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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
	Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
	Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH v28 22/32] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2021 13:52:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210722205219.7934-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210722205219.7934-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

There was no more caller passing vm_flags to do_mmap(), and vm_flags was
removed from the function's input by:

    commit 45e55300f114 ("mm: remove unnecessary wrapper function do_mmap_pgoff()").

There is a new user now.  Shadow stack allocation passes VM_SHADOW_STACK to
do_mmap().  Thus, re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap().

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
---
 fs/aio.c           |  2 +-
 include/linux/mm.h |  3 ++-
 ipc/shm.c          |  2 +-
 mm/mmap.c          | 10 +++++-----
 mm/nommu.c         |  4 ++--
 mm/util.c          |  2 +-
 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index 76ce0cc3ee4e..92e09b0863ad 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ static int aio_setup_ring(struct kioctx *ctx, unsigned int nr_events)
 
 	ctx->mmap_base = do_mmap(ctx->aio_ring_file, 0, ctx->mmap_size,
 				 PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
-				 MAP_SHARED, 0, &unused, NULL);
+				 MAP_SHARED, 0, 0, &unused, NULL);
 	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
 	if (IS_ERR((void *)ctx->mmap_base)) {
 		ctx->mmap_size = 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 354f38d21eed..07e642af59d3 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2617,7 +2617,8 @@ extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	struct list_head *uf);
 extern unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-	unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf);
+	vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
+	struct list_head *uf);
 extern int __do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t,
 		       struct list_head *uf, bool downgrade);
 extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t,
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index 748933e376ca..fb7a3a230b79 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg,
 			goto invalid;
 	}
 
-	addr = do_mmap(file, addr, size, prot, flags, 0, &populate, NULL);
+	addr = do_mmap(file, addr, size, prot, flags, 0, 0, &populate, NULL);
 	*raddr = addr;
 	err = 0;
 	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 6be9ff4007ab..100db6e46831 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1406,11 +1406,11 @@ static inline bool file_mmap_ok(struct file *file, struct inode *inode,
  */
 unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 			unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
-			unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff,
-			unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf)
+			unsigned long flags, vm_flags_t vm_flags,
+			unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
+			struct list_head *uf)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
-	vm_flags_t vm_flags;
 	int pkey = 0;
 
 	*populate = 0;
@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	 * to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open
 	 * of the memory object, so we don't do any here.
 	 */
-	vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
+	vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
 			mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
 
 	if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
@@ -3036,7 +3036,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
 
 	file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
 	ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size,
-			prot, flags, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
+			prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
 	fput(file);
 out:
 	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
index 3a93d4054810..5b6dcf42659a 100644
--- a/mm/nommu.c
+++ b/mm/nommu.c
@@ -1061,6 +1061,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
 			unsigned long len,
 			unsigned long prot,
 			unsigned long flags,
+			vm_flags_t vm_flags,
 			unsigned long pgoff,
 			unsigned long *populate,
 			struct list_head *uf)
@@ -1068,7 +1069,6 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	struct vm_region *region;
 	struct rb_node *rb;
-	vm_flags_t vm_flags;
 	unsigned long capabilities, result;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
 
 	/* we've determined that we can make the mapping, now translate what we
 	 * now know into VMA flags */
-	vm_flags = determine_vm_flags(file, prot, flags, capabilities);
+	vm_flags |= determine_vm_flags(file, prot, flags, capabilities);
 
 	/* we're going to need to record the mapping */
 	region = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_region_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
index 9043d03750a7..9db194fc2030 100644
--- a/mm/util.c
+++ b/mm/util.c
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	if (!ret) {
 		if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
 			return -EINTR;
-		ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, pgoff, &populate,
+		ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, 0, pgoff, &populate,
 			      &uf);
 		mmap_write_unlock(mm);
 		userfaultfd_unmap_complete(mm, &uf);
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-07-22 20:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-22 20:51 [PATCH v28 00/32] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 01/32] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 02/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 03/32] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 04/32] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 16:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-10 15:39     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-10 16:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 05/32] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 16:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-10 15:50     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 06/32] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 17:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-10 16:06     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 07/32] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 08/32] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 18:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 09/32] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 10:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:24     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-17 19:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 20:13         ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-08-17 20:24           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 20:51             ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-08-17 21:01               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-18 16:38                 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-21 16:27                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 10/32] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 11/32] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 12/32] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:33     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 13/32] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 14/32] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 16:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:35     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 15/32] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 16/32] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 17:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:36     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 17/32] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 18/32] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 19/32] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 20/32] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 21/32] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 23/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 24/32] x86/process: Change copy_thread() argument 'arg' to 'stack_size' Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 25/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 21:05   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-23 17:30     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 26/32] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 21:15   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-23 18:01     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 27/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 28/32] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 29/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 30/32] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 31/32] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 32/32] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 21:08 ` [PATCH v28 00/32] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
2021-07-23 17:28   ` Yu, Yu-cheng

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