From: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: cohuck@redhat.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
thuth@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, david@redhat.com,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: s390: pv: properly handle page flags for protected guests
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2021 16:26:21 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210728142631.41860-4-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210728142631.41860-1-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Introduce variants of the convert and destroy page functions that also
clear the PG_arch_1 bit used to mark them as secure pages.
These new functions can only be called on pages for which a reference
is already being held.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 9 ++++++---
arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h | 10 ++++++++--
arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 4 +++-
4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
index dcac7b2df72c..0f1af2232ebe 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1074,8 +1074,9 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
pte_t res;
res = ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID));
+ /* At this point the reference through the mapping is still present */
if (mm_is_protected(mm) && pte_present(res))
- uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK);
+ uv_convert_owned_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK);
return res;
}
@@ -1091,8 +1092,9 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_clear_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
pte_t res;
res = ptep_xchg_direct(vma->vm_mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID));
+ /* At this point the reference through the mapping is still present */
if (mm_is_protected(vma->vm_mm) && pte_present(res))
- uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK);
+ uv_convert_owned_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK);
return res;
}
@@ -1116,8 +1118,9 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,
} else {
res = ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID));
}
+ /* At this point the reference through the mapping is still present */
if (mm_is_protected(mm) && pte_present(res))
- uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK);
+ uv_convert_owned_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK);
return res;
}
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
index 12c5f006c136..bbd51aa94d05 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
@@ -351,8 +351,9 @@ static inline int is_prot_virt_host(void)
}
int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb);
-int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr);
+int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr);
int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr);
+int uv_convert_owned_from_secure(unsigned long paddr);
int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr);
void setup_uv(void);
@@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ void adjust_to_uv_max(unsigned long *vmax);
static inline void setup_uv(void) {}
static inline void adjust_to_uv_max(unsigned long *vmax) {}
-static inline int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr)
+static inline int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -371,6 +372,11 @@ static inline int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
{
return 0;
}
+
+static inline int uv_convert_owned_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index fd0faa51c1bb..5a6ac965f379 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr)
*
* @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be destroyed
*/
-int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr)
+static int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr)
{
struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = {
.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_DESTR_SEC_STOR,
@@ -135,6 +135,22 @@ int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * The caller must already hold a reference to the page
+ */
+int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr)
+{
+ struct page *page = phys_to_page(paddr);
+ int rc;
+
+ get_page(page);
+ rc = uv_destroy_page(paddr);
+ if (!rc)
+ clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
+ put_page(page);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* Requests the Ultravisor to encrypt a guest page and make it
* accessible to the host for paging (export).
@@ -154,6 +170,22 @@ int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * The caller must already hold a reference to the page
+ */
+int uv_convert_owned_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)
+{
+ struct page *page = phys_to_page(paddr);
+ int rc;
+
+ get_page(page);
+ rc = uv_convert_from_secure(paddr);
+ if (!rc)
+ clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags);
+ put_page(page);
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* Calculate the expected ref_count for a page that would otherwise have no
* further pins. This was cribbed from similar functions in other places in
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
index 9bb2c7512cd5..de679facc720 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c
@@ -2678,8 +2678,10 @@ static int __s390_reset_acc(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
{
pte_t pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
+ /* There is a reference through the mapping */
if (pte_present(pte))
- WARN_ON_ONCE(uv_destroy_page(pte_val(pte) & PAGE_MASK));
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(uv_destroy_owned_page(pte_val(pte) & PAGE_MASK));
+
return 0;
}
--
2.31.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-07-28 14:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-07-28 14:26 [PATCH v2 00/13] KVM: s390: pv: implement lazy destroy Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] KVM: s390: pv: avoid stall notifications for some UVCs Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-29 9:58 ` Janosch Frank
2021-07-29 12:52 ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-29 10:49 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-07-29 13:22 ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] KVM: s390: pv: leak the ASCE page when destroy fails Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-29 10:41 ` Janosch Frank
2021-07-29 12:54 ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-29 13:45 ` Janosch Frank
2021-07-28 14:26 ` Claudio Imbrenda [this message]
2021-07-29 11:43 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] KVM: s390: pv: properly handle page flags for protected guests Janosch Frank
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations " Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage exceptions for normal guests Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-29 12:17 ` Janosch Frank
2021-07-29 13:28 ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] KVM: s390: pv: refactor s390_reset_acc Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] KVM: s390: pv: usage counter instead of flag Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] KVM: s390: pv: add export before import Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] KVM: s390: pv: lazy destroy for reboot Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] KVM: s390: pv: extend lazy destroy to handle shutdown Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] KVM: s390: pv: module parameter to fence lazy destroy Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: s390: pv: add OOM notifier for " Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-28 14:26 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] KVM: s390: pv: add support for UV feature bits Claudio Imbrenda
2021-07-29 9:52 ` Janosch Frank
2021-07-29 13:28 ` Claudio Imbrenda
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