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 01/30] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 02/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (29 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Explain no_user_shstk/no_user_ibt kernel parameters, and introduce a new
document on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v24:
- Update for Kconfig changes from X86_CET to X86_SHADOW_STACK, X86_IBT.
- Update for the change of VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |   6 +
 Documentation/x86/index.rst                   |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst               | 136 ++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 143 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 04545725f187..bc79e54be91e 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3220,6 +3220,12 @@
 			noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
 			noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings
 
+	no_user_shstk	[X86-64] Disable Shadow Stack for user-mode
+			applications
+
+	no_user_ibt	[X86-64] Disable Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode
+			applications
+
 	nosmap		[X86,PPC]
 			Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
 			even if it is supported by processor.
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
index 4693e192b447..cf5250a3cc70 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation
    tlb
    mtrr
    pat
+   intel_cet
    intel-iommu
    intel_txt
    amd-memory-encryption
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ae30c392994a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=========================================
+Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
+=========================================
+
+[1] Overview
+============
+
+Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) is an Intel processor feature
+that provides protection against return/jump-oriented programming (ROP)
+attacks.  It can be set up to protect both applications and the kernel.
+Only user-mode protection is implemented in the 64-bit kernel, including
+support for running legacy 32-bit applications.
+
+CET introduces Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking.  Shadow stack is
+a secondary stack allocated from memory and cannot be directly modified by
+applications.  When executing a CALL instruction, the processor pushes the
+return address to both the normal stack and the shadow stack.  Upon
+function return, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it
+to the normal stack copy.  If the two differ, the processor raises a
+control-protection fault.  Indirect branch tracking verifies indirect
+CALL/JMP targets are intended as marked by the compiler with 'ENDBR'
+opcodes.
+
+There are two Kconfig options:
+
+    X86_SHADOW_STACK, and X86_IBT.
+
+To build a CET-enabled kernel, Binutils v2.31 and GCC v8.1 or LLVM v10.0.1
+or later are required.  To build a CET-enabled application, GLIBC v2.28 or
+later is also required.
+
+There are two command-line options for disabling CET features::
+
+    no_user_shstk - disables user shadow stack, and
+    no_user_ibt   - disables user indirect branch tracking.
+
+At run time, /proc/cpuinfo shows CET features if the processor supports
+CET.
+
+[2] Application Enabling
+========================
+
+An application's CET capability is marked in its ELF header and can be
+verified from readelf/llvm-readelf output:
+
+    readelf -n <application> | grep -a SHSTK
+        properties: x86 feature: IBT, SHSTK
+
+If an application supports CET and is statically linked, it will run with
+CET protection.  If the application needs any shared libraries, the loader
+checks all dependencies and enables CET when all requirements are met.
+
+[3] Backward Compatibility
+==========================
+
+GLIBC provides a few CET tunables via the GLIBC_TUNABLES environment
+variable:
+
+GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.tune.hwcaps=-SHSTK,-IBT
+    Turn off SHSTK/IBT.
+
+GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.tune.x86_shstk=<on, permissive>
+    This controls how dlopen() handles SHSTK legacy libraries::
+
+        on         - continue with SHSTK enabled;
+        permissive - continue with SHSTK off.
+
+Details can be found in the GLIBC manual pages.
+
+[4] CET arch_prctl()'s
+======================
+
+Several arch_prctl()'s have been added for CET:
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, u64 *addr)
+    Return CET feature status.
+
+    The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer.
+    On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following
+    information::
+
+        *addr       = shadow stack/indirect branch tracking status
+        *(addr + 1) = shadow stack base address
+        *(addr + 2) = shadow stack size
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned int features)
+    Disable shadow stack and/or indirect branch tracking as specified in
+    'features'.  Return -EPERM if CET is locked.
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK)
+    Lock in all CET features.  They cannot be turned off afterwards.
+
+Note:
+  There is no CET-enabling arch_prctl function.  By design, CET is enabled
+  automatically if the binary and the system can support it.
+
+[5] The implementation of the Shadow Stack
+==========================================
+
+Shadow Stack size
+-----------------
+
+A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory to a fixed size of
+MIN(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB).  In other words, the shadow stack is allocated to
+the maximum size of the normal stack, but capped to 4 GB.  However,
+a compat-mode application's address space is smaller, each of its thread's
+shadow stack size is MIN(1/4 RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB).
+
+Signal
+------
+
+The main program and its signal handlers use the same shadow stack.
+Because the shadow stack stores only return addresses, a large shadow
+stack covers the condition that both the program stack and the signal
+alternate stack run out.
+
+The kernel creates a restore token for the shadow stack restoring address
+and verifies that token when restoring from the signal handler.
+
+Fork
+----
+
+The shadow stack's vma has VM_SHADOW_STACK flag set; its PTEs are required
+to be read-only and dirty.  When a shadow stack PTE is not RO and dirty, a
+shadow access triggers a page fault with the shadow stack access bit set
+in the page fault error code.
+
+When a task forks a child, its shadow stack PTEs are copied and both the
+parent's and the child's shadow stack PTEs are cleared of the dirty bit.
+Upon the next shadow stack access, the resulting shadow stack page fault
+is handled by page copy/re-use.
+
+When a pthread child is created, the kernel allocates a new shadow stack
+for the new thread.
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 02/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 01/30] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 03/30] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (28 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
corruption.  It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built for the
feature.  This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel.  When it is
enabled, legacy non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without
protection.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v25:
- Remove X86_CET and use X86_SHADOW_STACK directly.

v24:
- Update for the splitting X86_CET to X86_SHADOW_STACK and X86_IBT.

 arch/x86/Kconfig           | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler |  5 +++++
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 2792879d398e..41283f82fd87 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ config X86_64
 	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128
 	select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
+	select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
 	select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
 	select NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE
@@ -1941,6 +1942,27 @@ config X86_SGX
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+	def_bool n
+
+config X86_SHADOW_STACK
+	prompt "Intel Shadow Stack"
+	def_bool n
+	depends on AS_WRUSS
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+	help
+	  Shadow Stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+	  return address corruption.  This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
+	  Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not
+	  get protection "for free".
+	  Support for this feature is present on Tiger Lake family of
+	  processors released in 2020 or later.  Enabling this feature
+	  increases kernel text size by 3.7 KB.
+	  See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst for more information.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
index 26b8c08e2fc4..00c79dd93651 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
@@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ config AS_TPAUSE
 	def_bool $(as-instr,tpause %ecx)
 	help
 	  Supported by binutils >= 2.31.1 and LLVM integrated assembler >= V7
+
+config AS_WRUSS
+	def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx))
+	help
+	  Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 03/30] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 01/30] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 02/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 04/30] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (27 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Add CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).

CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 7] Shadow stack
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 20] Indirect Branch Tracking

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v25:
- Make X86_FEATURE_IBT depend on X86_FEATURE_SHSTK.

v24:
- Update for splitting CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK and CONFIG_X86_IBT.
- Move DISABLE_IBT definition to the IBT series.

 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h       | 2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c         | 2 ++
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index cc96e26d69f7..bf861fc89fef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE		(16*32+ 4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG		(16*32+ 5) /* UMONITOR/UMWAIT/TPAUSE Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2	(16*32+ 6) /* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK		(16*32+ 7) /* Shadow Stack */
 #define X86_FEATURE_GFNI		(16*32+ 8) /* Galois Field New Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VAES		(16*32+ 9) /* Vector AES */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ		(16*32+10) /* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
@@ -377,6 +378,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSXLDTRK		(18*32+16) /* TSX Suspend Load Address Tracking */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR		(18*32+19) /* Intel ARCH LBR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBT			(18*32+20) /* Indirect Branch Tracking */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16		(18*32+23) /* AVX512 FP16 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index b7dd944dc867..e5c6ed9373e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -68,6 +68,12 @@
 # define DISABLE_SGX	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_SGX & 31))
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK	0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
  */
@@ -88,7 +94,7 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK14	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK15	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK16	(DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP| \
-			 DISABLE_ENQCMD)
+			 DISABLE_ENQCMD|DISABLE_SHSTK)
 #define DISABLED_MASK17	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK18	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK19	0
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
index 42af31b64c2c..c88b7e0ebf6d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16,		X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW  },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,			X86_FEATURE_XSAVES    },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA,		X86_FEATURE_MBA       },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SHSTK,			X86_FEATURE_XSAVES    },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_IBT,			X86_FEATURE_SHSTK    },
 	{}
 };
 
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 04/30] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 03/30] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 05/30] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (26 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Introduce CPU setup and boot option parsing for CET features.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v25:
- Remove software-defined X86_FEATURE_CET.

v24:
- Update #ifdef placement to reflect Kconfig changes of splitting shadow stack and ibt.

 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                | 14 ++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
index bcba3c643e63..a8df907e8017 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@
 #define X86_CR4_SMAP		_BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT)
 #define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT		22 /* enable Protection Keys support */
 #define X86_CR4_PKE		_BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
+#define X86_CR4_CET_BIT		23 /* enable Control-flow Enforcement */
+#define X86_CR4_CET		_BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
 
 /*
  * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index ab640abe26b6..b6eeb5f2ae4d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -510,6 +510,14 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
 __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
+static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return;
+
+	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
+}
+
 /*
  * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
  * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
@@ -1255,6 +1263,11 @@ static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void)
 	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaves"))
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
 
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no_user_shstk"))
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no_user_ibt"))
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
+
 	arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "clearcpuid", arg, sizeof(arg));
 	if (arglen <= 0)
 		return;
@@ -1594,6 +1607,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	x86_init_rdrand(c);
 	setup_pku(c);
+	setup_cet(c);
 
 	/*
 	 * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 05/30] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 04/30] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 06/30] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (25 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) introduces these MSRs:

    MSR_IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings),
    MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack pointer),

    MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack pointer),
    MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP (Privilege Level 1 shadow stack pointer),
    MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP (Privilege Level 2 shadow stack pointer),
    MSR_IA32_S_CET (kernel-mode CET settings),
    MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB (exception shadow stack table).

The two user-mode MSRs belong to XFEATURE_CET_USER.  The first three of
kernel-mode MSRs belong to XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL.  Both XSAVES states are
supervisor states.  This means that there is no direct, unprivileged access
to these states, making it harder for an attacker to subvert CET.

For sigreturn and future ptrace() support, shadow stack address and MSR
reserved bits are checked before written to the supervisor states.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v25:
- Update xsave_cpuid_features[].  Now CET XSAVES features depend on
  X86_FEATURE_SHSTK (vs. the software-defined X86_FEATURE_CET).

 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h  | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h |  6 ++++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h  | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c      | 10 +++++++++-
 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
index f5a38a5f3ae1..035eb0ec665e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ enum xfeature {
 	XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR,
 	XFEATURE_PKRU,
 	XFEATURE_PASID,
-	XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11,
-	XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_12,
+	XFEATURE_CET_USER,
+	XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL,
 	XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13,
 	XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_14,
 	XFEATURE_LBR,
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ enum xfeature {
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_PT		(1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU		(1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_PASID		(1 << XFEATURE_PASID)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER		(1 << XFEATURE_CET_USER)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL	(1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL)
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR		(1 << XFEATURE_LBR)
 
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE		(XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
@@ -237,6 +239,23 @@ struct pkru_state {
 	u32				pad;
 } __packed;
 
+/*
+ * State component 11 is Control-flow Enforcement user states
+ */
+struct cet_user_state {
+	u64 user_cet;			/* user control-flow settings */
+	u64 user_ssp;			/* user shadow stack pointer */
+};
+
+/*
+ * State component 12 is Control-flow Enforcement kernel states
+ */
+struct cet_kernel_state {
+	u64 kernel_ssp;			/* kernel shadow stack */
+	u64 pl1_ssp;			/* privilege level 1 shadow stack */
+	u64 pl2_ssp;			/* privilege level 2 shadow stack */
+};
+
 /*
  * State component 15: Architectural LBR configuration state.
  * The size of Arch LBR state depends on the number of LBRs (lbr_depth).
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
index 47a92232d595..582f3575e0bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@
 				      XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)
 
 /* All currently supported supervisor features */
-#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID | \
+					    XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)
 
 /*
  * A supervisor state component may not always contain valuable information,
@@ -62,7 +63,8 @@
  * Unsupported supervisor features. When a supervisor feature in this mask is
  * supported in the future, move it to the supported supervisor feature mask.
  */
-#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT | \
+					      XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)
 
 /* All supervisor states including supported and unsupported states. */
 #define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_ALL (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED | \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 546d6ecf0a35..5f4b7edead0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -933,4 +933,23 @@
 #define MSR_VM_IGNNE                    0xc0010115
 #define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA                 0xc0010117
 
+/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */
+#define MSR_IA32_U_CET		0x000006a0 /* user mode cet setting */
+#define MSR_IA32_S_CET		0x000006a2 /* kernel mode cet setting */
+#define CET_SHSTK_EN		BIT_ULL(0)
+#define CET_WRSS_EN		BIT_ULL(1)
+#define CET_ENDBR_EN		BIT_ULL(2)
+#define CET_LEG_IW_EN		BIT_ULL(3)
+#define CET_NO_TRACK_EN		BIT_ULL(4)
+#define CET_SUPPRESS_DISABLE	BIT_ULL(5)
+#define CET_RESERVED		(BIT_ULL(6) | BIT_ULL(7) | BIT_ULL(8) | BIT_ULL(9))
+#define CET_SUPPRESS		BIT_ULL(10)
+#define CET_WAIT_ENDBR		BIT_ULL(11)
+
+#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP	0x000006a4 /* kernel shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP	0x000006a5 /* ring-1 shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP	0x000006a6 /* ring-2 shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP	0x000006a7 /* user shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB	0x000006a8 /* exception shadow stack table */
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 683749b80ae2..64477b527019 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] =
 	"Processor Trace (unused)"	,
 	"Protection Keys User registers",
 	"PASID state",
+	"Control-flow User registers"	,
+	"Control-flow Kernel registers"	,
 	"unknown xstate feature"	,
 };
 
@@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
 	X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
 	X86_FEATURE_PKU,
 	X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,
+	X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_CET_USER */
+	X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, /* XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -321,6 +325,8 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features(void)
 	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM);
 	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU);
 	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PASID);
+	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER);
+	print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -596,6 +602,8 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)
 	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM,  struct avx_512_hi16_state);
 	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PKRU,      struct pkru_state);
 	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PASID,     struct ia32_pasid_state);
+	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_USER,   struct cet_user_state);
+	XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL, struct cet_kernel_state);
 
 	/*
 	 * Make *SURE* to add any feature numbers in below if
@@ -605,7 +613,7 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)
 	if ((nr < XFEATURE_YMM) ||
 	    (nr >= XFEATURE_MAX) ||
 	    (nr == XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR) ||
-	    ((nr >= XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11) && (nr <= XFEATURE_LBR))) {
+	    ((nr >= XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13) && (nr <= XFEATURE_LBR))) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "no structure for xstate: %d\n", nr);
 		XSTATE_WARN_ON(1);
 	}
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 06/30] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 05/30] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 07/30] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (24 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Michael Kerrisk

A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer
attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints.
For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy
on the shadow stack; or an indirect JMP instruction, without the NOTRACK
prefix, arrives at a non-ENDBR opcode.

The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general
protection fault handler.  It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal
handler.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
---
v25:
- Change CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK.
- Change X86_FEATURE_CET to X86_FEATURE_SHSTK.

 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h    |  4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/idt.c              |  4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c            | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h |  3 +-
 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index 5eb3bdf36a41..5791c02864ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -571,6 +571,10 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_SS,	exc_stack_segment);
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_GP,	exc_general_protection);
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_AC,	exc_alignment_check);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_CP, exc_control_protection);
+#endif
+
 /* Raw exception entries which need extra work */
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_UD,		exc_invalid_op);
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_BP,		exc_int3);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index ee1a283f8e96..0315fb297dd3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -105,6 +105,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
 #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
 	SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR,	entry_INT80_32),
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+	INTG(X86_TRAP_CP,		asm_exc_control_protection),
+#endif
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
index a5330ff498f0..dd92490b1e7f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
 	 */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL  != 11);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE  != 15);
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 9);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 10);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS  != 5);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 5);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 651e3e508959..a40b34b09400 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/hardirq.h>
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -606,6 +607,68 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection)
 	cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+static const char * const control_protection_err[] = {
+	"unknown",
+	"near-ret",
+	"far-ret/iret",
+	"endbranch",
+	"rstorssp",
+	"setssbsy",
+	"unknown",
+};
+
+static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(cpf_rate, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
+			      DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
+
+/*
+ * When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal to the responsible
+ * application.  Currently, control protection is only enabled for user mode.
+ * This exception should not come from kernel mode.
+ */
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
+
+	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
+		pr_emerg("PANIC: unexpected kernel control protection fault\n");
+		die("kernel control protection fault", regs, error_code);
+		panic("Machine halted.");
+	}
+
+	cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Control protection fault with CET support disabled\n");
+
+	tsk = current;
+	tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+	tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ratelimit to prevent log spamming.
+	 */
+	if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
+	    __ratelimit(&cpf_rate)) {
+		unsigned long ssp;
+		int cpf_type;
+
+		cpf_type = array_index_nospec(error_code, ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err));
+
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+		pr_emerg("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)",
+			 tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
+			 regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
+			 control_protection_err[cpf_type]);
+		print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
+		pr_cont("\n");
+	}
+
+	force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR, (void __user *)0);
+	cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
+}
+#endif
+
 static bool do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	int res;
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index d2597000407a..1c2ea91284a0 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define SEGV_ADIPERR	7	/* Precise MCD exception */
 #define SEGV_MTEAERR	8	/* Asynchronous ARM MTE error */
 #define SEGV_MTESERR	9	/* Synchronous ARM MTE exception */
-#define NSIGSEGV	9
+#define SEGV_CPERR	10	/* Control protection fault */
+#define NSIGSEGV	10
 
 /*
  * SIGBUS si_codes
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 07/30] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 06/30] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 08/30] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (23 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov, Christoph Hellwig

The x86 family of processors do not directly create read-only and Dirty
PTEs.  These PTEs are created by software.  One such case is that kernel
read-only pages are historically setup as Dirty.

New processors that support Shadow Stack regard read-only and Dirty PTEs as
shadow stack pages.  This results in ambiguity between shadow stack and
kernel read-only pages.  To resolve this, removed Dirty from kernel read-
only pages.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c         | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index f24d7ef8fffa..9db61817dfff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -192,10 +192,10 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
 #define _KERNPG_TABLE		 (__PP|__RW|   0|___A|   0|___D|   0|   0| _ENC)
 #define _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC	 (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A|   0|___D|   0|   0)
 #define _PAGE_TABLE		 (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A|   0|___D|   0|   0| _ENC)
-#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO	 (__PP|   0|   0|___A|__NX|___D|   0|___G)
-#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX	 (__PP|   0|   0|___A|   0|___D|   0|___G)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO	 (__PP|   0|   0|___A|__NX|   0|   0|___G)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX	 (__PP|   0|   0|___A|   0|   0|   0|___G)
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE	 (__PP|__RW|   0|___A|__NX|___D|   0|___G| __NC)
-#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR	 (__PP|   0|_USR|___A|__NX|___D|   0|___G)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR	 (__PP|   0|_USR|___A|__NX|   0|   0|___G)
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE	 (__PP|__RW|   0|___A|__NX|___D|_PSE|___G)
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC (__PP|__RW|   0|___A|   0|___D|_PSE|___G)
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_WP	 (__PP|__RW|   0|___A|__NX|___D|   0|___G| __WP)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index 16f878c26667..6bebb95a6988 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -1932,7 +1932,7 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 
 int set_memory_ro(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
 {
-	return change_page_attr_clear(&addr, numpages, __pgprot(_PAGE_RW), 0);
+	return change_page_attr_clear(&addr, numpages, __pgprot(_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY), 0);
 }
 
 int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 08/30] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (6 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 07/30] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 09/30] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (22 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

To prepare the introduction of _PAGE_COW, move pmd_write() and
pud_write() up in the file, so that they can be used by other
helpers below.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 24 ++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index a02c67291cfc..c1650d0af1b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -185,6 +185,18 @@ static inline int pte_write(pte_t pte)
 	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_RW;
 }
 
+#define pmd_write pmd_write
+static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_RW;
+}
+
+#define pud_write pud_write
+static inline int pud_write(pud_t pud)
+{
+	return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_RW;
+}
+
 static inline int pte_huge(pte_t pte)
 {
 	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_PSE;
@@ -1128,12 +1140,6 @@ extern int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 				  unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp);
 
 
-#define pmd_write pmd_write
-static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd)
-{
-	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_RW;
-}
-
 #define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR
 static inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
 				       pmd_t *pmdp)
@@ -1155,12 +1161,6 @@ static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp);
 }
 
-#define pud_write pud_write
-static inline int pud_write(pud_t pud)
-{
-	return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_RW;
-}
-
 #ifndef pmdp_establish
 #define pmdp_establish pmdp_establish
 static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 09/30] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (7 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 08/30] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 10/30] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (21 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

There is essentially no room left in the x86 hardware PTEs on some OSes
(not Linux).  That left the hardware architects looking for a way to
represent a new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits.
They chose to repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0, Dirty=1.

The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by hardware
and cannot normally be set by hardware on a Write=0 PTE.  Software must
normally be involved to create one of these PTEs, so software can simply
opt to not create them.

In places where Linux normally creates Write=0, Dirty=1, it can use the
software-defined _PAGE_COW in place of the hardware _PAGE_DIRTY.  In other
words, whenever Linux needs to create Write=0, Dirty=1, it instead creates
Write=0, Cow=1, except for shadow stack, which is Write=0, Dirty=1.  This
clearly separates shadow stack from other data, and results in the
following:

(a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page: (Write=0, Cow=1)
(b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed: (Write=0, Cow=1)
    The user page is in a R/O VMA, and get_user_pages() needs a writable
    copy.  The page fault handler creates a copy of the page and sets
    the new copy's PTE as Write=0 and Cow=1.
(c) A shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Dirty=1)
(d) A shared shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Cow=1)
    When a shadow stack page is being shared among processes (this happens
    at fork()), its PTE is made Dirty=0, so the next shadow stack access
    causes a fault, and the page is duplicated and Dirty=1 is set again.
    This is the COW equivalent for shadow stack pages, even though it's
    copy-on-access rather than copy-on-write.
(e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write, set
    Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE.  That's possible today, but
    will not happen on processors that support shadow stack.

Define _PAGE_COW and update pte_*() helpers and apply the same changes to
pmd and pud.

After this, there are six free bits left in the 64-bit PTE, and no more
free bits in the 32-bit PTE (except for PAE) and Shadow Stack is not
implemented for the 32-bit kernel.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
v24:
- Replace CONFIG_X86_CET with CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK, to reflect the Kconfig
  changes.

 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h       | 195 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h |  42 +++++-
 2 files changed, 216 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index c1650d0af1b5..9c056d5815de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -121,11 +121,21 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
  * The following only work if pte_present() is true.
  * Undefined behaviour if not..
  */
-static inline int pte_dirty(pte_t pte)
+static inline bool pte_dirty(pte_t pte)
 {
-	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY;
+	/*
+	 * A dirty PTE has Dirty=1 or Cow=1.
+	 */
+	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
 }
 
+static inline bool pte_shstk(pte_t pte)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return false;
+
+	return (pte_flags(pte) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)) == _PAGE_DIRTY;
+}
 
 static inline u32 read_pkru(void)
 {
@@ -160,9 +170,20 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)
 	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;
 }
 
-static inline int pmd_dirty(pmd_t pmd)
+static inline bool pmd_dirty(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	/*
+	 * A dirty PMD has Dirty=1 or Cow=1.
+	 */
+	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
+}
+
+static inline bool pmd_shstk(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY;
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return false;
+
+	return (pmd_flags(pmd) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)) == _PAGE_DIRTY;
 }
 
 static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)
@@ -170,9 +191,12 @@ static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)
 	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;
 }
 
-static inline int pud_dirty(pud_t pud)
+static inline bool pud_dirty(pud_t pud)
 {
-	return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY;
+	/*
+	 * A dirty PUD has Dirty=1 or Cow=1.
+	 */
+	return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
 }
 
 static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)
@@ -182,13 +206,23 @@ static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)
 
 static inline int pte_write(pte_t pte)
 {
-	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_RW;
+	/*
+	 * Shadow stack pages are always writable - but not by normal
+	 * instructions, and only by shadow stack operations.  Therefore,
+	 * the W=0,D=1 test with pte_shstk().
+	 */
+	return (pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_RW) || pte_shstk(pte);
 }
 
 #define pmd_write pmd_write
 static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_RW;
+	/*
+	 * Shadow stack pages are always writable - but not by normal
+	 * instructions, and only by shadow stack operations.  Therefore,
+	 * the W=0,D=1 test with pmd_shstk().
+	 */
+	return (pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_RW) || pmd_shstk(pmd);
 }
 
 #define pud_write pud_write
@@ -326,6 +360,24 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)
 	return native_make_pte(v & ~clear);
 }
 
+static inline pte_t pte_mkcow(pte_t pte)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return pte;
+
+	pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
+static inline pte_t pte_clear_cow(pte_t pte)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return pte;
+
+	pte = pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
 static inline int pte_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
 {
@@ -345,7 +397,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkclean(pte_t pte)
 {
-	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
 }
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)
@@ -355,7 +407,16 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)
 
 static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte)
 {
-	return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
+	pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
+
+	/*
+	 * Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create
+	 * a shadow stack PTE (RW=0, Dirty=1).  Move the hardware
+	 * dirty value to the software bit.
+	 */
+	if (pte_dirty(pte))
+		pte = pte_mkcow(pte);
+	return pte;
 }
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)
@@ -365,7 +426,18 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty(pte_t pte)
 {
-	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+	pteval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY;
+
+	/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PTEs */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && !pte_write(pte))
+		dirty = _PAGE_COW;
+
+	return pte_set_flags(pte, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+}
+
+static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte_t pte)
+{
+	return pte_clear_cow(pte);
 }
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
@@ -375,7 +447,12 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite(pte_t pte)
 {
-	return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
+	pte = pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
+
+	if (pte_dirty(pte))
+		pte = pte_clear_cow(pte);
+
+	return pte;
 }
 
 static inline pte_t pte_mkhuge(pte_t pte)
@@ -422,6 +499,24 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_flags(pmd_t pmd, pmdval_t clear)
 	return native_make_pmd(v & ~clear);
 }
 
+static inline pmd_t pmd_mkcow(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return pmd;
+
+	pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
+static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_cow(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return pmd;
+
+	pmd = pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
 static inline int pmd_uffd_wp(pmd_t pmd)
 {
@@ -446,17 +541,36 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd)
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_mkclean(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
 }
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
+	pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
+	/*
+	 * Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create
+	 * a shadow stack PMD (RW=0, Dirty=1).  Move the hardware
+	 * dirty value to the software bit.
+	 */
+	if (pmd_dirty(pmd))
+		pmd = pmd_mkcow(pmd);
+	return pmd;
 }
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+	pmdval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY;
+
+	/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PMDs */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && !pmd_write(pmd))
+		dirty = _PAGE_COW;
+
+	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+}
+
+static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_shstk(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+	return pmd_clear_cow(pmd);
 }
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdevmap(pmd_t pmd)
@@ -476,7 +590,11 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)
 
 static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd)
 {
-	return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
+	pmd = pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
+
+	if (pmd_dirty(pmd))
+		pmd = pmd_clear_cow(pmd);
+	return pmd;
 }
 
 static inline pud_t pud_set_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t set)
@@ -493,6 +611,24 @@ static inline pud_t pud_clear_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t clear)
 	return native_make_pud(v & ~clear);
 }
 
+static inline pud_t pud_mkcow(pud_t pud)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return pud;
+
+	pud = pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
+static inline pud_t pud_clear_cow(pud_t pud)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return pud;
+
+	pud = pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
 static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)
 {
 	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
@@ -500,17 +636,32 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)
 
 static inline pud_t pud_mkclean(pud_t pud)
 {
-	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
 }
 
 static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect(pud_t pud)
 {
-	return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
+	pud = pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
+
+	/*
+	 * Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create
+	 * a shadow stack PUD (RW=0, Dirty=1).  Move the hardware
+	 * dirty value to the software bit.
+	 */
+	if (pud_dirty(pud))
+		pud = pud_mkcow(pud);
+	return pud;
 }
 
 static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty(pud_t pud)
 {
-	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+	pudval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY;
+
+	/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PUDs */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && !pud_write(pud))
+		dirty = _PAGE_COW;
+
+	return pud_set_flags(pud, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
 }
 
 static inline pud_t pud_mkdevmap(pud_t pud)
@@ -530,7 +681,11 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkyoung(pud_t pud)
 
 static inline pud_t pud_mkwrite(pud_t pud)
 {
-	return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
+	pud = pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
+
+	if (pud_dirty(pud))
+		pud = pud_clear_cow(pud);
+	return pud;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index 9db61817dfff..ce853c28c253 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@
 #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2	10	/* " */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3	11	/* " */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE	12	/* On 2MB or 1GB pages */
-#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4	58	/* available for programmer */
+#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4	57	/* available for programmer */
+#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5	58	/* available for programmer */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0	59	/* Protection Keys, bit 1/4 */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1	60	/* Protection Keys, bit 2/4 */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT2	61	/* Protection Keys, bit 3/4 */
@@ -36,6 +37,15 @@
 #define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 /* software dirty tracking */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_DEVMAP	_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4
 
+/*
+ * Indicates a copy-on-write page.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+#define _PAGE_BIT_COW		_PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 /* copy-on-write */
+#else
+#define _PAGE_BIT_COW		0
+#endif
+
 /* If _PAGE_BIT_PRESENT is clear, we use these: */
 /* - if the user mapped it with PROT_NONE; pte_present gives true */
 #define _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE	_PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL
@@ -117,6 +127,36 @@
 #define _PAGE_DEVMAP	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * The hardware requires shadow stack to be read-only and Dirty.
+ * _PAGE_COW is a software-only bit used to separate copy-on-write PTEs
+ * from shadow stack PTEs:
+ * (a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page: (Write=0, Cow=1)
+ * (b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed: (Write=0, Cow=1)
+ *     The user page is in a R/O VMA, and get_user_pages() needs a
+ *     writable copy.  The page fault handler creates a copy of the page
+ *     and sets the new copy's PTE as Write=0, Cow=1.
+ * (c) A shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Dirty=1)
+ * (d) A shared (copy-on-access) shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Cow=1)
+ *     When a shadow stack page is being shared among processes (this
+ *     happens at fork()), its PTE is cleared of _PAGE_DIRTY, so the next
+ *     shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is duplicated and
+ *     _PAGE_DIRTY is set again.  This is the COW equivalent for shadow
+ *     stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than
+ *     copy-on-write.
+ * (e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write,
+ *     set Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE (changed by another
+ *     thread).  That's possible today, but will not happen on processors
+ *     that support shadow stack.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+#define _PAGE_COW	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_COW)
+#else
+#define _PAGE_COW	(_AT(pteval_t, 0))
+#endif
+
+#define _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_COW)
+
 #define _PAGE_PROTNONE	(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE)
 
 /*
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 10/30] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (8 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 09/30] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 11/30] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (20 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov, David Airlie, Joonas Lahtinen,
	Jani Nikula, Daniel Vetter, Rodrigo Vivi, Zhenyu Wang, Zhi Wang

After the introduction of _PAGE_COW, a modified page's PTE can have either
_PAGE_DIRTY or _PAGE_COW.  Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Zhi Wang <zhi.a.wang@intel.com>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c
index 897c007ea96a..937b6083b2dc 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ static int split_2MB_gtt_entry(struct intel_vgpu *vgpu,
 	}
 
 	/* Clear dirty field. */
-	se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY;
+	se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
 
 	ops->clear_pse(se);
 	ops->clear_ips(se);
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 11/30] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (9 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 10/30] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 12/30] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (19 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

The read-only and Dirty PTE has been used to indicate copy-on-write pages.
However, newer x86 processors also regard a read-only and Dirty PTE as a
shadow stack page.  In order to separate the two, the software-defined
_PAGE_COW is created to replace _PAGE_DIRTY for the copy-on-write case, and
pte_*() are updated.

Pte_modify() changes a PTE to 'newprot', but it doesn't use the pte_*().
Introduce fixup_dirty_pte(), which sets a dirty PTE, based on _PAGE_RW,
to either _PAGE_DIRTY or _PAGE_COW.

Apply the same changes to pmd_modify().

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 9c056d5815de..e1739f590ca6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -799,6 +799,23 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkinvalid(pmd_t pmd)
 
 static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard(u64 oldval, u64 val, u64 mask);
 
+static inline pteval_t fixup_dirty_pte(pteval_t pteval)
+{
+	pte_t pte = __pte(pteval);
+
+	/*
+	 * Fix up potential shadow stack page flags because the RO, Dirty
+	 * PTE is special.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		if (pte_dirty(pte)) {
+			pte = pte_mkclean(pte);
+			pte = pte_mkdirty(pte);
+		}
+	}
+	return pte_val(pte);
+}
+
 static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)
 {
 	pteval_t val = pte_val(pte), oldval = val;
@@ -809,16 +826,36 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)
 	 */
 	val &= _PAGE_CHG_MASK;
 	val |= check_pgprot(newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK;
+	val = fixup_dirty_pte(val);
 	val = flip_protnone_guard(oldval, val, PTE_PFN_MASK);
 	return __pte(val);
 }
 
+static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd);
+static inline pmdval_t fixup_dirty_pmd(pmdval_t pmdval)
+{
+	pmd_t pmd = __pmd(pmdval);
+
+	/*
+	 * Fix up potential shadow stack page flags because the RO, Dirty
+	 * PMD is special.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		if (pmd_dirty(pmd)) {
+			pmd = pmd_mkclean(pmd);
+			pmd = pmd_mkdirty(pmd);
+		}
+	}
+	return pmd_val(pmd);
+}
+
 static inline pmd_t pmd_modify(pmd_t pmd, pgprot_t newprot)
 {
 	pmdval_t val = pmd_val(pmd), oldval = val;
 
 	val &= _HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
 	val |= check_pgprot(newprot) & ~_HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
+	val = fixup_dirty_pmd(val);
 	val = flip_protnone_guard(oldval, val, PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK);
 	return __pmd(val);
 }
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 12/30] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (10 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 11/30] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 13/30] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (18 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

When Shadow Stack is introduced, [R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY] PTE is reserved for
shadow stack.  Copy-on-write PTEs have [R/O + _PAGE_COW].

When a PTE goes from [R/W + _PAGE_DIRTY] to [R/O + _PAGE_COW], it could
become a transient shadow stack PTE in two cases:

The first case is that some processors can start a write but end up seeing
a read-only PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit, creating a transient
shadow stack PTE.  However, this will not occur on processors supporting
Shadow Stack, and a TLB flush is not necessary.

The second case is that when _PAGE_DIRTY is replaced with _PAGE_COW non-
atomically, a transient shadow stack PTE can be created as a result.
Thus, prevent that with cmpxchg.

Dave Hansen, Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski, and Peter Zijlstra provided many
insights to the issue.  Jann Horn provided the cmpxchg solution.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index e1739f590ca6..46d9394b884f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1306,6 +1306,24 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,
 static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				      unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
 {
+	/*
+	 * If Shadow Stack is enabled, pte_wrprotect() moves _PAGE_DIRTY
+	 * to _PAGE_COW (see comments at pte_wrprotect()).
+	 * When a thread reads a RW=1, Dirty=0 PTE and before changing it
+	 * to RW=0, Dirty=0, another thread could have written to the page
+	 * and the PTE is RW=1, Dirty=1 now.  Use try_cmpxchg() to detect
+	 * PTE changes and update old_pte, then try again.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		pte_t old_pte, new_pte;
+
+		old_pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
+		do {
+			new_pte = pte_wrprotect(old_pte);
+		} while (!try_cmpxchg(&ptep->pte, &old_pte.pte, new_pte.pte));
+
+		return;
+	}
 	clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)&ptep->pte);
 }
 
@@ -1350,6 +1368,24 @@ static inline pud_t pudp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
 static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				      unsigned long addr, pmd_t *pmdp)
 {
+	/*
+	 * If Shadow Stack is enabled, pmd_wrprotect() moves _PAGE_DIRTY
+	 * to _PAGE_COW (see comments at pmd_wrprotect()).
+	 * When a thread reads a RW=1, Dirty=0 PMD and before changing it
+	 * to RW=0, Dirty=0, another thread could have written to the page
+	 * and the PMD is RW=1, Dirty=1 now.  Use try_cmpxchg() to detect
+	 * PMD changes and update old_pmd, then try again.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		pmd_t old_pmd, new_pmd;
+
+		old_pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
+		do {
+			new_pmd = pmd_wrprotect(old_pmd);
+		} while (!try_cmpxchg((pmdval_t *)pmdp, (pmdval_t *)&old_pmd, pmd_val(new_pmd)));
+
+		return;
+	}
 	clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp);
 }
 
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 13/30] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (11 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 12/30] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 14/30] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (17 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

A shadow stack PTE must be read-only and have _PAGE_DIRTY set.  However,
read-only and Dirty PTEs also exist for copy-on-write (COW) pages.  These
two cases are handled differently for page faults.  Introduce
VM_SHADOW_STACK to track shadow stack VMAs.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v24:
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.
- Change CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK to reflect Kconfig changes.

 Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 +
 arch/x86/mm/mmap.c                 | 2 ++
 fs/proc/task_mmu.c                 | 3 +++
 include/linux/mm.h                 | 8 ++++++++
 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
index 48fbfc336ebf..5d8a2d75c799 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
@@ -549,6 +549,7 @@ encoded manner. The codes are the following:
     mg    mergable advise flag
     bt    arm64 BTI guarded page
     mt    arm64 MTE allocation tags are enabled
+    ss    shadow stack page
     ==    =======================================
 
 Note that there is no guarantee that every flag and associated mnemonic will
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index c90c20904a60..f3f52c5e2fd6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ unsigned long get_mmap_base(int is_legacy)
 
 const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)
+		return "[shadow stack]";
 	return NULL;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index e862cab69583..0aa57de9dfab 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -661,6 +661,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT4)]	= "",
 #endif
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+		[ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)]= "ss",
+#endif
 	};
 	size_t i;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 8ba434287387..08282eb2f195 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -312,11 +312,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2	34	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3	35	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4	36	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5	37	/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)
 #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5	BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -332,6 +334,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
 #endif
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+# define VM_SHADOW_STACK	VM_HIGH_ARCH_5
+#else
+# define VM_SHADOW_STACK	VM_NONE
+#endif
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86)
 # define VM_PAT		VM_ARCH_1	/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 14/30] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (12 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 13/30] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:42 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 15/30] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (16 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

Shadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it
expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping.  These accesses are performed
implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer.  These
accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like
WRUSSQ.

Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal,
valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings.  Shadow
stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and
copy-on-write.

Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow
stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack
mapping.

In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow
stack mapping.  It is always an error otherwise.  For valid shadow stack
accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write.  Because clearing
_PAGE_DIRTY (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack read
fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both are
handled as a write access.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
v24:
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.

 arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c            | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
index 10b1de500ab1..afa524325e55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
  *   bit 3 ==				1: use of reserved bit detected
  *   bit 4 ==				1: fault was an instruction fetch
  *   bit 5 ==				1: protection keys block access
+ *   bit 6 ==				1: shadow stack access fault
  *   bit 15 ==				1: SGX MMU page-fault
  */
 enum x86_pf_error_code {
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
 	X86_PF_RSVD	=		1 << 3,
 	X86_PF_INSTR	=		1 << 4,
 	X86_PF_PK	=		1 << 5,
+	X86_PF_SHSTK	=		1 << 6,
 	X86_PF_SGX	=		1 << 15,
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index a73347e2cdfc..394e504305b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1100,6 +1100,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 				       (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))
 		return 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Verify a shadow stack access is within a shadow stack VMA.
+	 * It is always an error otherwise.  Normal data access to a
+	 * shadow stack area is checked in the case followed.
+	 */
+	if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) {
+		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))
+			return 1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) {
 		/* write, present and write, not present: */
 		if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
@@ -1293,6 +1304,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 	perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);
 
+	/*
+	 * Clearing _PAGE_DIRTY is used to detect shadow stack access.
+	 * This method cannot distinguish shadow stack read vs. write.
+	 * For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect
+	 * copy-on-write.
+	 */
+	if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK)
+		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE)
 		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 	if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 15/30] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (13 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 14/30] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 16/30] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (15 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

When serving a page fault, maybe_mkwrite() makes a PTE writable if its vma
has VM_WRITE.

A shadow stack vma has VM_SHADOW_STACK.  Its PTEs have _PAGE_DIRTY, but not
_PAGE_WRITE.  In fork(), _PAGE_DIRTY is cleared to cause copy-on-write,
and in the page fault handler, _PAGE_DIRTY is restored and the shadow stack
page is writable again.

Introduce an x86 version of maybe_mkwrite(), which sets proper PTE bits
according to VM flags.

Apply the same changes to maybe_pmd_mkwrite().

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v24:
- Instead of doing arch_maybe_mkwrite(), overwrite maybe*_mkwrite() with x86
  versions.
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.

 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h |  6 ++++++
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c          | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/mm.h             |  2 ++
 mm/huge_memory.c               |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 46d9394b884f..da5dea417663 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -308,6 +308,9 @@ static inline int pmd_trans_huge(pmd_t pmd)
 	return (pmd_val(pmd) & (_PAGE_PSE|_PAGE_DEVMAP)) == _PAGE_PSE;
 }
 
+#define maybe_pmd_mkwrite maybe_pmd_mkwrite
+extern pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD
 static inline int pud_trans_huge(pud_t pud)
 {
@@ -1686,6 +1689,9 @@ static inline bool arch_faults_on_old_pte(void)
 	return false;
 }
 
+#define maybe_mkwrite maybe_mkwrite
+extern pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+
 #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index f6a9e2e36642..e778dbbef3d8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -610,6 +610,26 @@ int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 }
 #endif
 
+pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
+		pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
+	else if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))
+		pte = pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte);
+	return pte;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
+		pmd = pmd_mkwrite(pmd);
+	else if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))
+		pmd = pmd_mkwrite_shstk(pmd);
+	return pmd;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
+
 /**
  * reserve_top_address - reserves a hole in the top of kernel address space
  * @reserve - size of hole to reserve
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 08282eb2f195..6ac9b3e9a865 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -993,12 +993,14 @@ void free_compound_page(struct page *page);
  * pte_mkwrite.  But get_user_pages can cause write faults for mappings
  * that do not have writing enabled, when used by access_process_vm.
  */
+#ifndef maybe_mkwrite
 static inline pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
 		pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
 	return pte;
 }
+#endif
 
 vm_fault_t do_set_pmd(struct vm_fault *vmf, struct page *page);
 void do_set_pte(struct vm_fault *vmf, struct page *page, unsigned long addr);
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index ae907a9c2050..8203bd6ae4bd 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -478,12 +478,14 @@ static int __init setup_transparent_hugepage(char *str)
 }
 __setup("transparent_hugepage=", setup_transparent_hugepage);
 
+#ifndef maybe_pmd_mkwrite
 pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
 		pmd = pmd_mkwrite(pmd);
 	return pmd;
 }
+#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
 static inline struct deferred_split *get_deferred_split_queue(struct page *page)
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 16/30] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (14 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 15/30] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 17/30] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (14 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

When serving a page fault, maybe_mkwrite() makes a PTE writable if it is in
a writable vma.  A shadow stack vma is writable, but its PTEs need
_PAGE_DIRTY to be set to become writable.  For this reason, maybe_mkwrite()
has been updated.

There are a few places that call pte_mkwrite() directly, but have the
same result as from maybe_mkwrite().  These sites need to be updated for
shadow stack as well.  Thus, change them to maybe_mkwrite():

- do_anonymous_page() and migrate_vma_insert_page() check VM_WRITE directly
  and call pte_mkwrite(), which is the same as maybe_mkwrite().  Change
  them to maybe_mkwrite().

- In do_numa_page(), if the numa entry was writable, then pte_mkwrite()
  is called directly.  Fix it by doing maybe_mkwrite().  Make the same
  changes to do_huge_pmd_numa_page().

- In change_pte_range(), pte_mkwrite() is called directly.  Replace it with
  maybe_mkwrite().

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v25:
- Apply same changes to do_huge_pmd_numa_page() as to do_numa_page().

 mm/huge_memory.c | 2 +-
 mm/memory.c      | 5 ++---
 mm/migrate.c     | 3 +--
 mm/mprotect.c    | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 8203bd6ae4bd..044029ef45cd 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1553,7 +1553,7 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_numa_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t pmd)
 	pmd = pmd_modify(pmd, vma->vm_page_prot);
 	pmd = pmd_mkyoung(pmd);
 	if (was_writable)
-		pmd = pmd_mkwrite(pmd);
+		pmd = maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd, vma);
 	set_pmd_at(vma->vm_mm, haddr, vmf->pmd, pmd);
 	update_mmu_cache_pmd(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pmd);
 	unlock_page(page);
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index 550405fc3b5e..0cb1028b1c02 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -3561,8 +3561,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	__SetPageUptodate(page);
 
 	entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
-		entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));
+	entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
 
 	vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address,
 			&vmf->ptl);
@@ -4125,7 +4124,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_numa_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	pte = pte_modify(old_pte, vma->vm_page_prot);
 	pte = pte_mkyoung(pte);
 	if (was_writable)
-		pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
+		pte = maybe_mkwrite(pte, vma);
 	ptep_modify_prot_commit(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, old_pte, pte);
 	update_mmu_cache(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
 
diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c
index 62b81d5257aa..7251c88a3d64 100644
--- a/mm/migrate.c
+++ b/mm/migrate.c
@@ -2976,8 +2976,7 @@ static void migrate_vma_insert_page(struct migrate_vma *migrate,
 		}
 	} else {
 		entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
-		if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
-			entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));
+		entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
 	}
 
 	ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmdp, addr, &ptl);
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 94188df1ee55..c1ce78d688b6 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static unsigned long change_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
 			if (dirty_accountable && pte_dirty(ptent) &&
 					(pte_soft_dirty(ptent) ||
 					 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SOFTDIRTY))) {
-				ptent = pte_mkwrite(ptent);
+				ptent = maybe_mkwrite(ptent, vma);
 			}
 			ptep_modify_prot_commit(vma, addr, pte, oldpte, ptent);
 			pages++;
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 17/30] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (15 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 16/30] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 18/30] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (13 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

INCSSP(Q/D) increments shadow stack pointer and 'pops and discards' the
first and the last elements in the range, effectively touches those memory
areas.

The maximum moving distance by INCSSPQ is 255 * 8 = 2040 bytes and
255 * 4 = 1020 bytes by INCSSPD.  Both ranges are far from PAGE_SIZE.
Thus, putting a gap page on both ends of a shadow stack prevents INCSSP,
CALL, and RET from going beyond.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v25:
- Move SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP to arch/x86/mm/mmap.c.

v24:
- Instead changing vm_*_gap(), create x86-specific versions.

 arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h |  7 +++++
 arch/x86/mm/mmap.c                | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/mm.h                |  4 +++
 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
index a506a411474d..e1533fdc08b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
@@ -73,6 +73,13 @@ bool pfn_range_is_mapped(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn);
 
 extern void initmem_init(void);
 
+#define vm_start_gap vm_start_gap
+struct vm_area_struct;
+extern unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+
+#define vm_end_gap vm_end_gap
+extern unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+
 #endif	/* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif	/* _ASM_X86_PAGE_DEFS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index f3f52c5e2fd6..81f9325084d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -250,3 +250,49 @@ bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot)
 		return false;
 	return true;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Shadow stack pointer is moved by CALL, RET, and INCSSP(Q/D).  INCSSPQ
+ * moves shadow stack pointer up to 255 * 8 = ~2 KB (~1KB for INCSSPD) and
+ * touches the first and the last element in the range, which triggers a
+ * page fault if the range is not in a shadow stack.  Because of this,
+ * creating 4-KB guard pages around a shadow stack prevents these
+ * instructions from going beyond.
+ */
+#define SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP PAGE_SIZE
+
+unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start;
+	unsigned long gap = 0;
+
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)
+		gap = stack_guard_gap;
+	else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)
+		gap = SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP;
+
+	if (gap != 0) {
+		vm_start -= gap;
+		if (vm_start > vma->vm_start)
+			vm_start = 0;
+	}
+	return vm_start;
+}
+
+unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	unsigned long vm_end = vma->vm_end;
+	unsigned long gap = 0;
+
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP)
+		gap = stack_guard_gap;
+	else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)
+		gap = SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP;
+
+	if (gap != 0) {
+		vm_end += gap;
+		if (vm_end < vma->vm_end)
+			vm_end = -PAGE_SIZE;
+	}
+	return vm_end;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 6ac9b3e9a865..3e9c84f21ef6 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2660,6 +2660,7 @@ static inline struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_intersection(struct mm_struct * m
 	return vma;
 }
 
+#ifndef vm_start_gap
 static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start;
@@ -2671,7 +2672,9 @@ static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	}
 	return vm_start;
 }
+#endif
 
+#ifndef vm_end_gap
 static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	unsigned long vm_end = vma->vm_end;
@@ -2683,6 +2686,7 @@ static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	}
 	return vm_end;
 }
+#endif
 
 static inline unsigned long vma_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 18/30] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (16 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 17/30] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 19/30] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (12 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

Account shadow stack pages to stack memory.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v26:
- Remove redundant #ifdef CONFIG_MMU.

v25:
- Remove #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK for is_shadow_stack_mapping().

v24:
- Change arch_shadow_stack_mapping() to is_shadow_stack_mapping().
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.

 arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 3 +++
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c          | 5 +++++
 include/linux/pgtable.h        | 7 +++++++
 mm/mmap.c                      | 5 +++++
 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index da5dea417663..7f324edaedfa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1692,6 +1692,9 @@ static inline bool arch_faults_on_old_pte(void)
 #define maybe_mkwrite maybe_mkwrite
 extern pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 
+#define is_shadow_stack_mapping is_shadow_stack_mapping
+extern bool is_shadow_stack_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags);
+
 #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index e778dbbef3d8..b6ce620922e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -897,3 +897,8 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */
+
+bool is_shadow_stack_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
+{
+	return vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/pgtable.h b/include/linux/pgtable.h
index 5e772392a379..d9af6f9aeef1 100644
--- a/include/linux/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/linux/pgtable.h
@@ -1446,6 +1446,13 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 }
 #endif /* !_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED */
 
+#ifndef is_shadow_stack_mapping
+static inline bool is_shadow_stack_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Architecture PAGE_KERNEL_* fallbacks
  *
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 3f287599a7a3..d77fb39b6ab5 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1718,6 +1718,9 @@ static inline int accountable_mapping(struct file *file, vm_flags_t vm_flags)
 	if (file && is_file_hugepages(file))
 		return 0;
 
+	if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(vm_flags))
+		return 1;
+
 	return (vm_flags & (VM_NORESERVE | VM_SHARED | VM_WRITE)) == VM_WRITE;
 }
 
@@ -3387,6 +3390,8 @@ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *mm, vm_flags_t flags, long npages)
 		mm->stack_vm += npages;
 	else if (is_data_mapping(flags))
 		mm->data_vm += npages;
+	else if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(flags))
+		mm->stack_vm += npages;
 }
 
 static vm_fault_t special_mapping_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf);
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 19/30] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (17 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 18/30] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 20/30] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (11 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

Can_follow_write_pte() ensures a read-only page is COWed by checking the
FOLL_COW flag, and uses pte_dirty() to validate the flag is still valid.

Like a writable data page, a shadow stack page is writable, and becomes
read-only during copy-on-write, but it is always dirty.  Thus, in the
can_follow_write_pte() check, it belongs to the writable page case and
should be excluded from the read-only page pte_dirty() check.  Apply
the same changes to can_follow_write_pmd().

While at it, also split the long line into smaller ones.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v26:
- Instead of passing vm_flags, pass down vma pointer to can_follow_write_*().

v25:
- Split long line into smaller ones.

v24:
- Change arch_shadow_stack_mapping() to is_shadow_stack_mapping().

 mm/gup.c         | 16 ++++++++++++----
 mm/huge_memory.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index ef7d2da9f03f..f9705281e853 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -356,10 +356,18 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
+					struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
-	return pte_write(pte) ||
-		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
+	if (pte_write(pte))
+		return true;
+	if ((flags & (FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_COW)) != (FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_COW))
+		return false;
+	if (!pte_dirty(pte))
+		return false;
+	if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
+		return false;
+	return true;
 }
 
 static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -402,7 +410,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	}
 	if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
 		goto no_page;
-	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
+	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags, vma)) {
 		pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
 		return NULL;
 	}
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 044029ef45cd..cf10c3822853 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1338,10 +1338,18 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags,
+					struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
-	return pmd_write(pmd) ||
-	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
+	if (pmd_write(pmd))
+		return true;
+	if ((flags & (FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_COW)) != (FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_COW))
+		return false;
+	if (!pmd_dirty(pmd))
+		return false;
+	if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
+		return false;
+	return true;
 }
 
 struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1354,7 +1362,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 
 	assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
 
-	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags))
+	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags, vma))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 20/30] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (18 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 19/30] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 21/30] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (10 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

In change_pte_range(), when a PTE is changed for prot_numa, _PAGE_RW is
preserved to avoid the additional write fault after the NUMA hinting fault.
However, pte_write() now includes both normal writable and shadow stack
(RW=0, Dirty=1) PTEs, but the latter does not have _PAGE_RW and has no need
to preserve it.

Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write test, and apply the same change to
change_huge_pmd().

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
v25:
- Move is_shadow_stack_mapping() to a separate line.

v24:
- Change arch_shadow_stack_mapping() to is_shadow_stack_mapping().

 mm/huge_memory.c | 7 +++++++
 mm/mprotect.c    | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index cf10c3822853..3b841d7efd13 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1824,6 +1824,13 @@ int change_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
 		return 0;
 
 	preserve_write = prot_numa && pmd_write(*pmd);
+
+	/*
+	 * Preserve only normal writable huge PMD, but not shadow
+	 * stack (RW=0, Dirty=1).
+	 */
+	if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
+		preserve_write = false;
 	ret = 1;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index c1ce78d688b6..3b2f0d75519f 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -77,6 +77,13 @@ static unsigned long change_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
 			pte_t ptent;
 			bool preserve_write = prot_numa && pte_write(oldpte);
 
+			/*
+			 * Preserve only normal writable PTE, but not shadow
+			 * stack (RW=0, Dirty=1).
+			 */
+			if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
+				preserve_write = false;
+
 			/*
 			 * Avoid trapping faults against the zero or KSM
 			 * pages. See similar comment in change_huge_pmd.
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 21/30] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (19 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 20/30] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (9 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Peter Collingbourne, Kirill A . Shutemov, Andrew Morton

There was no more caller passing vm_flags to do_mmap(), and vm_flags was
removed from the function's input by:

    commit 45e55300f114 ("mm: remove unnecessary wrapper function do_mmap_pgoff()").

There is a new user now.  Shadow stack allocation passes VM_SHADOW_STACK to
do_mmap().  Thus, re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap().

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
---
v24:
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.
- Update commit log.

 fs/aio.c           |  2 +-
 include/linux/mm.h |  3 ++-
 ipc/shm.c          |  2 +-
 mm/mmap.c          | 10 +++++-----
 mm/nommu.c         |  4 ++--
 mm/util.c          |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index 1f32da13d39e..b5d0586209a7 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static int aio_setup_ring(struct kioctx *ctx, unsigned int nr_events)
 
 	ctx->mmap_base = do_mmap(ctx->aio_ring_file, 0, ctx->mmap_size,
 				 PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
-				 MAP_SHARED, 0, &unused, NULL);
+				 MAP_SHARED, 0, 0, &unused, NULL);
 	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
 	if (IS_ERR((void *)ctx->mmap_base)) {
 		ctx->mmap_size = 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 3e9c84f21ef6..1ccec5cc399b 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2576,7 +2576,8 @@ extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	struct list_head *uf);
 extern unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-	unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf);
+	vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
+	struct list_head *uf);
 extern int __do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t,
 		       struct list_head *uf, bool downgrade);
 extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t,
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index febd88daba8c..b6370eb1eaab 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg,
 			goto invalid;
 	}
 
-	addr = do_mmap(file, addr, size, prot, flags, 0, &populate, NULL);
+	addr = do_mmap(file, addr, size, prot, flags, 0, 0, &populate, NULL);
 	*raddr = addr;
 	err = 0;
 	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index d77fb39b6ab5..7b2992ef8ee0 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1401,11 +1401,11 @@ static inline bool file_mmap_ok(struct file *file, struct inode *inode,
  */
 unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 			unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
-			unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff,
-			unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf)
+			unsigned long flags, vm_flags_t vm_flags,
+			unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
+			struct list_head *uf)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
-	vm_flags_t vm_flags;
 	int pkey = 0;
 
 	*populate = 0;
@@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	 * to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open
 	 * of the memory object, so we don't do any here.
 	 */
-	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
+	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
 			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
 
 	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
@@ -3047,7 +3047,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
 
 	file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
 	ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size,
-			prot, flags, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
+			prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
 	fput(file);
 out:
 	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
index 5c9ab799c0e6..9b6f7a1895c2 100644
--- a/mm/nommu.c
+++ b/mm/nommu.c
@@ -1071,6 +1071,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
 			unsigned long len,
 			unsigned long prot,
 			unsigned long flags,
+			vm_flags_t vm_flags,
 			unsigned long pgoff,
 			unsigned long *populate,
 			struct list_head *uf)
@@ -1078,7 +1079,6 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	struct vm_region *region;
 	struct rb_node *rb;
-	vm_flags_t vm_flags;
 	unsigned long capabilities, result;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
 
 	/* we've determined that we can make the mapping, now translate what we
 	 * now know into VMA flags */
-	vm_flags = determine_vm_flags(file, prot, flags, capabilities);
+	vm_flags |= determine_vm_flags(file, prot, flags, capabilities);
 
 	/* we're going to need to record the mapping */
 	region = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_region_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
index 54870226cea6..49cbd4400d13 100644
--- a/mm/util.c
+++ b/mm/util.c
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	if (!ret) {
 		if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
 			return -EINTR;
-		ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, pgoff, &populate,
+		ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, 0, pgoff, &populate,
 			      &uf);
 		mmap_write_unlock(mm);
 		userfaultfd_unmap_complete(mm, &uf);
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (20 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 21/30] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-28 17:52   ` Borislav Petkov
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 23/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (8 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines.
A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag
and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v25:
- Change CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK.
- Update alloc_shstk(), remove unused input flags.

v24:
- Rename cet.c to shstk.c, update related areas accordingly.

 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h       |  29 ++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |   5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile         |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c          | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 159 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..aa85d599b184
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
+#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct task_struct;
+/*
+ * Per-thread CET status
+ */
+struct cet_status {
+	unsigned long	shstk_base;
+	unsigned long	shstk_size;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+int shstk_setup(void);
+void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
+void shstk_disable(void);
+#else
+static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
+static inline void shstk_disable(void) {}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index f1b9ed5efaa9..3690b78e55bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86;
 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
 #include <asm/vmxfeatures.h>
 #include <asm/vdso/processor.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 #include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -535,6 +536,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
 
 	unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+	struct cet_status	cet;
+#endif
+
 	/* Floating point and extended processor state */
 	struct fpu		fpu;
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 2ddf08351f0b..0f99b093f350 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)	+= unwind_frame.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS)		+= unwind_guess.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)		+= sev-es.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK)		+= shstk.o
+
 ###
 # 64 bit specific files
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c815c7507830
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * shstk.c - Intel shadow stack support
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, Intel Corporation.
+ * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <linux/user.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+static void start_update_msrs(void)
+{
+	fpregs_lock();
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+		__fpregs_load_activate();
+}
+
+static void end_update_msrs(void)
+{
+	fpregs_unlock();
+}
+
+static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	unsigned long addr, populate;
+	int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
+
+	mmap_write_lock(mm);
+	addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, flags, VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0,
+		       &populate, NULL);
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
+int shstk_setup(void)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	size = round_up(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G), PAGE_SIZE);
+	addr = alloc_shstk(size);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+		return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
+
+	cet->shstk_base = addr;
+	cet->shstk_size = size;
+
+	start_update_msrs();
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
+	end_update_msrs();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+	    !cet->shstk_size ||
+	    !cet->shstk_base)
+		return;
+
+	if (!tsk->mm)
+		return;
+
+	while (1) {
+		int r;
+
+		r = vm_munmap(cet->shstk_base, cet->shstk_size);
+
+		/*
+		 * vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when mmap_lock is held by
+		 * something else, and that lock should not be held for a
+		 * long time.  Retry it for the case.
+		 */
+		if (r == -EINTR) {
+			cond_resched();
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	cet->shstk_base = 0;
+	cet->shstk_size = 0;
+}
+
+void shstk_disable(void)
+{
+	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
+	u64 msr_val;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+	    !cet->shstk_size ||
+	    !cet->shstk_base)
+		return;
+
+	start_update_msrs();
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val & ~CET_SHSTK_EN);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+	end_update_msrs();
+
+	shstk_free(current);
+}
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 23/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (21 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-05-10 14:15   ` Borislav Petkov
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 24/30] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (7 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

For clone() with CLONE_VM specified, the child and the parent must have
separate shadow stacks.  Thus, the kernel allocates, and frees on thread
exit a new shadow stack for the child.

Use stack_size passed from clone3() syscall for thread shadow stack size,
but cap it to min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB).  A compat-mode thread shadow stack
size is further reduced to 1/4.  This allows more threads to run in a 32-
bit address space.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h         |  5 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          | 15 ++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c            | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index aa85d599b184..8b83ded577cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -16,10 +16,15 @@ struct cet_status {
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
 int shstk_setup(void);
+int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
+		       unsigned long stack_size);
 void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
 void shstk_disable(void);
 #else
 static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return 0; }
+static inline int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p,
+				     unsigned long clone_flags,
+				     unsigned long stack_size) { return 0; }
 static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline void shstk_disable(void) {}
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 27516046117a..53569114aa01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/paravirt.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
 
 extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
@@ -146,6 +147,8 @@ do {						\
 #else
 #define deactivate_mm(tsk, mm)			\
 do {						\
+	if (!tsk->vfork_done)			\
+		shstk_free(tsk);		\
 	load_gs_index(0);			\
 	loadsegment(fs, 0);			\
 } while (0)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 9c214d7085a4..fa01e8679d01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
 #include <asm/proto.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 #include "process.h"
 
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 	free_vm86(t);
 
+	shstk_free(tsk);
 	fpu__drop(fpu);
 }
 
@@ -122,8 +124,9 @@ static int set_new_tls(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long tls)
 		return do_set_thread_area_64(p, ARCH_SET_FS, tls);
 }
 
-int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,
-		struct task_struct *p, unsigned long tls)
+int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
+		unsigned long stack_size, struct task_struct *p,
+		unsigned long tls)
 {
 	struct inactive_task_frame *frame;
 	struct fork_frame *fork_frame;
@@ -163,7 +166,7 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,
 	/* Kernel thread ? */
 	if (unlikely(p->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_IO_WORKER))) {
 		memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
-		kthread_frame_init(frame, sp, arg);
+		kthread_frame_init(frame, sp, stack_size);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -181,6 +184,12 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,
 	if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
 		ret = set_new_tls(p, tls);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = shstk_setup_thread(p, clone_flags, stack_size);
+#endif
+
 	if (!ret && unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_IO_BITMAP)))
 		io_bitmap_share(p);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index c815c7507830..d387df84b7f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -70,6 +70,55 @@ int shstk_setup(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags,
+		       unsigned long stack_size)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+	struct cet_user_state *state;
+	struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
+
+	if (!cet->shstk_size)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) != CLONE_VM)
+		return 0;
+
+	state = get_xsave_addr(&tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave,
+			       XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+
+	if (!state)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (stack_size == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Cap shadow stack size to 4 GB */
+	size = min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G);
+	size = min(size, stack_size);
+
+	/*
+	 * Compat-mode pthreads share a limited address space.
+	 * If each function call takes an average of four slots
+	 * stack space, allocate 1/4 of stack size for shadow stack.
+	 */
+	if (in_compat_syscall())
+		size /= 4;
+	size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE);
+	addr = alloc_shstk(size);
+
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
+		cet->shstk_base = 0;
+		cet->shstk_size = 0;
+		return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
+	}
+
+	fpu__prepare_write(&tsk->thread.fpu);
+	state->user_ssp = (u64)(addr + size);
+	cet->shstk_base = addr;
+	cet->shstk_size = size;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
@@ -79,7 +128,13 @@ void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	    !cet->shstk_base)
 		return;
 
-	if (!tsk->mm)
+	/*
+	 * When fork() with CLONE_VM fails, the child (tsk) already has a
+	 * shadow stack allocated, and exit_thread() calls this function to
+	 * free it.  In this case the parent (current) and the child is
+	 * sharing the same mm struct.
+	 */
+	if (!tsk->mm || tsk->mm != current->mm)
 		return;
 
 	while (1) {
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 24/30] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (22 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 23/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (6 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

A shadow stack restore token marks a restore point of the shadow stack, and
the address in a token must point directly above the token, which is within
the same shadow stack.  This is distinctively different from other pointers
on the shadow stack, since those pointers point to executable code area.

The restore token can be used as an extra protection for signal handling.
To deliver a signal, create a shadow stack restore token and put the token
and the signal restorer address on the shadow stack.  In sigreturn, verify
the token and restore from it the shadow stack pointer.

Introduce token setup and verify routines.  Also introduce WRUSS, which is
a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user shadow stack.  It is
used to construct user signal stack as described above.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v25:
- Update inline assembly syntax, use %[].
- Change token address from (unsigned long) to (u64/u32 __user *).
- Change -EPERM to -EFAULT.

 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h           |   9 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h |  32 +++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c              | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 167 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index 8b83ded577cc..ef6155213b7e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
 		       unsigned long stack_size);
 void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
 void shstk_disable(void);
+int shstk_setup_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor,
+			    unsigned long *token_addr, unsigned long *new_ssp);
+int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long token_addr,
+			    unsigned long *new_ssp);
 #else
 static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return 0; }
 static inline int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -27,6 +31,11 @@ static inline int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p,
 				     unsigned long stack_size) { return 0; }
 static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline void shstk_disable(void) {}
+static inline int shstk_setup_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor,
+					  unsigned long *token_addr,
+					  unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
+static inline int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long token_addr,
+					  unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
index 1d3cbaef4bb7..5a0488923cae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
@@ -234,6 +234,38 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
 		: [pax] "a" (p));
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+#if defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) || defined(CONFIG_X86_X32)
+static inline int write_user_shstk_32(u32 __user *addr, u32 val)
+{
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussd %[val], (%[addr])\n"
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
+			  :: [addr] "r" (addr), [val] "r" (val)
+			  :: fail);
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+#else
+static inline int write_user_shstk_32(u32 __user *addr, u32 val)
+{
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "%s used but not supported.\n", __func__);
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline int write_user_shstk_64(u64 __user *addr, u64 val)
+{
+	asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussq %[val], (%[addr])\n"
+			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
+			  :: [addr] "r" (addr), [val] "r" (val)
+			  :: fail);
+	return 0;
+fail:
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
+
 #define nop() asm volatile ("nop")
 
 static inline void serialize(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index d387df84b7f1..48a0c87414ef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/types.h>
 #include <asm/cet.h>
+#include <asm/special_insns.h>
 
 static void start_update_msrs(void)
 {
@@ -176,3 +177,128 @@ void shstk_disable(void)
 
 	shstk_free(current);
 }
+
+static unsigned long _get_user_shstk_addr(void)
+{
+	struct fpu *fpu = &current->thread.fpu;
+	unsigned long ssp = 0;
+
+	fpregs_lock();
+
+	if (fpregs_state_valid(fpu, smp_processor_id())) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+	} else {
+		struct cet_user_state *p;
+
+		p = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+		if (p)
+			ssp = p->user_ssp;
+	}
+
+	fpregs_unlock();
+	return ssp;
+}
+
+#define TOKEN_MODE_MASK	3UL
+#define TOKEN_MODE_64	1UL
+#define IS_TOKEN_64(token) (((token) & TOKEN_MODE_MASK) == TOKEN_MODE_64)
+#define IS_TOKEN_32(token) (((token) & TOKEN_MODE_MASK) == 0)
+
+/*
+ * Create a restore token on the shadow stack.  A token is always 8-byte
+ * and aligned to 8.
+ */
+static int _create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,
+			       unsigned long *token_addr)
+{
+	unsigned long addr;
+
+	*token_addr = 0;
+
+	if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 4))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	addr = ALIGN_DOWN(ssp, 8) - 8;
+
+	/* Is the token for 64-bit? */
+	if (!ia32)
+		ssp |= TOKEN_MODE_64;
+
+	if (write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)addr, (u64)ssp))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	*token_addr = addr;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a restore token on shadow stack, and then push the user-mode
+ * function return address.
+ */
+int shstk_setup_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ret_addr,
+			    unsigned long *token_addr, unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
+	unsigned long ssp = 0;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (cet->shstk_size) {
+		if (!ret_addr)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		ssp = _get_user_shstk_addr();
+		err = _create_rstor_token(ia32, ssp, token_addr);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		if (ia32) {
+			*new_ssp = *token_addr - sizeof(u32);
+			err = write_user_shstk_32((u32 __user *)*new_ssp, (u32)ret_addr);
+		} else {
+			*new_ssp = *token_addr - sizeof(u64);
+			err = write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)*new_ssp, (u64)ret_addr);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify token_addr point to a valid token, and then set *new_ssp
+ * according to the token.
+ */
+int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long token_addr, unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+	unsigned long token;
+
+	*new_ssp = 0;
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(token_addr, 8))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (get_user(token, (unsigned long __user *)token_addr))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* Is 64-bit mode flag correct? */
+	if (!ia32 && !IS_TOKEN_64(token))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	else if (ia32 && !IS_TOKEN_32(token))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	token &= ~TOKEN_MODE_MASK;
+
+	/*
+	 * Restore address properly aligned?
+	 */
+	if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(token, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(token, 4))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Token was placed properly?
+	 */
+	if (((ALIGN_DOWN(token, 8) - 8) != token_addr) || token >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*new_ssp = token;
+	return 0;
+}
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (23 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 24/30] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-28 23:03   ` extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack) Andy Lutomirski
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 26/30] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (5 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
extensions.

Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
keeps track of total size.

Introduce routines for the allocation, save, and restore for sc_ext:
- fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(),
- save_extra_state_to_sigframe(),
- get_extra_state_from_sigframe(),
- restore_extra_state_to_xregs().

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v25:
- Update commit log/comments for the sc_ext struct.
- Use restorer address already calculated.
- Change CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK.
- Change X86_FEATURE_CET to X86_FEATURE_SHSTK.
- Eliminate writing to MSR_IA32_U_CET for shadow stack.
- Change wrmsrl() to wrmsrl_safe() and handle error.

v24:
- Split out shadow stack token routines to a separate patch.
- Put signal frame save/restore routines to fpu/signal.c and re-name accordingly.

 arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c            |  24 +++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h             |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h    |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h |   9 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c           | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c               |   9 ++
 6 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
index 5e3d9b7fd5fb..423abcd181f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
@@ -202,7 +202,8 @@ do {									\
  */
 static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs,
 				 size_t frame_size,
-				 void __user **fpstate)
+				 void __user **fpstate,
+				 void __user *restorer)
 {
 	unsigned long sp, fx_aligned, math_size;
 
@@ -220,6 +221,10 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 	sp = fpu__alloc_mathframe(sp, 1, &fx_aligned, &math_size);
 	*fpstate = (struct _fpstate_32 __user *) sp;
+
+	if (save_extra_state_to_sigframe(1, *fpstate, restorer))
+		return (void __user *)-1L;
+
 	if (copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(*fpstate, (void __user *)fx_aligned,
 				     math_size) < 0)
 		return (void __user *) -1L;
@@ -249,8 +254,6 @@ int ia32_setup_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
 		0x80cd,		/* int $0x80 */
 	};
 
-	frame = get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sizeof(*frame), &fp);
-
 	if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) {
 		restorer = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
 	} else {
@@ -262,6 +265,8 @@ int ia32_setup_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
 			restorer = &frame->retcode;
 	}
 
+	frame = get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sizeof(*frame), &fp, restorer);
+
 	if (!user_access_begin(frame, sizeof(*frame)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -317,7 +322,13 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
 		0,
 	};
 
-	frame = get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sizeof(*frame), &fp);
+	if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
+		restorer = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
+	else
+		restorer = current->mm->context.vdso +
+			vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_rt_sigreturn;
+
+	frame = get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sizeof(*frame), &fp, restorer);
 
 	if (!user_access_begin(frame, sizeof(*frame)))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -334,11 +345,6 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
 	unsafe_put_user(0, &frame->uc.uc_link, Efault);
 	unsafe_compat_save_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack, regs->sp, Efault);
 
-	if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
-		restorer = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
-	else
-		restorer = current->mm->context.vdso +
-			vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_rt_sigreturn;
 	unsafe_put_user(ptr_to_compat(restorer), &frame->pretcode, Efault);
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index ef6155213b7e..5e66919bd2fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 struct task_struct;
+struct sc_ext;
+
 /*
  * Per-thread CET status
  */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
index 8d33ad80704f..2a3c6a160dd6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
@@ -443,6 +443,8 @@ static inline void copy_kernel_to_fpregs(union fpregs_state *fpstate)
 	__copy_kernel_to_fpregs(fpstate, -1);
 }
 
+extern int save_extra_state_to_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp,
+					void __user *restorer);
 extern int copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(void __user *buf, void __user *fp, int size);
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
index 844d60eb1882..10d7fa192d48 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
@@ -196,6 +196,15 @@ struct _xstate {
 	/* New processor state extensions go here: */
 };
 
+/*
+ * Located at the end of sigcontext->fpstate, aligned to 8.
+ * total_size keeps track of further extension of the struct.
+ */
+struct sc_ext {
+	unsigned long total_size;
+	unsigned long ssp;
+};
+
 /*
  * The 32-bit signal frame:
  */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
index a4ec65317a7f..0488407bec81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
@@ -52,6 +52,107 @@ static inline int check_for_xstate(struct fxregs_state __user *buf,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int save_extra_state_to_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp, void __user *restorer)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
+	unsigned long token_addr = 0, new_ssp = 0;
+	struct sc_ext ext = {};
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (cet->shstk_size) {
+		err = shstk_setup_rstor_token(ia32, (unsigned long)restorer,
+					      &token_addr, &new_ssp);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		ext.ssp = token_addr;
+
+		fpregs_lock();
+		if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+			__fpregs_load_activate();
+		if (new_ssp)
+			err = wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, new_ssp);
+		fpregs_unlock();
+	}
+
+	if (!err && ext.ssp) {
+		void __user *p = fp;
+
+		ext.total_size = sizeof(ext);
+
+		p = fp;
+		if (ia32)
+			p += sizeof(struct fregs_state);
+
+		p += fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
+		p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
+
+		if (copy_to_user(p, &ext, sizeof(ext)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+	}
+#endif
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int get_extra_state_from_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp, struct sc_ext *ext)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
+	void __user *p;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!cet->shstk_size)
+		return 0;
+
+	memset(ext, 0, sizeof(*ext));
+
+	p = fp;
+	if (ia32)
+		p += sizeof(struct fregs_state);
+
+	p += fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
+	p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
+
+	if (copy_from_user(ext, p, sizeof(*ext)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (ext->total_size != sizeof(*ext))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (cet->shstk_size)
+		err = shstk_check_rstor_token(ia32, ext->ssp, &ext->ssp);
+#endif
+	return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from __fpu__restore_sig() and protected by fpregs_lock().
+ */
+static int restore_extra_state_to_xregs(struct sc_ext *sc_ext)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (cet->shstk_size)
+		err = wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, sc_ext->ssp);
+#endif
+	return err;
+}
+
 /*
  * Signal frame handlers.
  */
@@ -295,6 +396,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu;
 	struct user_i387_ia32_struct env;
+	struct sc_ext sc_ext;
 	u64 user_xfeatures = 0;
 	int fx_only = 0;
 	int ret = 0;
@@ -335,6 +437,10 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
 	if ((unsigned long)buf_fx % 64)
 		fx_only = 1;
 
+	ret = get_extra_state_from_sigframe(ia32_fxstate, buf, &sc_ext);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	if (!ia32_fxstate) {
 		/*
 		 * Attempt to restore the FPU registers directly from user
@@ -365,9 +471,17 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
 			    xfeatures_mask_supervisor())
 				copy_kernel_to_xregs(&fpu->state.xsave,
 						     xfeatures_mask_supervisor());
-			fpregs_mark_activate();
+
+			ret = restore_extra_state_to_xregs(&sc_ext);
+			if (!ret) {
+				fpregs_mark_activate();
+			} else {
+				fpregs_deactivate(fpu);
+				fpu__clear_user_states(fpu);
+			}
+
 			fpregs_unlock();
-			return 0;
+			return ret;
 		}
 		fpregs_unlock();
 	} else {
@@ -430,6 +544,8 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
 		ret = copy_kernel_to_xregs_err(&fpu->state.xsave,
 					       user_xfeatures | xfeatures_mask_supervisor());
 
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = restore_extra_state_to_xregs(&sc_ext);
 	} else if (use_fxsr()) {
 		ret = __copy_from_user(&fpu->state.fxsave, buf_fx, state_size);
 		if (ret) {
@@ -491,12 +607,29 @@ int fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, int ia32_frame)
 	return __fpu__restore_sig(buf, buf_fx, size);
 }
 
+static unsigned long fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(unsigned long sp)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
+
+	/*
+	 * sigcontext_ext is at: fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size +
+	 * FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE, then aligned to 8.
+	 */
+	if (cet->shstk_size)
+		sp -= (sizeof(struct sc_ext) + 8);
+#endif
+	return sp;
+}
+
 unsigned long
 fpu__alloc_mathframe(unsigned long sp, int ia32_frame,
 		     unsigned long *buf_fx, unsigned long *size)
 {
 	unsigned long frame_size = xstate_sigframe_size();
 
+	sp = fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(sp);
+
 	*buf_fx = sp = round_down(sp - frame_size, 64);
 	if (ia32_frame && use_fxsr()) {
 		frame_size += sizeof(struct fregs_state);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index f306e85a08a6..56d2412174c8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -239,6 +239,9 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
 	unsigned long buf_fx = 0;
 	int onsigstack = on_sig_stack(sp);
 	int ret;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	void __user *restorer = NULL;
+#endif
 
 	/* redzone */
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
@@ -270,6 +273,12 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
 	if (onsigstack && !likely(on_sig_stack(sp)))
 		return (void __user *)-1L;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
+		restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
+	ret = save_extra_state_to_sigframe(0, *fpstate, restorer);
+#endif
+
 	/* save i387 and extended state */
 	ret = copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(*fpstate, (void __user *)buf_fx, math_size);
 	if (ret < 0)
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 26/30] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (24 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 27/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Mark Brown, Catalin Marinas

An ELF file's .note.gnu.property indicates arch features supported by the
file.  These features are extracted by arch_parse_elf_property() and stored
in 'arch_elf_state'.

Introduce x86 feature definitions and arch_setup_elf_property(), which
enables such features.  The first use-case of this function is Shadow
Stack.

ARM64 is the other arch that has ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY and arch_parse_elf_
property().  Add arch_setup_elf_property() for it.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
---
v24:
- Change cet_setup_shstk() to shstk_setup() to reflect function name changes
  relating to the splitting of shadow stack and ibt.

 arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h |  5 +++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig             |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h   | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/binfmt_elf.c              |  4 ++++
 include/linux/elf.h          |  6 ++++++
 include/uapi/linux/elf.h     |  9 +++++++++
 7 files changed, 71 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
index 8d1c8dcb87fd..d37bc7915935 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -281,6 +281,11 @@ static inline int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *arch)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int arch_elf_pt_proc(void *ehdr, void *phdr,
 				   struct file *f, bool is_interp,
 				   struct arch_elf_state *state)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 41283f82fd87..77d2e44995d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1951,6 +1951,8 @@ config X86_SHADOW_STACK
 	depends on AS_WRUSS
 	depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
 	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+	select ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY
+	select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
 	help
 	  Shadow Stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
 	  return address corruption.  This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
index 9224d40cdefe..6a131047be8a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -390,6 +390,19 @@ extern int compat_arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 
 extern bool arch_syscall_is_vdso_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
+struct arch_elf_state {
+	unsigned int gnu_property;
+};
+
+#define INIT_ARCH_ELF_STATE {	\
+	.gnu_property = 0,	\
+}
+
+#define arch_elf_pt_proc(ehdr, phdr, elf, interp, state) (0)
+#define arch_check_elf(ehdr, interp, interp_ehdr, state) (0)
+#endif
+
 /* Do not change the values. See get_align_mask() */
 enum align_flags {
 	ALIGN_VA_32	= BIT(0),
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index d08307df69ad..d71045b29475 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -835,3 +835,35 @@ unsigned long KSTK_ESP(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	return task_pt_regs(task)->sp;
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY
+int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data, size_t datasz,
+			    bool compat, struct arch_elf_state *state)
+{
+	if (type != GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (datasz != sizeof(unsigned int))
+		return -ENOEXEC;
+
+	state->gnu_property = *(unsigned int *)data;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *state)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK))
+		return r;
+
+	memset(&current->thread.cet, 0, sizeof(struct cet_status));
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		if (state->gnu_property & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
+			r = shstk_setup();
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index b12ba98ae9f5..fa665eceba04 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -1248,6 +1248,10 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 	set_binfmt(&elf_format);
 
+	retval = arch_setup_elf_property(&arch_state);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto out;
+
 #ifdef ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES
 	retval = ARCH_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES(bprm, elf_ex, !!interpreter);
 	if (retval < 0)
diff --git a/include/linux/elf.h b/include/linux/elf.h
index c9a46c4e183b..be04d15e937f 100644
--- a/include/linux/elf.h
+++ b/include/linux/elf.h
@@ -92,9 +92,15 @@ static inline int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *arch)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #else
 extern int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data, size_t datasz,
 				   bool compat, struct arch_elf_state *arch);
+extern int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *arch);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAVE_ELF_PROT
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/elf.h b/include/uapi/linux/elf.h
index 30f68b42eeb5..24ba55ba8278 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/elf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/elf.h
@@ -455,4 +455,13 @@ typedef struct elf64_note {
 /* Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI */
 #define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI	(1U << 0)
 
+/* .note.gnu.property types for x86: */
+#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND		0xc0000002
+
+/* Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND */
+#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT		0x00000001
+#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK	0x00000002
+#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_VALID (GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT | \
+					   GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
+
 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_ELF_H */
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 27/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (25 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 26/30] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 28/30] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu

arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, u64 *args)
    Get CET feature status.

    The parameter 'args' is a pointer to a user buffer.  The kernel returns
    the following information:

    *args = shadow stack/IBT status
    *(args + 1) = shadow stack base address
    *(args + 2) = shadow stack size

    32-bit binaries use the same interface, but only lower 32-bits of each
    item.

arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned int features)
    Disable CET features specified in 'features'.  Return -EPERM if CET is
    locked.

arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK)
    Lock in CET features.

Also change do_arch_prctl_common()'s parameter 'cpuid_enabled' to
'arg2', as it is now also passed to prctl_cet().

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v25:
- Change CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK.
- Change X86_FEATURE_CET to X86_FEATURE_SHSTK.

v24:
- Update #ifdef placement relating to shadow stack and ibt split.
- Update function names.

 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h        |  7 ++++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h |  4 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/Makefile          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c       | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c         |  6 ++--
 5 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index 5e66919bd2fe..662335ceb57f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ struct sc_ext;
 struct cet_status {
 	unsigned long	shstk_base;
 	unsigned long	shstk_size;
+	unsigned int	locked:1;
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
@@ -40,6 +41,12 @@ static inline int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long token_addr,
 					  unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+int prctl_cet(int option, u64 arg2);
+#else
+static inline int prctl_cet(int option, u64 arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
index 5a6aac9fa41f..9245bf629120 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
@@ -14,4 +14,8 @@
 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32	0x2002
 #define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64	0x2003
 
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS		0x3001
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE		0x3002
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK		0x3003
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 0f99b093f350..eb13d578ad36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)	+= unwind_frame.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS)		+= unwind_guess.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)		+= sev-es.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK)		+= shstk.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK)		+= shstk.o cet_prctl.o
 
 ###
 # 64 bit specific files
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3bb9f32ca70d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/elfcore.h>
+#include <linux/processor.h>
+#include <asm/prctl.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+/* See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst. */
+
+static int cet_copy_status_to_user(struct cet_status *cet, u64 __user *ubuf)
+{
+	u64 buf[3] = {};
+
+	if (cet->shstk_size) {
+		buf[0] |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK;
+		buf[1] = cet->shstk_base;
+		buf[2] = cet->shstk_size;
+	}
+
+	return copy_to_user(ubuf, buf, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+int prctl_cet(int option, u64 arg2)
+{
+	struct cet_status *cet;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+	cet = &current->thread.cet;
+
+	if (option == ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS)
+		return cet_copy_status_to_user(cet, (u64 __user *)arg2);
+
+	switch (option) {
+	case ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE:
+		if (cet->locked)
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		if (arg2 & ~GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_VALID)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
+			shstk_disable();
+		return 0;
+
+	case ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK:
+		if (arg2)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		cet->locked = 1;
+		return 0;
+
+	default:
+		return -ENOSYS;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index fa01e8679d01..315668a334fd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -980,14 +980,14 @@ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p)
 }
 
 long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option,
-			  unsigned long cpuid_enabled)
+			  unsigned long arg2)
 {
 	switch (option) {
 	case ARCH_GET_CPUID:
 		return get_cpuid_mode();
 	case ARCH_SET_CPUID:
-		return set_cpuid_mode(task, cpuid_enabled);
+		return set_cpuid_mode(task, arg2);
 	}
 
-	return -EINVAL;
+	return prctl_cet(option, arg2);
 }
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 28/30] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (26 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 27/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 29/30] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

To prepare the introduction of PROT_SHADOW_STACK and be consistent with other
architectures, move arch_vm_get_page_prot() and arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h      | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 28 +++-------------------------
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..629f6c81263a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/mman.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+/*
+ * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags
+ * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in
+ * to a pte.
+ *
+ * Only override these if Protection Keys are available
+ * (which is only on 64-bit).
+ */
+#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags)	__pgprot(	\
+		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) |	\
+		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) |	\
+		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |	\
+		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (		\
+		((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) |      \
+		((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) |      \
+		((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |      \
+		((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
index d4a8d0424bfb..f28fa4acaeaf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
@@ -1,31 +1,9 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
-#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
-#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H
 
 #define MAP_32BIT	0x40		/* only give out 32bit addresses */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
-/*
- * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags
- * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in
- * to a pte.
- *
- * Only override these if Protection Keys are available
- * (which is only on 64-bit).
- */
-#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags)	__pgprot(	\
-		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) |	\
-		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) |	\
-		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |	\
-		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
-
-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (		\
-		((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) |      \
-		((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) |      \
-		((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |      \
-		((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
-#endif
-
 #include <asm-generic/mman.h>
 
-#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
+#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 29/30] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (27 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 28/30] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 30/30] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-29 17:13 ` [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Borislav Petkov
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Catalin Marinas, Kirill A . Shutemov,
	Vincenzo Frascino, Will Deacon

When newer VM flags are being created, such as VM_MTE, it becomes necessary
for mmap/mprotect to verify if certain flags are being applied to an
anonymous VMA.

To solve this, one approach is adding a VM flag to track that MAP_ANONYMOUS
is specified [1], and then using the flag in arch_validate_flags().

Another approach is passing the VMA to arch_validate_flags(), and check
vma_is_anonymous().

To prepare the introduction of PROT_SHADOW_STACK, which creates a shadow
stack mapping and can be applied only to an anonymous VMA, update
arch_validate_flags() to pass in the VMA.

[1] commit 9f3419315f3c ("arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()"),

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
v26:
- Instead of passing vma is anonymous, pass the VMA to arch_validate_flags().

 arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 4 ++--
 arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h | 4 ++--
 include/linux/mman.h          | 2 +-
 mm/mmap.c                     | 2 +-
 mm/mprotect.c                 | 2 +-
 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
index e3e28f7daf62..7c45e7578f78 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot,
 }
 #define arch_validate_prot(prot, addr) arch_validate_prot(prot, addr)
 
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
 {
 	if (!system_supports_mte())
 		return true;
@@ -82,6 +82,6 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
 	/* only allow VM_MTE if VM_MTE_ALLOWED has been set previously */
 	return !(vm_flags & VM_MTE) || (vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED);
 }
-#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags)
+#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
 
 #endif /* ! __ASM_MMAN_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
index 274217e7ed70..0ec4975f167d 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ static inline int sparc_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags)
+#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
 /* arch_validate_flags() - Ensure combination of flags is valid for a
  *	VMA.
  */
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
 {
 	/* If ADI is being enabled on this VMA, check for ADI
 	 * capability on the platform and ensure VMA is suitable
diff --git a/include/linux/mman.h b/include/linux/mman.h
index 629cefc4ecba..41d6fbf4e7d9 100644
--- a/include/linux/mman.h
+++ b/include/linux/mman.h
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
  *
  * Returns true if the VM_* flags are valid.
  */
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	return true;
 }
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 7b2992ef8ee0..b6a2b44b75dc 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	}
 
 	/* Allow architectures to sanity-check the vm_flags */
-	if (!arch_validate_flags(vma->vm_flags)) {
+	if (!arch_validate_flags(vma, vma->vm_flags)) {
 		error = -EINVAL;
 		if (file)
 			goto unmap_and_free_vma;
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 3b2f0d75519f..7aef1e1af11a 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 		}
 
 		/* Allow architectures to sanity-check the new flags */
-		if (!arch_validate_flags(newflags)) {
+		if (!arch_validate_flags(vma, newflags)) {
 			error = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
 		}
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v26 30/30] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (28 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 29/30] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu
  2021-04-29 17:13 ` [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Borislav Petkov
  30 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu-cheng Yu @ 2021-04-27 20:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, Kirill A . Shutemov

There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API:
an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHADOW_STACK to mmap() and
mprotect().  Each has its advantages and compromises.

An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive.  However, the existing x86
arch_prctl() takes only two parameters.  Multiple parameters must be
passed in a memory buffer.  There is a proposal to pass more parameters in
registers [1], but no active discussion on that.

A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame
work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of
mmap()/mprotect().

The introduction of PROT_SHADOW_STACK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage
of existing APIs.  The x86-specific PROT_SHADOW_STACK is translated to
VM_SHADOW_STACK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing
the wheel.  There are potential pitfalls though.  The most obvious one
would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection.  However, the
attacker would have to get to the syscall first.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com/

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
v26:
- Change PROT_SHSTK to PROT_SHADOW_STACK.
- Remove (vm_flags & VM_SHARED) check, since it is covered by
  !vma_is_anonymous().

v24:
- Update arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(), leave PROT* checking to
  arch_validate_prot().
- Update arch_validate_prot(), leave vma flags checking to
  arch_validate_flags().
- Add arch_validate_flags().

 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h      | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h |  2 ++
 include/linux/mm.h               |  1 +
 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
index 629f6c81263a..fbb90f1b02c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -20,11 +20,69 @@
 		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |	\
 		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
 
-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (		\
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (			\
 		((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) |      \
 		((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) |      \
 		((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |      \
 		((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+#else
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0)
 #endif
 
+static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
+						   unsigned long pkey)
+{
+	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey);
+
+	if (prot & PROT_SHADOW_STACK)
+		vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHADOW_STACK;
+
+	return vm_prot_bits;
+}
+
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	unsigned long valid = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM |
+			      PROT_SHADOW_STACK;
+
+	if (prot & ~valid)
+		return false;
+
+	if (prot & PROT_SHADOW_STACK) {
+		if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size)
+			return false;
+
+		/*
+		 * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only
+		 * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write
+		 * instructions).  PROT_SHADOW_STACK and PROT_WRITE are
+		 * mutually exclusive.
+		 */
+		if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot
+
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Shadow stack must be anonymous and not shared.
+	 */
+	if ((vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) && !vma_is_anonymous(vma))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
index f28fa4acaeaf..4c36b263cf0a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 
 #define MAP_32BIT	0x40		/* only give out 32bit addresses */
 
+#define PROT_SHADOW_STACK	0x10	/* shadow stack pages */
+
 #include <asm-generic/mman.h>
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 1ccec5cc399b..9a7652eea207 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86)
 # define VM_PAT		VM_ARCH_1	/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
+# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR	VM_SHADOW_STACK
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
 # define VM_SAO		VM_ARCH_1	/* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC)
-- 
2.21.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-28 17:52   ` Borislav Petkov
  2021-04-28 18:39     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2021-04-28 17:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 01:43:07PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> @@ -535,6 +536,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
>  
>  	unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
> +	struct cet_status	cet;

A couple of versions ago I said:

"	struct shstk_desc       shstk;

or so"

but no movement here. That thing is still called cet_status even though
there's nothing status-related with it.

So what's up?

> +static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> +	unsigned long addr, populate;
> +	int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;

The tip-tree preferred ordering of variable declarations at the
beginning of a function is reverse fir tree order::

	struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name;
	unsigned long foo, bar;
	unsigned int tmp;
	int ret;

The above is faster to parse than the reverse ordering::

	int ret;
	unsigned int tmp;
	unsigned long foo, bar;
	struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name;

And even more so than random ordering::

	unsigned long foo, bar;
	int ret;
	struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name;
	unsigned int tmp;

Please fix it up everywhere.

> +	mmap_write_lock(mm);
> +	addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, flags, VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0,
> +		       &populate, NULL);
> +	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
> +
> +	return addr;
> +}
> +
> +int shstk_setup(void)
> +{
> +	unsigned long addr, size;
> +	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
> +
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> +	size = round_up(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G), PAGE_SIZE);
> +	addr = alloc_shstk(size);
> +	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
> +		return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
> +
> +	cet->shstk_base = addr;
> +	cet->shstk_size = size;
> +
> +	start_update_msrs();
> +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
> +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
> +	end_update_msrs();

<---- newline here.

> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> +	struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
> +
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> +	    !cet->shstk_size ||
> +	    !cet->shstk_base)
> +		return;
> +
> +	if (!tsk->mm)
> +		return;

Where are the comments you said you wanna add:

https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b05ee7eb-1b5d-f84f-c8f3-bfe9426e8a7d@intel.com

?

> +
> +	while (1) {
> +		int r;
> +
> +		r = vm_munmap(cet->shstk_base, cet->shstk_size);

		int r = vm_munmap...

> +
> +		/*
> +		 * vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when mmap_lock is held by
> +		 * something else, and that lock should not be held for a
> +		 * long time.  Retry it for the case.
> +		 */
> +		if (r == -EINTR) {
> +			cond_resched();
> +			continue;
> +		}
> +		break;
> +	}

vm_munmap() can return other negative error values, where are you
handling those?

> +
> +	cet->shstk_base = 0;
> +	cet->shstk_size = 0;
> +}
> +
> +void shstk_disable(void)
> +{
> +	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;

Same question as before: what guarantees that current doesn't change
from under you here?

One of the worst thing to do is to ignore review comments. I'd strongly
suggest you pay more attention and avoid that in the future.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
  2021-04-28 17:52   ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2021-04-28 18:39     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-04-29  9:12       ` Borislav Petkov
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu, Yu-cheng @ 2021-04-28 18:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On 4/28/2021 10:52 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 01:43:07PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> @@ -535,6 +536,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
>>   
>>   	unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
>>   
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
>> +	struct cet_status	cet;
> 
> A couple of versions ago I said:
> 
> "	struct shstk_desc       shstk;
> 
> or so"
> 
> but no movement here. That thing is still called cet_status even though
> there's nothing status-related with it.
> 
> So what's up?
> 

Sorry about that.  After that email thread, we went ahead to separate 
shadow stack and ibt into different files.  I thought about the struct, 
the file names cet.h, etc.  The struct still needs to include ibt 
status, and if it is shstk_desc, the name is not entirely true.  One 
possible approach is, we don't make it a struct here, and put every item 
directly in thread_struct.  However, the benefit of putting all in a 
struct is understandable (you might argue the opposite :-)).  Please 
make the call, and I will do the change.

>> +static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> +	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
>> +	unsigned long addr, populate;
>> +	int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
> 
> The tip-tree preferred ordering of variable declarations at the
> beginning of a function is reverse fir tree order::
> 
> 	struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name;
> 	unsigned long foo, bar;
> 	unsigned int tmp;
> 	int ret;
> 
> The above is faster to parse than the reverse ordering::
> 
> 	int ret;
> 	unsigned int tmp;
> 	unsigned long foo, bar;
> 	struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name;
> 
> And even more so than random ordering::
> 
> 	unsigned long foo, bar;
> 	int ret;
> 	struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name;
> 	unsigned int tmp;
> 
> Please fix it up everywhere.
> 

Ok!

>> +	mmap_write_lock(mm);
>> +	addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, flags, VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0,
>> +		       &populate, NULL);
>> +	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
>> +
>> +	return addr;
>> +}
>> +
>> +int shstk_setup(void)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned long addr, size;
>> +	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
>> +
>> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
>> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> +
>> +	size = round_up(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G), PAGE_SIZE);
>> +	addr = alloc_shstk(size);
>> +	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
>> +		return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
>> +
>> +	cet->shstk_base = addr;
>> +	cet->shstk_size = size;
>> +
>> +	start_update_msrs();
>> +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
>> +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
>> +	end_update_msrs();
> 
> <---- newline here.
> 
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
>> +{
>> +	struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
>> +
>> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
>> +	    !cet->shstk_size ||
>> +	    !cet->shstk_base)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	if (!tsk->mm)
>> +		return;
> 
> Where are the comments you said you wanna add:
> 
> https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b05ee7eb-1b5d-f84f-c8f3-bfe9426e8a7d@intel.com
> 
> ?
> 

Yes, the comments are in patch #23: Handle thread shadow stack.  I 
wanted to add that in the patch that takes the path.

>> +
>> +	while (1) {
>> +		int r;
>> +
>> +		r = vm_munmap(cet->shstk_base, cet->shstk_size);
> 
> 		int r = vm_munmap...
> 
>> +
>> +		/*
>> +		 * vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when mmap_lock is held by
>> +		 * something else, and that lock should not be held for a
>> +		 * long time.  Retry it for the case.
>> +		 */
>> +		if (r == -EINTR) {
>> +			cond_resched();
>> +			continue;
>> +		}
>> +		break;
>> +	}
> 
> vm_munmap() can return other negative error values, where are you
> handling those?
> 

For other error values, the loop stops.

>> +
>> +	cet->shstk_base = 0;
>> +	cet->shstk_size = 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +void shstk_disable(void)
>> +{
>> +	struct cet_status *cet = &current->thread.cet;
> 
> Same question as before: what guarantees that current doesn't change
> from under you here?

The actual reading/writing MSRs are protected by fpregs_lock().

> 
> One of the worst thing to do is to ignore review comments. I'd strongly
> suggest you pay more attention and avoid that in the future.
> 
> Thx.
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-28 23:03   ` Andy Lutomirski
  2021-04-28 23:20     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
                       ` (3 more replies)
  0 siblings, 4 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2021-04-28 23:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu, linux-arch
  Cc: X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML,
	open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>
> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
> extensions.
>
> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
> keeps track of total size.

I still don't like this.

Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:

The kernel has:

struct rt_sigframe {
    char __user *pretcode;
    struct ucontext uc;
    struct siginfo info;
    /* fp state follows here */
};

This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not have
this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of the
fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal handler
function is passed a pointer to the whole sigframe implicitly in RSP,
a pointer to &frame->info in RSI, anda pointer to &frame->uc in RDX.
User code can *find* the fp state by following a pointer from
mcontext, which is, in turn, found via uc:

struct ucontext {
    unsigned long      uc_flags;
    struct ucontext  *uc_link;
    stack_t          uc_stack;
    struct sigcontext uc_mcontext;  <-- fp pointer is in here
    sigset_t      uc_sigmask;    /* mask last for extensibility */
};

The kernel, in sigreturn, works a bit differently.  The sigreturn
variants know the base address of the frame but don't have the benefit
of receiving pointers to the fields.  So instead the kernel takes
advantage of the fact that it knows the offset to uc and parses uc
accordingly.  And the kernel follows the pointer in mcontext to find
the fp state.  The latter bit is quite important later.  The kernel
does not parse info at all.

The fp state is its own mess.  When XSAVE happened, Intel kindly (?)
gave us a software defined area between the "legacy" x87 region and
the modern supposedly extensible part.  Linux sticks the following
structure in that hole:

struct _fpx_sw_bytes {
    /*
     * If set to FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then this is an xstate context.
     * 0 if a legacy frame.
     */
    __u32                magic1;

    /*
     * Total size of the fpstate area:
     *
     *  - if magic1 == 0 then it's sizeof(struct _fpstate)
     *  - if magic1 == FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then it's sizeof(struct _xstate)
     *    plus extensions (if any)
     */
    __u32                extended_size;

    /*
     * Feature bit mask (including FP/SSE/extended state) that is present
     * in the memory layout:
     */
    __u64                xfeatures;

    /*
     * Actual XSAVE state size, based on the xfeatures saved in the layout.
     * 'extended_size' is greater than 'xstate_size':
     */
    __u32                xstate_size;

    /* For future use: */
    __u32                padding[7];
};


That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:

1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
will read off into lala land.

2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.

This is *almost*, but not quite, easy: struct ucontext is already
variable length!  Unfortunately, the whole variable length portion is
used up by uc_sigmask.  So I propose that we introduce a brand new
bona fide extension mechanism.  It works like this:

First, we add a struct ucontext_extension at the end.  It looks like:

struct ucontext_extension {
  u64 length;  /* sizeof(struct ucontext_extension) */
  u64 flags;  /* we will want this some day */
  [CET stuff here]
  [future stuff here]
};

And we locate it by scrounging a word somewhere in ucontext to give
the offset from the beginning of struct ucontext to
ucontext_extension.  We indicate the presence of this feature using a
new uc_flags bit.  I can think of a couple of vaguely reasonable
places:

a) the reserved word in sigcontext.  This is fine for x86 but not so
great if other architectures want to do this.

b) uc_link.  Fine everywhere but powerpc.  Oops.

c) use the high bits of uc_flags.  After all, once we add extensions,
we don't need new flags, so we can steal 16 high bits of uc_flags for
this.

I think I'm in favor of (c).  We do:

(uc_flags & 0xffff0000) == 0: extension not present

Otherwise the extension region is at ucontext + (uc_flags >> 16).

And sigreturn finds the extension the same way, because CRIU can
already migrate a signal frame from one kernel to another, your patch
breaks this, and having sigreturn hardcode the offset would also break
it.

What do you think?

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-04-28 23:03   ` extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack) Andy Lutomirski
@ 2021-04-28 23:20     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-04-29  7:28     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
                       ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu, Yu-cheng @ 2021-04-28 23:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski, linux-arch
  Cc: X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML,
	open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann,
	Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
>> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
>> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
>> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
>> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
>> extensions.
>>
>> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
>> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
>> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
>> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
>> keeps track of total size.
> 
> I still don't like this.
> 
> Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
> 
> The kernel has:
> 
> struct rt_sigframe {
>      char __user *pretcode;
>      struct ucontext uc;
>      struct siginfo info;
>      /* fp state follows here */
> };
> 
> This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not have
> this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of the
> fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal handler
> function is passed a pointer to the whole sigframe implicitly in RSP,
> a pointer to &frame->info in RSI, anda pointer to &frame->uc in RDX.
> User code can *find* the fp state by following a pointer from
> mcontext, which is, in turn, found via uc:
> 
> struct ucontext {
>      unsigned long      uc_flags;
>      struct ucontext  *uc_link;
>      stack_t          uc_stack;
>      struct sigcontext uc_mcontext;  <-- fp pointer is in here
>      sigset_t      uc_sigmask;    /* mask last for extensibility */
> };
> 
> The kernel, in sigreturn, works a bit differently.  The sigreturn
> variants know the base address of the frame but don't have the benefit
> of receiving pointers to the fields.  So instead the kernel takes
> advantage of the fact that it knows the offset to uc and parses uc
> accordingly.  And the kernel follows the pointer in mcontext to find
> the fp state.  The latter bit is quite important later.  The kernel
> does not parse info at all.
> 
> The fp state is its own mess.  When XSAVE happened, Intel kindly (?)
> gave us a software defined area between the "legacy" x87 region and
> the modern supposedly extensible part.  Linux sticks the following
> structure in that hole:
> 
> struct _fpx_sw_bytes {
>      /*
>       * If set to FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then this is an xstate context.
>       * 0 if a legacy frame.
>       */
>      __u32                magic1;
> 
>      /*
>       * Total size of the fpstate area:
>       *
>       *  - if magic1 == 0 then it's sizeof(struct _fpstate)
>       *  - if magic1 == FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then it's sizeof(struct _xstate)
>       *    plus extensions (if any)
>       */
>      __u32                extended_size;
> 
>      /*
>       * Feature bit mask (including FP/SSE/extended state) that is present
>       * in the memory layout:
>       */
>      __u64                xfeatures;
> 
>      /*
>       * Actual XSAVE state size, based on the xfeatures saved in the layout.
>       * 'extended_size' is greater than 'xstate_size':
>       */
>      __u32                xstate_size;
> 
>      /* For future use: */
>      __u32                padding[7];
> };
> 
> 
> That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
> the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
> rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
> features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
> 
> 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
> but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
> promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
> bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
> it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
> anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
> vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
> than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
> possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
> no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
> have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
> the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
> pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
> could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
> awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
> some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
> that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
> one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
> will read off into lala land.
> 
> 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
> bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
> 
> This is *almost*, but not quite, easy: struct ucontext is already
> variable length!  Unfortunately, the whole variable length portion is
> used up by uc_sigmask.  So I propose that we introduce a brand new
> bona fide extension mechanism.  It works like this:
> 
> First, we add a struct ucontext_extension at the end.  It looks like:
> 
> struct ucontext_extension {
>    u64 length;  /* sizeof(struct ucontext_extension) */
>    u64 flags;  /* we will want this some day */
>    [CET stuff here]
>    [future stuff here]
> };
> 
> And we locate it by scrounging a word somewhere in ucontext to give
> the offset from the beginning of struct ucontext to
> ucontext_extension.  We indicate the presence of this feature using a
> new uc_flags bit.  I can think of a couple of vaguely reasonable
> places:
> 
> a) the reserved word in sigcontext.  This is fine for x86 but not so
> great if other architectures want to do this.
> 
> b) uc_link.  Fine everywhere but powerpc.  Oops.
> 
> c) use the high bits of uc_flags.  After all, once we add extensions,
> we don't need new flags, so we can steal 16 high bits of uc_flags for
> this.
> 
> I think I'm in favor of (c).  We do:
> 
> (uc_flags & 0xffff0000) == 0: extension not present
> 
> Otherwise the extension region is at ucontext + (uc_flags >> 16).
> 
> And sigreturn finds the extension the same way, because CRIU can
> already migrate a signal frame from one kernel to another, your patch
> breaks this, and having sigreturn hardcode the offset would also break
> it.
> 
> What do you think?
> 

There are a lot of things in here.  I think I could create some patches 
for ucontext_extension and send out for discussion.  Thanks for 
explaining this!

Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-04-28 23:03   ` extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack) Andy Lutomirski
  2021-04-28 23:20     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
@ 2021-04-29  7:28     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
  2021-04-29 14:44       ` Andy Lutomirski
  2021-04-30  6:45     ` Florian Weimer
  2021-04-30 17:00     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  3 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Cyrill Gorcunov @ 2021-04-29  7:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On Wed, Apr 28, 2021 at 04:03:55PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
> > along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
> > currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
> > There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
> > to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
> > extensions.
> >
> > Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
> > shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
> > states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
> > wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
> > keeps track of total size.
> 
> I still don't like this.
> 
> Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
> 
> The kernel has:
> 
> struct rt_sigframe {
>     char __user *pretcode;
>     struct ucontext uc;
>     struct siginfo info;
>     /* fp state follows here */
> };
> 
> This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not have
> this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of the
> fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal handler

Well, not really. While indeed this is not declared as a part of API
the structure is widely used for rt_sigreturn syscall (and we're using
it inside criu thus any change here will simply break the restore
procedure). Sorry out of time right now, I'll read your mail more
carefully once time permit.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
  2021-04-28 18:39     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
@ 2021-04-29  9:12       ` Borislav Petkov
  2021-04-29 16:17         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2021-04-29  9:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu, Yu-cheng
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On Wed, Apr 28, 2021 at 11:39:00AM -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> Sorry about that.  After that email thread, we went ahead to separate shadow
> stack and ibt into different files.  I thought about the struct, the file
> names cet.h, etc.  The struct still needs to include ibt status, and if it
> is shstk_desc, the name is not entirely true.  One possible approach is, we
> don't make it a struct here, and put every item directly in thread_struct.
> However, the benefit of putting all in a struct is understandable (you might
> argue the opposite :-)).  Please make the call, and I will do the change.

/me looks forward into the patchset...

So this looks like the final version of it:

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ struct cet_status {
 	unsigned long	shstk_base;
 	unsigned long	shstk_size;
 	unsigned int	locked:1;
+	unsigned int	ibt_enabled:1;
 };

If so, that thing should be simply:

	struct cet {
		unsigned long shstk_base;
		unsigned long shstk_size;
		unsigned int shstk_lock : 1,
			     ibt	: 1;
	}

Is that ibt flag per thread or why is it here? I guess I'll find out.

/me greps...

ah yes, it is.

> Yes, the comments are in patch #23: Handle thread shadow stack.  I wanted to
> add that in the patch that takes the path.

That comes next, I'll look there.

> > vm_munmap() can return other negative error values, where are you
> > handling those?
> > 
> 
> For other error values, the loop stops.

And then what happens?

> > > +	cet->shstk_base = 0;
> > > +	cet->shstk_size = 0;

You clear those here without even checking whether unmap failed somehow.
And then stuff leaks but we don't care, right?

Someone else's problem, I'm sure.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-04-29  7:28     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
@ 2021-04-29 14:44       ` Andy Lutomirski
  2021-04-29 15:35         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2021-04-29 14:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Cyrill Gorcunov
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, Yu-cheng Yu, linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov,
	Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook,
	Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit, Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek,
	Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap, Ravi V. Shankar,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang, Pengfei Xu,
	Haitao Huang

On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 12:28 AM Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 28, 2021 at 04:03:55PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
> > > along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
> > > currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
> > > There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
> > > to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
> > > extensions.
> > >
> > > Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
> > > shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
> > > states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
> > > wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
> > > keeps track of total size.
> >
> > I still don't like this.
> >
> > Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
> >
> > The kernel has:
> >
> > struct rt_sigframe {
> >     char __user *pretcode;
> >     struct ucontext uc;
> >     struct siginfo info;
> >     /* fp state follows here */
> > };
> >
> > This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not have
> > this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of the
> > fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal handler
>
> Well, not really. While indeed this is not declared as a part of API
> the structure is widely used for rt_sigreturn syscall (and we're using
> it inside criu thus any change here will simply break the restore
> procedure). Sorry out of time right now, I'll read your mail more
> carefully once time permit.

I skimmed the CRIU code.  You appear to declare struct rt_sigframe,
and you use the offset from the start of rt_sigframe to uc.  You also
use the offset to the /* fp state follows here */ part, but that's
unnecessary -- you could just as easily have put the fp state at any
other address -- the kernel will happily follow the pointer you supply
regardless of where it points.  So the only issues I can see are if
you write the fp state on top of something else or if you
inadvertently fill in the proposed extension part of uc_flags.  Right
now you seem to be ignoring uc_flags, which I presume means that you
are filling it in as zero.  Even if the offset of the fp state in the
kernel rt_sigframe changes, the kernel should still successfully parse
the signal frame you generate.

I suppose there is another potential issue: would CRIU have issues if
the *save* runs on a kernel that uses this proposed extension
mechanism?  Are you doing something with the saved state that would
get confused?

--Andy

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-04-29 14:44       ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2021-04-29 15:35         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Cyrill Gorcunov @ 2021-04-29 15:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang, Andrey Vagin

On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 07:44:03AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 12:28 AM Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Apr 28, 2021 at 04:03:55PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
> > > > along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
> > > > currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
> > > > There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
> > > > to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
> > > > extensions.
> > > >
> > > > Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
> > > > shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
> > > > states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
> > > > wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
> > > > keeps track of total size.
> > >
> > > I still don't like this.
> > >
> > > Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
> > >
> > > The kernel has:
> > >
> > > struct rt_sigframe {
> > >     char __user *pretcode;
> > >     struct ucontext uc;
> > >     struct siginfo info;
> > >     /* fp state follows here */
> > > };
> > >
> > > This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not have
> > > this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of the
> > > fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal handler
> >
> > Well, not really. While indeed this is not declared as a part of API
> > the structure is widely used for rt_sigreturn syscall (and we're using
> > it inside criu thus any change here will simply break the restore
> > procedure). Sorry out of time right now, I'll read your mail more
> > carefully once time permit.
> 
> I skimmed the CRIU code.  You appear to declare struct rt_sigframe,
> and you use the offset from the start of rt_sigframe to uc.  You also
> use the offset to the /* fp state follows here */ part, but that's
> unnecessary -- you could just as easily have put the fp state at any
> other address -- the kernel will happily follow the pointer you supply
> regardless of where it points.  So the only issues I can see are if

Yes, since rt_sigreturn is a very late stage of restore we've to preallocate
memory early and surely doing it in one slab is a way more convenient, thus
that's why fp context follows the structure declaration (well, it was at
least I didn't touch this code for years already). Anyway, I meant that
assuming "user code does not know the sizes of the fields" is not exactly
true and strictly speaking current layout became a part of nondeclared api
(simply because kernel use this structure run-time only and even if something
get changed in kernel declaration for this structure the kernel itself will
be fine because it doesn't save it on disk between kernel updates) but for
tools like criu such change might require update. IOW, I mean that changing
rt_sigreturn structure itself is not safe and we can't reorder the members
and theirs size.

Or I misunderstood you, and you meant only the fact that fp may be arbitrary,
pointing for any place in userspace? If so then indeed, fp can be pointing
to context placed anywere since kernel will fetch it from the address during
rt_sigreturn processing.

> you write the fp state on top of something else or if you
> inadvertently fill in the proposed extension part of uc_flags.  Right
> now you seem to be ignoring uc_flags, which I presume means that you
> are filling it in as zero.  Even if the offset of the fp state in the

yes

> kernel rt_sigframe changes, the kernel should still successfully parse
> the signal frame you generate.
> 
> I suppose there is another potential issue: would CRIU have issues if
> the *save* runs on a kernel that uses this proposed extension
> mechanism?  Are you doing something with the saved state that would
> get confused?

You know, actually I guess criu may not work with new extensions, we have
a predefined max xsave frame size and any new extensions to cpu states
will require additional support.

I must confess I didn't follow much on CET internals yet so I must be simply
wrong. CC'ing Anrew just in case.

	Cyrill

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
  2021-04-29  9:12       ` Borislav Petkov
@ 2021-04-29 16:17         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-04-29 16:45           ` Borislav Petkov
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu, Yu-cheng @ 2021-04-29 16:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On 4/29/2021 2:12 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 28, 2021 at 11:39:00AM -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
>> Sorry about that.  After that email thread, we went ahead to separate shadow
>> stack and ibt into different files.  I thought about the struct, the file
>> names cet.h, etc.  The struct still needs to include ibt status, and if it
>> is shstk_desc, the name is not entirely true.  One possible approach is, we
>> don't make it a struct here, and put every item directly in thread_struct.
>> However, the benefit of putting all in a struct is understandable (you might
>> argue the opposite :-)).  Please make the call, and I will do the change.
> 
> /me looks forward into the patchset...
> 
> So this looks like the final version of it:
> 
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ struct cet_status {
>   	unsigned long	shstk_base;
>   	unsigned long	shstk_size;
>   	unsigned int	locked:1;
> +	unsigned int	ibt_enabled:1;
>   };
> 
> If so, that thing should be simply:
> 
> 	struct cet {
> 		unsigned long shstk_base;
> 		unsigned long shstk_size;
> 		unsigned int shstk_lock : 1,
> 			     ibt	: 1;
> 	}
> 
> Is that ibt flag per thread or why is it here? I guess I'll find out.
> 
> /me greps...
> 
> ah yes, it is.
> 

The lock applies to both shadow stack and ibt.  So maybe just "locked"?

>> Yes, the comments are in patch #23: Handle thread shadow stack.  I wanted to
>> add that in the patch that takes the path.
> 
> That comes next, I'll look there.
> 
>>> vm_munmap() can return other negative error values, where are you
>>> handling those?
>>>
>>
>> For other error values, the loop stops.
> 
> And then what happens?
> 
>>>> +	cet->shstk_base = 0;
>>>> +	cet->shstk_size = 0;
> 
> You clear those here without even checking whether unmap failed somehow.
> And then stuff leaks but we don't care, right?
> 
> Someone else's problem, I'm sure.
> 

vm_munmap() returns error as the following:

(1) -EINVAL: address/size/alignment is wrong.
	For shadow stack, the kernel keeps track of it, this cannot/should not 
happen.  Should it happen, it is a bug.  The kernel can probably do WARN().

(2) -ENOMEM: when doing __split_vma()/__vma_adjust(), kmem_cache_alloc() 
fails.
	Not much we can do.  Perhaps WARN()?

(3) -EINTR: mmap_write_lock_killable(mm) fails.
	This should only happen to a pthread.  When a thread is existing, its 
siblings are holding mm->mmap_lock.  This is handled here.

Right now, in the kernel, only the munmap() syscall returns 
__vm_munmap() error code, otherwise the error is not checked.  Within 
the kernel and if -EINTR is not expected, this makes sense as explained 
above.

Thanks for questioning.  This piece needs to be correct.

Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
  2021-04-29 16:17         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
@ 2021-04-29 16:45           ` Borislav Petkov
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2021-04-29 16:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu, Yu-cheng
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 09:17:06AM -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> The lock applies to both shadow stack and ibt.  So maybe just "locked"?

Sure.

> vm_munmap() returns error as the following:
> 
> (1) -EINVAL: address/size/alignment is wrong.
> 	For shadow stack, the kernel keeps track of it, this cannot/should not
> happen.

You mean nothing might corrupt

        cet->shstk_base
        cet->shstk_size

?

I can't count the ways I've heard "should not happen" before and then it
happening anyway.

So probably not but we better catch stuff like that instead of leaking.

> Should it happen, it is a bug.

Ack.

> The kernel can probably do WARN().

Most definitely WARN. You need to catch funsies like that. But WARN_ONCE
should be enough for now.

> (2) -ENOMEM: when doing __split_vma()/__vma_adjust(), kmem_cache_alloc()
> fails.
> 	Not much we can do.  Perhaps WARN()?

You got it.

Bottom line is: if you can check for this and it is cheap, then
definitely. Code changes, gets rewritten, reorganized, the old
assertions change significance, and so on...

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
  2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
                   ` (29 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 30/30] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-04-29 17:13 ` Borislav Petkov
  2021-04-29 17:32   ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  30 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2021-04-29 17:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 01:42:45PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> I have run tests on these patches for quite some time, and they have been
> very stable.

While at it, how about adding a simple selftest too, so that people can
play with it and perhaps it could even run a bunch of tests?

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
  2021-04-29 17:13 ` [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Borislav Petkov
@ 2021-04-29 17:32   ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-04-29 17:49     ` Borislav Petkov
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu, Yu-cheng @ 2021-04-29 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On 4/29/2021 10:13 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 01:42:45PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> I have run tests on these patches for quite some time, and they have been
>> very stable.
> 
> While at it, how about adding a simple selftest too, so that people can
> play with it and perhaps it could even run a bunch of tests?
> 

I did send out some selftest patches (link is in the cover letter). 
However, those need to be updated to the Linux standard, and I would 
like to do it separately.

Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
  2021-04-29 17:32   ` Yu, Yu-cheng
@ 2021-04-29 17:49     ` Borislav Petkov
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2021-04-29 17:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu, Yu-cheng
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 10:32:04AM -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> I did send out some selftest patches (link is in the cover letter). However,
> those need to be updated to the Linux standard, and I would like to do it
> separately.

Ok, and they look exactly like what I had in mind.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-04-28 23:03   ` extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack) Andy Lutomirski
  2021-04-28 23:20     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-04-29  7:28     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
@ 2021-04-30  6:45     ` Florian Weimer
  2021-04-30 17:00     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Florian Weimer @ 2021-04-30  6:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: Yu-cheng Yu, linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner,
	Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

* Andy Lutomirski:

> The kernel has:
>
> struct rt_sigframe {
>     char __user *pretcode;
>     struct ucontext uc;
>     struct siginfo info;
>     /* fp state follows here */
> };
>
> This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not have
> this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of the
> fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal handler
> function is passed a pointer to the whole sigframe implicitly in RSP,
> a pointer to &frame->info in RSI, anda pointer to &frame->uc in RDX.
> User code can *find* the fp state by following a pointer from
> mcontext, which is, in turn, found via uc:
>
> struct ucontext {
>     unsigned long      uc_flags;
>     struct ucontext  *uc_link;
>     stack_t          uc_stack;
>     struct sigcontext uc_mcontext;  <-- fp pointer is in here
>     sigset_t      uc_sigmask;    /* mask last for extensibility */
> };

I must say that I haven't reviewed this in detail, but for historic
reasons, glibc userspace has a differently-sized sigset_t.  So the
kernel ucontext (used in signals) and user ucontext (used for
swapcontext et al.) are already fully decoupled?

Thanks,
Florian


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-04-28 23:03   ` extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack) Andy Lutomirski
                       ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2021-04-30  6:45     ` Florian Weimer
@ 2021-04-30 17:00     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-04-30 17:47       ` Andy Lutomirski
  3 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu, Yu-cheng @ 2021-04-30 17:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski, linux-arch
  Cc: X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML,
	open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann,
	Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
>> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
>> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
>> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
>> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
>> extensions.
>>
>> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
>> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
>> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
>> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
>> keeps track of total size.
> 
> I still don't like this.
> 
> Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
> 
> The kernel has:
> 
> struct rt_sigframe {
>      char __user *pretcode;
>      struct ucontext uc;
>      struct siginfo info;
>      /* fp state follows here */
> };
> 
> This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not have
> this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of the
> fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal handler
> function is passed a pointer to the whole sigframe implicitly in RSP,
> a pointer to &frame->info in RSI, anda pointer to &frame->uc in RDX.
> User code can *find* the fp state by following a pointer from
> mcontext, which is, in turn, found via uc:
> 
> struct ucontext {
>      unsigned long      uc_flags;
>      struct ucontext  *uc_link;
>      stack_t          uc_stack;
>      struct sigcontext uc_mcontext;  <-- fp pointer is in here
>      sigset_t      uc_sigmask;    /* mask last for extensibility */
> };
> 
> The kernel, in sigreturn, works a bit differently.  The sigreturn
> variants know the base address of the frame but don't have the benefit
> of receiving pointers to the fields.  So instead the kernel takes
> advantage of the fact that it knows the offset to uc and parses uc
> accordingly.  And the kernel follows the pointer in mcontext to find
> the fp state.  The latter bit is quite important later.  The kernel
> does not parse info at all.
> 
> The fp state is its own mess.  When XSAVE happened, Intel kindly (?)
> gave us a software defined area between the "legacy" x87 region and
> the modern supposedly extensible part.  Linux sticks the following
> structure in that hole:
> 
> struct _fpx_sw_bytes {
>      /*
>       * If set to FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then this is an xstate context.
>       * 0 if a legacy frame.
>       */
>      __u32                magic1;
> 
>      /*
>       * Total size of the fpstate area:
>       *
>       *  - if magic1 == 0 then it's sizeof(struct _fpstate)
>       *  - if magic1 == FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then it's sizeof(struct _xstate)
>       *    plus extensions (if any)
>       */
>      __u32                extended_size;
> 
>      /*
>       * Feature bit mask (including FP/SSE/extended state) that is present
>       * in the memory layout:
>       */
>      __u64                xfeatures;
> 
>      /*
>       * Actual XSAVE state size, based on the xfeatures saved in the layout.
>       * 'extended_size' is greater than 'xstate_size':
>       */
>      __u32                xstate_size;
> 
>      /* For future use: */
>      __u32                padding[7];
> };
> 
> 
> That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
> the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
> rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
> features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
> 
> 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
> but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
> promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
> bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
> it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
> anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
> vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
> than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
> possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
> no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
> have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
> the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
> pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
> could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
> awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
> some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
> that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
> one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
> will read off into lala land.
> 

Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now on we 
don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu approach?

> 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
> bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
> 

Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When the 
kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is right at 
the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.

However, the WAIT_ENDBR status needs to be saved/restored for signals. 
Since IBT is now dependent on shadow stack, we can use a spare bit of 
the shadow stack restore token for that.

I have tested the change, and will send out another version of the whole 
series.

> This is *almost*, but not quite, easy: struct ucontext is already
> variable length!  Unfortunately, the whole variable length portion is
> used up by uc_sigmask.  So I propose that we introduce a brand new
> bona fide extension mechanism.  It works like this:
> 
> First, we add a struct ucontext_extension at the end.  It looks like:
> 
> struct ucontext_extension {
>    u64 length;  /* sizeof(struct ucontext_extension) */
>    u64 flags;  /* we will want this some day */
>    [CET stuff here]
>    [future stuff here]
> };
> 
> And we locate it by scrounging a word somewhere in ucontext to give
> the offset from the beginning of struct ucontext to
> ucontext_extension.  We indicate the presence of this feature using a
> new uc_flags bit.  I can think of a couple of vaguely reasonable
> places:
> 
> a) the reserved word in sigcontext.  This is fine for x86 but not so
> great if other architectures want to do this.
> 
> b) uc_link.  Fine everywhere but powerpc.  Oops.
> 
> c) use the high bits of uc_flags.  After all, once we add extensions,
> we don't need new flags, so we can steal 16 high bits of uc_flags for
> this.
> 
> I think I'm in favor of (c).  We do:
> 
> (uc_flags & 0xffff0000) == 0: extension not present
> 
> Otherwise the extension region is at ucontext + (uc_flags >> 16).
> 
> And sigreturn finds the extension the same way, because CRIU can
> already migrate a signal frame from one kernel to another, your patch
> breaks this, and having sigreturn hardcode the offset would also break
> it.
> 
> What do you think?
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-04-30 17:00     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
@ 2021-04-30 17:47       ` Andy Lutomirski
  2021-04-30 18:32         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-05-02 23:23         ` Andy Lutomirski
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2021-04-30 17:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu, Yu-cheng
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:00 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
> >> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
> >> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
> >> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
> >> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
> >> extensions.
> >>
> >> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
> >> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
> >> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
> >> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
> >> keeps track of total size.
> >
> > I still don't like this.
> >
> > Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
> >
> > The kernel has:
> >
> > struct rt_sigframe {
> >      char __user *pretcode;
> >      struct ucontext uc;
> >      struct siginfo info;
> >      /* fp state follows here */
> > };
> >
> > This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not have
> > this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of the
> > fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal handler
> > function is passed a pointer to the whole sigframe implicitly in RSP,
> > a pointer to &frame->info in RSI, anda pointer to &frame->uc in RDX.
> > User code can *find* the fp state by following a pointer from
> > mcontext, which is, in turn, found via uc:
> >
> > struct ucontext {
> >      unsigned long      uc_flags;
> >      struct ucontext  *uc_link;
> >      stack_t          uc_stack;
> >      struct sigcontext uc_mcontext;  <-- fp pointer is in here
> >      sigset_t      uc_sigmask;    /* mask last for extensibility */
> > };
> >
> > The kernel, in sigreturn, works a bit differently.  The sigreturn
> > variants know the base address of the frame but don't have the benefit
> > of receiving pointers to the fields.  So instead the kernel takes
> > advantage of the fact that it knows the offset to uc and parses uc
> > accordingly.  And the kernel follows the pointer in mcontext to find
> > the fp state.  The latter bit is quite important later.  The kernel
> > does not parse info at all.
> >
> > The fp state is its own mess.  When XSAVE happened, Intel kindly (?)
> > gave us a software defined area between the "legacy" x87 region and
> > the modern supposedly extensible part.  Linux sticks the following
> > structure in that hole:
> >
> > struct _fpx_sw_bytes {
> >      /*
> >       * If set to FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then this is an xstate context.
> >       * 0 if a legacy frame.
> >       */
> >      __u32                magic1;
> >
> >      /*
> >       * Total size of the fpstate area:
> >       *
> >       *  - if magic1 == 0 then it's sizeof(struct _fpstate)
> >       *  - if magic1 == FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then it's sizeof(struct _xstate)
> >       *    plus extensions (if any)
> >       */
> >      __u32                extended_size;
> >
> >      /*
> >       * Feature bit mask (including FP/SSE/extended state) that is present
> >       * in the memory layout:
> >       */
> >      __u64                xfeatures;
> >
> >      /*
> >       * Actual XSAVE state size, based on the xfeatures saved in the layout.
> >       * 'extended_size' is greater than 'xstate_size':
> >       */
> >      __u32                xstate_size;
> >
> >      /* For future use: */
> >      __u32                padding[7];
> > };
> >
> >
> > That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
> > the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
> > rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
> > features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
> >
> > 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
> > but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
> > promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
> > bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
> > it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
> > anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
> > vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
> > than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
> > possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
> > no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
> > have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
> > the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
> > pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
> > could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
> > awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
> > some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
> > that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
> > one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
> > will read off into lala land.
> >
>
> Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now on we
> don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu approach?
>
> > 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
> > bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
> >
>
> Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When the
> kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is right at
> the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.

That seems entirely reasonable.  This might also avoid needing to
teach CRIU about CET at all.

>
> However, the WAIT_ENDBR status needs to be saved/restored for signals.
> Since IBT is now dependent on shadow stack, we can use a spare bit of
> the shadow stack restore token for that.

That seems like unnecessary ABI coupling.  We have plenty of bits in
uc_flags, and we have an entire reserved word in sigcontext.  How
about just sticking this bit in one of those places?

--Andy

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-04-30 17:47       ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2021-04-30 18:32         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-05-04 20:49           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-05-02 23:23         ` Andy Lutomirski
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu, Yu-cheng @ 2021-04-30 18:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On 4/30/2021 10:47 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:00 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
>>>> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
>>>> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
>>>> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
>>>> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
>>>> extensions.
>>>>
>>>> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
>>>> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
>>>> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
>>>> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
>>>> keeps track of total size.
>>>
>>> I still don't like this.
>>>
>>> Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
>>>
>>> The kernel has:
>>>
>>> struct rt_sigframe {
>>>       char __user *pretcode;
>>>       struct ucontext uc;
>>>       struct siginfo info;
>>>       /* fp state follows here */
>>> };
>>>
>>> This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not have
>>> this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of the
>>> fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal handler
>>> function is passed a pointer to the whole sigframe implicitly in RSP,
>>> a pointer to &frame->info in RSI, anda pointer to &frame->uc in RDX.
>>> User code can *find* the fp state by following a pointer from
>>> mcontext, which is, in turn, found via uc:
>>>
>>> struct ucontext {
>>>       unsigned long      uc_flags;
>>>       struct ucontext  *uc_link;
>>>       stack_t          uc_stack;
>>>       struct sigcontext uc_mcontext;  <-- fp pointer is in here
>>>       sigset_t      uc_sigmask;    /* mask last for extensibility */
>>> };
>>>
>>> The kernel, in sigreturn, works a bit differently.  The sigreturn
>>> variants know the base address of the frame but don't have the benefit
>>> of receiving pointers to the fields.  So instead the kernel takes
>>> advantage of the fact that it knows the offset to uc and parses uc
>>> accordingly.  And the kernel follows the pointer in mcontext to find
>>> the fp state.  The latter bit is quite important later.  The kernel
>>> does not parse info at all.
>>>
>>> The fp state is its own mess.  When XSAVE happened, Intel kindly (?)
>>> gave us a software defined area between the "legacy" x87 region and
>>> the modern supposedly extensible part.  Linux sticks the following
>>> structure in that hole:
>>>
>>> struct _fpx_sw_bytes {
>>>       /*
>>>        * If set to FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then this is an xstate context.
>>>        * 0 if a legacy frame.
>>>        */
>>>       __u32                magic1;
>>>
>>>       /*
>>>        * Total size of the fpstate area:
>>>        *
>>>        *  - if magic1 == 0 then it's sizeof(struct _fpstate)
>>>        *  - if magic1 == FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then it's sizeof(struct _xstate)
>>>        *    plus extensions (if any)
>>>        */
>>>       __u32                extended_size;
>>>
>>>       /*
>>>        * Feature bit mask (including FP/SSE/extended state) that is present
>>>        * in the memory layout:
>>>        */
>>>       __u64                xfeatures;
>>>
>>>       /*
>>>        * Actual XSAVE state size, based on the xfeatures saved in the layout.
>>>        * 'extended_size' is greater than 'xstate_size':
>>>        */
>>>       __u32                xstate_size;
>>>
>>>       /* For future use: */
>>>       __u32                padding[7];
>>> };
>>>
>>>
>>> That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
>>> the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
>>> rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
>>> features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
>>>
>>> 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
>>> but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
>>> promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
>>> bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
>>> it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
>>> anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
>>> vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
>>> than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
>>> possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
>>> no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
>>> have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
>>> the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
>>> pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
>>> could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
>>> awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
>>> some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
>>> that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
>>> one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
>>> will read off into lala land.
>>>
>>
>> Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now on we
>> don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu approach?
>>
>>> 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
>>> bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
>>>
>>
>> Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When the
>> kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is right at
>> the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.
> 
> That seems entirely reasonable.  This might also avoid needing to
> teach CRIU about CET at all.
> 
>>
>> However, the WAIT_ENDBR status needs to be saved/restored for signals.
>> Since IBT is now dependent on shadow stack, we can use a spare bit of
>> the shadow stack restore token for that.
> 
> That seems like unnecessary ABI coupling.  We have plenty of bits in
> uc_flags, and we have an entire reserved word in sigcontext.  How
> about just sticking this bit in one of those places?

Yes, I will make it UC_WAIT_ENDBR.

Thanks,
Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-04-30 17:47       ` Andy Lutomirski
  2021-04-30 18:32         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
@ 2021-05-02 23:23         ` Andy Lutomirski
  2021-05-03  6:03           ` H. Peter Anvin
  2021-05-03 15:13           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  1 sibling, 2 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2021-05-02 23:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: Yu, Yu-cheng, linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:47 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:00 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
> > >> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
> > >> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
> > >> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
> > >> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
> > >> extensions.
> > >>
> > >> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
> > >> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
> > >> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
> > >> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
> > >> keeps track of total size.
> > >
> > > I still don't like this.
> > >
> > > Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
> > >
> > > The kernel has:
> > >
> > > struct rt_sigframe {
> > >      char __user *pretcode;
> > >      struct ucontext uc;
> > >      struct siginfo info;
> > >      /* fp state follows here */
> > > };
> > >
> > > This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not have
> > > this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of the
> > > fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal handler
> > > function is passed a pointer to the whole sigframe implicitly in RSP,
> > > a pointer to &frame->info in RSI, anda pointer to &frame->uc in RDX.
> > > User code can *find* the fp state by following a pointer from
> > > mcontext, which is, in turn, found via uc:
> > >
> > > struct ucontext {
> > >      unsigned long      uc_flags;
> > >      struct ucontext  *uc_link;
> > >      stack_t          uc_stack;
> > >      struct sigcontext uc_mcontext;  <-- fp pointer is in here
> > >      sigset_t      uc_sigmask;    /* mask last for extensibility */
> > > };
> > >
> > > The kernel, in sigreturn, works a bit differently.  The sigreturn
> > > variants know the base address of the frame but don't have the benefit
> > > of receiving pointers to the fields.  So instead the kernel takes
> > > advantage of the fact that it knows the offset to uc and parses uc
> > > accordingly.  And the kernel follows the pointer in mcontext to find
> > > the fp state.  The latter bit is quite important later.  The kernel
> > > does not parse info at all.
> > >
> > > The fp state is its own mess.  When XSAVE happened, Intel kindly (?)
> > > gave us a software defined area between the "legacy" x87 region and
> > > the modern supposedly extensible part.  Linux sticks the following
> > > structure in that hole:
> > >
> > > struct _fpx_sw_bytes {
> > >      /*
> > >       * If set to FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then this is an xstate context.
> > >       * 0 if a legacy frame.
> > >       */
> > >      __u32                magic1;
> > >
> > >      /*
> > >       * Total size of the fpstate area:
> > >       *
> > >       *  - if magic1 == 0 then it's sizeof(struct _fpstate)
> > >       *  - if magic1 == FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then it's sizeof(struct _xstate)
> > >       *    plus extensions (if any)
> > >       */
> > >      __u32                extended_size;
> > >
> > >      /*
> > >       * Feature bit mask (including FP/SSE/extended state) that is present
> > >       * in the memory layout:
> > >       */
> > >      __u64                xfeatures;
> > >
> > >      /*
> > >       * Actual XSAVE state size, based on the xfeatures saved in the layout.
> > >       * 'extended_size' is greater than 'xstate_size':
> > >       */
> > >      __u32                xstate_size;
> > >
> > >      /* For future use: */
> > >      __u32                padding[7];
> > > };
> > >
> > >
> > > That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
> > > the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
> > > rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
> > > features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
> > >
> > > 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
> > > but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
> > > promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
> > > bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
> > > it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
> > > anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
> > > vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
> > > than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
> > > possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
> > > no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
> > > have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
> > > the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
> > > pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
> > > could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
> > > awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
> > > some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
> > > that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
> > > one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
> > > will read off into lala land.
> > >
> >
> > Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now on we
> > don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu approach?
> >
> > > 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
> > > bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
> > >
> >
> > Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When the
> > kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is right at
> > the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.
>
> That seems entirely reasonable.  This might also avoid needing to
> teach CRIU about CET at all.

Wait, what's the actual shadow stack token format?  And is the token
on the new stack or the old stack when sigaltstack is in use?  For
that matter, is there any support for an alternate shadow stack for
signals?

--Andy

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-05-02 23:23         ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2021-05-03  6:03           ` H. Peter Anvin
  2021-05-03 15:13           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: H. Peter Anvin @ 2021-05-03  6:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: Yu, Yu-cheng, linux-arch, X86 ML, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas.Shanbhogue

<vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Message-ID: <2360408E-9967-469C-96AF-E8AC40044021@zytor.com>

There are a few words at the end of the FXSAVE area for software use for this reason: so we can extend the signal frame – originally to enable saving the XSAVE state but that doesn't use up the whole software available area.

On May 2, 2021 4:23:49 PM PDT, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:47 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:00 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
>wrote:
>> >
>> > On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> > > On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu
><yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>> > >>
>> > >> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must
>be saved
>> > >> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn. 
>However,
>> > >> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal
>context.
>> > >> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext
>is likely
>> > >> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for
>further
>> > >> extensions.
>> > >>
>> > >> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is
>used to save
>> > >> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located
>above the fpu
>> > >> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the
>ibt's
>> > >> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size
>field
>> > >> keeps track of total size.
>> > >
>> > > I still don't like this.
>> > >
>> > > Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
>> > >
>> > > The kernel has:
>> > >
>> > > struct rt_sigframe {
>> > >      char __user *pretcode;
>> > >      struct ucontext uc;
>> > >      struct siginfo info;
>> > >      /* fp state follows here */
>> > > };
>> > >
>> > > This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not
>have
>> > > this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of
>the
>> > > fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal
>handler
>> > > function is passed a pointer to the whole sigframe implicitly in
>RSP,
>> > > a pointer to &frame->info in RSI, anda pointer to &frame->uc in
>RDX.
>> > > User code can *find* the fp state by following a pointer from
>> > > mcontext, which is, in turn, found via uc:
>> > >
>> > > struct ucontext {
>> > >      unsigned long      uc_flags;
>> > >      struct ucontext  *uc_link;
>> > >      stack_t          uc_stack;
>> > >      struct sigcontext uc_mcontext;  <-- fp pointer is in here
>> > >      sigset_t      uc_sigmask;    /* mask last for extensibility
>*/
>> > > };
>> > >
>> > > The kernel, in sigreturn, works a bit differently.  The sigreturn
>> > > variants know the base address of the frame but don't have the
>benefit
>> > > of receiving pointers to the fields.  So instead the kernel takes
>> > > advantage of the fact that it knows the offset to uc and parses
>uc
>> > > accordingly.  And the kernel follows the pointer in mcontext to
>find
>> > > the fp state.  The latter bit is quite important later.  The
>kernel
>> > > does not parse info at all.
>> > >
>> > > The fp state is its own mess.  When XSAVE happened, Intel kindly
>(?)
>> > > gave us a software defined area between the "legacy" x87 region
>and
>> > > the modern supposedly extensible part.  Linux sticks the
>following
>> > > structure in that hole:
>> > >
>> > > struct _fpx_sw_bytes {
>> > >      /*
>> > >       * If set to FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then this is an xstate
>context.
>> > >       * 0 if a legacy frame.
>> > >       */
>> > >      __u32                magic1;
>> > >
>> > >      /*
>> > >       * Total size of the fpstate area:
>> > >       *
>> > >       *  - if magic1 == 0 then it's sizeof(struct _fpstate)
>> > >       *  - if magic1 == FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then it's sizeof(struct
>_xstate)
>> > >       *    plus extensions (if any)
>> > >       */
>> > >      __u32                extended_size;
>> > >
>> > >      /*
>> > >       * Feature bit mask (including FP/SSE/extended state) that
>is present
>> > >       * in the memory layout:
>> > >       */
>> > >      __u64                xfeatures;
>> > >
>> > >      /*
>> > >       * Actual XSAVE state size, based on the xfeatures saved in
>the layout.
>> > >       * 'extended_size' is greater than 'xstate_size':
>> > >       */
>> > >      __u32                xstate_size;
>> > >
>> > >      /* For future use: */
>> > >      __u32                padding[7];
>> > > };
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser
>for
>> > > the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have
>to be
>> > > rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two
>upcoming
>> > > features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
>> > >
>> > > 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years
>ago,
>> > > but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
>> > > promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
>> > > bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With
>AMX
>> > > it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
>> > > anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU
>state
>> > > vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more
>compact
>> > > than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
>> > > possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature
>with
>> > > no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack
>won't
>> > > have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state,
>update
>> > > the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
>> > > pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
>> > > could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap?
>very
>> > > awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we
>know,
>> > > some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great,
>except
>> > > that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that
>no
>> > > one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer,
>and
>> > > will read off into lala land.
>> > >
>> >
>> > Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now
>on we
>> > don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu
>approach?
>> >
>> > > 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and
>those
>> > > bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
>> > >
>> >
>> > Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When
>the
>> > kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is
>right at
>> > the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.
>>
>> That seems entirely reasonable.  This might also avoid needing to
>> teach CRIU about CET at all.
>
>Wait, what's the actual shadow stack token format?  And is the token
>on the new stack or the old stack when sigaltstack is in use?  For
>that matter, is there any support for an alternate shadow stack for
>signals?
>
>--Andy

-- 
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-05-02 23:23         ` Andy Lutomirski
  2021-05-03  6:03           ` H. Peter Anvin
@ 2021-05-03 15:13           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-05-03 15:29             ` Andy Lutomirski
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu, Yu-cheng @ 2021-05-03 15:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On 5/2/2021 4:23 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:47 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:00 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
>>>>> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
>>>>> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
>>>>> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
>>>>> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
>>>>> extensions.
>>>>>
>>>>> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
>>>>> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
>>>>> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
>>>>> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
>>>>> keeps track of total size.
>>>>
>>>> I still don't like this.
>>>>
>>>> Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
>>>>

[...]

>>>>
>>>> That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
>>>> the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
>>>> rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
>>>> features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
>>>>
>>>> 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
>>>> but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
>>>> promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
>>>> bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
>>>> it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
>>>> anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
>>>> vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
>>>> than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
>>>> possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
>>>> no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
>>>> have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
>>>> the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
>>>> pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
>>>> could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
>>>> awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
>>>> some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
>>>> that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
>>>> one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
>>>> will read off into lala land.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now on we
>>> don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu approach?
>>>
>>>> 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
>>>> bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When the
>>> kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is right at
>>> the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.
>>
>> That seems entirely reasonable.  This might also avoid needing to
>> teach CRIU about CET at all.
> 
> Wait, what's the actual shadow stack token format?  And is the token
> on the new stack or the old stack when sigaltstack is in use?  For
> that matter, is there any support for an alternate shadow stack for
> signals?
> 

The restore token is a pointer pointing directly above itself and bit[0] 
indicates 64-bit mode.

Because the shadow stack stores only return addresses, there is no 
alternate shadow stack.  However, the application can allocate and 
switch to a new shadow stack.

Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-05-03 15:13           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
@ 2021-05-03 15:29             ` Andy Lutomirski
  2021-05-03 20:25               ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2021-05-03 15:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu, Yu-cheng
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang


> On May 3, 2021, at 8:14 AM, Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
> 
> On 5/2/2021 4:23 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:47 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:00 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
>>>>>> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
>>>>>> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
>>>>>> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
>>>>>> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
>>>>>> extensions.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
>>>>>> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
>>>>>> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
>>>>>> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
>>>>>> keeps track of total size.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I still don't like this.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
>>>>> 
> 
> [...]
> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
>>>>> the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
>>>>> rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
>>>>> features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
>>>>> but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
>>>>> promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
>>>>> bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
>>>>> it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
>>>>> anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
>>>>> vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
>>>>> than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
>>>>> possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
>>>>> no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
>>>>> have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
>>>>> the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
>>>>> pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
>>>>> could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
>>>>> awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
>>>>> some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
>>>>> that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
>>>>> one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
>>>>> will read off into lala land.
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now on we
>>>> don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu approach?
>>>> 
>>>>> 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
>>>>> bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When the
>>>> kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is right at
>>>> the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.
>>> 
>>> That seems entirely reasonable.  This might also avoid needing to
>>> teach CRIU about CET at all.
>> Wait, what's the actual shadow stack token format?  And is the token
>> on the new stack or the old stack when sigaltstack is in use?  For
>> that matter, is there any support for an alternate shadow stack for
>> signals?
> 
> The restore token is a pointer pointing directly above itself and bit[0] indicates 64-bit mode.
> 
> Because the shadow stack stores only return addresses, there is no alternate shadow stack.  However, the application can allocate and switch to a new shadow stack.

I think we should make the ABI support an alternate shadow stack even if we don’t implement it initially. After all, some day someone might want to register a handler for shadow stack overflow.

> 
> Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-05-03 15:29             ` Andy Lutomirski
@ 2021-05-03 20:25               ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu, Yu-cheng @ 2021-05-03 20:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On 5/3/2021 8:29 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 
>> On May 3, 2021, at 8:14 AM, Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 5/2/2021 4:23 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:47 AM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:00 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
>>>>>>> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  However,
>>>>>>> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
>>>>>>> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is likely
>>>>>>> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for further
>>>>>>> extensions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
>>>>>>> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above the fpu
>>>>>>> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
>>>>>>> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
>>>>>>> keeps track of total size.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I still don't like this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
>>>>>>
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
>>>>>> the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
>>>>>> rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
>>>>>> features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
>>>>>> but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
>>>>>> promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
>>>>>> bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
>>>>>> it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
>>>>>> anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
>>>>>> vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
>>>>>> than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
>>>>>> possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
>>>>>> no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
>>>>>> have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
>>>>>> the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
>>>>>> pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
>>>>>> could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
>>>>>> awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
>>>>>> some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
>>>>>> that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
>>>>>> one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
>>>>>> will read off into lala land.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now on we
>>>>> don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu approach?
>>>>>
>>>>>> 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
>>>>>> bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When the
>>>>> kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is right at
>>>>> the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.
>>>>
>>>> That seems entirely reasonable.  This might also avoid needing to
>>>> teach CRIU about CET at all.
>>> Wait, what's the actual shadow stack token format?  And is the token
>>> on the new stack or the old stack when sigaltstack is in use?  For
>>> that matter, is there any support for an alternate shadow stack for
>>> signals?
>>
>> The restore token is a pointer pointing directly above itself and bit[0] indicates 64-bit mode.
>>
>> Because the shadow stack stores only return addresses, there is no alternate shadow stack.  However, the application can allocate and switch to a new shadow stack.
> 
> I think we should make the ABI support an alternate shadow stack even if we don’t implement it initially. After all, some day someone might want to register a handler for shadow stack overflow.
> 

Agree.  We can probably add something in parallel of sigaltstack(), and 
let the user choose separately alternate normal/shadow stacks.

Thanks,
Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-04-30 18:32         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
@ 2021-05-04 20:49           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-05-06 22:05             ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu, Yu-cheng @ 2021-05-04 20:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On 4/30/2021 11:32 AM, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> On 4/30/2021 10:47 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:00 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be 
>>>>> saved
>>>>> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.  
>>>>> However,
>>>>> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal 
>>>>> context.
>>>>> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is 
>>>>> likely
>>>>> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for 
>>>>> further
>>>>> extensions.
>>>>>
>>>>> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used 
>>>>> to save
>>>>> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located above 
>>>>> the fpu
>>>>> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the ibt's
>>>>> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size field
>>>>> keeps track of total size.
>>>>
>>>> I still don't like this.
>>>>
>>>> Here's how the signal layout works, for better or for worse:
>>>>
>>>> The kernel has:
>>>>
>>>> struct rt_sigframe {
>>>>       char __user *pretcode;
>>>>       struct ucontext uc;
>>>>       struct siginfo info;
>>>>       /* fp state follows here */
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>> This is roughly the actual signal frame.  But userspace does not have
>>>> this struct declared, and user code does not know the sizes of the
>>>> fields.  So it's accessed in a nonsensical way.  The signal handler
>>>> function is passed a pointer to the whole sigframe implicitly in RSP,
>>>> a pointer to &frame->info in RSI, anda pointer to &frame->uc in RDX.
>>>> User code can *find* the fp state by following a pointer from
>>>> mcontext, which is, in turn, found via uc:
>>>>
>>>> struct ucontext {
>>>>       unsigned long      uc_flags;
>>>>       struct ucontext  *uc_link;
>>>>       stack_t          uc_stack;
>>>>       struct sigcontext uc_mcontext;  <-- fp pointer is in here
>>>>       sigset_t      uc_sigmask;    /* mask last for extensibility */
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>> The kernel, in sigreturn, works a bit differently.  The sigreturn
>>>> variants know the base address of the frame but don't have the benefit
>>>> of receiving pointers to the fields.  So instead the kernel takes
>>>> advantage of the fact that it knows the offset to uc and parses uc
>>>> accordingly.  And the kernel follows the pointer in mcontext to find
>>>> the fp state.  The latter bit is quite important later.  The kernel
>>>> does not parse info at all.
>>>>
>>>> The fp state is its own mess.  When XSAVE happened, Intel kindly (?)
>>>> gave us a software defined area between the "legacy" x87 region and
>>>> the modern supposedly extensible part.  Linux sticks the following
>>>> structure in that hole:
>>>>
>>>> struct _fpx_sw_bytes {
>>>>       /*
>>>>        * If set to FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then this is an xstate context.
>>>>        * 0 if a legacy frame.
>>>>        */
>>>>       __u32                magic1;
>>>>
>>>>       /*
>>>>        * Total size of the fpstate area:
>>>>        *
>>>>        *  - if magic1 == 0 then it's sizeof(struct _fpstate)
>>>>        *  - if magic1 == FP_XSTATE_MAGIC1 then it's sizeof(struct 
>>>> _xstate)
>>>>        *    plus extensions (if any)
>>>>        */
>>>>       __u32                extended_size;
>>>>
>>>>       /*
>>>>        * Feature bit mask (including FP/SSE/extended state) that is 
>>>> present
>>>>        * in the memory layout:
>>>>        */
>>>>       __u64                xfeatures;
>>>>
>>>>       /*
>>>>        * Actual XSAVE state size, based on the xfeatures saved in 
>>>> the layout.
>>>>        * 'extended_size' is greater than 'xstate_size':
>>>>        */
>>>>       __u32                xstate_size;
>>>>
>>>>       /* For future use: */
>>>>       __u32                padding[7];
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
>>>> the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
>>>> rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
>>>> features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
>>>>
>>>> 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
>>>> but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
>>>> promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
>>>> bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
>>>> it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
>>>> anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
>>>> vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
>>>> than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
>>>> possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
>>>> no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
>>>> have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
>>>> the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
>>>> pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
>>>> could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
>>>> awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
>>>> some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
>>>> that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
>>>> one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
>>>> will read off into lala land.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now on we
>>> don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu approach?
>>>
>>>> 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
>>>> bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When the
>>> kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is right at
>>> the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.
>>
>> That seems entirely reasonable.  This might also avoid needing to
>> teach CRIU about CET at all.
>>
>>>
>>> However, the WAIT_ENDBR status needs to be saved/restored for signals.
>>> Since IBT is now dependent on shadow stack, we can use a spare bit of
>>> the shadow stack restore token for that.
>>
>> That seems like unnecessary ABI coupling.  We have plenty of bits in
>> uc_flags, and we have an entire reserved word in sigcontext.  How
>> about just sticking this bit in one of those places?
> 
> Yes, I will make it UC_WAIT_ENDBR.

Personally, I think an explicit flag is cleaner than using a reserved 
word somewhere.  However, there is a small issue: ia32 has no uc_flags.

This series can support legacy apps up to now.  But, instead of creating 
too many special cases, perhaps we should drop CET support of ia32?

Thoughts?

Thanks,
Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-05-04 20:49           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
@ 2021-05-06 22:05             ` Yu, Yu-cheng
  2021-05-06 23:31               ` Andy Lutomirski
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 57+ messages in thread
From: Yu, Yu-cheng @ 2021-05-06 22:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andy Lutomirski
  Cc: linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
	LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION, Linux-MM, Linux API,
	Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov,
	Dave Hansen, Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu,
	Jann Horn, Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On 5/4/2021 1:49 PM, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> On 4/30/2021 11:32 AM, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
>> On 4/30/2021 10:47 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:00 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> 
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be 
>>>>>> saved
>>>>>> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn. 
>>>>>> However,
>>>>>> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal 
>>>>>> context.
>>>>>> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is 
>>>>>> likely
>>>>>> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for 
>>>>>> further
>>>>>> extensions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is 
>>>>>> used to save
>>>>>> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located 
>>>>>> above the fpu
>>>>>> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the 
>>>>>> ibt's
>>>>>> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size 
>>>>>> field
>>>>>> keeps track of total size.
>>>>>
>>>>> I still don't like this.
>>>>>

[...]

>>>>>
>>>>> That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
>>>>> the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
>>>>> rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
>>>>> features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
>>>>> but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
>>>>> promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
>>>>> bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
>>>>> it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
>>>>> anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
>>>>> vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
>>>>> than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
>>>>> possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
>>>>> no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
>>>>> have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
>>>>> the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
>>>>> pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
>>>>> could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
>>>>> awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
>>>>> some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
>>>>> that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
>>>>> one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
>>>>> will read off into lala land.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now 
>>>> on we
>>>> don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu approach?
>>>>
>>>>> 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
>>>>> bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When the
>>>> kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is 
>>>> right at
>>>> the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.
>>>
>>> That seems entirely reasonable.  This might also avoid needing to
>>> teach CRIU about CET at all.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> However, the WAIT_ENDBR status needs to be saved/restored for signals.
>>>> Since IBT is now dependent on shadow stack, we can use a spare bit of
>>>> the shadow stack restore token for that.
>>>
>>> That seems like unnecessary ABI coupling.  We have plenty of bits in
>>> uc_flags, and we have an entire reserved word in sigcontext.  How
>>> about just sticking this bit in one of those places?
>>
>> Yes, I will make it UC_WAIT_ENDBR.
> 
> Personally, I think an explicit flag is cleaner than using a reserved 
> word somewhere.  However, there is a small issue: ia32 has no uc_flags.
> 
> This series can support legacy apps up to now.  But, instead of creating 
> too many special cases, perhaps we should drop CET support of ia32?
> 
> Thoughts?
> 

Once we have UC_WAIT_ENDBR, IBT signal handling becomes quite simple. 
Like the following:

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ucontext.h 
b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ucontext.h
index 5657b7a49f03..96375d609e11 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ucontext.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ucontext.h
@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@
   */
  #define UC_SIGCONTEXT_SS	0x2
  #define UC_STRICT_RESTORE_SS	0x4
+
+/*
+ * UC_WAIT_ENDBR indicates the task is in wait-ENDBR status.
+ */
+#define UC_WAIT_ENDBR		0x08
  #endif

  #include <asm-generic/ucontext.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
index d2563dd4759f..da804314ddc4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ibt.c
@@ -66,3 +66,32 @@ void ibt_disable(void)
  	ibt_set_clear_msr_bits(0, CET_ENDBR_EN);
  	current->thread.cet.ibt = 0;
  }
+
+int ibt_get_clear_wait_endbr(void)
+{
+	u64 msr_val = 0;
+
+	if (!current->thread.cet.ibt)
+		return 0;
+
+	fpregs_lock();
+
+	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+		__fpregs_load_activate();
+
+	if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_U_CET, &msr_val))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val & ~CET_WAIT_ENDBR);
+
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	return msr_val & CET_WAIT_ENDBR;
+}
+
+int ibt_set_wait_endbr(void)
+{
+	if (!current->thread.cet.ibt)
+		return 0;
+
+
+	return ibt_set_clear_msr_bits(CET_WAIT_ENDBR, 0);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index 66b662e57e19..5afd15419006 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
  #include <asm/syscall.h>
  #include <asm/sigframe.h>
  #include <asm/signal.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>

  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
  /*
@@ -134,6 +135,9 @@ static int restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
  	 */
  	if (unlikely(!(uc_flags & UC_STRICT_RESTORE_SS) && 
user_64bit_mode(regs)))
  		force_valid_ss(regs);
+
+	if (uc_flags & UC_WAIT_ENDBR)
+		ibt_set_wait_endbr();
  #endif

  	return fpu__restore_sig((void __user *)sc.fpstate,
@@ -433,6 +437,9 @@ static unsigned long frame_uc_flags(struct pt_regs 
*regs)
  	if (likely(user_64bit_mode(regs)))
  		flags |= UC_STRICT_RESTORE_SS;

+	if (ibt_get_clear_wait_endbr())
+		flags |= UC_WAIT_ENDBR;
+
  	return flags;
  }


However, this cannot handle ia32 with no SA_SIGINFO.  For that, can we 
create a synthetic token on the shadow stack?

- The token points to itself with reserved bit[1] set, and cannot be 
used for RSTORSSP.
- The token only exists for ia32 with no SA_SIGINFO *AND* when the task 
is in wait-endbr.

The signal shadow stack will look like this:

--> ssp before signal
     synthetic IBT token (for ia32 no SA_SIGINFO)
     shadow stack restore token
     sigreturn address

The synthetic token is not valid in other situations.
How is that?

Thanks,
Yu-cheng

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack)
  2021-05-06 22:05             ` Yu, Yu-cheng
@ 2021-05-06 23:31               ` Andy Lutomirski
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2021-05-06 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu, Yu-cheng
  Cc: Andy Lutomirski, linux-arch, X86 ML, H. Peter Anvin,
	Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, LKML, open list:DOCUMENTATION,
	Linux-MM, Linux API, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh,
	Borislav Petkov, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On Thu, May 6, 2021 at 3:05 PM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 5/4/2021 1:49 PM, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> > On 4/30/2021 11:32 AM, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> >> On 4/30/2021 10:47 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>> On Fri, Apr 30, 2021 at 10:00 AM Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> On 4/28/2021 4:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >>>>> On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 1:44 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be
> >>>>>> saved
> >>>>>> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn.
> >>>>>> However,
> >>>>>> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal
> >>>>>> context.
> >>>>>> There is some space left in the ucontext, but changing ucontext is
> >>>>>> likely
> >>>>>> to create compatibility issues and there is not enough space for
> >>>>>> further
> >>>>>> extensions.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is
> >>>>>> used to save
> >>>>>> shadow stack restore token address.  The extension is located
> >>>>>> above the fpu
> >>>>>> states, plus alignment.  The struct can be extended (such as the
> >>>>>> ibt's
> >>>>>> wait_endbr status to be introduced later), and sc_ext.total_size
> >>>>>> field
> >>>>>> keeps track of total size.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I still don't like this.
> >>>>>
>
> [...]
>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> That's where we are right now upstream.  The kernel has a parser for
> >>>>> the FPU state that is bugs piled upon bugs and is going to have to be
> >>>>> rewritten sometime soon.  On top of all this, we have two upcoming
> >>>>> features, both of which require different kinds of extensions:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> 1. AVX-512.  (Yeah, you thought this story was over a few years ago,
> >>>>> but no.  And AMX makes it worse.)  To make a long story short, we
> >>>>> promised user code many years ago that a signal frame fit in 2048
> >>>>> bytes with some room to spare.  With AVX-512 this is false.  With AMX
> >>>>> it's so wrong it's not even funny.  The only way out of the mess
> >>>>> anyone has come up with involves making the length of the FPU state
> >>>>> vary depending on which features are INIT, i.e. making it more compact
> >>>>> than "compact" mode is.  This has a side effect: it's no longer
> >>>>> possible to modify the state in place, because enabling a feature with
> >>>>> no space allocated will make the structure bigger, and the stack won't
> >>>>> have room.  Fortunately, one can relocate the entire FPU state, update
> >>>>> the pointer in mcontext, and the kernel will happily follow the
> >>>>> pointer.  So new code on a new kernel using a super-compact state
> >>>>> could expand the state by allocating new memory (on the heap? very
> >>>>> awkwardly on the stack?) and changing the pointer.  For all we know,
> >>>>> some code already fiddles with the pointer.  This is great, except
> >>>>> that your patch sticks more data at the end of the FPU block that no
> >>>>> one is expecting, and your sigreturn code follows that pointer, and
> >>>>> will read off into lala land.
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Then, what about we don't do that at all.  Is it possible from now
> >>>> on we
> >>>> don't stick more data at the end, and take the relocating-fpu approach?
> >>>>
> >>>>> 2. CET.  CET wants us to find a few more bytes somewhere, and those
> >>>>> bytes logically belong in ucontext, and here we are.
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Fortunately, we can spare CET the need of ucontext extension.  When the
> >>>> kernel handles sigreturn, the user-mode shadow stack pointer is
> >>>> right at
> >>>> the restore token.  There is no need to put that in ucontext.
> >>>
> >>> That seems entirely reasonable.  This might also avoid needing to
> >>> teach CRIU about CET at all.
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> However, the WAIT_ENDBR status needs to be saved/restored for signals.
> >>>> Since IBT is now dependent on shadow stack, we can use a spare bit of
> >>>> the shadow stack restore token for that.
> >>>
> >>> That seems like unnecessary ABI coupling.  We have plenty of bits in
> >>> uc_flags, and we have an entire reserved word in sigcontext.  How
> >>> about just sticking this bit in one of those places?
> >>
> >> Yes, I will make it UC_WAIT_ENDBR.
> >
> > Personally, I think an explicit flag is cleaner than using a reserved
> > word somewhere.  However, there is a small issue: ia32 has no uc_flags.
> >
> > This series can support legacy apps up to now.  But, instead of creating
> > too many special cases, perhaps we should drop CET support of ia32?
> >
> > Thoughts?

I'm really not thrilled about coupling IBT and SHSTK like this.

Here are a couple of possible solutions:

- Don't support IBT in 32-bit mode, or maybe just don't support IBT
with legacy 32-bit signals.  The actual mechanics of this could be
awkward.  Maybe we would reject the sigaction() call or the
IBT-enabling request if they conflict?

- Find some space in the signal frame for these flags.  Looking around
a bit, sigframe_ia32 has fpstate_unused, but I can imagine things like
CRIU getting very confused if it stops being unused.  sigframe_ia32
uses sigcontext_32, which has a bunch of reserved space in __gsh,
__fsh, etc.

rt_sigframe_ia32 has uc_flags, so this isn't a real problem.

I don't have a brilliant solution here.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v26 23/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 23/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
@ 2021-05-10 14:15   ` Borislav Petkov
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 57+ messages in thread
From: Borislav Petkov @ 2021-05-10 14:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Yu-cheng Yu
  Cc: x86, H. Peter Anvin, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, linux-kernel,
	linux-doc, linux-mm, linux-arch, linux-api, Arnd Bergmann,
	Andy Lutomirski, Balbir Singh, Cyrill Gorcunov, Dave Hansen,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov, Florian Weimer, H.J. Lu, Jann Horn,
	Jonathan Corbet, Kees Cook, Mike Kravetz, Nadav Amit,
	Oleg Nesterov, Pavel Machek, Peter Zijlstra, Randy Dunlap,
	Ravi V. Shankar, Vedvyas Shanbhogue, Dave Martin, Weijiang Yang,
	Pengfei Xu, Haitao Huang

On Tue, Apr 27, 2021 at 01:43:08PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> @@ -181,6 +184,12 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,
>  	if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
>  		ret = set_new_tls(p, tls);
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64

IS_ENABLED

> +	/* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */
> +	if (!ret)
> +		ret = shstk_setup_thread(p, clone_flags, stack_size);
> +#endif
> +

And why is this addition here...

>  	if (!ret && unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_IO_BITMAP)))
>  		io_bitmap_share(p);

... instead of here?

<---

>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> index c815c7507830..d387df84b7f1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> @@ -70,6 +70,55 @@ int shstk_setup(void)
>  	return 0;
>  }

> +int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags,

Judging by what this function does, its name wants to be

shstk_alloc_thread_stack()

or so?

> +		       unsigned long stack_size)
> +{
> +	unsigned long addr, size;
> +	struct cet_user_state *state;
> +	struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;

The tip-tree preferred ordering of variable declarations at the
beginning of a function is reverse fir tree order::

	struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name;
	unsigned long foo, bar;
	unsigned int tmp;
	int ret;

The above is faster to parse than the reverse ordering::

	int ret;
	unsigned int tmp;
	unsigned long foo, bar;
	struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name;

And even more so than random ordering::

	unsigned long foo, bar;
	int ret;
	struct long_struct_name *descriptive_name;
	unsigned int tmp;

> +
> +	if (!cet->shstk_size)
> +		return 0;
> +

This check needs a comment.

> +	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) != CLONE_VM)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	state = get_xsave_addr(&tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave,
> +			       XFEATURE_CET_USER);

Let that line stick out.

> +
> +	if (!state)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (stack_size == 0)

	if (!stack_size)

> +		return -EINVAL;

and that test needs to be done first in the function.

> +
> +	/* Cap shadow stack size to 4 GB */

Why?

> +	size = min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G);
> +	size = min(size, stack_size);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Compat-mode pthreads share a limited address space.
> +	 * If each function call takes an average of four slots
> +	 * stack space, allocate 1/4 of stack size for shadow stack.
> +	 */
> +	if (in_compat_syscall())
> +		size /= 4;

<---- newline here.

> +	size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE);
> +	addr = alloc_shstk(size);
> +

^ Superfluous newline.

> +	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
> +		cet->shstk_base = 0;
> +		cet->shstk_size = 0;
> +		return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
> +	}
> +
> +	fpu__prepare_write(&tsk->thread.fpu);
> +	state->user_ssp = (u64)(addr + size);

cet_user_state has u64, cet_status has unsigned longs. Make them all u64.

And since cet_status is per thread, but I had suggested struct
shstk_desc, I think now that that should be called

struct thread_shstk

or so to denote *exactly* what it is.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 57+ messages in thread

end of thread, back to index

Thread overview: 57+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 01/30] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 02/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 03/30] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 04/30] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 05/30] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 06/30] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 07/30] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 08/30] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 09/30] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 10/30] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 11/30] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 12/30] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 13/30] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 14/30] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 15/30] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 16/30] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 17/30] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 18/30] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 19/30] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 20/30] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 21/30] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-28 17:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-28 18:39     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-29  9:12       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-29 16:17         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-29 16:45           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 23/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-10 14:15   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 24/30] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-28 23:03   ` extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack) Andy Lutomirski
2021-04-28 23:20     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-29  7:28     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2021-04-29 14:44       ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-04-29 15:35         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2021-04-30  6:45     ` Florian Weimer
2021-04-30 17:00     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-30 17:47       ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-04-30 18:32         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-04 20:49           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-06 22:05             ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-06 23:31               ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-02 23:23         ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-03  6:03           ` H. Peter Anvin
2021-05-03 15:13           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-03 15:29             ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-03 20:25               ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 26/30] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 27/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 28/30] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 29/30] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 30/30] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-29 17:13 ` [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Borislav Petkov
2021-04-29 17:32   ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-29 17:49     ` Borislav Petkov

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	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/3 lkml/git/3.git
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/4 lkml/git/4.git
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5 lkml/git/5.git
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/6 lkml/git/6.git
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/7 lkml/git/7.git
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8 lkml/git/8.git
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/9 lkml/git/9.git
	git clone --mirror https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/10 lkml/git/10.git

	# If you have public-inbox 1.1+ installed, you may
	# initialize and index your mirror using the following commands:
	public-inbox-init -V2 lkml lkml/ https://lore.kernel.org/lkml \
		linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
	public-inbox-index lkml

Example config snippet for mirrors

Newsgroup available over NNTP:
	nntp://nntp.lore.kernel.org/org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel


AGPL code for this site: git clone https://public-inbox.org/public-inbox.git