linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
	Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
	Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v28 31/32] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2021 13:52:18 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210722205219.7934-32-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210722205219.7934-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

When newer VM flags are being created, such as VM_MTE, it becomes necessary
for mmap/mprotect to verify if certain flags are being applied to an
anonymous VMA.

To solve this, one approach is adding a VM flag to track that MAP_ANONYMOUS
is specified [1], and then using the flag in arch_validate_flags().

Another approach is passing the VMA to arch_validate_flags(), and check
vma_is_anonymous().

To prepare the introduction of PROT_SHADOW_STACK, which creates a shadow
stack mapping and can be applied only to an anonymous VMA, update
arch_validate_flags() to pass in the VMA.

[1] commit 9f3419315f3c ("arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()"),

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 4 ++--
 arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h | 4 ++--
 include/linux/mman.h          | 2 +-
 mm/mmap.c                     | 2 +-
 mm/mprotect.c                 | 2 +-
 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
index e3e28f7daf62..7c45e7578f78 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot,
 }
 #define arch_validate_prot(prot, addr) arch_validate_prot(prot, addr)
 
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
 {
 	if (!system_supports_mte())
 		return true;
@@ -82,6 +82,6 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
 	/* only allow VM_MTE if VM_MTE_ALLOWED has been set previously */
 	return !(vm_flags & VM_MTE) || (vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED);
 }
-#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags)
+#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
 
 #endif /* ! __ASM_MMAN_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
index 274217e7ed70..0ec4975f167d 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ static inline int sparc_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags)
+#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
 /* arch_validate_flags() - Ensure combination of flags is valid for a
  *	VMA.
  */
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
 {
 	/* If ADI is being enabled on this VMA, check for ADI
 	 * capability on the platform and ensure VMA is suitable
diff --git a/include/linux/mman.h b/include/linux/mman.h
index ebb09a964272..b6a9414e806c 100644
--- a/include/linux/mman.h
+++ b/include/linux/mman.h
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
  *
  * Returns true if the VM_* flags are valid.
  */
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	return true;
 }
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 100db6e46831..fe7afd968087 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1853,7 +1853,7 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	}
 
 	/* Allow architectures to sanity-check the vm_flags */
-	if (!arch_validate_flags(vma->vm_flags)) {
+	if (!arch_validate_flags(vma, vma->vm_flags)) {
 		error = -EINVAL;
 		if (file)
 			goto unmap_and_free_vma;
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 94cb799216ec..e826ecb68e3a 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 		}
 
 		/* Allow architectures to sanity-check the new flags */
-		if (!arch_validate_flags(newflags)) {
+		if (!arch_validate_flags(vma, newflags)) {
 			error = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
 		}
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-07-22 20:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-22 20:51 [PATCH v28 00/32] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 01/32] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 02/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 03/32] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 04/32] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 16:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-10 15:39     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-10 16:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 05/32] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 16:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-10 15:50     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 06/32] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 17:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-10 16:06     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 07/32] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 08/32] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-09 18:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 09/32] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 10:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:24     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-17 19:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 20:13         ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-08-17 20:24           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 20:51             ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-08-17 21:01               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-18 16:38                 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-08-21 16:27                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 10/32] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 11/32] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:51 ` [PATCH v28 12/32] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 16:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:33     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 13/32] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 14/32] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 16:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:35     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 15/32] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 16/32] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-16 17:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 18:36     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 17/32] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 18/32] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 19/32] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 20/32] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 21/32] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 22/32] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 23/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 24/32] x86/process: Change copy_thread() argument 'arg' to 'stack_size' Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 25/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 21:05   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-23 17:30     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 26/32] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 21:15   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-23 18:01     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 27/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 28/32] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 29/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 30/32] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 20:52 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2021-07-22 20:52 ` [PATCH v28 32/32] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-07-22 21:08 ` [PATCH v28 00/32] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
2021-07-23 17:28   ` Yu, Yu-cheng

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20210722205219.7934-32-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
    --to=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \
    --cc=Dave.Martin@arm.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=esyr@redhat.com \
    --cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
    --cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \
    --cc=haitao.huang@intel.com \
    --cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
    --cc=pengfei.xu@intel.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=ravi.v.shankar@intel.com \
    --cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
    --cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com \
    --cc=vincenzo.frascino@arm.com \
    --cc=weijiang.yang@intel.com \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).