From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH v26 21/30] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2021 13:43:06 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210427204315.24153-22-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210427204315.24153-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
There was no more caller passing vm_flags to do_mmap(), and vm_flags was
removed from the function's input by:
commit 45e55300f114 ("mm: remove unnecessary wrapper function do_mmap_pgoff()").
There is a new user now. Shadow stack allocation passes VM_SHADOW_STACK to
do_mmap(). Thus, re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap().
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
---
v24:
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.
- Update commit log.
fs/aio.c | 2 +-
include/linux/mm.h | 3 ++-
ipc/shm.c | 2 +-
mm/mmap.c | 10 +++++-----
mm/nommu.c | 4 ++--
mm/util.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index 1f32da13d39e..b5d0586209a7 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static int aio_setup_ring(struct kioctx *ctx, unsigned int nr_events)
ctx->mmap_base = do_mmap(ctx->aio_ring_file, 0, ctx->mmap_size,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
- MAP_SHARED, 0, &unused, NULL);
+ MAP_SHARED, 0, 0, &unused, NULL);
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
if (IS_ERR((void *)ctx->mmap_base)) {
ctx->mmap_size = 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 3e9c84f21ef6..1ccec5cc399b 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2576,7 +2576,8 @@ extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
struct list_head *uf);
extern unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf);
+ vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
+ struct list_head *uf);
extern int __do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t,
struct list_head *uf, bool downgrade);
extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t,
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index febd88daba8c..b6370eb1eaab 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg,
goto invalid;
}
- addr = do_mmap(file, addr, size, prot, flags, 0, &populate, NULL);
+ addr = do_mmap(file, addr, size, prot, flags, 0, 0, &populate, NULL);
*raddr = addr;
err = 0;
if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index d77fb39b6ab5..7b2992ef8ee0 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1401,11 +1401,11 @@ static inline bool file_mmap_ok(struct file *file, struct inode *inode,
*/
unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
- unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff,
- unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf)
+ unsigned long flags, vm_flags_t vm_flags,
+ unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
+ struct list_head *uf)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
- vm_flags_t vm_flags;
int pkey = 0;
*populate = 0;
@@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
* to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open
* of the memory object, so we don't do any here.
*/
- vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
+ vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
@@ -3047,7 +3047,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size,
- prot, flags, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
+ prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
fput(file);
out:
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
index 5c9ab799c0e6..9b6f7a1895c2 100644
--- a/mm/nommu.c
+++ b/mm/nommu.c
@@ -1071,6 +1071,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
unsigned long len,
unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags,
+ vm_flags_t vm_flags,
unsigned long pgoff,
unsigned long *populate,
struct list_head *uf)
@@ -1078,7 +1079,6 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct vm_region *region;
struct rb_node *rb;
- vm_flags_t vm_flags;
unsigned long capabilities, result;
int ret;
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
/* we've determined that we can make the mapping, now translate what we
* now know into VMA flags */
- vm_flags = determine_vm_flags(file, prot, flags, capabilities);
+ vm_flags |= determine_vm_flags(file, prot, flags, capabilities);
/* we're going to need to record the mapping */
region = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_region_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
index 54870226cea6..49cbd4400d13 100644
--- a/mm/util.c
+++ b/mm/util.c
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
if (!ret) {
if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
return -EINTR;
- ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, pgoff, &populate,
+ ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, 0, pgoff, &populate,
&uf);
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
userfaultfd_unmap_complete(mm, &uf);
--
2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-27 20:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-04-27 20:42 [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 01/30] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 02/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 03/30] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 04/30] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 05/30] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 06/30] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 07/30] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 08/30] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 09/30] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 10/30] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 11/30] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 12/30] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 13/30] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:42 ` [PATCH v26 14/30] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 15/30] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 16/30] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 17/30] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 18/30] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 19/30] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 20/30] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-28 17:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-28 18:39 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-29 9:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-29 16:17 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-29 16:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 23/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-10 14:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-10 22:57 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-11 17:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-12 8:12 ` David Laight
2021-05-11 18:35 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-12 15:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 24/30] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-17 7:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-17 20:55 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-18 0:14 ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2021-05-18 17:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-18 19:45 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-18 18:05 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-18 5:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-21 16:17 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-21 18:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-28 23:03 ` extending ucontext (Re: [PATCH v26 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack) Andy Lutomirski
2021-04-28 23:20 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-29 7:28 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2021-04-29 14:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-04-29 15:35 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2021-04-30 6:45 ` Florian Weimer
2021-04-30 17:00 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-30 17:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-04-30 18:32 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-04 20:49 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-06 22:05 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-06 23:31 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-02 23:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-03 6:03 ` H. Peter Anvin
2021-05-03 15:13 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-03 15:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-03 20:25 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 26/30] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-19 18:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-19 22:14 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-20 9:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-20 17:18 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-20 17:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2021-05-20 17:51 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-20 17:38 ` Matthew Wilcox
2021-05-20 17:52 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-05-20 21:06 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 27/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 28/30] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 29/30] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-11 11:35 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-27 20:43 ` [PATCH v26 30/30] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-05-11 11:48 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-05-11 14:44 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-29 17:13 ` [PATCH v26 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Borislav Petkov
2021-04-29 17:32 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-29 17:49 ` Borislav Petkov
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20210427204315.24153-22-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
--to=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
--cc=Dave.Martin@arm.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=esyr@redhat.com \
--cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
--cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \
--cc=haitao.huang@intel.com \
--cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
--cc=pcc@google.com \
--cc=pengfei.xu@intel.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=ravi.v.shankar@intel.com \
--cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com \
--cc=weijiang.yang@intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).