From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-20.2 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C599C07E9D for ; Mon, 19 Jul 2021 16:19:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E3736120A for ; Mon, 19 Jul 2021 16:19:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1346215AbhGSPil (ORCPT ); Mon, 19 Jul 2021 11:38:41 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:52766 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1343955AbhGSO7Z (ORCPT ); Mon, 19 Jul 2021 10:59:25 -0400 Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EB49E6113C; Mon, 19 Jul 2021 15:37:55 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1626709076; bh=zpPR9wcL8+H2sARlugzOS4AHiOpeCsblx6zpenS4A+Y=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=OE5zWRvs8+ltZnKUyP73hg7s9phTp6+GxmF4vh95LTj/P5ebSBTESdub2aQvMjHbH vTGevSUmCD/L7APU9lbAnrq/wTCLQ7+kkc0omVaJY/tbLeYxjJViqN9t11tORb11bu rVg65D8+/NVslZXVMYj+lwcxo0QI6Itb8ev+7YRI= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Amit Klein , Willy Tarreau , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.19 243/421] ipv6: use prandom_u32() for ID generation Date: Mon, 19 Jul 2021 16:50:54 +0200 Message-Id: <20210719144954.833409473@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.32.0 In-Reply-To: <20210719144946.310399455@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20210719144946.310399455@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Willy Tarreau [ Upstream commit 62f20e068ccc50d6ab66fdb72ba90da2b9418c99 ] This is a complement to commit aa6dd211e4b1 ("inet: use bigger hash table for IP ID generation"), but focusing on some specific aspects of IPv6. Contary to IPv4, IPv6 only uses packet IDs with fragments, and with a minimum MTU of 1280, it's much less easy to force a remote peer to produce many fragments to explore its ID sequence. In addition packet IDs are 32-bit in IPv6, which further complicates their analysis. On the other hand, it is often easier to choose among plenty of possible source addresses and partially work around the bigger hash table the commit above permits, which leaves IPv6 partially exposed to some possibilities of remote analysis at the risk of weakening some protocols like DNS if some IDs can be predicted with a good enough probability. Given the wide range of permitted IDs, the risk of collision is extremely low so there's no need to rely on the positive increment algorithm that is shared with the IPv4 code via ip_idents_reserve(). We have a fast PRNG, so let's simply call prandom_u32() and be done with it. Performance measurements at 10 Gbps couldn't show any difference with the previous code, even when using a single core, because due to the large fragments, we're limited to only ~930 kpps at 10 Gbps and the cost of the random generation is completely offset by other operations and by the network transfer time. In addition, this change removes the need to update a shared entry in the idents table so it may even end up being slightly faster on large scale systems where this matters. The risk of at least one collision here is about 1/80 million among 10 IDs, 1/850k among 100 IDs, and still only 1/8.5k among 1000 IDs, which remains very low compared to IPv4 where all IDs are reused every 4 to 80ms on a 10 Gbps flow depending on packet sizes. Reported-by: Amit Klein Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210529110746.6796-1-w@1wt.eu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv6/output_core.c | 28 +++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/output_core.c b/net/ipv6/output_core.c index 868ae23dbae1..3829b565c645 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/output_core.c +++ b/net/ipv6/output_core.c @@ -14,29 +14,11 @@ static u32 __ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *dst, const struct in6_addr *src) { - const struct { - struct in6_addr dst; - struct in6_addr src; - } __aligned(SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT) combined = { - .dst = *dst, - .src = *src, - }; - u32 hash, id; - - /* Note the following code is not safe, but this is okay. */ - if (unlikely(siphash_key_is_zero(&net->ipv4.ip_id_key))) - get_random_bytes(&net->ipv4.ip_id_key, - sizeof(net->ipv4.ip_id_key)); - - hash = siphash(&combined, sizeof(combined), &net->ipv4.ip_id_key); - - /* Treat id of 0 as unset and if we get 0 back from ip_idents_reserve, - * set the hight order instead thus minimizing possible future - * collisions. - */ - id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, 1); - if (unlikely(!id)) - id = 1 << 31; + u32 id; + + do { + id = prandom_u32(); + } while (!id); return id; } -- 2.30.2