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From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Kuan-Ying Lee <Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com>,
	Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Nicholas Tang <nicholas.tang@mediatek.com>,
	Andrew Yang <andrew.yang@mediatek.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Chinwen Chang <chinwen.chang@mediatek.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"moderated list:ARM/Mediatek SoC support" 
	<linux-mediatek@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] kasan, mm: reset tag when access metadata
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 2021 16:24:39 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210730152438.GA2690@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+fCnZdprormHJHHuEMC07+OnHdC9MLb9PLpBnE1P9TvrVisfw@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jul 30, 2021 at 04:57:20PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 9:22 PM Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Jul 27, 2021 at 04:32:02PM +0800, Kuan-Ying Lee wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2021-07-27 at 09:10 +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> > > > +Cc Catalin
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, 27 Jul 2021 at 06:00, Kuan-Ying Lee <
> > > > Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > Hardware tag-based KASAN doesn't use compiler instrumentation, we
> > > > > can not use kasan_disable_current() to ignore tag check.
> > > > >
> > > > > Thus, we need to reset tags when accessing metadata.
> > > > >
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com>
> > > >
> > > > This looks reasonable, but the patch title is not saying this is
> > > > kmemleak, nor does the description say what the problem is. What
> > > > problem did you encounter? Was it a false positive?
> > >
> > > kmemleak would scan kernel memory to check memory leak.
> > > When it scans on the invalid slab and dereference, the issue
> > > will occur like below.
> > >
> > > So I think we should reset the tag before scanning.
> > >
> > > # echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
> > > [  151.905804]
> > > ==================================================================
> > > [  151.907120] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in scan_block+0x58/0x170
> > > [  151.908773] Read at addr f7ff0000c0074eb0 by task kmemleak/138
> > > [  151.909656] Pointer tag: [f7], memory tag: [fe]
> >
> > It would be interesting to find out why the tag doesn't match. Kmemleak
> > should in principle only scan valid objects that have been allocated and
> > the pointer can be safely dereferenced. 0xfe is KASAN_TAG_INVALID, so it
> > either goes past the size of the object (into the red zone) or it still
> > accesses the object after it was marked as freed but before being
> > released from kmemleak.
> >
> > With slab, looking at __cache_free(), it calls kasan_slab_free() before
> > ___cache_free() -> kmemleak_free_recursive(), so the second scenario is
> > possible. With slub, however, slab_free_hook() first releases the object
> > from kmemleak before poisoning it. Based on the stack dump, you are
> > using slub, so it may be that kmemleak goes into the object red zones.
> >
> > I'd like this clarified before blindly resetting the tag.
> 
> AFAIK, kmemleak scans the whole object including the leftover redzone
> for kmalloc-allocated objects.
> 
> Looking at the report, there are 11 0xf7 granules, which amounts to
> 176 bytes, and the object is allocated from the kmalloc-256 cache. So
> when kmemleak accesses the last 256-176 bytes, it causes faults, as
> those are marked with KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE == KASAN_TAG_INVALID ==
> 0xfe.
> 
> Generally, resetting tags in kasan_disable/enable_current() section
> should be fine to suppress MTE faults, provided those sections had
> been added correctly in the first place.

Thanks for the explanation, the patch makes sense. FWIW:

Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2021-07-30 15:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-27  4:00 [PATCH 0/2] kasan, mm: reset tag when access metadata Kuan-Ying Lee
2021-07-27  4:00 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Kuan-Ying Lee
2021-07-27  7:10   ` Marco Elver
2021-07-27  8:32     ` Kuan-Ying Lee
2021-07-27  9:34       ` Marco Elver
2021-07-27 19:22       ` Catalin Marinas
2021-07-28 11:05         ` Kuan-Ying Lee
2021-07-28 12:43           ` Marco Elver
2021-07-30 14:57         ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-07-30 15:24           ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2021-07-27  4:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] kasan, mm: reset tag for hex dump address Kuan-Ying Lee
2021-07-27  7:20   ` Marco Elver
2021-07-27  8:54     ` Kuan-Ying Lee

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