From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-16.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE099C48BE5 for ; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 09:43:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9CD561353 for ; Tue, 22 Jun 2021 09:43:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S230044AbhFVJpz (ORCPT ); Tue, 22 Jun 2021 05:45:55 -0400 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]:20217 "EHLO mga18.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229915AbhFVJps (ORCPT ); Tue, 22 Jun 2021 05:45:48 -0400 IronPort-SDR: p77QrvYfc8JnFmtiHQObg/nvBxRl3MPvXBCLTDLhzYejCj1a67z1NIu3eDWzjhsLB0BOROmg6d BNkLowRBYiYw== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6200,9189,10022"; a="194330937" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.83,291,1616482800"; d="scan'208";a="194330937" Received: from fmsmga005.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.32]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 22 Jun 2021 02:43:33 -0700 IronPort-SDR: fSwwSsL/6foLvFXAacHhuZX3rW3GHHehpjoYyPoELISHjt8VRQBm2YCnjHszjfF74sBKhZleT8 URhNhsJaKE0A== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.83,291,1616482800"; d="scan'208";a="641600133" Received: from vmm_a4_icx.sh.intel.com (HELO localhost.localdomain) ([10.239.53.245]) by fmsmga005-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 22 Jun 2021 02:43:27 -0700 From: Zhu Lingshan To: peterz@infradead.org, pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: bp@alien8.de, seanjc@google.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com, jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, weijiang.yang@intel.com, kan.liang@linux.intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com, wei.w.wang@intel.com, eranian@google.com, liuxiangdong5@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, like.xu.linux@gmail.com, Like Xu , Zhu Lingshan Subject: [PATCH V7 03/18] perf/x86/intel: Handle guest PEBS overflow PMI for KVM guest Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 17:42:51 +0800 Message-Id: <20210622094306.8336-4-lingshan.zhu@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.27.0 In-Reply-To: <20210622094306.8336-1-lingshan.zhu@intel.com> References: <20210622094306.8336-1-lingshan.zhu@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Like Xu With PEBS virtualization, the guest PEBS records get delivered to the guest DS, and the host pmi handler uses perf_guest_cbs->is_in_guest() to distinguish whether the PMI comes from the guest code like Intel PT. No matter how many guest PEBS counters are overflowed, only triggering one fake event is enough. The fake event causes the KVM PMI callback to be called, thereby injecting the PEBS overflow PMI into the guest. KVM may inject the PMI with BUFFER_OVF set, even if the guest DS is empty. That should really be harmless. Thus guest PEBS handler would retrieve the correct information from its own PEBS records buffer. Originally-by: Andi Kleen Co-developed-by: Kan Liang Signed-off-by: Kan Liang Signed-off-by: Like Xu Signed-off-by: Zhu Lingshan --- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index 211b3767d7e6..b187cb6b72fa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -2781,6 +2781,50 @@ static void intel_pmu_reset(void) } DECLARE_STATIC_CALL(x86_guest_handle_intel_pt_intr, *(perf_guest_cbs->handle_intel_pt_intr)); +DECLARE_STATIC_CALL(x86_guest_state, *(perf_guest_cbs->state)); + +/* + * We may be running with guest PEBS events created by KVM, and the + * PEBS records are logged into the guest's DS and invisible to host. + * + * In the case of guest PEBS overflow, we only trigger a fake event + * to emulate the PEBS overflow PMI for guest PBES counters in KVM. + * The guest will then vm-entry and check the guest DS area to read + * the guest PEBS records. + * + * The contents and other behavior of the guest event do not matter. + */ +static void x86_pmu_handle_guest_pebs(struct pt_regs *regs, + struct perf_sample_data *data) +{ + struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); + u64 guest_pebs_idxs = cpuc->pebs_enabled & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_host_mask; + struct perf_event *event = NULL; + unsigned int guest = 0; + int bit; + + if (!x86_pmu.pebs_vmx || !x86_pmu.pebs_active || + !(cpuc->pebs_enabled & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_host_mask)) + return; + + guest = static_call(x86_guest_state)(); + if (!(guest & PERF_GUEST_ACTIVE)) + return; + + for_each_set_bit(bit, (unsigned long *)&guest_pebs_idxs, + INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED + x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed) { + event = cpuc->events[bit]; + if (!event->attr.precise_ip) + continue; + + perf_sample_data_init(data, 0, event->hw.last_period); + if (perf_event_overflow(event, data, regs)) + x86_pmu_stop(event, 0); + + /* Inject one fake event is enough. */ + break; + } +} static int handle_pmi_common(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 status) { @@ -2833,6 +2877,7 @@ static int handle_pmi_common(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 status) u64 pebs_enabled = cpuc->pebs_enabled; handled++; + x86_pmu_handle_guest_pebs(regs, &data); x86_pmu.drain_pebs(regs, &data); status &= intel_ctrl | GLOBAL_STATUS_TRACE_TOPAPMI; -- 2.27.0